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Abstract 
This theological study is a contribution to the search for a conception of justice 
which will form a just society. Its aim is to discover whether two leading modern 
secular theories of justice might be mediations of the justice of God, which I take 
to be a principle in Creation and the basis for the formation of society. My 
interdisciplinary approach advocates and employs critical theory to expose the 
pathologies of modernity, particularly domination (or the arbitrary use of power) 
as a major cause of injustice, and thus an impediment to the formation of a just 
society. This approach is undergirded by an Incarnational and Trinitarian theology 
which, through the use of a socio-political hermeneutic, transcends the biblical 
categories from which it originates. It recognises that the justice of God, understood 
throughout this thesis as right relationship or true sociality, is mediated through 
human agency and action which accord with God's nature and will. The theories of 
John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas which I choose to examine understand justice 
in terms of normative legitimacy, achieved through a publicly discursive and 
justificatory procedure, leading to a rational consensus about the social norms 
which form and direct society. My study assesses how far each mediates God's 
justice in forming society. It concludes that Habermas's theory has a stronger claim 
in this regard owing to its greater degree of consonance with the communicative 
nature of that justice, and to a recognition that the reality underlying Habermas's 
theory of justice as communicative action is God's justice, mediated in the linguistic 
structure of Habermas's procedure. In conclusion, I propose that the Church, in 
adopting this communicative understanding of justice, commit itself to the building 
and defence of a vibrant public sphere, in which justice is discursively determined; 
and in which all members of society, especially the disadvantaged for whom God 
is concerned, participate deliberatively in the formation of the society God justly 
wills. 
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The Justice of God and the Formation of Society 
This thesis stems from a concern to understand what constitutes social justice in a 
world where the social policies, norms and principles which form society and affect 
people living together grow ever more complex. Since people raise differing 
normative validity claims about social policies and social organisational principles, 
and frequently come into conflict about them, there is an urgent need for an 
understanding of social justice which addresses the question of the formation of 
society. 
Although justice has been very widely discussed in Christian literature, there 
is still no clear understanding of the concept of social justice. This is so despite the 
fact that the quest for social justice at a national and international level has been 
a central concern of the Church since its earliest days, arising from the divine 
imperative to do justice, and from the Church's reflection on the concept of justice 
in the teaching by Jesus about the Kingdom of God. According to Konrad Raiser, 
the conceptual difficulty arises from the fact that the results of intensive ecumenical 
reflections on [social] justice "cannot be formulated within the framework of a 
consistent theory which integrates convincingly the biblical understanding of jus-
tice and is critically related to the contemporary debate among social philosophers, 
political scientists and lawyers".1 Raiser's point is that the ecumenical reflections 
of the churches do not amount to providing a substantive theory of justice which 
could help to form a just society: 
[Ecumenical] reflection is oriented towards searching for ways to over-
come apparent injustice and not so much guided by an ideal concept 
which could then serve as a basis to formulate clear criteria for the 
building of social order.2 
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My thesis is a contribution to the search for a conception of justice which will 
form a just society. It is based on my contention that ultimately it is the justice of 
God which forms society, because the locus of justice rests in God himself, 
specifically in the righteousness or justice which is the essence of his nature, and 
because scripture and tradition point to the justice of God as aprinciple in creation, 
particularly in the formation of society and social order. Justice is this righteousness 
mediated through human agency and activity in society which accord with God's 
will. Justice or righteousness in the Judeo-Christian tradition is a highly relational 
term, and denotes "right relationship", which is the guiding concept throughout this 
thesis. 
The kind of society formed by the justice of God is characterised by the 
essential nature of that justice - right relationship or, as I interpret it at a societal 
level, true sociality. My aim in this thesis is to discover how this might be achieved 
under the conditions of modernity, by investigating whether certain modem secu-
lar theories of justice may be mediations of God's society-forming justice. I turn to 
these theories because I believe that they may provide systematic explications of 
the inchoate understanding of social justice in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Although this may be a bold claim, it is not without precedent. According to H.-H. 
Wolf, the WCC's Uppsala Report recognised that 
the church is nowadays being confronted with insights from the Word 
of God which are beginning to be realised in contemporary secular 
human society or which are being advocated strenuously although they 
are not realised to be specifically Christian. This is a challenge to 
Christians and puts them to shame for in human society now we see 
taking place, albeit fragmentarily, something which Christians have 
failed to achieve for themselves and to which they should have devoted 
all their energies.3 
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Biblical categories, and theology as methodological reflection on these ca-
tegories alone, will not conceive adequately the function of justice in forming 
society under modern conditions in advanced capitalist, welfare-state mass democ-
racies. The theological search for a deeper understanding of justice and society is 
congruent with that of modem secular thinkers who explore how the social condi-
tions of freedom, truth and justice can be conceived and secured so that a just and 
maturely human society can be formed. Political theology, in particular, has the 
responsibility of reflecting on the meaning and implications of God's demand for 
justice in the world of which it and the Church are an integral and vital part. 
A theological thesis which contends that the justice which forms society is the 
justice of God must take into account modern theories of justice and society, 
including the philosophical discussions of rationality and its relation to justice, 
which form the backdrop to these theories. This necessity derives from the nature 
of modern theology as intrinsically correlational, because, in the joint endeavour 
with other disciplines seeking a more just society, it makes available its normative 
resources to the public sphere. When the Church enters its claims about justice, it 
cannot demand privileged consideration for these claims, but must recognise that 
all claims to justice must be rationally justified in the public sphere. 
In this sphere, theology is a "modem discipline that clarifies and defends its 
implicit validity claims".4 The requirement that modem theology, especially a 
political theology which attempts to understand justice under modem conditions, 
correlate its resources and content with the best insights from secular disciplines 
seeking similar understanding, does not mean a simple appropriation of modem 
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theories, or an appending of theological statements to such theories, but an 
integrated approach to the issue of how to form a just society. 
I do not accept that the dialectical interaction between theology and other 
disciplines will sacrifice the integrity of the distinct disciplines, or dilute the 
Christian position until nothing distinctively Christian remains. On the contrary, 
an interdisciplinary approach is mutually informative and enriching, mutually 
critical and corrective. With regard to the formation of society, a theologically-mo-
tivated interdisciplinary approach tries to discern the presence and action of God 
through the Holy Spirit within that enterprise. I do not see open dialogue with 
non-Christian thought as a risk if God is present in that thought. 
What I am asserting in this thesis, without a simplistic and uncritical 'baptism' 
of theories which share a common interest with political theology, is that there is, 
in accordance with a theological emphasis on the Incarnation, a sense in which God 
is the reality underlying human thought and action oriented toward forming a (just) 
society. A mutually critical approach ensures the distinctive position of each, 
including the primacy of God required by theological method. 
The two modern theories of justice which I have chosen to study in this thesis 
are, in my view, the two leading theories in modem times, namely those of John 
Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. Both theories are representative of modern justice 
theory in general, which has taken a marked normative departure, in the sense that 
it emphasises the importance of the meta-ethical question of the ground or 
justification of the principles of justice and of those norms which form and steer 
society. 
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However, as my search for a society-forming concept of justice progresses, it 
reveals that the kind of theory which political theology may find most useful will 
be one which points less to the provision of a substantive set of principles than to 
normative legitimacy, especially the establishment of a procedure which critically 
assesses social norms, institutions and arrangements. Such a theory will entail a 
transformation off ethics, in which ethics becomes discursive arid universalistic, and 
stresses the priority of the right over the good. The moral point of view advocated 
in this understanding of ethics does not simply explicate the intuitions of specific 
cultures or groups, but is open to universal consensus. Justice understood in such 
a theory would be the outcome of a publicly discursive procedure, leading to a 
rational consensus about social norms which form and direct society. 
The formation of society requires not only the establishment of a public 
procedure for the rational justification of norms that underlie social practices and 
political arrangements, but also a theory of justice which prevents domination (or 
the illegitimate use of power). The understanding of justice which I am proposing 
in this thesis goes further than traditional approaches, which hold that social justice 
is concerned with the fair distribution of primary social goods and the regulation 
of relationships and competing interests. My contention is that to consider social 
justice is to consider societal formation in terms of the legitimacy of political 
authority (and the norms on which it is based), because this authority is responsible 
for such distribution and regulation. 
This contention rests on an incarnational theology which discerns the justice 
of God in the reflective and discursive practices and procedures which determine 
the legitimacy of, and obligation to, political authority. My 'incarnational' approach 
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also sees God's justice operating in critical theory, ideology-critique and social 
analysis which unmask illusion and the arbitrary use of power. Without these social 
analytical tools, and without engaging social theory, theology will not be able to 
achieve an adequate grasp of the complexities of the issues surrounding justice and 
the formation of society, nor will it be able to penetrate the false consciousness and 
the pathologies which beset modem society. 
The first chapter of my thesis lays the groundwork for claiming that ultimately 
it is the justice of God which forms society. It sets out the need for justice to be 
understood as normative legitimacy, achieved dialogically, and examines the ra-
tional justifiability of normative theories. It includes a section on social contract 
theory, since the social contract has been considered to be the basis of social 
formation. Owing to the constraints of space, I do not discuss the development of 
the social contract, the essential functions of which are to evaluate the legitimacy 
of political authority and to prevent domination. Instead, I begin this section with 
a discussion of Kant's idea that the social contract should be a test of the justice or 
legitimacy of norms and laws, which should be the outcome of the united agree-
ment of all who are subject to them. The chapter emphasises the need for social 
analysis, and specifically for critical theory, in order to understand the complex 
issues of social formation, and to identify factors which inhibit that formation, 
including legitimation crises and the deformation of the public sphere in modern-
ity. At the end of the chapter I suggest that the Church should be committed to a 
spirited defence of the public sphere, since this is where justice is determined. 
The second chapter provides a substantiation for my argument that society is 
formed through the universal principle of justice as normative legitimacy. My 
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contention is that this principle is located in God's Trinitarian and social Being. I 
examine the biblical evidence for the social and relational nature of God's justice, 
and argue that there are in the biblical material vital indicators of the communica-
tive and procedural nature of that justice. Since my aim in this thesis is to investigate 
whether modern theories of justice may be considered to mediate God's justice, I 
search for congruence or consonance between such theories and biblical and 
theological categories. This means that it is not possible to present a comprehens-
ive analysis of biblical justice, because such a study (which I have done) involves a 
full discussion of the terms for justice and their etymology, of the developing 
understandings of justice in the Bible (the forensic, the ethical and the religious), 
of the tension between the retributive and redemptive dimensions of God's justice, 
and of the elevation of the concept of justice into the Doctrine of the Atonement. 
The biblical categories from which I develop my critical-theoretical Christology 
and Trinitarian and Incarnational theology are ultimately transcended by these 
theological bases. The latter are correlated with critical social theory in my attempt 
to establish the ground for the communicative understanding of justice which I am 
proposing. Hence this chapter concludes with an interpretation of Jesus' attempt 
to establish justice in terms of the theory of communicative action. The adoption 
by Jesus of a certain form of discourse to achieve agreement about the norms which 
guide people's actions in society, and which regulate their interaction, points to the 
need for an examination of theories of justice which use a discursive or procedural 
basis to achieve justice under modem conditions, thereby forming a society in 
accordance with God's will. 
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Chapter 3 examines John Rawls's theory of justice. Both Rawls and Haber-
mas subscribe to the consensus principle of legitimacy, which asserts that the 
legitimacy of norms and off normative institutional arrangements can be justified 
only by the principle of rational consensus. They share the meta=theoretical 
premise of "methodological proceduralism", which contends that a rational con-
sensus about social institutions and the norms underlying them is to be achieved 
only procedurally, "by specifying strategies and modes of argumentation".5 In this 
chapter I present and assess Rawls's theory of justice, giving particular attention 
to the adequacy of his discursive device of the "original position" in determining 
social justice. The conclusion to be drawn from an investigation into Rawls's 
justificatory method is that it is individualistic and monological, and therefore not 
compatible with a Christian understanding of the social and relational justice of 
God. The recognition that the justification of social norms and principles is tied to 
the idea of a public discourse pushes us in the direction of a communicative or 
discourse ethics, in which the basic idea is that a norm is justified only if it could 
be agreed to by all concerned as participants in a practical discourse where no force 
but that of the better argument prevails. 
Habermas's discourse ethics, which is part of his theory of communicative 
action, contains an implicit theory of justice, which is the subject of chapter 4. 
Habermas develops his theory of justice in the form of a discursive legitimation 
procedure for rationally evaluating the legitimacy of a political order and for 
justifying proposed social norms of action, thereby providing a method of moral 
argumentation among citizens in civil society. A constitutive rule of their argumen-
tation is the principle of universalisability. Habermas's position is that this prin-
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ciple, and the norm of discursive will=formation on generalisable interests, can be 
derived from the unavoidable and universal pragmatic presuppositions of ar-
gumentation and everyday communication. They are also derivable from the 
notion (implicit in communicative action) of what it means to justify a norm of 
action. Thus Habermas asserts that agreement about social norms, principles and 
values is achieved only communicatively, through a special kind of linguistically 
mediated interaction which is both ideology-critical (unmasking the illegitimate 
and arbitrary use of power) and domination-free. 
In chapter 41 set out some of the complicated and interrelated elements of 
Habermas's social theory, as well as his theory of universal pragmatics and his 
theory of truth, which are the foundation of his theory of justice. My explication of 
his theory of justice concentrates on the notions of universalisability and discursive 
will-formation, since these provide the link between justice and the formation of 
society. I conclude with an endorsement of Habermas's theory because, although 
it does not provide substantive principles of justice, it does provide a genuinely 
dialogical procedure for establishing true sociality in accordance with our social, 
relational and linguistic constitution by God. However, the endorsement of Haber-
mas's theory of justice as a possible mediation of God's justice can be made only 
after treating a major aporia in his theory of communicative action, namely the 
limitation of solidarity entailed by his universalism. In chapter 5 I consider how 
only the theological category of the Resurrection can answer the problem of the 
utmost limit situation formulated by the structure of communicative action -
universal solidarity in the unlimited communication community with all victims of 
injustice. 
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In chapter 5 I argue that not only can Habemias's theory of justice as 
communicative action be appropriated and transformed from a theological per-
spective, but that it has a theological dimension in that the reality at the heart of 
his theory is the just and saving reality of God. I argue that Habermas's theory of 
communicative action, which is inseparable from his theory of justice, has a 
theological dimension. I do this in the light of two theologians, Helmut Peukert 
and Rudolf Siebert, who have developed the thought of Habermas and other 
thinkers of the Frankfurt School. Peukert's reconstruction of a foundational theo-
logy from the theory of communicative action, while it is not the subject of my 
investigation, contains some crucial insights which assist my task of examining the 
role of justice in the formation of society. His familiarity with thinkers like Hork-
heimer, Adomo and Benjamin of the Frankfurt School enable him to find a 
theological solution to the paradox of anamnestic solidarity, which they pose to 
anyone who seeks justice and the formation of a just society. 
Following Peukert, I argue that the explicitly theological and Christian 
categories of the Cross and the Resurrection not only resolve a theoretical paradox, 
but more importantly are an expression or demonstration of God's justice, which 
also empower human action to achieve reconciliation and universal solidarity in 
history, and thereby to establish justice in the social dimension. I conclude that 
Habermas's theory of justice, lodged within his theory of communicative action, 
has a specifically Christian core (even though he may be unaware of it): its 
dimensions are congruent with those of Christian action, and may be regarded as 
an incarnational medium for the expression of those dimensions in modern times 
for modern conditions. 
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In the sixth chapter I pursue the claim that the justice of God is operative 
incamationally in secular theories which aim at the formation of a more just and 
humane society. I offer reasons for giving greater consideration to Habermas's 
theory of justice as a mediation of God's justice, owing to its truly social rather than 
monistic character, and because to a greater degree than Rawls's theory it meets 
the criterion of congruence or consonance with a theological understanding de-
veloped from the biblical notion of justice. Finally, I assert that the dialogical 
insights which such a theory generates about the public nature of justice impel us 
to develop a theory of justice in closer connection with a model of properly 
deliberative democracy (towards which Habermas's theory tends). I also return to 
my recommendation that the Church should commit itself to a defence of the public 
sphere, in which all participants, whatever their differences, can meet and discuss 
any claim that is rationally redeemable. 
In conclusion I affirm interdisciplinary engagement with secular theories 
through which God's justice may be mediated, and which may help the practical 
task before the Church - active, critical involvement in the political process in order 
to build a vibrant public sphere, in which all may have the opportunity to participate 
deliberatively in the formation of the kind of society which God wills through his 
justice. 
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In this chapter I elaborate my contention that justice is the basis of society, and I 
lay the groundwork for claiming that ultimately it is the justice of God which forms 
society. In addition to its theological themes, this justice is mediated through 
certain secular theories which can be interpreted as systematically explicating for 
modern times both those themes, and the inchoate understanding of social justice 
in the Bible - the primary source of the Judeo-Christian tradition. The chapter 
primarily contains a discussion of justice in terms of normative legitimacy and of 
the need for rational justification of principles and norms proposed for the forma-
tion of a just society. 
The first section is given to a discussion of the basic need for a ground, namely 
justice, to order and regulate social interaction. It advances a claim that traditional 
approaches to justice need to be supplemented by an understanding of justice as 
normative legitimacy, i.e. the outcome of a rational consensus about the norms and 
principles which form and steer society. The second section concerns the status of 
normative theories and the concept of rational justification, the latter being 
important when considering the issue of universal obligation to a proposed system 
of justice. 
In section three I argue that the formation of society requires a theory of 
justice which prevents domination or the illegitimate use of power. The concept of 
the legitimacy of social and political norms is embedded in the idea of the social 
contract, which is considered to be the basis of social formation. Social contract 
theory emphasises the importance of the public determination of legitimacy or the 
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principle of 'publicity' = the public testing of the validity off social and political 
norms. This principle in turn raises the issue of the distinction between the right 
and the good, i.e. between issues of right or justice and issues of the good life. The 
principle of publicity also raises the issue of the deformation of the public sphere 
in modernity, which is the consequence off its systematic neglect. 
In section four I point to the need for a critical social theory as a tool to analyse 
society and to unmask the illusions and injustices upon which society has based 
itself. For reasons of length it is not possible to provide a comprehensive and 
rigorous discussion of critical theory, nor of its critique of instrumental reason 
which is responsible for domination and injustice in society. However, I do refer 
the reader to Habermas's two-fold theory of society as lifeworld and system,1 in 
order to show how legitimation crises occur when economic and administrative 
systems invade the socio-cultural realm, thereby depoliticising the subjects of 
society and preventing them from proper participation in the public procedure of 
determining justice (i.e. legitimating or justifying social norms and principles). 
Section five provides an explanation of the theory of legitimation crisis, and 
also proposes that the Church, by recognising the presence of God's justice in 
secular theories of justice, become the agent of social transformation. It does this 
not only by resisting the deformation of the public sphere in which justice is 
determined, but also by emphasising the dialogical nature of justice. This is taken 
up in the next chapter, where I explicate justice's social provenance in the Trinity. 
I conclude with an emphasis on the need for justice to be understood as normative 
and procedural legitimacy, determined by the rational agreement and consensus 
of free and equal people. My contention in this section is that an incarnational 
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understanding of the progress of society sees God's justice within those reflective 
and relational practices which determine legitimacy. 
It is a tenet of Christian belief that God created human beings to live in 
communion with him and with one another in society. The warrant for this belief 
is to be found not only in Scripture, but in the great social doctrines of Christianity, 
namely the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Kingdom of God. These warrants 
indicate that God is essentially social in his nature,2 and assert that it is his will that 
his creation should be characterised by true sociality or justice. Such justice in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition is a highly relational term, and denotes "right relation-
ship", which is the guiding concept throughout this thesis. A key aspect of this study 
is the way in which the justice of God is deemed to intend harmonious human 
society, and how this intention may be realised under modern conditions in 
advanced western welfare-state mass democracies. 
It is clear that people living together in a society are caught up in a web of 
patterned relationships, needing a stable environment in which to interact, plan 
securely, carry on various sorts of transactions and work to attain their purposes. 
For instance, the sociologist D. Phillips points out that 
at the societal level, stability and survival depend upon regularities and 
uniformities among the distinct individuals and groups which constitute 
society. Whatever the differences may be in their concrete form in one 
place and time or another, each and every society has distinct social 
arrangements for dealing with births, deaths, sexual relations, sociali-
sation, the allocation of goods and the like. These regularities and 
uniformities of human conduct - sometimes spoken of as social institu-
tions - provide the order that is the necessary matrix of social life.3 
Justice and the Formation of Society 20 
A society achieves cohesion or identity by its adherence to common morms 
and rules, It is dependent for its cohesion on being committed to common interests 
and goals, and, as I hope to show, through publicly discursive consensus about these 
interests and goals. The guiding concept of justice in this thesis is right relationship 
or true sociality. It has to do with the proper ordering of power and social life, the 
satisfaction of needs and interests, and the fair distribution of primary social goods. 
The matter that has to be ordered is the interactions of people living together, and 
thus justice is a term which covers the interactive behaviour of people in society, 
and the norms guiding their economic, social and political behaviour. To consider 
justice under modern conditions is to assess the quality of social and political life, 
and to examine for legitimacy the social norms which regulate society. 
Publicly discursive consensus, as justice, helps to establish regularities of 
behaviour, i.e., the societal practices requisite for the formation of society.4 "Thus 
justice," as Rawls asserts, "is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of 
systems of thought".5 Important here are the generic categories of non-violence, 
non-fraudulence, truth-telling, promise-keeping, and benevolence, conformity to 
which would appear to be a pre-condition of society.6 An analysis of what forms a 
society points to the general conformity of individuals living together to civil, 
economic and legal regulations. This conformity is not accidental, and arises not 
from an indispensable motivational link between an individual's expectation of 
general conformity and her tendency to conform herself to that expectation: 
rather, it arises from the awareness of people living together that general conform-
ity gives them some reason to want deviance discouraged, including their own 
deviance if that is the cost of general discouragement.7 As Rawls says, "One may 
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think of a public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental charter of a 
well-ordered association".8 We may go further and say that included in the notion 
of the basic structure of society are principles for the formation of society, i.e. the 
principles for choosing among various social arrangements and institutions. 
Even a cursory glance at past and present societies will reveal that a range of 
social evils and injustices have prevented people from forming the kind of society 
which they desire, or indeed which God wills. Many people in modern western 
societies (which are to be the focus of our concern) are afflicted by social ills like 
homelessness and unsafe housing, poverty, poor education and health-care, viol-
ation of human rights, unemployment, dependence and loss of freedom. In addi-
tion, the disparity of ideologies, the alarming diminishment of natural resources, 
the increasing recourse to violence to implement one's own interests, the dimin-
ishing influence of the family, the violation of personal conscience by certain 
sectors of the state, are some of the factors which cause large numbers of people 
to feel afraid, manipulated, abused, cheated, alienated, and powerless; they feel 
that they have lost hope of the possibility of a decent, just and humane society. 
However, some people retain the conviction that there must be something better 
than what now exists, and offer visions of a new society in which a just social order 
will be established. Of course, such visions require an understanding of the deter-
mination of norms and principles which underlie the practice of justice in society. 
Although it is part of the multifaceted task of morally constituted authority 
to regulate social interaction, a very important function of justice with regard to 
the formation of society is the selection of a just social charter, which requires the 
establishment of public procedures for the rational justification of the norms that 
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underlie social practices and political arrangements. W@ need to find ways of living 
together which bring about both personal happiness and fulfilment and social 
justice and harmony, so that personal freedom and solidarity become harmonious 
rather than contradictory concepts. Such ways must enable every individual to work 
out his or her own lifestyle based on unconditional mutual recognition of and 
respect for others, and to do so ultimately in a universal perspective. What needs 
to be found is a procedure to determine a mode of human action (and interaction) 
which aims not at domination of others but seeks the autonomous responsibility of 
the individual within an intersubjectivity of unconstrained agreement. What is 
envisaged here is a process of finding such a possible consensus. To understand 
justice in these terms is to recall the mutuality and relationship at the root of the 
biblical idea of justice, and to see it as part of a larger project, namely the 
establishment of a communicative or discourse ethics in which the dimension of 
intersubjectivity is paramount 
Traditional approaches to social justice, following Aristotle, have tried to 
understand it in terms of a moral virtue exercised in relation to others and with 
regard for the good of others.9 This tradition asserts that a society is just if it renders 
to its members what is due to them, and is in accord with the ancient notion of 
"suum cuique", which "ever since the earliest times became the common possession 
of the Western tradition through Plato, Aristotle, Ambrose, Augustine and ... 
Roman Law... ".1 0 Traditional approaches have attempted to define social justice 
as proper distribution of social goods, opportunities, duties, punishments, status, 
privileges, etc.; as right-dealing; as beneficence; as love; as equality; as fairness; as 
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reciprocity; as utility, etc. AM these approaches are well-known and have been 
thoroughly studied and discussed.11 
However, since the early 1970s, justice theory has particularly emphasised 
the importance off the meta-ethical question of the pound or justification of the 
principles of justice and of those norms which form and steer society. This depar-
ture does not ignore the fact that certain principles (for example, the principle of 
equality) are an integral part of the concept of justice, but it recognises that 
principles and norms pertaining to the formation of a (just) society are based on 
moral judgements which claim a certain authority, and claim to be backed by 
reasons which are generally valid,12 and rationally justifiable in the public sphere. 
The norms which are proposed for the formation of a good and just society, and 
the validity claims on which they rest, must appeal beyond subjective, individual 
feelings and beliefs to the intersubjective consensus of rational beings. This ap-
proach is not entirely new; justice has since ancient times been considered to be a 
concept of reason, which requires us to enter rational discussion and to be ready 
to generalise any claims made or reasons given.13 Justice in this sense is the 
outcome of an agreement or consensus about norms whose tightness and validity 
have been justified through practical discourse. 
In all sociological theories, the consensus of opinion of people in society plays 
a central role in explaining social order, and in forming society. Important in any 
analysis of the formation of society is a consideration of the role of language in 
co-ordinating social action, in providing intersubjective meaning and overlapping 
interpretations of situations, and in leading to agreement and consensus. My 
argument in this thesis is that the idea of justice as the outcome of a consensus 
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among free and equal people is consistent with the sources and traditions of the 
Christian faith; and further, that it is incumbent upon us, in late modernity or 
post-modern times, to discern whether God is mediating Ms sodety-forming justice 
through theories which express justice as normative legitimacy, and attempt to 
establish a universal procedure for securing it. This will not satisfy those who 
maintain that justice cannot be justified or defended (because it rests on 'irrational' 
needs, interests, and values), or that it rests ultimately on arbitrary decisions or acts 
of faith. When Christians enter the debate about what will bring about social justice 
or a just social order, they cannot appeal to certain principles contained in then-
faith as self-evident; for example, the principle of equality (equal consideration) 
cannot be established by an appeal to the theological doctrine that all people are 
the children of God as a proof that all people are to be accounted equal. Frankena 
rejects such an appeal, because "the premise does not logically entail the desired 
conclusion and is itself an act of faith of just the kind that the one appealing to it is 
trying to avoid in the conclusion".14 Rather, Christians would do well to acknow-
ledge that a claim to justice is only validated in a situation where an ideologically 
undistorted (domination-free) agreement is reached by people who recognise and 
respect one another as free and equal moral beings. 
Principles of justice thus agreed will be sustained by all who make a full and 
free review of them through an intersubjective process of argumentation, and will 
thus attain a genuine and transcendent validity. This idea is not at odds with 
Brunner's insistence that any claim to justice appeals to the transcendent, absolute, 
eternal divine standard,15 because God's justice as a "primal ordinance" may well 
be incarnationally expressed through rational agreement and consensus of those 
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contesting normative validity claims in practical discourse. Frankena acknow-
ledges the divine provenance of justice in his discussion of Brunner's contention 
that all judgements of social justice presuppose the eternal standard of God's 
justice: "Judgements of social justice do presuppose principles which in a sense 
transcend both the feelings of the speaker and the institutions of human society -
principles which are claimed to be absolutely or eternally valid in the sense at least 
that all men or an impartial spectator, taking the appropriate point of view and 
being free and fully informed (God would be such a spectator), would accept 
them."16 
In a theological understanding of justice the provision of a rational basis 
points to the fact that a theory of justice is a reflective rather than an empirical form 
of enquiry, i.e., its data are made available through reflection. A thesis such as mine 
which claims that God's justice is mediated in certain secular theories of justice 
needs to synthesise the categories found in the Judeo-Christian normative tradition 
with the two main categories found in politico-philosophical approaches,17 namely 
reliance on certain judgements or intuitions about matters of principle (e.g., all 
human beings are equally deserving of human respect), and reliance on certain 
considered judgements about particular matters (e.g., slavery is wrong, arbitrary 
arrest unjust, religious repression indefensible).18 The political theology towards 
which this thesis tends relies on a broad reflective equilibrium between what is 
normative in the Judeo-Christian tradition of justice and what is publicly defensible 
through universal principles or conceptions of justice, a point to which I shall return 
in the final chapter. 
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It is my contention in this thesis that ultimately it is the justice of God which 
forms society, because the locus of justice rests in God himself, specifically in the 
righteousness or justice which is the essence of his nature: justice is this righteous-
ness mediated through human agency and activity in society which accord with 
God's will, whether or not those practising justice overtly recognise its ultimate 
source. 
However, to make such a theological assertion requires caution and due 
recognition of the complex ways and procedures by which the content of justice is 
established in modern society by a wide range of people who are equally interested 
in trying to achieve a better society. Theologians need to work closely with all who 
seek justice and put forward their visions of a more just social order; Emil Brunner 
made this point in 1945 when he said that "it can hardly be contested that it is the 
duty of the Christian theologian to take his share in the reconstruction [of a just 
social order]... It is high time that theologians, philosophers and jurists should unite 
to comprehend and clarify the meaning of this great idea, the idea of justice..."19 
The difficulty with Brunner's commendable enthusiasm for the reconstruc-
tion of society and Christian contributions to it is that he did not foresee the 
objections which would be raised from an increasingly secular (Western) society, 
including charges of cultural imperialism, arrogance and naivet6. For, as Beckley 
has noted in an important essay,20 there may be a dilemma 
when a group with distinctive beliefs and values seeks, on the basis of 
moral standards inferred from its beliefs, to influence the major institu-
tions of society which determine the distribution of rights, duties, 
benefits, and burdens for all citizens.21 
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In modem society the belief is generally held that, despite the enforcement 
of institutions which a group committed to a better society may require on the basis 
of fdthfulness to the moral implications of their belief, others should not be forced 
to act upon moral standards that ar© justified on the basis of beliefs which they 
should be free to reject. Beckley says that our current understanding of religious 
liberty is that non-Christians should be free to reject distinctive Christian beliefs, 
and he defines the dilemma facing Christians as follows: 
How can an evaluation of the distribution of rights, duties, benefits, and 
burdens which society necessarily imposes upon all of its citizens be 
faithful to Christian beliefs without forcing others to accept the distinc-
tive moral implications of the beliefs they do not and should not be 
required to share?22 
This is a crucial question, not only for Christians but for all who seek to work 
together to establish the vision of a better and more just society. For in a predomi-
nantly secular and pluralistic culture it can equally be posed to any group which 
seeks to influence major social institutions by imposing its particular theory of 
justice. Any such group must confront the dilemma of adjudicating between 
faithfulness to its beliefs and the liberty of others to hold and act upon other beliefs. 
Although the authors considered in this thesis do not explicitly address this 
dilemma, it is at the heart of their attempts to justify their theories of justice. The 
issue before Christians is whether they can affirm conceptions of justice which do 
not spring directly from distinctively Christian beliefs and values but which, cru-
cially, may be sufficiently continuous or consonant with those beliefs. In spite of 
my contention that the locus of justice rests in God, it is untenable to expect general 
recognition of this, or to expect the general acceptance of a substantive Christian 
theory of justice which has a special bias towards the protection of the poor, the 
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weak and vulnerable, the needy = indeed all who are disadvantaged. As Beckley 
points out, "if that justification depends upon distinctively Christian beliefs, we are 
attempting to obligate others to moral, political and economic implications of 
belief that they do not hold and which we presumably believe they should not be 
required to hold".23 By the same token, other conceptions of justice need to be 
justified and reasons need to be given for acceptance of their systems of justice. 
The real issue at stake here is whether Christians (or others) can justify 
universal obligation to a system of justice based upon distinctive beliefs and values. 
In the modern world, that can only be done by presenting a rational justification 
for one's system which is sufficiently compelling to command general acceptance. 
Beckley believes that the dilemma can only be resolved "if the justification for 
principles of justice is founded upon general beliefs and values that others can hold, 
or can be reasonably expected to hold, and which Christians can affirm on the basis 
of their distinctive beliefs. Such a resolution ... does not require ... that the 
justification for principles of justice be compatible with any beliefs persons hold".24 
He also makes the very important point that since justice does not encompass the 
whole of morality, Christians and others can agree to a common theory and 
conception of justice while disagreeing about other moral standards.25 This argu-
ment suggests that we could commit ourselves as Christians to a particular perspec-
tive of justice without using it for all of Christian ethics. Another way the dilemma 
could be resolved is by seeking a common normative foundation among different 
conceptions of justice. 
Despite the strong reservations of some Christian ethicists, e.g. Hauerwas26 
and Yoder27,1 believe that Christian theologians must explore the possibility of a 
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common normative foundation for different ways of life bound to one another by 
ties of symmetric reciprocity.28 Theologians are in a position to support sociologists 
who stand out against the dominant "value-free" or "neutral" position in the social 
sciences, which maintains their purely descriptive and explanatory role, and which 
maintains that normative questions about justice are beyond systematic discourse, 
prohibiting social theorists from proposing alternative institutional arrangements 
and modes of social organisation. In this regard, it is important that theology is 
properly informed by contemporary social analysis, a point to which I shall return 
shortly. The question of the normative component in the search for the just charter 
which forms society needs to be dealt with at this stage in my argument 
1.2 lb® irat§®eial Justifiability of nmmmiW® theories 
Theologians who are concerned with the question of social order are accus-
tomed to working with prescriptive statements as they attempt to understand the 
nature of God (justice), and how this is expressed through the divine imperative to 
do His will. Social scientists, on the other hand, have traditionally avoided making 
prescriptive statements or specifying and justifying particular mechanisms that 
should provide for social order. Following their scientific tradition not to make 
"ought" statements or to become involved in the assessments of values, they have 
tended to describe or explain the different mechanisms which have produced social 
order, e.g., compulsion, coercion and fear, manipulation, as well as consensus about 
certain codes of social conduct.29 The provision of alternative descriptions and 
explanations by social scientists may show that social order can be achieved in a 
wide variety of ways, but does not point to a rational justification for one set of 
mechanisms in preference to another, nor does it consider whether there are any 
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compelling arguments for the normative superiority or inferiority of internal or 
external sources of social order. This position stems from the scientific belief that 
moral values or value-judgements are not rationally justifiable and cannot be 
shown to be true or correct; hence they are "only individual, subjective preferences 
outside the realm of rational enquiry".30 This leads to the conclusion that much 
social analysis, in conformity to its methodological canon of "value-neutrality", 
lacks deep and explicit concern about the moral elements in social life. However, 
if the reason d'etre of social analysis is ultimately to seek a "better" or the "best 
possible" society, these moral elements and evaluation cannot be avoided, particu-
larly when, given the existence of competing sets of moral principles, we are faced 
with the question of whether it is possible to justify rationally one set as superior 
to others. 
Beckley suggests that a resolution to this dilemma is possible only if, on the 
basis of their beliefs and values, Christians can embrace general beliefs obligating 
all persons to a system of distributive justice.31 Beckley believes this because he 
sees, for example in Rawls's contract theory of justice as fairness, a justification of 
universal obligation to a system of justice without obtaining full agreement on the 
question of the good or all other moral values or principles. He argues that Rawls's 
theory is helpful to Christians "because it justifies a conception of justice on the 
basis of the general and shared beliefs that persons are free, rational, and equal 
without ignoring the distinctive beliefs and moralities persons also hold".32 
Although Beckley's argument is by no means acceptable to all Christians, he 
does make the important point that a belief in the rationality of persons requires 
that people living together in society, who hold different beliefs, moralities and 
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life-plans, should respect the rationality of other ways of life by not basing the 
principles of justice on their distinctive beliefs.33 Both Rawls and Habermas also 
base their theories on the reasonableness of treating persons as rational even 
though they might hold different or conflicting conceptions of the good. The 
criticisms of those who are suspicious of rationality3* are diminished if it can be 
shown that while people who hold distinctive beliefs, ends and moralities are 
rational, the principles of rational choice and the notion of deliberative rationality 
do not entail specific ends or moral standards 3 5 
The issue of rationality is integral to modern ethical discourse, as may be seen 
in the many works devoted to it in recent years;36 Habermas, whose theory of justice 
will be considered in Chapter 4, argues throughout his work that discourse and 
argumentation, including the procedure of rational justification, are the basis for 
establishing the validity and correctness of norms and the truth of statements. The 
assessment of a claim is a matter of determining whether it meets the agreed-upon 
standards of the relevant community; by this token, a normative claim is in principle 
just as susceptible to justification as a strictly empirical claim 3 7 
Normative theories such as those considered in this thesis have no less status 
than explanatory theories and are no less objective or rational, because they, too, 
are concerned with justifying their truth- and knowledge-claims. As Rorty points 
out, conversation is "the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be under-
stood".38 This does not mean that the argument has to be totally compelling nor 
that the conclusion is the only one that could have been reached: "with justification, 
the status of truth and knowledge is granted (always provisionally) to the proposi-
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tions and theories that have survived the criticisms and objections of the particular 
audience to whom they have been directed."39 
What rationality requires is a commitment to certain modes of argument 
whose very nature is to lead to (or allow for) agreement; without the hope of 
agreement argumentation would be pointless. Rationality rests in general agree-
ment about modes of argument or methods which allow for the possibility of 
consensus about specific propositions and theories. This is equally true for expla-
natory (empirical) theories and for normative theories: "What makes them rational 
is that they rest on arguments, reasons and justifications which allow for their 
appraisal and evaluation."40 Rationality also requires respect for the rational 
interests of others participating in a discourse who may have different goals. The 
search for the principles which would form a just society requires respect for the 
rationality of fellow seekers with different, even conflicting, beliefs and concep-
tions of the good. 
It is with an actual community of enquirers that justification of verbal and 
written arguments provides the basis for claims about validity, truth and knowl-
edge. Crucially, any kind of scholarly discourse in the community of enquiry, 
whether scientific or ethical, requires the basic moral norm of truth-telling, since 
without it discourse and argumentation would be impossible. Such discourse also 
assumes a commitment to the equality of all the participants to explicate, defend, 
and justify (extensively) their truth- and justice-claims. All must also satisfy the 
requirements of coherence and consistency, and since at their best they share an 
emphasis on reason and rational justification, it is fair to conclude that the logical 
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status and structure of the normative theories in this thesis is identical to those of 
explanatory theories. 
Theology, in its attempts to find, develop and recommend an understanding 
of justice which would serve as the ground for the formation of society in the 
modem world, can make common cause with those social scientists whose socio-
logy has taken account of the importance of normative issues with regard to social 
order and the forming of a society that is more just, more legitimate and more 
authentic for the lives of human beings and, indeed, for the creation in general. 
Whereas it is now widely agreed among philosophers that the rigid dichotomy 
between descriptive and prescriptive, along with a commitment to detachment and 
value-neutrality, is a thing of the past, many sociologists still adhere to this dicho-
tomy and commitment. However, there are some sociologists who, like moral and 
political philosophers, have rejected value-neutrality and the dictates of positivism, 
and who are engaged in openly normative theorising, concerned with providing an 
adequate justification for specified moral principles which can be used to assess 
the moral lightness of a norm or act, or the justice of an institution. 
Central to the formation of society is a theory of justice which not only 
resolves the problem of competing interests in society by permitting adequate 
redistribution of wealth or other social goods, but also addresses the problem of 
injustice, namely the illegitimate use of power (i.e., domination). The optimal form 
of social formation must be one "which looks in some broad sense to the interests 
of people and which does not place the interests of some above those of others in 
an arbitrary fashion: that is, in a manner for which there is no plausible justifica-
tion".41 The arbitrary placing of certain parties' interests above others is the 
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illegitimate use of power, the consequence of domination. The concept of the 
legitimacy of social and political norms is embedded in the idea of the social 
contract, which has exercised philosophers in the modem period from Kant to 
Rawls and Habermas. Since social contract theory constitutes the major mode of 
conceiving of the formation of human society in western culture, and since the 
modem revival of social contract theory has been as a theory of justice, we cannot 
proceed with our analysis without due consideration of this theory, which, in its 
Kantian form, is the basis of the theories of justice to be investigated in this thesis. 
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Kant's version of the social contract, which is based on the notion that laws 
and institutions are legitimate only to the extent that they could receive the consent 
of citizens regarded as free and equal moral persons, requires some attention 
before we can move on to the notion of publicity, to which Rousseau had drawn 
attention in The Social Contract,4,2 in his conception of the general wil l . 4 3 Kant was 
the first to state clearly and explicitly that the social contract was not an actual event 
in history but a regulatory ideal, an idea of practical reason: 
It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted 
practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in 
such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a 
whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim 
citizenship, as if he had consented within the general wil l . 4 4 
This idea of reason is a criterion, not of political obligation, but of the Tightness 
of political institutions and authority. Kant's position is that, while political institu-
tions have not derived from a historical contract, the idea of a social contract can 
and should be used to test their tightness; that they should be such that they could 
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have been produced by the united will of all, i.e. agreed to by all who are subject 
to them.45 In this sense, Kant's idea of the social contract is that it should serve as 
a guide for legislators and rulers, and as a test for the legitimacy of their legislation 
as well as for the rightness of political institutions and authority. This presupposes 
the practice of criticising or justifying social norms and institutions, and calls into 
question the normative grounds on which this practice rests. Any modern under-
standing of justice must consider these grounds because, as Kenneth Baynes 
argues, "it is widely assumed that such grounds are necessary if criticism is to express 
anything more than the subjective preferences or particular interests of the 
critic".46 Kant's moral and political philosophy is relevant to the effort to establish 
the objectivity of these grounds and to ensure that social criticism reflects genera-
lisable interests. 
As will become clear in our examination of Rawls's theory of justice, Rawls's 
constructivist (rather than teleological) understanding of Kantian moral philos-
ophy47 attempts to account for the objectivity of normative assessments by relating 
the ideals and principles employed in critical practices to an expressly normative 
conception of practical reason, that is a conception of human beings as free and 
equal moral persons.48 In the case of Habermas, the clarification of the basis of 
public social criticism and justification of social norms is carried out with reference 
to a mode of communicative reason. In both cases (Rawls and Habermas), the basis 
of social criticism - necessary for the establishing of justice - is developed with 
reference to a normative conception of practical or communicative reason; and by 
seeking a device or procedure which can assess the legitimacy of social norms and 
produce the principles of justice for the formation of society. 
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Kant goes further than Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in using the 'idea' of 
the social contract as a test of the justice of laws, or the legitimacy of legislation. In 
Kant's view the test for valid legislation is the (counterfactual) ideal of that to which 
free and equal moral persons could agree. Thus political legitimacy, for Kant, is 
based on the consent of the governed. According to Kant, laws should be framed 
in such a way that they could be consented to by every citizen.49 This entails that 
all subjects should be equal before the law, that there should be no hereditary legal 
privileges for favoured groups, no unequal taxation of subjects of the same class, 
and that there should be equal freedom within a workable general law.50 Much of 
Kant's social contract theory takes place in the context of his discussion about 
property rights (which formed the basis of Locke's social contract theory). 
A problem arises with his proposal of testing the lightness of political 
institutions by whether or not they could have been agreed to in social contract. 
The operative word in this proposal is "could"; Kant does not mean that citizens 
would agree to certain political institutions, but that the test of their rightness is 
that they could be agreed to by all in a social contract. The reason that certain things, 
like hereditary privileges, are proscribed by the contractarian test, is not because 
it is not in the self-interest of certain parties to the contract, but because people of 
mature rational powers would not prescribe laws which permitted such things.51 
Kant's essential conclusion about such people, i.e. free and equal moral agents, is 
that their most basic interests must coincide with those given in a conception of 
themselves as citizen legislators of a notional republic.52 The principles according 
to which these rational agents operate is the supreme moral principle or categorical 
imperative, which specifies that we should act only on that maxim which we can at 
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the same time will that it should become a universal law.53 Concern for the 
universal effect of the maxim underlying one's action, and the preparedness to 
formulate it as a universal law, is quite evidently not the consequence of pure 
self-interest. On the other hand, there is a flaw in Kant's process, in that it is 
monological: this seriously diminishes its credibility as a way of deteraiining the 
universal validity of norms and maxims. This point is taken up in my critique of 
Rawls's thought, who also does not recognise the intersubjective dimension of 
moral autonomy and plays down intersubjective recognition and justification of 
norms for their validity. 
Although to adopt the stand-point of self-interest is in accord with the social 
contract tradition in general, and although the mature rationality of contractors 
does not preclude this adoption (because, as Lessnoff argues, "there is no necessary 
contradiction between self-interest and rationality"54), Kant disavows self-interest 
as a motive for contractual agreement Rationality for Kant "is co-extensive with 
morality, and hence cannot be reconciled with purely self-interested motivation".55 
Kant's theory of the social contract, which is closely related to his project of 
grounding the principles of justice in the notion of non-instrumental, practical 
reason, does not rest on considerations of rational self-interest; rather, his aim is 
"to specify a basic set of rights and a criterion of political legitimacy (the social 
contract) with reference to a notion of practical reason that cannot be reduced to 
instrumental reason or self-interested rationality".56 
What is in the interest of all can be interpreted in terms of communicative 
rationality, that is a self-transcendent rationality which has an unselfish but equally 
rational orientation toward the other and her needs and interests. In correcting the 
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Kantian stance, however, Christian theologians may wish to argue for communica-
tive rationality, and advocate its adoption in the interests of forming a just society: 
Trinitarian sociality is the analogy here (see chapter 2, pp. 80f., 84f.). Such advocacy 
must demonstrate the dialogical and intersubjective nature of the process of agreeing 
what is in the interest of all. Not only does this process, which is at the heart of the 
social contract, establish justice, but it is itself part of the task of justice. It must not 
be forgotten that the social contract developed as a hypothetical concept from 
which to deduce political authority and its limits, and to test its legitimacy. The 
standard of legitimacy it proposes is not the self-interest of any individual,57 but 
rather a (hypothetical) contract that promotes or reconciles the legitimate interests 
of all concerned. Social contract theory, according to Lessnoff, "appeals not only 
to self-interest, but also to a due concern for the interests of one's fellows".58 
Hence theologians may advocate the principle of publicity, which Kant 
introduces as a principle of practical reason possessing a transcendental status: "All 
actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not 
compatible with their being made public."59 Baynes suggests that the principle of 
publicity is "the citizens' counterpart to what is, strictly speaking, a standard or 
criterion for the legislator".60 Both notions refer back to the idea of the general 
will or united agreement, but the former points to the public sphere as a realm of 
discussion and debate among reasoning citizens,61 even though in Kant's thought 
the public sphere was restricted to "active" citizens, i.e. propertied males. However, 
what is important in Kant's idea of 'publicity' or public reason is that it does 
not refer to the institutions of government, but to a civil, political sphere of 
public debate among private citizens (see chapter 6, pp. 333ff.). The value of 
Justice and the Formation of Society 39 
Kantian thought for our discussion is the idea that the public use of reason stands 
over against the state, thus making it the supreme instrument for its criticism and 
reform. 
The principle of publicity is adverted to in Rawls's theory of justice, and given 
wider scope in Habermas's theory. In both cases, the importance of the public 
sphere is stressed as the arena in which justice performs its sodety-forming task; 
each theorist presents a different method for publicly testing the validity of the 
norms which form and direct society. I intend to show that Habermas gives greatest 
prominence to the concept of publicity. 
The conception of publicity raises a final but significant point in justice 
theory, namely the distinction between the right and the good,62 i.e. between norma-
tive issues of justice (what is a matter of justice to which all people have a claim) 
and evaluative issues of the good life (what is a matter of one's individual pursuit 
of a particular conception of the good life within the limits of justice). 
As we shall see, Rawls and Habermas, although firmly in the Kantian tradi-
tion, decide differently as to how this distinction is to be made, but both agree 
substantially with Kant's insistence that principles of justice or right, which are 
based on what all can agree to as free and equal moral beings, have priority over 
the plurality of conceptions of the good life. This distinction is especially important 
for an understanding of justice in modern pluralistic societies, because it provides 
a means of dealing with a plurality of conceptions of the good within the limits of 
justice. It concedes that diverse conceptions of the good life can exist, yet insists 
that conceptions of justice can be defined independently of comprehensive the-
ories of the good. 
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The capacity to frame, revise and pursue various conceptions of the good is 
a characteristic of the freedom, equality and independence of a moral agent who 
is a party to the social contract,63 but this freedom is restricted by the social 
conditions necessary for the effective realisation of the freedom of others (Rawls), 
and by the satisfaction of needs and interests whose validity is recognised by all 
(Habermas). Both these positions follow Kant's dictum that "each may seek his 
happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the 
freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom 
of everyone else within a workable general law".64 Rawls distinguishes not only 
between justice as a basic political virtue of society and a full theory of the good, 
but he also makes a distinction (central to his political conception of justice) 
between "thick" and "thin" conceptions of the good. 
A "thick" conception of the good denotes a full, common conception of the 
good, which it is not feasible to obtain in a modern pluralistic society. A "thin" 
conception of the good signifies some overlapping, less full and comprehensive 
conception shared in society, which relates to that society's understanding of right 
and justice.65 Habermas, on the other hand, goes further than Rawls in his under-
standing that conceptions of justice should limit what can be legitimately and 
justifiably be claimed to be a conception of the good life. On the point of the priority 
of justice, Habermas's discourse ethics, which discusses questions of the good life 
as questions of justice within a discourse about justice that takes into account 
interests and needs, gives justice a more central and basic role than Rawls does; 
for in Habermas's theory, "justice specifies, delineates and determines one's con-
ception of the good".66 
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The concept of publicity which arises in social contract theory is also given 
prominence by critical theory, which helps us to analyse and understand society 
and the issues surrounding its formation, especially the connection between justice 
and rationality and modernity. What a critical social theory does in the service of 
justice and the formation of society is to reveal the debasement, corruption and 
erosion of the public sphere (in which social norms and principles should be 
rationally justified) owing to the adoption of erroneous and fallacious forms of 
rationality. If the public sphere, in which normative validity claims are publicly 
redeemed, is damaged, so is justice, with detrimental consequences for society. A 
critical social theory also assesses the devices and procedures which may assist 
people in the public sphere to choose norms, thus shaping a properly democratic 
polity. 
According to David Tracy, the need of the public sphere is twofold: "first, to 
clarify the character of rationality so that the genuinely public nature of the public 
realm may be defended; second, to clarify the sociological realities that have 
weakened the public realms in... advanced industrial and post-industrial Western 
democracies."67 From a theological perspective, part of the task of justice in 
forming a society under modem conditions is to make a contribution to the repair 
of a damaged public sphere. A public sphere, as Tracy argues, is dependent on a 
shared concept of reason, and refers to "that shared rational space where all 
participants, whatever their other particular differences, can meet to discuss any 
claim that is rationally redeemable".68 
Justice is not confined to the contractual agreements between persons, but 
has to do with the fundamental arrangement of major social institutions in the 
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contest of which other associations form and mdividnaal transactions take place. 
For this reason, a theory of justice needs to take account of the background social 
institutions that shape the expectations and opportunities of representative mem-
bers within that society. For the same reason Rawls believes that the basic social 
structure is the primary subject of justice.69 
However, Rawls's analysis of the basic social structure makes a distinction 
between the public and the private sphere, something which Baynes considers to 
result in "undesirable consequences" for a theory of justice, owing to Rawls's 
systematic neglect of the public sphere in civil society. Baynes rightly charges Rawls 
with neglecting a discussion of how certain institutions in civil society might curb 
the regulatory power of the state.70 Rawls assumes that social justice can be realised 
and maintained through the active intervention of the welfare state into the private 
sphere. However, it is this very intervention which creates pathologies, and crises 
of legitimation, within the private sphere (or lifeworld). Intervention or intrusion 
of the system into the lifeworld, through 'juridification'71 and other mechanisms 
which colonise the lifeworld,72 disables citizens from participating in the public 
realm. Some may argue that a socio-theoretical analysis of the basic structure is 
not the task of a theory of justice, but, as Baynes contends, the failure to take such 
an analysis into consideration has negative implications for an understanding of 
justice.73 
The problem of the defence of the public sphere has a direct bearing on the 
search for a legitimation procedure, and is intimately related to the function of 
justice. A neglect of the public sphere and the forces which threaten it (which are 
covered by a theory of modernity like that of Habermas) leads to an inadequate 
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and unsatisfactory understanding of democratic participation, and therefore of 
achieving social justice and forming a just society. David Tracy argues that "there 
is no good theological reason why publicness (which entails a willingness to defend 
all implicit validity claims and implies a democratic polity) should be ignored by 
any form of theology",74 because in the modern period theology has become a 
critical mode of inquiry willing to give reasons for any of its claims. Modern political 
theology, in its attempts to enter the claims of God's justice to form society, must 
note the demand of critical theory for the testing of all claims to publicness in a 
society, and for reflective reason. 
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The analysis of society in critical theory75 is useful to theology as it considers 
the important question of how the conditions under which we live are shaping our 
very capacity to think and make wise choices about our collective destiny, and as 
it prescribes a remedy for the injustices and social ills of the contemporary world. 
The immense value which critical theory has for a theology concerned with justice 
and the formation of society lies in the fact that it unmasks the illusions upon which 
society has based itself; more specifically it unmasks domination, coercion and the 
illegitimate use of power in society. According to Helmut Peukert, theology, "as a 
methodically controlled reflective form of religion", has been concerned with the 
basic problems of advanced civilisations, the most important being the unsolved 
fundamental problem of the accelerating accumulation and systematic organisa-
tion of power and its unjust use.76 
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Peukert argues that religion and its reflective form = theology = cannot be 
understood as the attempt to endorse these mechanisms, but must be understood 
as the attempt to put them into question.77 Critical theory provides the means for 
this questioning, which is essential not only to theology as a critical discipline but 
more importantly to its task of delegfflmating illegitimate political authority and 
of establishing justice: 
Ever since modernity's critique of religion, theology is suspected of 
having covered up and also legitimising the mechanisms of accumula-
tion and of the unjust sharing of power. And, in general, theology is 
accused of obscuring the true recognition of the human condition by 
producing an illusory consciousness. The most extreme perversion of 
religion, then, consists in the exploitation once again of the angst of 
existence and the desperation of human beings by a religious system 
interested in exerting its power. The fundamentalistic regressions, 
which presently can be observed even inside the major churches, suffi-
ciently illustrate the danger of this perversion. Theology, then, must 
first always prove itself anew as a critical endeavour. The attempts of a 
new "political theology," of a "theology of liberation," or of a "theology 
of the public realm" must be counted as attempts in the great tradition 
of theology to develop and bring to bear the critical potential of religion 
even within theology itself 7 8 
What theology needs to do is to seek to correlate its normative tradition with 
those disciplines or theories (including critical theory) which attempt to ground 
other ways for human beings to relate to one another, i.e., ways other than 
domination or the legitimation of domination. 
Critical theory emphasises the capacity of humans for the reflective, i.e, 
critical, use of reason. As conceived of by Habermas, critical theory has the 
practical intention of the self-emancipation of people from domination. It has 
shown how historical circumstances inhibited the range and depth of reflection, 
effectively permitting all kinds of injustice, exploitation, repression and domina-
tion to go unquestioned and unchallenged, resulting in people's entrapment in 
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unjust structures. Although oppressive religious and political powers have less 
influence over thought than action, the most effective repressive force on individ-
uals and society may operate at deep unconscious levels owing to cultural condi-
tioning, especially when individuals fireely limit their own reflection.79 
Thus critical theory requires consideration of "a number of consciously and 
unconsciously operative factors deriving from the cultural and historical assump-
tion of the time, the current paradigms of thought, and the cultural mechanisms 
exercised by... political and religious structures".80 In other words, critical theory 
requires attention to the role of ideology. Geuss, in his study of critical theory, 
distinguishes three senses of the term "ideology" - descriptive, pejorative and 
positive.81 Critical theory tends to regard ideology in the second of these senses, 
namely the pejorative; here ideology is a particular constellation of beliefs, atti-
tudes or disposition that distort reality, creating a false consciousness. 
The aim of my use of critical theory is to show that the Christian tradition of 
justice can appropriate the point of secular social theorists from Kant and Hegel 
onwards (especially Marx and the central members of the Frankfurt School -
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse), namely the struggle for human emancipation, 
and the formation of a good and just society. The insights of the Frankfurt School, 
which are vital to a theory of justice and society, were the result of the refinement 
of the critique of reason conjoined with sociological research into the principal 
currents of twentieth century modernity.82 One of the most important aspects of 
Horkheimer and Adorno's work was their focus on rationality, and specifically their 
critique of instrumental reason,83 which they perceived to be an instrument of 
domination, and to be responsible for the injustices and ills of society. This insight 
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is crucial for understanding the disabling of the public sphere in which people 
engage in the justice-working activity of public normative legitimation (i.e., justi-
fication of norms and principles). 
As public normative legitimation ©merges as the theme of this thesis, we need 
to examine understandings of justice which will help to secure such legitimation in 
the interests of forming a just society, and to inquire into how far they may be seen 
to be congruent with, or mediations of, God's justice. This perforce delimits the 
scope of our investigation, and does not permit us to enter a detailed socio-theore-
tical analysis of rationality and modernity, nor of the social and systemic integration 
adumbrated by such an analysis.84 However, a major insight which is gained from 
this analysis is the recognition, contra Weber's concept of goalrationality, that 
social action might be more than "that action which, as far as its intended meaning 
is concerned, refers to other people's behaviour and remains oriented to this while 
it proceeds".85 This definition, because it is embedded in the philosophy of con-
sciousness, ignores the fact that social action might be more than means-end or 
goal-oriented, and might be directed toward the achievement of shared under-
standing. It also does not take into account that interaction is co-ordinated in 
basically different ways. The achievement of shared understanding as to what 
certain acts of cognition and manipulation of objects mean, and the achievement 
of the co-ordination of social action through linguistically mediated (justifiable) 
validity claims, are key elements of the new paradigm of communicative rationality 
which must replace goal- or instrumental rationality. Unless such an expanded 
rationality is sought and developed, the pessimistic conclusions of Weber and the 
Frankfurt school are inevitable. 
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An emphasis on goalrationality involves the loss of the wider rationality which 
is needed to demonstrate that society is formed properly through social action that 
is genuinely communicative, and through a rationality which attempts to co-ordi-
nate social action on the basis of shared understanding. Weber's theory of society 
and social analysis, because it gave a central place to the isolated actor, could not 
grasp the essentially intersubjective nature of action; the achievement of under-
standing is perforce the result of intersubjective activity: 
If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the 
socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination 
has to be established through communication - and in certain central 
spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement - then 
the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions 
of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action.86 
This passage emphasises the need for a communicatively-based procedure to 
determine justice for the purpose of forming society. 
I have already mentioned the abuse of power and the problem of domination 
in the areas which justice, in the interests of forming a society, needs to address 
most urgently. For those who control power control the distribution of social goods, 
which has been the traditional concern of theories of social justice. The legitim-
ation of power, and particularly legitimation in terms of the justification of "steer-
ing" norms and actions, becomes a major concern for a theory of justice. 
Any analysis of modern society would be incomplete without an examination 
of the problem of legitimation crisis, because such an examination reveals the 
issues which a theory of justice needs to address; probably most prominent among 
these issues are the deformation of the public sphere and the depoliticisation of 
subjects through the economic and bureaucratic intervention of the state in late 
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capitalist economies, as it seeks to forestall the withdrawal of legitimation by the 
pacification of class conflict, and by buying off protest by compensating measures 
and system-conforming rewards. 
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The basic thesis of legitimation crisis was stated by Habennas in his book of 
the same title j 8 7 which was a major contribution to the analysis of contemporary 
capitalism, and to the analysis of modern western society in general. A more 
succinct expression of the thesis occurs in his essay "Legitimation Problems in the 
Modern State".88 Baldly stated the thesis of legitimation crisis reveals capitalism 
as a system of unfair exchange between capital and labour, which is the conse-
quence of crisis tendencies inherent in its mode of production. These crises, which 
originate in the economic system owing to systemic steering imperatives that assert 
themselves in the pressure for capital realisation, are expressed in the lifeworld as 
class conflict The continuing tendency toward disturbance caused by these steering 
imperatives "can be administratively processed and transferred by stages through 
the political and into the socio-cultural system"89 The class conflict thus generated 
could be acute and destabilising, thus threatening the state and its legitimacy. 
Power needs legitimation, but crises threaten the possibilities for its legitim-
ation because the inequalities and dysfunction of the economic system cause 
citizens to withdraw their legitimation. They also threaten the motivation of 
subjects which the state needs for its continual functioning. Thus legitimation and 
motivation require protection by the state's intervention through state power. 
However, the state attempts to compensate for the functional deficiencies of the 
market without going to the extreme of total regulation of the economy; its 
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interference amounts to the manipulation of conditions for private entrepreneurial 
decisions and the implementation of strategies to avoid the negative side-effects 
of the unhampered functioning of the market Nevertheless, this interference is 
significant enough to create a tension between the economy and the (democratic) 
process of legitimation. 
Legitimation, in modem western societies, is and can only be bestowed on 
power by democratic procedures. The tension between democracy and capitalism 
occurs because they correlate with different forms of integration: the former 
implies the primacy of the Lifeworld and integration through communicative 
action, whereas the latter requires that the subsystems follow their own inner 
dynamics, are held free from legitimation requirements and fulfil their necessary 
functional roles, even at the cost of the technification and reification of the 
lifeworld. In order to lift the possible threat to the legitimation of and motivation 
for the System, the democratic welfare state buys off protest in the lifeworld by 
using the increase in its social product for compensatory measures, thus pacifying 
class conflict and averting legitimation crises. But, as Brand points out, "in doing 
so, it interferes by using law as a medium, in communicatively structured areas of 
the lifeworld,... damaging in the process the cultural resources necessary for the 
continued existence of its symbolic structure".90 This interference is an aspect of 
the colonisation of the lifeworld, which implies the partial monetarisation and 
bureaucratisation of the lifeworld, threatening its symbolic reproduction, most 
crucially the public domain in which consensus about "governing" norms is reached. 
This is the domain of justice as normative legitimacy and communicative action. 
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It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present fully Habermas's argument 
about the inherent and contradictory problems of capitalism; what I wish to draw 
from this line of argument is the destructive effects of the intervention by power 
in the public sphere of the lifeworld which follows in the wake of a legitimation 
crisis, because it is here that justice is operative in the form of the justification of 
those norms which form a just society. 
As the rights of citizens to political participation became established in the 
course of social evolution, legitimation became a consequence of democratic 
procedure, thus creating a problem for capitalist states trying to avert attention 
from the basic contradiction of organised capitalism, namely the private appropri-
ation of public wealth: 
Genuine participation of citizens in processes of political will-forma-
tion, that is, substantive democracy, would bring to consciousness the 
contradiction between administratively socialised production and the 
continued private appropriation and use of surplus value. In order to 
keep this contradiction from being thematised, the administrative sys-
tem must be sufficiently independent of legitimating will-formation.91 
However, the independence of the administrative system is not easy, or even 
possible, to secure. As the administrative-political system encroaches upon or 
intrudes into the socio-cultural system, it undermines and weakens cultural tradi-
tions; this has the unintended side-effect of 
causing meanings and norms previously fixed by tradition and belong-
ing to the boundary conditions of the political system to be publicly 
thematised. In this way the scope of discursive will-formation expands 
- a process that shakes the structures of the depoliticised public realm 
so important for the continued existence of the system.92 
The rationalisation of society which follows in the wake of the increased need 
for justification of government intervention into new areas of life destroys the 
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unquestionable character of traditions and their validity claims that were pre-
viously taken for granted. Habermas remarks that the "stirring up of cultural affairs 
[which are] taken for granted thus furthers the politicisation of areas of life 
previously assigned to the private sphere".93 This development signifies danger for 
the civic privatism (i.e. "political abstinence combined with an orientation to 
career, leisure and consumption" that promote the expectation of suitable rewards 
within the system) which is essential to the structurally depoliticised public realm.94 
Thus, the paradoxical effect of the administrative processing of economically 
conditioned crisis tendencies is an increased pressure for legitimation which 
cannot be relieved by the rationality introduced by that very administrative pro-
cessing: 
As long as motivations remain tied to norms requiring justification, the 
introduction of legitimate power into the reproduction process means 
that the "fundamental contradiction" can break out in a questioning, 
rich in practical consequences, of the norms that still underlie admin-
istrative action. And such questioning will break out if the correspond-
ing themes, problems, and arguments are not spared through 
sufficiently sedimented pre-determinations.95 
Even though the state recognises that the recoupling of the economic system 
to the political means greater use of democratic institutions and participation to 
secure legitimation for its expanded activities, it still would prefer to keep its 
administrative system independent of the legitimating system. Here Habermas 
introduces the idea that states arrange "formal" democratic institutions and proce-
dures to ensure that administrative decisions are made largely independently of 
the specific motives and interests of the citizens. These institutions and procedures 
are democratic in form, but not in substance, ensuring a "diffuse mass loyalty" and 
the avoidance of real participation; this alteration leads to a structurally depol-
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iticised public realm, in which subjects in a society "enjoy the status of passive 
conditions with only the right to withhold acclamation".96 Thus the political system 
in capitalist societies, which set up the public realm for effective legitimation, tries 
to change its function to directing attention toward topical areas, that is, "of pushing 
other themes, problems, and arguments below the threshold of attention and, 
thereby, of withholding them from opinion-formation".97 However, this whole 
attempt flounders when citizens in the process of democratic rationalisation and 
justification see through the mode of procurement of legitimation for a basically 
unjust enterprise. 
The way the state can counter the critical awareness unleashed through the 
process of rationalisation, with its ensuing legitimation deficits, is by securing the 
loyalty of the masses through rewards and welfare compensation.98 Habermas's 
thesis is that a properly functioning public realm, based on a universal discourse 
ethics, will produce an entirely different and just basis for the formation of society, 
and not a cynical willingness to accede to a political order because it provides an 
acceptable flow of system-conforming rewards. McCarthy uses this as a possible 
argument against Habermas's legitimation crisis thesis, noting that such a willing-
ness is not necessarily cynical and may follow "for the reason that nothing better 
seems practically possible in the given circumstances".99 Such a willingness, accord-
ing to McCarthy, can and does serve to legitimate political systems:"... it is difficult 
to see why the justification of a political order on the grounds that it provides an 
acceptable (in an imperfect world) distribution of 'primary goods' (Rawls) could 
not be widely effective in sustaining that order."100 
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McCarthy exposes a weakness in the predictive power of the legitimation 
crisis thesis, because empirical motives can be shown to have as much power in 
forming a society as communicative rationality and communicative action, and 
because it is too theoretical and insufficiently practical, despite Habermas's pur-
pose of developing his critical theory as a systematically generalised history with 
practical intent However, McCarthy's critique neglects the practical dimension of 
critical theory, and neglects the connection between theory and praxis. The purpose 
of a critical theory is to enlighten its addressees about their actual situation, real 
interests, and practical possibilities. Habermas's model for social critique is the 
model of the suppression of genercdisable interests^ which is concerned with those 
interests that can be shared (or agreed upon) in rational discourse. In a key passage 
in Legitimation Crisis Habermas asks: "How would the membership of a social 
system, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, have collectively 
and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which norms would they have accepted 
as justified) if they could and would have decided on organisation of social 
intercourse through discursive will-formation, with adequate knowledge of the 
limiting conditions and functional imperatives of their society?"102 The critical 
scrutiny by subjects in this regard would recognise the domination built into the 
prevailing normative structures and their interpretations, which is revealed as "the 
'injustice' of the repression of generalisable interests";103 further, this critique 
would reveal the de facto consensus underlying the institutionalised distribution of 
opportunities for the legitimate satisfaction of needs and interests as unwarranted, 
illusory, and ideological.104 
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The point of modem theories of justice (and of a modem social critical 
theory) is to eliminate domination, which is the root of injustice. This requires 
attention, in the first instance, not to specific interests and needs (which may be 
the immediate basis of socio-political critique), but to establishing a procedural 
criterion for assessing the rationality or legitimacy of concrete interests. If a theory 
of justice has such ^ mediate, normative-theoretical basis, its mode of social analysis 
will require attention to its normative grounding, and therefore is bound to stress 
the theoretical as the basis for the practical; as a consequence its practical import 
may be diffuse, but this in no way diminishes its ultimate practical value, especially 
if it succeeds in eliminating or reducing domination in society. How this process 
occurs is treated in chapter 4, in my examination of Habermas's theory of justice. 
The theory of legitimation crisis reveals the need for public debate in late 
capitalist democratic societies, in order to assess the legitimacy of concrete inter-
ests and norms. This public debate is intended to take place in the public sphere, 
and envisions the replacement of the rule of authority (i.e. domination) with that 
of reason. Habermas claims that the dessication of the public sphere, the surrender 
of the idea of rationalising power through the medium of public discussion, is a 
result of transferring practical into technical questions. This transformation legit-
imates the withdrawal of practical questions from public discussion and deprives 
the public sphere of its critical function; a depoliticised public sphere, which is 
essential to the stability of state-regulated capitalism, is legitimated and sustained 
by technocratic ideology: 'Technocratic consciousness ... not only justifies a par-
ticular class's interest in domination and represses another class's partial need for 
emancipation, but affects the human race's emancipatory interest as such."105 In 
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eliminating the distinction between the practical and the technical, it "violates an 
interest grounded in one of the two fundamental conditions of our cultural exist-
ence: in language".106 Faced with this "substitute ideology", critical theory must 
now "penetrate beyond the level of particular historical class interests to disclose 
the fundamental interests of mankind as such".107 
The difficulty with the noble aim of a critique which tries to reveal the basic 
human interest in domination-free communication is that it is not clear how this 
level of self-understanding to assist an effective political practice is to be achieved. 
Critical theory's penetration beyond class interest to the fundamental interest of 
humankind requires a potential agent of social transformation, i.e. a group or 
organisation which will protest against social injustice; and through its justice-
working activity of engendering (class-conflictual) public debate and discussion 
will change the existing order in the interests of forming a more just society.108 
Habermas believes that the re-politicisation of the public sphere is potentially the 
most crisis-laden tendency in contemporary capitalist society because the expan-
sion of discursive will-formation shakes the structures of the depoliticised public 
realm so important for the continued existence of the system.109 However, he is 
very pessimistic about the emergence of an organised social movement which will 
engender a genuine legitimation crisis leading to a radical transformation of 
society.110 
The thesis of legitimation crisis asserts that crisis tendencies occur in modern 
capitalist societies because the state has to implement class-based, economic 
imperatives and simultaneously secure general normative acceptance. However, 
the processes of reification and fragmentation now decrease the necessity of the 
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political system to rely on "normatively secured or communicatively achieved 
agreement", and increase "the scope of tolerance for merely instrumental attitudes, 
indifference and cynicism . . . 1 , 1 1 1 The task of justice in modern societies is less a 
direct matter of the distribution of wealth, and more of resisting the increasing 
colonisation of the lifeworld, of reacting against cultural impoverishment, and of 
arresting and reversing the fragmentation of consciousness. The task of justice in 
the formation of a just society is the development of a critical consciousness which 
withdraws legitimation, which protests against the deformation of the structures of 
subjectivity, and which tries to establish principles and procedures for securing 
normative legitimacy, thus overcoming the pathologies following societal ration-
alisation in modernity. The pacification of class conflict by welfare-state mass 
democracies does not mean that protest potential has been altogether laid to 
rest. 1 1 2 
New social movements (e.g., antinuclear and environmental movements, 
single-issue and local movements, the women's movement, etc.), which embody 
this "protest potential", have emerged. A characteristic of these new social move-
ments is their "self-limiting radicalism",113 i.e. their rejection of revolutionary 
theory which envisages collective revolutionary subjects speaking in the name of 
all of society and seeking to take over the economy and polity.114These movements 
must not be understood simply as a reaction against the uprooting of "traditional 
forms of life", but rather as a reaction against the deformation of "posttraditional 
forms of life"115 which arise with the structural differentiation (i.e. rationalisation) 
of the lifeworld. Thus the new social movements must attempt mainly to protect 
the conditions of "communicative sociation",116 rather than to generate a revol-
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utionary ideology to combat capitalism. White sums up the rationale of these new 
social movements: 'The problem is less that of building a collective, revolutionary 
ideology to combat that provided by capitalism, than it is one of overcoming the 
colonisation and fragmentation of consciousness by creating enough slack in the 
system for the ongoing autonomous articulation of plural identities by the groups 
involved."117 
While the differentiation of the structures of modern capitalist societies 
brings some benefits, the process of systemic rationalisation threatens our integrity 
as independent, critical beings capable of shaping the direction of our collective 
lives in a democratic way.118 The new social movements provide examples of a new 
stance vis-a-vis the formal political system: the critical consciousness which lies 
behind their activity bodes well for the kind of critical politics and re-emergence 
of a critical public sphere which Habermas desired in Legitimation Crisis. 
Although he mentions religious fundamentalism as one of the new social 
movements,119 he does not refer to the potential of political theology and the 
Church both for protest and transformation. It is my contention that a political 
theology which develops an understanding of justice as communicative action 
could enable the Church to be that agent of social transformation, not by being 
another self-limiting social movement trying to create space for communicative 
sociation and for the articulation and protection of its identity, but by going much 
further and promoting the notion of a universal ethics in the interests of forming 
a just society (both at a national and an international level). A political theology 
must promote an understanding of justice which engages, albeit warily, with the 
formal political system, by trying to ensure that the state returns to a basis of 
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normative legitimacy, through the adoption of a discourse ethics and the estab-
lishment of communicative rationality and communicative action. 
While this is an ambitious programme, it is different from a totalising 
revolutionary programme, because it relies upon the non-coercive commendation 
of a procedure which itself attempts to secure normative legitimacy through 
domination-free, fully intersubjective communication, based on shared under-
standing, agreement, co-operation and consensus. The Church is well-placed to 
undertake such a programme because there is virtually no other institutional locus 
in which this can be done. Since Habermas severs his discourse ethics from any 
religious foundations and institutions, and thus fails to provide an institutional 
social and cultural locus for the discussion of practical moral issues, the Church 
appears to be one possible agent which could provide the institutional base in 
modern society for a universal discourse ethics.120 Habermas's interpretation of 
modernity as the impoverishment of the lifeworld (owing to its colonisation by the 
system), and the concomitant deformation of the public sphere, raises the question 
about the locus of public discourse regarding issues of justice, right and good. It is 
F. S. Fiorenza who puts forward the proposal that churches, using political theology 
which explicates what Habermas acknowledges but does not develop (namely the 
transcending dimension of the unity of the lifeworld toward which moral discourse 
is aimed), could provide such an institutional locus, because the churches are 
constantly endeavouring to interpret the substantial normative potential of their 
religious traditions.1211 shall take up this proposal again in the final chapter. 
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The divine imperative to do justice obliges Christians in modem society to 
realise the irreducibly social dimension of justice, which is concerned with the 
formation of society in accordance with God's will for people to live together in 
right relationship, achieved by domination-free interaction. The province of justice 
is the democratic, political, public sphere in which validity claims are put forward 
with regard to the norms and principles that constitute the social charter which 
forms society. 
I have already argued that an investigation which seeks to discover how the 
justice of God forms society must use an analysis of society, and the insights gained 
from the necessary interdisciplinary nature of such an analysis. The principal thrust 
of God's justice is the establishment of right relationship, which I interpret as a 
polity which comes about through persons operating according to certain princi-
ples, norms and codes which regulate their interaction. This requires a procedure 
for legitimating such a polity: legitimacy here means the worthiness of a political 
order to be recognised. An investigation into how this legitimacy is to be achieved 
requires an examination of certain modern theories of justice, to see how the 
intention of God's justice to form society is mediated through them, and whether 
they can serve as models for the working out of God's justice in modern societies. 
Since political legitimation is a vital function of justice in forming a society, 
it is essential to our investigation that we consider theories of justice which attempt 
to establish a method of achieving legitimacy based on general interest and general 
will. Our discussion of the shift from the traditional sociological understanding of 
the descriptive role of social theory to a new understanding of its normative role 
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revealed that an independent evaluation of reasons on which the claim to legitim-
acy is based cannot be excluded. The theories which I propose to examine are 
concerned with this evaluation, and particularly with the justification or grounding 
of the reasons proffered for compliance with a political order which determines 
social justice. It is not enough for social theory to be concerned with the factuality 
of validity claims, e.g. in the sense of their frequency or accuracy in specific 
populations; social theory cannot ignore the fact that normative validity claims 
meet with recognition because they may be held to be well grounded ("capable of 
discursive vindication"122). What is needed is a method which helps us systemati-
cally to evaluate legitimacy claims in a rational, intersubjectively testable way, in 
order to arrive at the arrangements which will form a just society. 
The difficulty for an attempt to develop theologically the methods, and 
theories out of which they arise, is that these theories largely tend to exclude or 
dismiss the 'metaphysical' starting point of such an attempt. The point which I wish 
to make is that Christian theology, despite its possession of a substantive concept 
of morality, normative concepts of the good, of public welfare, etc., can endorse a 
purely procedural method of achieving legitimacy. It can not only use this method, 
but assert that God's justice implies the use of this method in which various actors, 
including Christians, enter a discourse and, through a process of rational argumen-
tation, either decide on a set of principles or justify the normative validity of their 
claims (arising from their substantive normative tradition) to a better social order. 
The criticism which Habermas applies to neo-Aristotelian, natural law-based 
attempts to justify hermeneutically rather than rationally everyday conceptions of 
the good, the virtuous and the just can be applied equally to Christian under-
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standings which fall back purely on the authority of their normative tradition: "if... 
philosophical ethics and political theory are supposed to disclose the moral core 
of the general consciousness and to re-construct it as a normative concept of the 
moral, then they must specify criteria and provide reasons;...1 , 1 2 3 Thus theology 
must develop a Christian understanding of justice in terms of normative legitimacy, 
such that it sees the necessity for giving reasons for its normative claims to a better 
and more just social order. Habermas is wrong when he suggests that the legitim-
ation based on a normative tradition (e.g., the Judeo-Christian or neo-Aristotelian 
tradition) is untenable "because of the metaphysical context in which it is em-
bedded".124 It would only be untenable if norms of action and their legitimation 
were asserted dogmatically as the only possible ones. There is no reason why 
Christians cannot engage in the "re-constructive" exercise of justifying their norms 
of action rather than in mere assertion. 
This raises the fundamental question of practical philosophy which, accord-
ing to Habermas, "has been taken up reflectively as a question of the procedures 
and presuppositions under which justification can have the power to produce 
consensus".125 A theological investigation into the connection between justice and 
the formation of society needs to examine the major theories in modern times 
which try to establish methods or procedures for achieving a consensus about the 
basic decisions and institutions for a (just) society, i.e., methods and procedures 
for forming a just society. After an examination of God's justice in the next chapter, 
I intend to investigate the two theories which appear to have the greatest potential 
for this achievement, to examine how far they coincide with Christian justice, how 
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far Christians could live in a society which come about under their proposed 
arrangements, and how far they may be mediations of God's justice. 
1 In considering how society is formed, integrated and maintained it is helpful to use 
Habermas's distinction between social integration, which comes about through 
communicative action, and systemic or functional integration, which comes about 
through the intertwining of the consequences of action. According to Habermas, 
society cannot be analysed using only action theory (Max Weber) or systems theory 
(Talcott Parsons): it must be analysed at both levels. Only a two-pronged approach, 
such as that of Habermas's lifeworld and system analysis, can explain phenomena 
which the classical sociologists Weber, Durkheim and Marx signalled under different 
names - the 'iron cage', anomie, alienation - but did not adequately analyse. [Arie 
Brand: The Force of Reason: An Introduction to Habermas' Theory of Communicative 
Action, Sydney. Allen & Unwin, 1990, p. 39.] Habermas claims that these phenomena 
can only be explained from the mutual relations between lifeworld and system. 
Habermas's conception of society as "a systemically stabilised nexus of action of 
socially integrated groups" [T. McCarthy, Introduction to Volume I of Habermas's 
The Theory of Communicative Action, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, p. xxviij depends 
on the combination and relation of lifeworld and system. If society is conceptualised 
as one or the other, the conception of society will be one-sided: both are necessary 
for a comprehensive conception of society. The Lifeworld concerns the symbolic 
reproduction of society: it represents the whole ensemble of human relations (social, 
cultural and personal) which is co-ordinated and reproduced through communicative 
action (i.e., action that is oriented toward achieving agreement), and thus through 
the medium of language. The System, on the other hand, concerns the material 
reproduction of society: it has to do with the preservation of bodies, which takes 
place through systems of action that have, in modern society, become more or less 
independent, mainly in the form of the subsystems of the market and the state. 
[Brand, op. cit, p. xii.] This approach makes the clear conceptual distinction of these 
different orders of integration a necessity. Habermas's social analysis helps us to see 
"social evolution as a process of the coming about of the System on the basis of the 
rationalisation of the Lifeworld, the increasing complexity of the System and ration-
ality of the Lifeworld and the disjunction between these two, and finally, the invasion 
of core Lifeworld areas by systemic mechanisms", [ibid., pp. 39-40.] 
2 For a sustained theological development of the social nature of God, see K. Leech's 
books The Social God, SPCK, 1981, and True God, SPCK, 1985. 
3 D. Phillips: Toward a Just Social Order, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1986, p. 3. 
4 P. Pettit analyses three areas of social life, which are distinguished from one another 
by characteristic regulations of behaviour - viz. civil, economic and legal, which are 
effective in the constitution of personhood, ownership and authority; see his Judging 
Justice, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p. 5. 
5 A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 2; hereafter referred to as TJ. 
6 Pettit, op. cit., p. 6. 
7 ibid., pp. 6-7. 
8 TJ, p. 5. 
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9 Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, 1: translated by D. Ross, Oxford University 
Press, 1954, p. 108; cf. J. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1966, pp. 43-113. 
10 Pieper, op. cit, p. 44. 
11 Since the literature is so vast on the topic of justice, it is not possible to give anything 
but an arbitrary list of references. However, the following help to indicate the issues 
arising from what Kelbley calls "the incredibly camples concept of justice": C 
Kelbley: The Value of Justice, New York: Fordham University Press, 1979, p. 1; R. 
Brandt, Ed.: Social Justice, Englewood Cliffs, N. X: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962; C. 
Friedrich and J. Chapman, Eds.: JUSTICE (Nomas VI: Yearbook of the American 
Society for Political and Legal Philosophy), New York: Atherton Press, 1963; Ch. 
Perelman: The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Augmentation, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1963; A. Heller: Beyond Justice, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987; W. Galston: 
Justice and the Human Good, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980; L . Hobhouse: 
The Elements of Social Justice, Allen and Unwin, 1922; H. Bedau, Ed.: Justice and 
Equality, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971; D. Miller: Social 
Justice, Oxford: Clarendon, 1976. 
12 With regard to the obligation of a society to justify its formative principles, D. Bell 
notes that "any society, in the end, is a moral order that has to justify [i.e. legitimate] 
its allocative principles and the balances of freedoms and coercions necessary to 
facilitate or enforce ... rules. The problem, inevitably, is the relation between 
self-interest and the public interest, between personal impulses and community 
requirements. Without a public philosophy, explicitly stated, we lack the fundamen-
tal condition whereby a modern polity can live by consensus (and without it there is 
only continuing conflict) and justice": The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, 
Heinemann, 1976, p. 250. 
13 A. Rogers: The Theory of Ethics, New York: Macmillan, 1922, p. 192ff. 
14 W. Frankena: "The Concept of Social Justice" in R. Brandt, Ed., Social Justice, op. 
tit, p. 27. 
15 E . Brunner: Justice and the Social Order, translated by M. Hottinger, Lutterworth 
Press, 1945, p. 47. 
16 Frankena, op. cit, pp. 28-29. 
17 A theological approach ought to be aware that in secular theories which employ 
normative conceptions of practical reason (like the Kantian and Rawlsian concep-
tions of ourselves as free and equal moral persons), there is no further claim that the 
principles or ideals employed in the justification of social norms and institutions 
correspond to an independently pre-existing moral order, "in the sense that there 
can be no higher appeal to something beyond the idea of that to which free and equal 
persons can rationally agree". [K. Baynes: The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. 1-2.] A theological approach, 
while endorsing and appropriating rational and critical 'reflexrvity', does this dialec-
tically, because it recognises that a purely reflexive approach can become ideological, 
since it asserts that moral principles and norms can only be justified through rational 
reflection independent of historical traditions and background theories. F. S. Fioren-
za gives an example of this in the 19th century moral injunction barring women from 
higher education, an injunction based upon unquestioned social assumptions about 
women's unequal social status and medical assumptions about women's intellectual 
ability and biology. Fiorenza argues that this sexism and discrimination could not 
simply be eliminated by reflexive reasoning: "it was only through women's historical 
protests stemming from their experience that society came to question the social, 
anthropological, and moral assumptions." [F. S. Fiorenza: The Church as a Com-
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munity of Interpretation: Political Theology between Discourse Ethics and Herase-
neutical Reconstruction", in Browning, D. and Fiorenza, F. §., Eds.: Habemms, 
Modernity, and Public Theology, New York: Crossroad, 1992, p. 84.] 
18 Pettit, op. cit, pp. 31-32. 
19 Justice and The Social Order, op. cit, p. 18. 
20 H. Beckley: "A Christian Affirmation of Rawls's Idea of Justice as Fairness - Part 1°, 
Journal of Religious Ethics 13/2 (1985) 210-242; tL K. Tanner: "Christian Belief and 
Respect for Others" and "Christian Belief and Respect for Difference" - chapters 5 
and 6 respectively of The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice, 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992, pp. 157-223. 
21 Beckley (1985), p. 210. 
22 ibid., pp. 210-211. 
23 ibid., p. 211. 
24 ibid., pp. 211-212. 
25 ibid., p. 212. 
26 S. Hauerwas: The Politics of Justice: Why Justice is a Bad Idea for Christians", in 
After Christendom?, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991, pp. 45-68. 
27 J. H. Yoder believes that Christians should not attempt to develop a common theory 
of obligation to just institutions, nor participate in public deliberations on universal 
standards and principles of justice; see The Politics of Jesus, Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1972. 
28 A. Heller: Beyond Justice, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 220ff. 
29 Phillips, op. cit, p. 4. 
30 ibid., p. 5. 
31 "A Christian Affirmation of Rawls's Idea of Justice as Fairness - Part F , op. cit This 
is similar to my view that any theory that is advocated in the interests of forming a 
just society must pay attention to what is potentially generalisable for all human 
beings. 
32 "A Christian Affirmation of Rawls's Idea of Justice as Fairness - Part II"; The Journal 
of Religious Ethics 14/2 (1986), p. 229. 
33 H. Beckley, 1986, op. cit, p. 234. 
34 like H. Clark in "Justice as Fairness and Christian Ethics", Soundings 56/3 (1973), 
359-369. 
35 Beckley, 1986, op. cit, p. 234. 
36 S. Benn and G. Mortimer, Eds.: Rationality and the Social Sciences, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1976; A. Gouldner: The Dialectics of Ideology and Technology, Macmil-
lan, 1976; B. Wilson, Ed.: Rationality, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979; M. Hollis and S. 
Lukes, Eds.: Rationality and Relativism Oxford: Blackwell, 1982; T. Kuhn: The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962; S. 
Toulmin, Human Understanding, vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. 
37 Phillips, op. cit, p. 41. 
38 R. Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, p. 389. 
39 Phillips, op. cit, p. 46. 
40 ibid., p. 47. 
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41 Pettit, op. ciL, pp. 24-25. 
42 J-J. Rousseau: The Social Contract and Discourses, translated by G. Cole, Dent, 1963. 
43 ibid., p. 13. 
44 The Political Writings of Kant, Ed. H. Reiss, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1971. p. 79. 
45 ibid. 
46 Bayraes, op. cit, p. 1. 
47 Rawls: "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", Journal of Philosophy 11/9 (1980), 
515-572. 
48 A constructivist view sees Kant's moral theory, in which the concept of moral 
autonomy is a basic category, as based on a conception of the person as an autono-
mous moral agent rather than on a rational intuition of objective ends given to us. 
A teleological position adopts the latter view, and regards justice as something that 
exists for the sake of these objective ends. The reason that Kant rejects such a 
teleological conception is that it violates the notion of human autonomy. [Baynes, 
op. cit., p. 24; cf. P. Riley: Kant's Political Philosophy, Totowa, New Jersey. Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1983, for a sustained defence of the teleological interpretation of 
Kant's moral theory.] 
49 The Political Writings of Kant, op. cit, p. 19. 
50 ibid., pp. 74-79. 
51 ibid., p. 187. 
52 B. Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1985, p. 65. 
53 Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, in The Moral Law, translated and 
analysed by H. Paton, Hutchinson University Library, 1948; p. 67 of 1966 edition. 
54 M. Lessnoff: Social Contract, Macmillan, 1986, p. 93. 
55 ibid. 
56 Baynes, op. cit., p. 13. 
57 We need to take account of a serious objection to contract theory if we are propose 
its use as part of a theological approach. Thinkers like C. B. Macpherson [The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962], 
D. Gauthier ["The Social Contract as Ideology", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6/2 
(1977), 130-164], and A. McFadyen [The Call to Personhood:A Christian Theory of 
the Individual in Social Relationships, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990] 
regard traditional contract theory as based on the individual pursuit of private 
self-interest Although I accept this objection, my discussion of social contract theory, 
and even the apparent entailment of certain aspects of the theory by biblical and 
theistic political thought, is not intended to endorse the self-interested, individual-
istic understanding of the social contract I am attempting to show that justice, as 
normative legitimacy, is established by consensus or shared agreement about norms 
as a consequence of democratic, discursive will-formation. Social contract theory 
provides the historical basis for this development, which is an advance on the 
traditional understanding of contract in political theory. This development, as we 
shall see, is most fully represented in the thought of Habermas, and coincides with 
a Christian understanding of consensus as not being constituted by self-interest but 
in an orientation toward the (generalisable) interests and needs of others, and toward 
the achievement of genuine, unconditional, mutual recognition and agreement. In 
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this thesis I wish to argue that society is formed through the universal principle of 
justice as normative legitimacy, and that this principle is located in God's Trinitarian 
and social Being. Basing justice on normative legitimacy (which includes political 
legitimation) does not entail a commitment to a contract view of society for the 
coordination of self-validated interests, but depends on mutuality of understanding 
achieved in genuine discourse. It depends on a dialogical conception of normative 
validity claims, an unconditional regard for the other, a self-transcending com-
prehension of the interests and needs of others, and a will to be incorporated into 
community with God and others. The formation of society appears, therefore, still 
to be dependent on agreement about different, even competing or conflicting, 
interests and needs. 
58 Lessnoff, op. cit, p. 121. 
59 The Political Writings of Kant, op. cit., p. 126. 
60 Baynes, op. cit, p. 45. 
61 The Political Writings of Kant, op. cit., p. 85. 
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Bedau: "Social Justice and Social Institutions", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 
(1978), 159-175. 
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71 By 'juridification' Habermas is referring to the general tendency in modern society 
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tive, and constitute what Habermas calls the pathologies of modernity, namely the 
reduction of rationality to instrumental rationality, the uncoupling of system and 
lifeworld, the colonisation of the lifeworld (including juridification), and the frag-
mentation of consciousness. 
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Contemporary theology which engages in reflection on problems of the relation of 
Christian faith to the quest for justice in the modem world is characterised by 
rooting that reflection largely in the Bible rather than in other sources (such as 
natural law philosophy).1 To a large extent, sacred scripture provides the basis for 
much of the Church's social teaching. This has been developed according to the 
needs of different ages.2 My approach in this chapter is guided by the hermeneutics 
of socio-critical theory,3 whilst attempting to remain faithful in particular to the 
Jewish element in our heritage, which attaches prime importance to social justice. 
Epsztein refers to one of the greatest teachers in Judaism - Simon Gamaliel - who 
stressed that "justice is the first of the three pillars (alongside truth and peace) 
which ensure the continuity of human society".4 
I argue that in the biblical material there are vital indicators to the principles 
and procedures of justice which later thinkers have developed. My approach is 
guided by the particular understanding of justice contained in my thesis, namely 
social justice, which concerns the creation, through participation in public dis-
course, of institutionalised patterns of societal and political organisation, mutual 
action, and interdependence. These patterns are essential for the creation of 
mutuality and for the formation of a society in which the demands of love can be 
met, among them the satisfaction of the needs of all living together. Social justice, 
which is rooted in the will of God and in the Christian moral norm of love, is more 
basic than distributive or commutative justice, for unless legitimate social and 
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political structures are established, the dimensions of the other modalities of 
justice5 cannot be realised. 
The issue of 'publicity' is particularly important here, because the conditions 
necessary for the other forms of justice depend on concerted action by society as a 
whole through its public institutions. The legitimacy of the norms by which these 
institutions, especially government, form and steer society rests upon the public 
agreement and consensus of those interacting in society. It is this normative 
legitimacy and its achievement which I take to be the crux of the issue of social 
justice (i.e. that justice which forms society). In order to establish that God's justice 
can be interpreted in this way, it is necessary to establish the essentially social and 
relational nature of God's justice, which God uses as an instrument to form society. 
Thus in this chapter I begin by examining justice as a principle in creation, 
particularly in the creation of a benevolent social order and harmonious society. 
Section two is given to an exposition of the relational and social nature of the justice 
of God. It examines the theological bases of the Image of God and of the Trinity 
as the ground for asserting the intrinsic relationalty of human beings and then-
need to live in a society which reflects the society of the Trinity. It argues for an 
intersubjective, dialogical (i.e., communicative) understanding of justice, derived 
from the Hebrew word sedaqah as 'right relationship' and 'true sociality', which 
forms the guiding concept of justice for my argument. The question then arises as 
to how the conditions of justice as right relationship at a societal level can be 
conceived and secured for our times so that a just human society can be formed. 
The third section discusses sin as the reason for the thwarting of God's 
intention for true sociality. This section also attempts to establish the connection 
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between redemption and creation, for once the wholeness of the created order and 
true sociality have been fractured, the chaos which ensues has to be re-ordered and 
redeemed: I suggest that this, too, is the role of justice. One of the consequences 
of distorted communication and fractured sociality (which follow in the wake of 
sin) is domination, which can be deconstructed by ideology-critique and the 
prophetic figures who engage in such critique. Section four examines the presence 
and use of ideology-critique in the biblical tradition as part of the critical, socio-
political function of justice in its task of re-ordering and (re-forming) society. 
Section five deals with the synoptic and New Testament notion of Jesus as the 
justice of God, as the Servant figure of the Old Testament who will establish justice 
on earth in its properly social, i.e. relational and intersubjective, form. I suggest in 
this section that we should imitate Christ in his communicative action as a way of 
establishing social justice. This argument depends not only on a re-imaging of Jesus 
as the righteousness and justice of God, but (in section six) on an interpretation of 
Jesus' attempt to establish justice (a mark of the Kingdom of God) in terms of the 
theory of communicative action. My contention is that, in the search for theories 
of justice which will assist the task of forming a just society under modern condi-
tions, Christians must examine the correlation between such theories and the 
normative traditions in the primary source of their faith. 
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The ground for asserting that it is justice, and specifically the justice of God, 
which forms society is found in the creation theology of the Bible, in the central 
paradigm of Jewish faith - the Exodus and liberation from oppression, in the 
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theology of the classical Prophets, and in the parables of Jesus. That God created 
social order, in addition to physical and moral order, is well-attested in the 
Judeo-Christian scriptures.6 The creation theology of the Pentateuch reveals 
clearly that God's role as the source of all order in creation is to bring order out of 
chaos (Gen. 1:2), and to sustain that order continuously. Thus God's creative 
activity is not limited to the beginning of all things but continuous through history, 
in every generation, as his sustenance and renewal of the created order.7 The 
character of this order, whether physical or social, is that "it is good" (Gen. 1:10, 
31): it is one of harmony, of peace, of well-being. Social life, as part of God's 
intended order, is to be as much a blessing as the rest of creation. 
The idea that God is the source of blessing arises early in the scriptures (Gen. 
1:22,28,2:3), in the context of the story of creation. The strong element of blessing 
in creation theology needs to be considered as a theology of blessing complemen-
tary to salvation theology, which has been the predominant focus of Old Testament 
theology.8 Birch notes that God's created order is the vehicle for blessing to all of 
God's creatures in all generations: 
In this stress on God's trustworthy order (rather than God's intervening 
act) we find ethical warrant for systemic and structural efforts to discern 
and embody God's faithful order in our own societal patterns... We are 
mandated to make the blessings of God's creation broadly and continu-
ously available to all God's creatures as God intended.9 
It is not only the creation tradition in the scriptures which speaks of the order 
which God provides in creation. The wisdom tradition, largely contained in 
Proverbs, Job, certain Psalms, and in the intertestamental texts of Sirach and 
Wisdom, has at its heart a belief in order "imbedded in the cosmos and discernible 
by human reason".10 Wisdom theology identifies human good with the order 
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intended by God in creation = am order which can b© discovered in the natural or 
social world: wisdom consists in discovering and attuning oneself to the divinely 
intended and sustained order, and living in harmony with it. This divinely intended 
order, out of which all the good things in life flow, is described by Walter Brueg-
gemann: 
The order of life is characterised in wisdom in many ways.... Whatever 
it is called, it is a remarkable confession of faith in the benevolence of 
life, in the staying power of our world, in the possibility of wholeness, 
in the health of right relations in right community, in the security every 
man may have without seizing what is his neighbour's. Moreover, in 
Israel's faith this orderliness to which a man may conform himself is not 
an accident, but is the knowing arrangement of a generous, benevolent 
God. 1 1 
The wisdom tradition provides strong support for my contention that God 
and his justice are the source of social order and society. It is God's justice which, 
as part of the created order, sustains the social order. God imparts his justice to 
human beings to form society and maintain social order. Wisdom theology, which 
can be interpreted as creation theology,12 understands God as responsible for the 
order built into creation, and as creating us with the capacity to discern that order 
and live in harmony with it: "wisdom is possessed of enormous confidence in the 
capacity of human reason to discover the truth of reality in productive patterns of 
personal and community life."13 That reality is God, whose Being is love and whose 
nature is justice: these form the fundamental principle inherent in the fabric of 
God's creation. Dianne Bergant has noted the intimate connection between cre-
ation and justice "both in regard to the primordial creation and in the continual 
victory over chaos within each person and within society as a whole".14 The task of 
wisdom is to aid the human search for the truth which God has built into creation, 
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and to choose life and live wisely, which means living in accord with the require-
ments of God's justice. 
The wisdom tradition, which views the created world as good, points to the 
fact that creation is the medium in which God is experienced - "in the very order 
which God originated and sustains" = and in which we have potential as co-agents 
with God for mamtaming his intended order through justice. Brace Birch, in his 
discussion of wisdom and creation, points out that "belief in God's creation for 
wisdom is always tied to issues of God's justice and not a simple affirmation of 
divine ordering".15 In view of the constant threat of chaos behind creation, human 
action in harmony with God's created order helps to maintain the fabric of the 
world.16 Since justice is an essential aspect of that order, in so far as it effects social 
order and forms society, human action must also be guided by and in harmony with 
God's justice. Birch states that manifestations of chaos in human experience "make 
it all the more imperative that God's justice be undergirded by reasserting the 
fundamental creation theology behind wisdom".1^ 
An appeal to the wisdom tradition for support for the contention that God 
creates social order and wills right sociality through justice is not unproblematic; 
for the character of wisdom morality is individualistic, and is based less on an 
understanding of covenant relationship to God and neighbour than on an appeal 
to a pious code of conduct which attempts to guide individuals in appropriate 
behaviour that makes life whole and harmonious. The predominant concern of the 
wisdom tradition with character formation, its perfectionist interest in the accom-
plishment of individual virtue rather than a deontological concern with the requi-
sites of social existence, its mechanical rewarding or punishing of every act, and the 
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critical challenge directed at God's justice and the human capacity for knowledge 
and understanding by undeserved human suffering (i.e. the problem of theodicy) 
- all present difficulties for an attempt to establish a convergence between the 
creation, wisdom and prophetic traditions with regard to the social nature of 
creation. 
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties in and tensions between these tradi-
tions, the social character of God's gracious nature and will, and of his graceful and 
benevolent intentions for society, is manifest in an overview of the biblical witness 
to creation. What emerges from this overview is a picture of the world and the 
universe as divinely and benevolently ordered for the harmonious existence of 
people (and all creatures) in God's creation. The shalom vision of people living 
together in society in unity, peace and harmony springs from an understanding of 
the social order which God intended in creation. This sociality is determined by 
justice. The nature of this justice needs examination before I can proceed to argue 
that it may be mediated through the work of those who attempt to establish true 
sociality in (sometimes unconscious) accordance with God's intention. 
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An examination of the biblical understanding of justice reveals that it is a 
concept much broader in scope and richer in meaning than it may have for us, given 
the more narrowly juridical meaning attached to it by the modern mind, with its 
Western presuppositions influenced by Roman legal thought.18 
The main term for justice in the Old Testament, righteousness, cuts right 
across our narrow ideas of justice;19 in the Old Testament there is no idea of 
personified impartial Justice, "blindfoldedly holding the scales in just equality",20 
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emuring that each person receives his or her due, in the classical understanding of 
distributive justice. Whereas it cannot be denied that the forensic or juridical sense 
is distinctly present in the biblical understanding of justice (some scholars assert 
that it is fundamental and predominant21), the positive and salvific qualities which 
'justice' signifies in the Bible are more consistent with the picture that emerges of 
God's acts and of His nature. An emphasis on law as basis of the view of God in 
the Old Testament fails to take account of the fact that "behind the detailed laws 
of Israel stands a more fundamental and ethical truth concerning the character of 
God himself - his justice".22 It is my contention that justice is the essence of God's 
nature, since no idea is more pervasive in the Old Testament than that God is a 
God of righteousness and justice.23 The fundamental use of the term justice or 
righteousness in the Old Testament is to describe the nature of God: "Righteous-
ness is God's name, the very essence of his nature, that which stands for the person 
himself."24 
The concept of justice in the Old Testament is not static, but dynamic. Justice 
in society and justice between humans and God was understood much more in 
terms of action than of a state. A. B. Davidson states that like the word 'holy', justice 
"once expressed a physical action",23 and E . Jacob points out that "the prophets 
never exhort men to acquire righteousness as a quality or state, but they constantly 
ask that justice be practised".26 The evidence in the biblical material regarding 
justice is to be understood in highly personal, relational and action terms; in the 
Old Testament, righteousness is always understood in terms of relationship, 
whether between humans and God, or between humans themselves in their 
inter-personal dealings. 
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There is no single Hebrew term for justice; rather, there are two major terms 
- sedaqah and mishpat, and a number of cognates which are frequently interchange-
able and, in some cases, synonymous. For the greater part of its usage in the Old 
Testament, righteousness is synonymous with justice: "the term 'righteousness', 
which characterizes the sphere of divine justice, understood in Israel with special 
reference to Yahweh, becomes likewise the central term for human justice".27 S. 
C. Mott believes that the presence of justice is often veiled from the English reader 
by the ambiguity of the terms righteousness and judgement; and he suggests that 
when one sees these two words in the context of social responsibility or oppression, 
one can assume that justice would be a better translation.28 
The two major terms reveal the essentially social and relational nature of 
God's justice, and connect with my focus on the question of how the conditions of 
justice as right relationship can be conceived and secured so that a just human 
society may be formed. These conditions need to be conceived of in dialogical and 
dialectical, i.e. communicative, terms. If the justice of God is relational, then the 
conception of the society which it forms is one in which people are inseparably 
bound together in a search for a mutuality of understanding. The basis of society 
formed by God's justice is true intersubjectivity, in which persons have uncondi-
tional mutual regard for each other as created by God in his image. 
We have seen that the Genesis creation narratives refer to the intrinsic 
relationality of the whole creation. Our human creation together in the image of 
God means that no Christian theology should speak of individuals as isolated, 
individual entities. According to McFadyen, God's creating and sustaining activity 
generates the ontological structures of both personal and social existence, and 
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"indicates in outline the ideal form of and norm for personal and social life. The 
assertion that we are created in the divine image operates both as assertion of the 
way things are=an ontological given = and as an ideal regulating personal and social 
conduct. It is both an 'is' and an 'ought5".29 McFadyem's discussion of personhood 
and the creation of individuality in God's image iHwninates the issue of relation-
ality, because it helps us to understand that the divine image designates a way of 
being in relation to God and others which is made possible by God addressing us 
and entering into relationship with us, thereby calling us in response to enter into 
(right) relationship and dialogue with others. 
Our creation in the social image of the Trinitarian God means that there can 
be no 'pure' subjectivity, because humans, like the 'Persons' of the Trinity, are 
subjects in continuing and sustaining relationship, in dialogue, in communication. 
The important truth for a theory of justice analogously informed by the nature of 
God as Trinity is that the Persons of the Trinity are "neither simply modes of 
relation nor absolutely discrete and independent individuals, but Persons in rela-
tion and Persons only through relation. Persons exist only as they exist for others, 
not merely as they exist in and for themselves".30 Justice as right relationship 
requires this sense of existing for others, of unconditional regard and respect for 
the freedom, dignity and equality of the other. 
Right relationship at a societal level, or what I have called 'true sociality', 
requires acknowledgement and assimilation of the conception of personhood 
which springs from our creation in the image of God, namely that "being a person 
means existing-in-relationship".31 Correct individuality and sociality are thus 
achieved through the Trinitarian process of existing in and for others, through 
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non-coercive commiunicatiom. Hie profound intezpenetrafcion of the Persons in the 
Trinity32 provides the mode! for an totersubjectivity of unconditional mutual 
regard, for orienting oneself towards others, and for understanding one another 
from the perspective of the other.33 Justice as true sociality and right relationship 
requires intersubjectivity of the open, reciprocal, mutual and communicative kind 
present in the Triune life. The society which the justice of God forms ought to be 
a continuation of the 'society5 in the Trinity = an outpouring and overflowing of the 
divine being. 
The dialogical and intersubjective understanding of persons-in-society is 
derived from the social nature of our created being, and from the divine intention 
for us to live in right relationship (i.e. justice) in society. This understanding 
includes the recognition that we are who and what we are through our intrinsic 
relation to others, and that this relation is dependent on our capacity for genuinely 
open communication in reflection of the totally open, non-coercive communica-
tion of the Trinity. 
My emphasis on open communication, and harmonisation of human action 
through consensus, does not imply a conflict-free model of either the Trinity, or of 
the human society which reflects the divine 'society' within the Trinity. Nicholls 
has rightly pointed to the danger of trying to deduce a harmonious social order 
from a (distorted) trinitarian theology which eliminates the idea of conflict from 
the internal life of the Godhead.34 A conflict-free conception of the Trinity leads 
to a model of an integrated society devoid of conflict, achieved through totalita-
rianism and the denial of plurality. From a sociological point of view, Haferkamp 
(referring to the theories of conflict propounded by Lockwood and Dahrendorf) 
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argues that dissent and conflict are central elements off society, and are just as 
fundamental as consent and cooperation.35 
Nicholls, in his criticism of Leonardo Boff s adoption of this idealist model 
of the relation between theology and politics, argues that the "model of an inte-
grated society free from conflict might possibly be fitting for a sniall Franciscan 
friary, but not for a modern state".36 My endorsement of democratic consensus and 
harmony does not, however, preclude the notion of positive conflict. Nicholls is 
right to point out that conflict may be "a necessary and beneficent feature of human 
communities",37 because without permitting the expression of conflicting interests 
and claims, a society could hardly be said to be free or just: "Conflicting claims ... 
may provide a healthy dynamism, a stimulus to progress and the elimination of 
specific evils."38 My use of the communicative model of the Trinity to support my 
model of a harmonious and just society does not presuppose a simplistic or 
romantic understanding of the Trinity as bereft of conflict. Indeed, my emphasis 
on dialogue requires genuine differences, which are resolved ultimately through 
agreement and communication characterised by mutual regard. 
2.3 Slim, distorted! ©©mmyoteatlon and 'kmturml soeiality 
Creation theology presents a picture of the world not as pure chance but an 
"intentional fortuitousness"39 - a free and benevolent creation for the purpose of 
the self-communication of God's goodness, with the ultimate goal of his glorifica-
tion. Part of that freedom and benevolence was to bestow upon us the moral 
capacity and freedom to choose obedience or disobedience to God's will. To be 
obedient to God's will was, and is, to choose life and relationship; the freedom to 
make choices within the boundaries of duty makes genuine relationship possible, 
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to God and to others. The converse is also true: to abuse our freedom, to disobey 
God by rejecting his divinely intended sociality, is to disrupt God's ordered 
creation, which includes breaking relationship with him and with others. The 
scriptures recognise that creation did not stay as God intended it, but has been 
disturbed and broken by human sin. Whereas the Yahwist tradition in Genesis 3 
focuses on the nature of human sin (pride, arrogance and disobedience), the 
priestly tradition in Genesis 6 concentrates on the consequences of sin (corruption, 
violence, moral collapse into a sub-human state that falls far short of what those 
created in God's image are to be). 
The biblical narratives contain the recognition that disobedience to God 
breaks the harmony of creation and unleashes sin, evil and injustice which continue 
to escalate in the world, fracturing the wholeness of the created order, especially 
social relations. The Bible speaks not only of the reality of sin and its consequences, 
but also of grace and redemption in the form of liberation and salvation. Already 
in one of the earliest traditions in the Bible the creative work of God, in calling 
Israel into being through divine deliverance (Exodus 3), is tied to God's role as 
Redeemer. Genesis 6 records the virtual "uncreation" of the world in the flood, 
after which God renews and guarantees the creation (Genesis 9). The scriptures 
develop the role of God as both Creator and Redeemer as they record the history 
of the people of Israel, who were called into being to play an essential part in God's 
redemptive purpose for a broken creation. 
The role of justice in redemption is to re-order the chaos created by human 
sin, and to set the creation free from its bondage (cf. Rom, 8:21) through the agency 
of one who would be the embodiment of God's justice. This agent is depicted in 
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the Suffering Servant passages of Isaiah, and is revealed most fully in the person 
of Jesus as the justice of God. The socio-political significance of Jesus' person, 
ministry, teaching and actions can be interpreted and cast in terms of communica-
tion and justice theory, as I propose to do. However, this argument must be 
preceded by a discussion of the deleterious effect of sin on the human capacity for 
communication, relation and sociality. 
The Trinitarian God in whose image we are made is intrinsically social and 
therefore properly (i.e dialogically) communicative and relational. In creating us 
in his image, God structures our relationship with him as a dialogue. The paradigm 
for human existence in the image of God is relatedness, the image representing an 
ideal codification of relations which nonetheless require realisation in concrete 
form in society. The image is not an essence or a static substance, but a form of 
relation: it denotes the creation of all human beings for a life of relationship with 
God and with others. Relationship is essentially an encounter between distinct, 
different, autonomous yet interdependent partners who engage or communicate 
with each other on the basis of freedom rather than coercion. The essence of the 
partners' communication is mutuality and reciprocity, not out of self-interest but 
out of an unselfish orientation towards the other. Mutuality rather than domination 
is what is intended in God's creation of human beings. The structural openness and 
orientation towards the other are a social refraction of these qualities in our 
relation with God. 
The communication between partners is (or should be) a reflection of the 
fundamentally non-coercive, open communication within the Trinity, and which 
overflows in God's communication of his goodness in creation. The import which 
The Justice of God 84 
a dialogical understanding of relation has for justice as normative legitimacy is 
contained in the recognition that relationship, as a dialogical encounter with the 
aim of mutual understanding, has a structure of open question and answer, of 
discussion and argumentation. The open and mutual consideration by distinct, 
autonomous yet interrelated partners produces an open, mutual and respectful 
questioning of each by the other with regard to their needs and interests. The major 
characteristic of God's gracious communication is that it is genuinely dialogical: it 
respects our freedom, difference and independence, and permits us to respond 
freely, even if the precondition of our autonomy in relation contains the possi-
bilities of misunderstanding and disobedience.40 
Our relational structure of freedom in God's image means that we are 
fulfilled personally and socially when we reciprocate the open address of God and 
of the other. A stance in relation based on anything else than openness and 
unconditional regard for the other assumes that relationship can be established by 
power, thus departing from the model of God's non-coercive communication and 
distorting communication and relation. Although God's address constitutes our 
ontological structure as relational and social, the freedom which is created with 
this structure may be distorted by rejection of dialogue-partnership, both with God 
and with others. McFadyen, in his analysis of our relational nature, claims that 
"human being is always in the image of God because it is constituted by God's 
prevenient, creative communication as abeing-in-response.... We live and breathe 
within the parameters set by the divine intention in communication of dialogue-
partnership with God as a more or less distorted image of and response to God".41 
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The refusal to reciprocate the intention of God's communication is to distort his 
image in us. 
This refusal is tantamount to disobedience, which the biblical tradition 
considers to be the cause of sin. The story of the Fall in Genesis 3 is about the choice 
between orienting oneself in obedience to God and faithfulness to values tran-
scending oneself (otherness) or to oneself and one's own values and laws. The 
self-centred choice of self-constitution recognises as binding only those laws or 
values which are self-chosen, and "represents a reversal of creation since it is a 
rejection of the reality of God and the other as intrinsically related to oneself'.42 
The distortion of God's image which this sinful rejection causes has serious effects 
at societal level, where interpersonal relationships are transacted in the over-
arching structures of social relations. Right relationship or justice at this level forms 
a society in accordance with God's will; wrong relationships, i.e. those in which 
dialogue, mutuality, reciprocity and regard for the other are rejected, produce 
fractured sociality or injustice. Injustice in society is the result of sin having entered 
social structures, particularly in the form of the failure to engage in open communi-
cation with regard to socially formative norms, leading to the arbitrary use of power 
or domination. McFadyen suggests that the Christian doctrines of the Fall and 
Original Sin describe the distortions of human being through the fracture of 
relation with God and one another, and provide a way of talking about the 
accumulative effects of such distortions in subsequent generations.43 
The personal and structural effects of sin affect us all and distort the image 
of God in us, so that we relate to God and to one another in a distorted way. If 
social structures and social relations are distorted, the possibilities of enacting 
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justice to form and transform society appear to be severely limited. Distortions of 
God's image also prevent clear apprehension of the consequences of those very 
distortions; as I have already argued, historical circumstances have inhibited the 
range and depth of reflection, effectively permitting all kinds of injustice, exploi-
tation, repression and domination to go unquestioned and unchallenged, resulting 
in people's entrapment in unjust structures and preventing the formation of a truly 
just society. However, there is to the creative justice of God another dimension 
which, like critical theory, is performative in its critical reflectivity: this dimension 
is operative within the redemption category of the creation-redemption conti-
nuum, seeking to liberate from injustice and to restore the right social order which 
God intended in creation. In this sense justice has a transformative, ideology-criti-
cal function in the interest of the formation of society. 
The critique of ideology as a function of justice is an essential step toward the 
formation of society, because it exposes the illegitimate use of power and releases 
the imagination to achieve the alternative envisioned by those who perceive the 
truth, i.e God's will for harmonious and true sociality. Ideology-critique is evident 
in the primal literature of the Old Testament - in the fundamentally critical 
narrative of the Exodus, which is the governing paradigm of biblical faith. It is also 
to be found in the thought of the classical prophets, and in the life, teaching and 
(communicative) action of Jesus. The parables of Jesus are significant critical-the-
oretical instances of God's society-forming justice, because in and through them 
Jesus unmasks the oppressive ideology of the authorities, and engages in a particu-
lar form of communication with his antipathetic interlocutors to bring about an 
alternative perception of reality and a new understanding of living together in 
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society. I propose to examine this sodo-political fraction of justice in some of these 
areas of biblical testimony because it is necessary for establishing my argument that 
the critical purpose of justice goes beyond the exposure of illegitimate social 
institutions and authority, and envisages and calls for an ethical procedure which 
will secure mutual understanding and agreement about the principles and norms 
which form and guide society. 
Brueggemann has shown44 that the text of Exodus 1-15 is both a concrete 
historical memory and a primal transformative memory, cast as a liturgical para-
digm through which human experience is regularly and publicly processed. In the 
liturgical recital and enactment Israel constructs its own life and identity, beginning 
the process of forming its society anew. 
Using the categories from Habermas's systems theory, Brueggemann asserts 
that the Exodus narrative offers a very particular reading of the public reality in 
which Israel is enmeshed. It speaks of a public world that is "a network of techno-
logical instruments which are legitimated if not absolutised by religious and myth-
opoetic ideology".*5 Israel concedes that it participates in this lifeworld, but does 
not accept that locus as proper or normative, and so practises a liturgy which intends 
to subvert that seemingly absolute shaping of social reality. In the face of this 
enmeshment in a negative reality the Israelites were taught to recite a creed within 
a liturgy which identified them as members of a community in which one was 
authoritatively summoned to break the enmeshment, and in which one could rely 
on God, the agent of dismantling, deconstraction and deligitimation of the unjust 
oppressor.46 Brueggemann suggests that the whole liturgical life of Israel was an 
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act of "deconstractioa". ' The imperial arrangement which enslaved Israel and 
which was legitimated by imperial ideology was not to be accepted as normative, 
or deserving of respect or obedience. Although the Israelites knew themselves to 
be enmeshed they also knew that they were destined for freedom: the world in 
which they lived was under criticism and would not b© the world that was meant to 
be or was sure to come. Because the tedmologkal-ideological lifeworld was a 
contrivance (and not a given), it could be undone and dismantled, in order to 
arrange the world in an alternative way. 
The material of the critique of ideology in the Bible is not extensive, but it is 
central. It is contained in narrative literature, considered to be dangerous and 
subversive because it has transformative power to shatter old descriptions of reality 
and invite one into a differently described reality, thus contributing powerfully to 
the process of emancipation. Metz, following Marcuse, has further enriched our 
sense of the emancipatory potential of memory by suggesting that remembering is 
a way of mediation that can break through (even if momentarily) the fact of an 
oppressive situation.48 like critical theory, it proves to be personally and socially 
transformative, capable of changing reality because it is disjunctive and uncomfort-
able, and above all disclosive or revelatory: "The biblical text, because it is a classic 
which continues to reveal, intends not only to report on an ancient transformation 
but also to evoke and generate transformation in each new moment of its hear-
ing."49 Thus the Egyptian ideology and programme of oppression become a model 
for every social setting which is judged by God's people to fall short of the justice 
and humanity which God expects in society. The narrative in Exod. 1:2-14,5:7-9, 
17-19, is not intended to be scientific critique, but to unmask the ideology which 
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tries to conceal the oppression in Egypt: "Each new generation, as it participates 
in this narrative, learns how to make and engages in this social criticism of 
established power."50 
Brueggemann suggests that whereas we might wish for a more scientific 
analysis, the Israelite community did its serious critique in narrative form: "Israel 
knows that the dominant ideology will be destroyed by the proper telling of the 
story... The mode of story is the only way to get at the concreteness of hurt that 
will lead to action. The story both discloses how Israel was enslaved and mediates 
the power to undertake transformative, liberating action."51 What the story does 
is to generate a context in which critical awareness and faith can develop; in this 
context, faith is an assertion against the prevailing injustice and oppression, and "a 
conviction of the freedom and justice to come which requires dismantling of the 
imperial world".52 Critical awareness is crucial, because without it there cannot be 
social criticism, whose purpose is to create a basis for challenging injustice and 
dismantling oppression, i.e. bringing about justice in order to liberated and form a 
new and genuine society. 
While social criticism and ideology-critique are important, they are not 
sufficient to delegitimate an oppressive regime. According to Brueggemann, the 
power and authority to make a move of delegitimation in the face of imperial 
definitions of reality come from "the public processing of pain", by which he means 
"an intentional and communal act of expressing grievance which is unheard of and 
risky"53 - the subversive, revolutionary move expressed in the phrase "and we cried 
out". He contends that it is not revolutionary to experience pain, nor does the pain 
go unnoticed by the regime; but noticing the pain is not the same as processing it 
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publicly: "As long as persons experience their pain privately and in isolation, no 
social power is generated. That is why every regime has a law against assembly. 
When there is a meeting, there is social anger which generates risky, passionate 
social power."54 
Brueggemann's understanding of the power of the public processing of pain 
is an extremely important insight into the way in which oppressive power can be 
delegitimated, but we cannot consider it fully here because it draws us into the 
theology of pain and lament.55 For our purposes it is sufficient to stress the 
importance of the cry of pain, in that it proclaims a refusal to bow down before 
dominating ideology, and begins the formation of a counter-community around an 
alternative perception of reality. Metz, too, points to the capacity of a dangerous 
memory of a history of suffering to shatter unquestioning submissiveness to the 
past and thus to assist the process of liberation.56 In Brueggemann's view, the 
Bible's most dangerous insight is the pivotal power of pain. This pain is the effect 
of sin; it is caused by distorted relationships, which follow the distortion of God's 
image through the rejection of dialogical relation and open, other-regarding 
communication, leading to fractured sociality, oppression and injustice. This in-
sight tells against all ideologies which function by cover-up, whitewash and denial: 
"It is precisely the public processing of pain that permits and evokes redescription 
which gives a chance for newness."57 The ideology-critical function of the Exodus 
narrative permits no ideology to cover up the pain and injustice which is the crucial 
element in the reality of the community. 
Ideology-critique in the service of justice and the formation of a just society 
is present in the prophetic tradition as well. The prophetic tradition in the Bible is 
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not confined to the prophetic corpus in the Canon but is present wherever God is 
presented as opposing evil, bringing justice and seeking to redeem and restore; it is 
a fertile source for understanding the nature of God's justice. According to 
Muilenberg, the prophets served as covenant mediators in the tradition of Moses 
and other earlier figures, representing the covenant demands of God to the people 
and calling them to task when those demands were ignored or broken.58 They 
courageously opposed all forces which might diminish the people's relational 
commitment to God and to one another. God is proclaimed as just throughout the 
Bible, but the ethical element in the understanding of justice is advanced pre-emi-
nently by the classical prophets who are the major exponents of the concept. 
Although the sense of forensic right is present in their use of the terms for justice, 
they elevate the whole idea to a higher, moral plane, so that in its most developed 
form (in Deutero-Isaiah) it acquires a universal significance. 
In a situation of injustice, corruption, exploitation and oppression, like that 
which prevailed in Israel in the 8th century B.C., there is an urgent need for a 
witness and call to God's righteousness (justice), based on the conviction that 
"social justice is the necessary and inexorable demand of [Yahweh's] moral na-
ture".59 This witness and call were provided by Amos primarily, but also by the 
other classical prophets who followed the same ideal of righteousness. The classical 
prophets recognised that God willed to make himself known in history, and that 
God manifested his holiness in justice and righteousness. According to Muilen-
berg, "Prophetic faith is faith in a singular, transcendent, holy, absolutely righteous 
God, a God who wills to live in community and to create his community among 
[people] ".60 
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Although the standard form of prophetic criticism is juridical, and is cast in 
the language of judgement and sentence, there is behind the prophetic compulsion 
to criticise a more basic critical awareness, based on a deep reflection on, and 
refined appreciation of, the multi=dimensional nature of God's righteousness and 
justice. For the prophets, righteousness is right relationship in society; it functions 
as a critical principle to expose and condemn unjust social practice which violates 
God's intentions, and the distorted faith of the religious establishment which 
reduces religion to an ideology that serves to legitimate their "crassest vested 
interests".61 If we adopt Brueggemann's motif of "history-making" to examine the 
function of God's justice in working through the historical process to form society, 
we can see how the Bible presents a very different characterisation of shaping the 
socio-political realm, i.e. of history-making. 
This characterisation, for which there is a warrant in the prophetic tradition, 
includes an insight which is essential to my argument that society is formed by 
people entering some kind of public discourse about the legitimacy of norms and 
principles which determine the satisfaction of the needs and interests of all. The 
people who are prepared to use the ideal kind of communication which this 
requires are often those who live at the edge of society, where alternatives are 
thinkable and possible in terms of an imagination not yet co-opted by those in 
power. This insight indicates that history-making is done through "the voice of 
marginality"62, and can be seen as "the free give-and-take of parties over new sets 
of power settlements that are made possible through honest, risky communication. 
That, of course, is not a conventional understanding of history... My urging is that, 
from its basic premises on, that history is the arena of the Holy One allied with the 
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marginal people to create newness". 3 Marginal voices are those who, like the 
prophet Jeremiah, engage in ideology-critique, who keep audible the cry of pain, 
who are not afraid to be labelled idealistic and visionary, who present to the world 
the possibility of forming a genuine society based on and achieved through the 
justice of God. The prophets, and prophetic figures in any generation, have the task 
of penetrating and disclosing official history and ideology which tries to cover up 
human hurt and suffering in the wake of injustice, which denies the existence of 
social justice64 and even denies the existence of society65. These voices do not 
succumb to the dominant definition of reality, to conventional epistemology, to 
accepted standards of duplicity, manipulation, and other forms of systematically 
distorted communication which prevent the formation of right relationship and 
true sociality. 
These voices of marginality are the voices of the prophets, the real history-
makers.66 It is they who employ the critique of ideology to dismantle unjust and 
illegitimate structures, and find ways to form society anew, in accordance with the 
will and justice of God. Theirs is an unsettling kind of history-making, even 
unacceptable, because it destabilises (illegitimate) power. In a sense, their awk-
ward questions provoke the equivalent of a legitimation crisis (see pp. 49ff. above). 
It is not fanciful to find in the consciousness of the prophets a sophisticated sense 
of social reality, or the ability to ask sophisticated socio-theoretical questions about 
the legitimacy of power; for example, Jeremiah 22:13-17 is a very radical text which 
asks what is the definition of kingship, and more generally what are the true marks 
of legitimate and just power.67 
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The ideology-critical function of justice is to delegitimate those settled 
arrangements of power, for there is a tendency for such arrangements to become 
permanent and absolute, beyond all criticism, with virtually unlimited potential for 
injustice of every kind. The function of justice here is not simply a matter of asking 
that social resources be fairly distributed, because such requests do not penetrate 
the ideology of those who have the power to make such decisions; it is to penetrate 
and unmask illusion and the coercive and arbitrary use of power. The prophets 
understood that this meant engaging in a process of subverting institutional forms 
of power that have become absolutised in favour of some at the expense of others, 
but at the same time proclaiming a vision of how things ought to be in a society in 
accordance with God's intention. They understood the abiding truth of the moral 
social order which God intended, that harmony depends upon justice as right 
relationship in society, that right conduct matters decisively in determining true 
sociality. 
In the prophetic consciousness, righteousness or justice refers to that host of 
cognate qualities like equity, humaneness, lovingkindness, mutuality, uncondi-
tional regard for the other, etc., which need to be practised in society. Isaiah 9:7 
proclaims that the public order is ordained to justice and righteousness. It would 
be fair to say that the classical prophets of social justice shared Jeremiah's con-
fidence in the moral coherence of the moral order, in spite of empirical evidence 
that the world is ordered in other ways, as though public life could be administered 
by might, technique, intimidation, self-interest, brutality and other manifestations 
of the abuse of power. 
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In recognition of the righteous character of God and the desired expression 
of that righteousness in society, the prophets engaged in social criticism, raising 
inescapable questions about the shapes of power, and employing ideology-critique 
to speak truth to power. They recognised that those who abuse power, who are 
"skilled in doing evil" and do not know how to do good (Jer. 4:22), will be crushed 
by the moral power and the rale of God in the historical process. They also 
recognised that those who abuse power set up devious structures to extenuate their 
grip on power, using religion to legitimate their rule, or, as Brueggemann puts it, 
"to melt the reality of God down into the system of governance, so that the present 
order comes to be an embodiment of God's will, i.e. the created order".68 
The same tendency is observable in modern times, where religion is reduced 
to "privatism, personalism and immanentism, so that God is remarkably congenial 
to the way things are".69 In such situations, prophetic figures - "history-makers" -
must use dangerous speech and subversive images to shake the theological indif-
ference of those who believe that they can co-opt and domesticate God. The 
challenging of dominant ideology, and of the power which it seeks to legitimate, 
although grounded in discerning social criticism, extends beyond the desire to 
analyse what is going on in society, and beyond the critique of social malpractices 
and injustice. It mounts an alternative, articulates a hopeful vision of new life and 
seeks to implement it in the strength of God. Even in the apparently hopeless and 
bleak prophecy of Amos, or in the bewildered cries of those who raise the issue of 
theodicy, there is the presupposition that something better exists, or ought to exist. 
In the case of Amos's condemnation of the injustice of the rulers of his time, 
behind the condemnation is an apprehension of a different set of norms, principles 
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and rules. Jeremiah's famous and subversive question70 suggests that the system is 
not working in an acceptable way. The act of social criticism here implies that there 
is an alternative which is acceptable. Heller states a fundamental truth about social 
criticism in her remark that "one cannot criticise existing norms and rules without 
proposing alternative ones",71 or at least an alternative procedure for establishing 
a different social arrangement. Heller's point is based on the recognition that by 
declaring certain social arrangements (and their underlying norms) unjust, "we 
already form in our mind (in communication with certain others) the idea of 
different norms and rules which have the telos, or at least the potential, to constitute 
social clusters different from existing ones".72 In the same way, the function of 
social analysis is to discover what is going on around us in order to mount an 
alternative. This was the role of the prophets in their social criticism and demand 
for social justice. 
Behind the prophets' condemnation of injustice, behind then* warnings of the 
breakdown in the social order if God's righteousness and justice were not reflected 
in people's relationships and conduct (Hos. 4:lb-2, Isa. 5:7b), behind their an-
nouncement of the doom which would follow on God's necessary judgement of 
Israel's sin (Amos 5:18-20, Isa. 24:5b-6a, etc.), is a deeper awareness of the Divine 
compassion (Isa. 54:7-8,10) and of God's redemptive purposes for the world (Isa. 
2:1-4, Mic. 4:1-4), to restore it through justice to what God had intended in creation. 
We can derive some idea of what God intends for all human society from eschato-
logical pictures of what the restored Kingdom of God would be like (Isa. 32:16-18, 
11:6-9, etc.). The prophets' radical notion of God's universal concern and love is 
closely connected with the notion of God as creator of a social order characterised 
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by his divine attributes of love, mercy, justice and peace, i.e, by the marks of his 
kingdom. The divine attributes of mercy and compassion, which are cognates of 
justice and integral components of God's nature, give us further insights into the 
nature of God's justice. The two most prominent characteristics of God's justice 
are that it is: 
a) relational, i.e social; it is concerned for the establishment of community and 
the formation of a societal order that values the worth of every person before 
God and seeks their right relationship (at every level - with God, with others, 
and in social systems or structures); 
b) concerned for the welfare of the marginal and vulnerable in society. God's 
justice, in the prophets' view, is not equal justice for all, but a special justice 
for the poor and weak. 
As special concern for the vulnerable, the justice of God requires attention 
to the cases of the poor, the needy, the widow, the orphan, and the weak who in 
the face of a range of injustices were in need of advocates. The prophets became 
these advocates. However, concern for the vulnerable is not confined to the 
prophets, but is characteristic of the entire Judeo-Christian tradition. The Israelite 
understanding of God's justice was enshrined in its legal codes and legislation, 
whose aim was the protection of those at greatest disadvantage. Paul Hanson notes 
that Israel's laws articulate "a community ideal dedicated to justice embracing all 
members and emphasising compassion to those whose economic [and] social status 
make them vulnerable to abuse".73 The social laws of the Pentateuch also provide 
evidence of codes which stress the need for justice, especially for the poor and 
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needy.' The Psalms indicate a strong consciousness of the duty of the Israelite 
king to protect the weak, the poor, widows and orphans.75 
The same understanding of God's justice is found in the teaching of Jesus in 
the Gospels, especially Matt. 25:3 Iff., where Jesus identifies himself with the poor 
and needy. The lesson in this famous parable of the Last Judgement is that those 
who concern themselves with the weak and suffering members of humanity are 
touched, even saved, by the justice of God, because they have served His Son who 
incarnates justice. The adoption of advocacy for the poor, weak and needy "sug-
gested that these most vulnerable and their welfare are the most adequate 
measures of justice and righteousness in the community. It is the task of the 
covenant community to secure value and place for full life to those most unable to 
secure it for themselves".76 The implication of the prophetic example is that the 
same task faces Christians, who must seek a social charter which will secure justice 
in similar terms. 
The message of the prophets was not simply one of condemnation and the 
impending wrath of God; the prophetic message is of a piece with the overall 
biblical vision of hope,77 and with the biblical presentation of God not merely as 
an abiding presence but as the speaker of a kerygma, a new Word who transforms 
reality by breaking open all that is settled, routine and conventional.78 Bruegge-
mann's analysis of the characteristic rhetorical pattern of prophetic utterance 
shows that the prophets proclaim a day when "the dominant order of things as we 
have known it will be terminated"79 to be replaced by a wholly new order. This 
dreamed-of and promised order will be characterised by the vanquishing of fear, 
insecurity, inequality, oppression, injustice, and by all the qualities summed up in 
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the rich biblical concept of shcdom (see, for example, Mic. 4:1-5, Isa. 2:1-5). 
Ezekiel's vision (Ezek. 34:25=31) indicates that it will be a restoration of the order 
which God intended in creation, in which "all relationships will be as they were 
envisioned in the uncontaminated anticipation of the creation narratives of Gen-
esis I " . 8 0 The prophetic hop© for this new order is not private, spiritual, romantic, 
or other-worldly: "It is always social, historical, political, economic. The dream of 
God and the hope of Israel are for the establishment of a new social order which 
will embody peace, justice, freedom, equity, and well-being."81 
What will form this order, this new society, is justice. Although it cannot be 
established by human plans, human knowledge and human power alone, God 
brings about this order incarnationally through human agency, empowered by the 
Holy Spirit, who may be considered as the energy and life-force, organising and 
sustaining human society by justice in communicative terms. If the Holy Spirit is 
conceived of as organising life, and the Word as ordering Logos giving form to life, 
then where the Spirit and Word co-inhere they create undistorted and open 
structures of relatedness which are necessary for the formation of a just society. 
McFadyen's Christian theory of personhood has shown that life cannot be lived in 
isolation, as an internal and private process; an unrelated and separated being 
ultimately disintegrates and dies.82 The Holy Spirit, who breathes life into the 
world and with the Word creates relationships and organises social existence, is a 
Spirit of communication: 
In the social world ... the Spirit's activity is normative for communica-
tion ... [and informs a social ethic]. In social terms the power of the Spirit 
is operative in breaking open hard structures of distorted communica-
tion in order to establish dialogue and community...83 
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God's choice to mediate his communicative, sodety-fonmrag justice through 
human agency is, in a sense, a necessity, for it is dependent upon the related 
structure of human being and of Ms whole creation. His justice does not operate 
coercively by divine fiat, which would violate human freedom and responsibility. 
Although he both commands and demands justice, he respects the relational 
structure of our being to establish the just social order which he desires and intends 
through communication. Such an understanding of God's justice is consistent with 
his non-coercive and communicative nature, and helps us to see that the activity of 
the Holy Spirit in the social world is primarily to prompt us to an orientation toward 
others. 
This understanding of justice is embodied in the teaching and communicative 
praxis of Jesus who, as the Incarnate Righteousness of God, is the ultimate 
mediation of God's justice, and who is the Justice of God (I Cor. 1:30,2 Cor. 5:21). 
This conception of Jesus needs to be elaborated before we can continue our search 
for a modern theory of justice which can be interpreted as an explication, even a 
mediation, of God's justice as it appears in Christ. 
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To understand the call, the ministry, the mission and the person of Jesus as 
the justice of God requires an exercise of 're-imaging' Jesus in terms of justice.84 
The reason that this exercise is necessary is the continuing emphasis by most 
leaders and teachers in the Church on the other-worldly nature of Jesus' mission, 
and of Christianity in general. Contrary to the dominant and prevailing view that 
the Christian faith is concerned with the relationship of the individual soul to God 
(often summed up in the ignorant slogan "no politics in religion and no religion in 
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politics"), it needs to be asserted vigorously that the Christian faith is directly 
concerned with social and political matters, and should issue in conduct oriented 
toward achieving a just society which conforms to the Hnd of society which God 
desires and designs by his justice. The prevalence of the doctrine that Christian 
faith orients human beings toward achieving a personal and individual relationship 
with God is one of the principal causes for not recognising how much JJesus was 
concerned with social justice. It is also one of the main causes for the split between 
faith and the daily life of Christians, and is a serious error according to Vatican I I . 8 5 
To assert that Jesus was intensely concerned with justice may be surprising 
in view of the fact that there is little direct teaching about justice in the New 
Testament; certainly no comprehensive or systematic theory of justice is given by 
Jesus or any of the New Testament writers. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the 
teaching of Jesus, particularly in the parables of the Kingdom of God which are 
dominated by the theme of justice,86 that he understood the justice of God in the 
full relational sense of the Old Testament, and for him God was the same God of 
justice as presented by the prophets of the Old Testament. Christians see him as 
embodying this justice, so Haughey's assessment of the power released by Jesus' 
life, death and resurrection supplies an important insight into the way in which 
justice is to be established: 
The truth of his person was the only political "form" he used. This form 
released its power primarily through his death and resurrection. The 
price then for the establishment of justice was his own life. The primary 
medium of Christian justice after Jesus, one could argue, is still the 
person who, like Jesus, stands in the truth the Spirit gives one to see. 
This truth unmasks untruth even when that untruth is systematised and 
ensconced in political social and religious power configurations that 
appear impregnable. 
The Justice of God 102 
This insight points to the close connection between truth and justice, and to 
the way in which Jesus engaged in communicative action towards others, both in 
his teaching and in his argumentation with his opponents. It is my contention that 
it is possible to derive from the praxis off Jesus in the society of his time a model of 
interaction which would assist the search for a method or procedure to establish 
social justice. This contention depends on a new and different understanding of 
Jesus' life and justice-working actions in terms of a theological theory of communi-
cative action. Peukert, Siebert and Arens have shown how it is possible to construct 
such a theology from Habermas's theory of communicative action.88 
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Edmund Arens, in particular, has interpreted the parables of Jesus as instances 
of communicative action, claiming that they incorporate ideology-critique, nar-
rative argumentation, and metaphorical yet performative language, designed to 
bring about an altered perception of reality, a revised orientation of action, and 
agreement or consensus through practical discourse about the norms which create 
just society. His pragmatic parable theory is directed toward a paradigmatic 
understanding of Jesus' parables as speech acts; Arens asserts that this under-
standing has to be paradigmatic for theology, because in his view Christian speech 
about God can only take place if Jesus' narrative theology is comprehended in 
terms of action paradigms.89 
For the purposes of this section, the briefest explanation of communicative 
action90 is that it is action which is oriented toward achieving mutual under-
standing, agreement and consensus. Arens, starting from the "theologically quali-
fied actions"91 of Jesus, and from the fundamental insights of the modern 
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philosophical theory of communication and action, understands theology as a 
theory of action with practical intent, and not as a theory of religious knowledge 
with its traditional concentration on doctrine.92 He asserts that, in his view, 
"Christian theology... has its origin in Jesus' communicative action".93 He applies 
the theory of communicative action to the discourses of Jesus and his opponents, 
especially to the parables about the Kingdom of God; he sees Jesus both as a 
story-teller and as a partner in discourse, passionately engaged in the struggle for 
recognition of the Kingdom of God, which envisages the kind of society God 
intends.94 
A theological appropriation of communication theory, especially universal-
pragmatic reflection on the double structure of everyday speech, produces the 
insight that almost every act of speech can be seen as communicative action 
between subjects about a certain subject matter. The communicative function of 
Jesus' parables can be clarified by recourse to these universal-pragmatic reflec-
tions. In standard speech-act theory, an utterance or speech-act consists of a) a 
sentence of prepositional content and b) a performative sentence which establishes 
the illocutionary force of the utterance, i.e. the doing of something in saying 
something. Understanding between speaker and listener comes about only when 
they come to a consensus at the level of intersubjectivity about the interpersonal 
relationship established by the performative sentence, and at the level of experi-
ence and perception about the propositional content. They must connect these two 
dialectically, recognising that what is at stake is not only the truth of the proposi-
tional content, but the attempt, even struggle, to establish mutual regard and 
respect through language. Arens discerns this double structure and linguistically-
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mediated struggle to establish right relationship in the New Testament texts, 
especially in Jesus' parables, which can be interpreted as parabolic speech acts95 
that aim at achieving mutual understanding and consensus about action orientation 
among his hearers. 
The original illocutionary force of Jesus' parabolic speech acts is objectified 
because it is preserved (as far as it is possible to discern this) in the text. A 
theological analysis using universal pragmatics examines Jesus' parables, relating 
the content and relational aspects to each other by trying to reconstruct the original 
illocutive act, and asks what Jesus wanted to reach an understanding about with his 
listeners. This analysis discovers that Jesus' interactive behaviour is the self-expli-
cation of his speech acts: in his speech acts he offers to his listeners a genuinely 
intersubjective, non-coercive relationship, based on unconditional mutual regard; 
his non-verbal, interactive behaviour is a reflection and enactment of the right 
relationship he intends in his speech acts. The form and content of Jesus' parables 
are not separate, but dialectically one, in the sense that they require each other: 
the propositional content of his parables corresponds to his illocutive acts and thus 
appears in his interactive behaviour. Jesus' parabolic action is communicative 
action, because in the telling of his stories the illocutionary force of his statements 
is such as to produce a relationship, even if it is initially offered unilaterally and 
proleptically. 
Although the reconstruction of the illocutionary force or illocutive act of 
Jesus' communication is contentious, an analysis of Jesus' parables as speech acts 
shows that he tries to come to an understanding with his opponents, mostly the 
Pharisees. The major conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees is, in a sense, a social 
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justice dispute: it is about bis solidarity with sinners and particularly with the poor 
"who at the time were often enough identical".95 The dispute between Jesus and 
the Pharisees concerns his and their different understandings of reality and the 
action-orientation based on them; Arens maintains that the dispute is one "over 
the question of how the reality of God and his reign was to be understood".97 The 
way that Jesus tries to deal with this situation and settle the dispute is by attempting 
to come to an understanding with his opponents: he does so by telling plausible 
stories and parables, in which the prepositional content has theological references 
comprehensible to his opponents,98 for example about the Kingdom of God ("The 
Kingdom of God is like..." - see Mk. 4:26ff., 30f.f; 10:14; Matt 13:24ff.; Lk. 13:18ff.; 
17:20f.; 18:16f.). The parables contain an offer of relationship, or an invitation to 
a discourse, in which Jesus' opponents are challenged to ratify the intersubjectivity 
he offers, by their own communicative action with him and with others. Arens says 
that we can define Jesus' illocutive acts as "communicating", "offering", "inviting".99 
Jesus offers his understanding of reality to his opponents, and invites them to enter 
a new form of action. Arens here speaks of the perlocutive act or effect, which is 
not entirely in the power of the speaker but is proleptically envisioned through the 
parable as "convincing" or, in theological terms, "converting".100 
The connection between the parable's prepositional content and the illocu-
tive act is vital for understanding Jesus' communicative action in bringing about 
justice: the matter [Sache] or proposition^ content which is mediated in the 
illustration of the parable, e.g., the Kingdom of God, is not separate from the 
Kingdom of God which Jesus inaugurates and enacts through the telling of the 
parable, with its illocutionary force. The parable simultaneously tells of the king-
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dom (content) and in the telling brings it about (form); thus form and content are 
one. The semantic content of Jesus' parables requires the illocutionary form, from 
which it receives its pragmatic meaning; conversely, the form is made non-ambigu-
ous through its content. The intersubjectivity which Jesus desires, including the 
dominion of God as the "co-thematised subject" [mitskemadsieste Sacks der Gleich-
nisseJesu] of Jesus' parables, is realised through the interaction structure mediated 
through the close relation of the parable's prepositional content and illocutive 
act. 1 0 1 Jesus indirectly "linguifies" the reality of God and his dominion [Gottesherrs-
chaft] which must be understood, according to Arens, from a linguistic perspective. 
The consequence of understanding parabolic speech about the Kingdom of God 
in pragmatic-linguistic terms is that it is mediated in the very act of communication: 
nothing can be said about the kingdom without it being enacted at the same time, 
and without people being invited into it and to participate in i t . 1 0 2 
If the parables of God's kingdom are formulated as "quasi-discursive speech" 
in terms of Habermas's universal-pragmatic categories, a problem arises with 
regard to two validity claims103 of Jesus' communicative action: the truth of his 
verbal expressions, and the tightness of his actions (or of the norms underlying his 
praxis). Jesus' action, in Habermas's terminology, is characterised by an absence 
of background consensus between him and his Pharisaic opponents, because they 
doubt the truth of his assertions about God and the lightness of his actions. There 
is deep dissent about Jesus' praxis with regard to tax-collectors and other sinners; 
and about bis violation of ritual and cultic commandments which constitute and 
stabilise the Pharisaic construction of reality.104 
The Justice of God 107 
The controversy about the legitimacy of Jesus' praxis is really about the truth 
of what he says about God, a controversy about the reality of God. 1 0 5 Arens notes 
that the disputed truth-claim of Jesus' speech and the righmess-claim of his praxis 
do not constitute two separate and independent validity claims, but (according to 
Habermas' thought on theoretical and practical discourse105) converge at the point 
of the radicalisation of discursive engagement which fuses knowledge and action, 
theory and praxis: the truth of Jesus' speech cannot be asserted without rightful 
actions directly corresponding to that speech. This recalls the teaching of Jesus 
according to St. John, that the truth liberates only when it is done: Jn. 3:21, 8:32. 
Arens follows the Habermasian understanding of speech acts in order to show that 
in the parables of Jesus, the truth-claim of his speech acts is proved by their 
self-obligating character and by the actions which correspond to them.1 0 7 
The parables of Jesus do not provide knowledge in the form of a systematic 
set of propositions about God, but an indirect theology in which he tells stories that 
show the listeners that their behaviour toward God and others should be just and 
right, and in which they can see Jesus acting in accordance with the truth of these 
stories. The norm underlying this right behaviour recommended in the parable 
must, nevertheless, be justified, for a proposed course of action, even in a parable, 
cannot avoid the discursive grounding of theoretical religious truth-claims or 
practical rightness-claims. This discursive grounding occurs in discourse, which 
serves to achieve a consensus. As I show in chapter 4, the arguments in practical 
discourse take the form of suggestions for the justification of a norm which is 
recommended for acceptance and is regarded as universalis able. The norm finds 
a rationally motivated recognition when a universal interest is perceived in it, and 
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when it receives mutually confirmed, "illusion-free" validation.108 Arens, following 
Habermas's advocatory model of "simulated discourse", contends strongly that 
Jesus' parables can be understood as narrative or quasi-discursive arguments which 
reflect Jesus' straggle for unconditional recognition by his opponents of the reign 
or Kingdom of God; the Kingdom of God includes the liberation of the people, 
leading to participation in establishing a just polity and a society in accordance with 
God's will. Through these narrative arguments Jesus tries to achieve agreement 
between himself and his opponents. 
Arens claims that Jesus' parables can be understood as quasi-discursive 
speech since they serve the justification of the lightness of his action.109 Jesus' 
illustrations can be compared, in certain features, with Habermas's mode of 
practical discourse, and their communicative function can be explicated within 
Habermas's paradigm. With his parables, Jesus pursues not only the apologetic aim 
of justifying his praxis, but also the aim of consensually settling the conflict between 
himself and the Pharisees. He tries to convince them of the lightness of his actions, 
or of the norms underlying them, by struggling in quasi-discursive speech which 
anticipates understanding. He does this through parables which are "metaphorisch-
ironisch-verfremdend", showing his opponents the folly [Unsinnigkeit] of their be-
haviour, bound to particularistic interests and norms.110 Jesus does this, according 
to Habermasian categories of communicative action, in view of the universality, 
egality and reciprocity of human communication as condition and normative 
foundation of being human, in view of what Jesus calls the Kingdom of God which 
all should enter, and in view of what is systematically theologically called the 
universality of God's will to redeem [der UniversaUtdt des Heilswillens Gottes].111 
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Arens is most insistent that a pragmatic theory of parables, which explicates 
the theologically relevant structure of action by action-theoretical means, does not 
reduce theology to the theory of communicative action.112 Although he parallels 
the language of Habermas's theory of communicative action, of Jesus, and of 
systematic theology, there is in this exercise no identification of these languages. 
Arens's pragmatic theory of Jesus' parables is intended to clarify certain theological 
problems in the "fundamental-pragmatically grounded action-theoretical frame-
work" with the help of categories worked out by pragmatics. The purpose of this 
approach, in contradistinction to linguistic-literary-scientific approaches to Jesus 
as a story-teller, is to focus on the public, i.e. political intention and effect of Jesus' 
communicative action. This approach permits the development of a political 
hermeneutics with regard to talk about Jesus' communicative praxis and his 
understanding of theology in terms of action. 
According to Arens, the quasi-discursive speech of Jesus' parables is at the 
same time ideology-critical, argumentative and analogical. Jesus' parables expose 
the principle of the Pharisees' interpretation of reality as ideology for the purpose 
of legitimating their collective identity, which is based on the exclusion of fringe 
groups of marginalised and alien people. The Pharisees identify themselves over 
against the impure as the Perushim, the pure. Jesus' parables tear down "the fence 
of the Law" which sanctions the Pharisaic construction of reality, by "fiktional-meta-
phorisch vermittelter narrativer Argumentation".1^ In both his speech acts and in 
his non-verbal action Jesus exposes the Pharisees' construction of reality as a 
lifeworld and social order built on the excommunication of people stigmatised as 
impure. He also exposes their ideological claim that God's will legitimates this 
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social order. On the basis of the reality of God and bis dominion, Jesus presents 
God as prevenient, absolute goodness and love who excommunicates nobody. At 
the same time as Jesus questions the Pharisees' interpretation of reality, built on 
the antagonism between im-group and out-group, he questions their ideological 
image of God, which corresponds to their particularistic, ideological construction 
of social reality. Against their interpretation of reality Jesus sets up an under-
standing of the self and the world which is grounded in the principle of universal 
communication, which principle is itself grounded in God (as absolute love, 
freedom and spirit). According to Arens, this new understanding of self and world 
seeks to realise the principal of universal communication in practical engagement, 
as the communicative movement toward the other and in the other toward God. 
In this way Arens applies Habermas's atheistic theory of communicative action to 
Jesus' discourses and his struggle for unconditional mutual recognition, between 
humans and God, and between humans themselves.114 In this sense, Habermas's 
work illuminates the task of forming society, and may be interpreted as a medium 
of the justice of God. 
The ideology-critical achievement of Jesus' parables consists in the fact that 
through them Jesus removes the 'legitimate' theological basis of the Pharisees' 
interpretation of reality and of their orientation of action. In Habermasian terms, 
he does this in his examples by not simply reclaiming their ultimate unity-producing 
principle - God - as the founding principle of another worldview, but by demon-
strating the reality of God in communicative praxis as the Reality which breaks 
through all domination-determined [herrschaftbestimmien] relations and social 
order constructs.115 The social order which God desires and intends, and in which 
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he provides an example in the person of Jesus who inaugurates the kingdom, is not 
one which is based on domination, but on liberation, on unconditional mutual 
recognition and agreement about sodety-forrning norms. 
Arens argues that Jesus' parables are designed to enable his Pharisaic oppo-
nents to see, in the light of the imaginary drcumstances of the story, the repress-
iveness of their previous interpretation of reality, their action-orientation, and the 
structures of power which they have created.116 Arens here uses Ricoeur's notion 
of the "scenic function of the parables" [szenischen Funktion des Gleichnisses] to 
show how the Pharisees might imaginatively entertain a different (and messianic) 
perspective of the "right life", paradigmatically presented by Jesus. Jesus intends 
this imaginative anticipation of successful communicative action to be a practically 
anticipated offer to bis opponents, in order to change their previous structure of 
action (which has been distorted by force); this change should happen as a result 
of the liberating experience of domination-free communication, which is grounded 
in God's dominion and made possible for all through i t 1 1 7 Jesus' ideology-critique 
is effective and proven in its truthfulness through his own domination-free com-
munication, which is grounded in his experience of God's gentle dominion, and 
which is the ground for asserting that domination-free communication is possible 
in principle among all people.118 
According to Arens, the consistency of Jesus' communicative action makes 
it clear how, i.e., in what direction, the ideologically-sanctioned power relations in 
his society are to be changed.119 Jesus' parables present the ideology-critical 
destruction of the Pharisaic interpretation of reality in metaphorical language; 
while unmasking the falseness of the Pharisaic worldview, they are oriented toward 
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a real consensus between him and Ms listeners, and become an offer and an 
invitation. Arens maintains that the illocutive and intentional perlocutive potential 
of Jesus' stories is a consequence of their specific combination of ideology-critique, 
argumentation and analogy. What makes Arena's approach unique and exciting is 
its synthesis of these two approaches with Habermas's theory of universal pragma-
tics and communicative action. His pragmatic parable theory contains both ele-
ments: 1) it recognises narrative arguments in Jesus' parabolic speech-acts, which 
are oriented toward achieving understanding and consensus with his opponents; 
2) it also recognises that Jesus uses analogical or metaphorical speech forms in his 
narrative arguments. He does this in order to help his addressees perceive sceni-
cally (by means of interconnecting, estranging and revelatory imagination) their 
interpretation of reality and their action-orientation in the face of a praxis 
grounded in God's dominion.120 Jesus' arguments are understanding-oriented 
elements of communication between himself and the Pharisees about the kingdom; 
they are a narrative struggle for consensus, which they anticipate in their quasi-dis-
cursive communication structure. 
The combination of ideology-critique, argumentation and analogy in dis-
course makes the parables of Jesus into subversive stories; it helps to make the 
critique acceptable to the addressees, and to make it possible to continue the 
dialogue even if the intended agreement is not achieved.121 The parables as 
subversive stories invite his opponents and challenge them to modify their under-
standing of reality and their action-orientation. However, the result of Jesus' 
consensus-seeking discourses was failure and his execution, in which the priestly 
oligarchy colluded with the Roman occupying power. The question arises as to 
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whether Jesus' death refuted his assertion about the reality of God and his action; 
Arens asserts that Jesus' disciples, shortly after the Crucifixion, announced him as 
being alive and proclaimed that God raised him: 
In Christian belief the Resurrection proves to be the definitive divine 
ratification off Jesus' action, Ms theology, and his person. It proves to be 
God's eschatological action in relation to his son and through it Jesus 
Christ proves to be the Living Parable of God. Confessing this invites 
and challenges us to act in following Christ. This is the attempt to take 
over the structure of his communicative action out of the experience of 
his and our Father, who seeks the lost and creates life out of death.122 
Our faith in and confession of the Resurrection provide the ground for 
imitating or taking over the subversive and revolutionary structure of Jesus' 
communicative action. The imitation of Jesus' communicative action can be under-
stood as a faithful response both to the divine imperative to do justice, and a 
grateful response to the ultimate victory of the Resurrection, through and beyond 
which Jesus' attempt to seek justice in society continues after his death. The 
attempt to silence Jesus by executing him failed, just as all attempts to stifle the 
truth ultimately fail. 
The pragmatic parable theory of Edmund Arens has implications for the 
present social and political situation in so far as the parables of Jesus contain 
potential for a new and different society, built on a deconstruction of oppressive 
ideology and on structures of action which will realise the non-coercive and 
domination-free communicative praxis demonstrated by Jesus. 
Cencluslon 
Reflection on the biblical basis of the justice of God reveals that it operates 
as a principle in creation to produce right relationships and true sociality. When 
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human sin fractures this sociality and introduces distorted structures of human 
interaction, particularly domination, God inspires prophetic figures through his 
Holy Spirit to call people back to the demands of his justice in the interests of 
forming society anew. Not only do they call people back to the task of bringing 
justice to form a new and better society, but they employ justice in its ideology-
critical mode - a mode which is finally transposed into communicative form by 
Jesus. The adoption by Jesus of a certain form of discourse to achieve agreement 
about the norms which guide people's actions in society, and which regulate their 
interaction, points to the need for an examination of theories of justice which use 
a discursive or procedural basis to achieve justice under modern conditions, 
thereby forming a society in accordance with God's will. 
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Dimf i i r®d ] iLa©&fl©oD 
In this and the next chapter I propose to examine two leading modern theories of 
justice in order to discover whether they might provide the means, Le. the methods 
or procedures, for forming a society through justice as discursively and publicly 
determined. There is wide agreement among sociologists, moral and political 
philosophers and other social theorists that societies cannot be created or sustained 
through force or strategic action, but must be formed through justice. The forma-
tion of a just society depends on mutual recognition of, and consensus about, 
principles, norms and values (or at least their de facto legitimacy). 
Justice is a normative (ethical) question which addresses the legitimacy of 
basic social norms that govern or regulate social life; if these norms are not 
legitimated or justified through some kind of discursive procedure in the public 
sphere, the result may be domination (the arbitrary use of power), leading to an 
unjust arrangement of social life and unfair distribution of social goods and 
opportunities. A genuine society (and true sociality) will not have been formed, 
because it will not have obtained the consent of those living together in society, 
nor will it be in accordance with God's will for a just and harmonious society. Both 
Rawls and Habermas subscribe to the consensus principle of legitimacy, which 
asserts that the legitimacy of norms and of normative institutional arrangements 
can be justified only by the principle of rational consensus. Seyla Benhabib has 
noted that both Rawls and Habermas share the meta-theoretical premise of 
"methodological proceduralism", which contends that a rational consensus about 
social institutions and the norms underlying them is to be achieved only proce-
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duraify, "by specifying strategies and modes of argumentation. In Ms later work, 
where Rawls moves to a position of "moral constructivism", he contends that he is 
not trying to find a conception of justice suitable for all societies, but "to settle a 
fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic institutions within a demo-
cratic society under modern conditions".2 
The task before us in this chapter is two-fold: firstly to examine Rawls's theory 
of justice and to assess the adequacy of the discursive device of the "Original 
Position" in determining social justice; and secondly, to discover whether Chris-
tians could affirm Rawls's theory of justice, i.e, whether it might be considered to 
be a possible mediation of the justice of God for the formation of society. I shall 
begin with a section (3.1) containing a presentation of Rawls's theory as an attempt 
to provide a counterf actual procedure of justification through wMch (universally) 
valid and binding norms of social co-existence can be established; this will include 
sub-sections devoted to the main features of Rawls's theory relevant to our 
discussion, namely his assertion that the primary subject of justice is the basic 
structure of society (3.1.1.); the central device of the original position (with its 
subsidiary device of the veil of ignorance) as a means of selecting and justifying the 
principles of justice for the basic structure of society (3.1.2.); the idea of pure 
procedural justice (3.1.3.); and Rawls's two principles of justice, wMch he believes 
would be the principles that parties under the conditions of the original position 
would choose (3.1.4). In the second major section (3.2) I discuss the problematic 
nature and adequacy of Rawls's justificatory method. In this section I argue that 
Rawls's justification of his principles depends on the process of reflective equili-
brium, and I explore this as an aspect of Rawls's moral constructivist approach to 
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establishing principles of justice. This section also includes a discussion of what I 
consider to be the most serious flaw in Rawls's theory - its monological nature. The 
final section (3.3), after a consideration of Rawls's notion of the self as antecedently 
individuated and therefore mdividualistic, examines how Rawls addresses the 
problem of competing conceptions of the good which might bias the choice of 
principles in the original position. This section concludes by asking whether certain 
conceptions (especially religious ones) might disadvantage those who hold them 
in the society which Rawls envisages and wants to form, 
3.1 J@te Rswls's Th©@ff @f c t o l t e 
Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness"3 has become a major point of reference 
for all subsequent discussion about justice. Widely acclaimed as being of great 
significance for moral and political theory, it is a massive, complex and rigorously 
analytical work which has generated a vast amount of scholarly literature. It is not 
feasible to provide a comprehensive analysis and critique of Rawls's entire theory, 
and his many subsequent attempts to defend its Kantian roots;41 shall concentrate 
on those aspects of his theory in which he discusses how society is to be formed and 
structured through attention to the fairness of its basic structure. 
Rawls, in defence of the Kantian notion of the freedom, autonomy and 
rationality of individuals, argues that the principles of justice will be the outcome 
of people's rational choice, since some social arrangements are inherently more 
reasonable and hence more defensible than others. He argues that some principles 
of justice provide a reasonable foundation for the fair structure of society and 
others do not As Karen Lebacqz puts it, "Rawls' aim is to use the concept of a 
social contract to give a procedural interpretation to Kant's notion of autonomous 
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choice as the basis for ethical principles". Rawls also claims that his theory of 
justice is a contrast with and superior alternative to utilitarian theory; the principles 
of justice which he proposes are not derived by assessing the utility of actions but 
by the rational choice of free, autonomous individuals in a fair setting. 
Rawls's emphasis on the priority of individual rights and freedoms is part of 
his aim to construct a theory of "justice as fairness", which takes persons seriously 
and attempts to protect their well-being by offering a concrete method for making 
the most fundamental decisions about distributive justice, as well as establishing 
principles of justice with the moral authority to obligate all persons to a system of 
justice without ignoring their diverse moral beliefs. This method is the result of 
Rawls's device of a decision-making technique, obtained from economic game 
theory, which he calls the "Original Position"; Rawls creates restrictions within the 
original position in order to provide a common perspective from which a fair, 
unbiased and unanimous choice of principles can be made regarding justice and 
the formation of society. His initial justification for the original position is that it 
"serves to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to 
impose on arguments for principles of justice, and therefore on the principles 
themselves".6 Although these principles do not directly address the problem of 
legitimation of a particular political system or regime, the assumption behind their 
provenance is that those in power are equally party to the rational discussion in the 
original position, and that they equally comply with the conception of justice 
adopted in it and legislate in accordance with the principles of justice chosen. 
Thus in A Theory of Justice Rawls aims to articulate a small set of general 
principles which he believes would be chosen by the parties in the original position, 
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and which underlie and account for the various considered moral judgements 
which we make in particular cases. Rawls introduces the original position as a 
"purely hypothetical device" which represents certain conditions and moral ideals 
"that we do in fact accept", or can be persuaded to accept after due philosophical 
reflection.7 He states that the social contract idea of the original position may be 
viewed as a "procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the 
categorical imperative";8 its justification, and hence the justification of his two 
principles, depend on the notion of reflective equilibrium, which is an alternative 
to rational intuitionism (or the attempt to ground moral theory on self-evident first 
principles). The process of reflective equilibrium establishes our "considered 
moral judgements", which justify the original position if they are adequately 
represented in it. The concepts of reflective equilibrium and considered moral 
judgements, and their inseparable connection with the original position as an 
equitable device for reaching decisions about principles of social justice, will be 
elucidated when we come to assess Rawls's justification of the original position. 
However, first we must establish the connection between justice and the formation 
of society in Rawls's thought. 
3.1.1 Its® bmte §«ryeiur® of seelefy is the primary sy&J©©& of Justles 
Rawls states quite explicitly that the primary subject of justice is the basic 
structure of society.9 The principles which he seeks to formulate have to do with 
that macrolevel structure, rather than the microlevel of every act where justice is 
a concern. What Rawls means by the basic structure of society is the entire set of 
major social, political, legal and economic institutions, and the way in which they 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages 
John Rawls's Theory of Justice 125 
from social co-operation. In section 10 ofA Theory of Justice, entitled "Institutions 
and Formal Justice", Rawls states that "by an institution I understand a public 
system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, 
powers and immunities, and the like".10 The reason Rawls believes the basic 
structure of society to be the primary subject of justice, is because the basic 
structure exerts such a profound influence on people's life prospects from the start. 
Deep inequalities arise from the fact that people are born into different social 
positions in society; these inequalities also arise because the institutions of society 
favour certain starting places above others. Thus people's initial life-chances are 
affected, and in part determined, by the political system, as well as by economic 
and social circumstances. Rawls maintains that these pervasive inequalities cannot 
possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or desert: 
It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of 
any society, to which the principles of social justice must in the first 
instance apply. These principles, then, regulate the choice of a political 
constitution and the main elements of the economic and social system. 
The justice of a social scheme depends essentially on how fundamental 
rights and duties are assigned and on the economic opportunities and 
social conditions in the various sectors of society.11 
In view of the influences of the basic structure on people from birth, the 
primary problem of justice is to formulate and justify a set of principles which a 
basic structure must satisfy. These principles of social justice, Rawls asserts, "are 
to govern the assignment of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution of 
social and economic advantages";12 further, they would specify how a just basic 
structure should properly distribute certain primary goods, which, according to 
Rawls, are things that every rational person is presumed to want, and which 
normally have a use whatever a person's rational plan of life.1 3 Rawls states that 
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"the chief [social] primary goods at the disposition of society are rights and liberties, 
powers and opportunities, income and wealth,... [and] self-respect".14 However, 
the proper distribution of these primary goods necessarily entails taking into 
account conflicting interests and claims; Rawls, in considering the role of the 
principles of justice, recognises that conflicts, as well as identity, of interests are 
inevitable in any society: 
There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible 
a better life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by bis 
own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since persons are not 
indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their greater 
collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each 
prefer a larger to a lesser share.15 
He holds that "a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage",16 and 
asks us, in accordance with his belief that morality is a necessary regulative 
mechanism for dealing with and settling these conflicting interests and claims, to 
assume that a society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who in 
their relations to one another recognise certain rules of conduct as binding, and 
who for the most part act in accordance with them; he asks us to suppose further 
that these rules specify a system of co-operation designed to advance the good of 
those taking part in it. Any such system requires 
a set of principles... for choosing among the various social arrangements 
which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an 
agreement on the proper distributive shares. These principles are the 
principles of social justice: they provide a way of assigning the rights 
and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the 
appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooper-
ation.17 
These principles, which approximate to the Kantian categorical imperative, 
are the result of a rational choice by free and equal agents in an initially fair 
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situation, i.e. the original position. Hie original position is a mediating conception 
- a device of representation that mediates between the ideals contained in Rawls's 
vision of the well-ordered society and the definition of the principles of justice. 
Kenneth Baynes suggests that for the characterisation of the original position we 
need to look to the ideal of the well-ordered society, because the ideals in such a 
society yield the two principles of justice.18 It is important, therefore, to outline 
these ideals in order to gain a better understanding of the original position, and to 
obtain a picture of the well-ordered society (or at least Rawls's vision of it). 
1. A well-ordered society is one that is "effectively regulated by a public 
conception of justice".19 It is a society where everyone accepts and knows that the 
others accept the same conception of justice. In this society the basic social 
institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy the principles of justice which all accept. 
This public acceptance points to a public conception of justice which does not need 
to invoke "theological or metaphysical doctrines"20 to support its principles, but 
which is based on reasonable beliefs established by widely accepted methods of 
enquiry. This publicity condition therefore excludes conceptions of justice which 
cannot be publicly affirmed, or which rely on such devices as Plato's Royal (or 
Noble) L ie 2 1 or the "advocacy of religion (when not believed) to buttress a social 
system that could not otherwise survive".22 
2. A well-ordered society, which is presumed to endure over time, has a 
second feature, namely stability (with regard to its conception of justice). The 
public conception of justice which regulates society implies that the members of 
society have a strong and normally effective desire to act as the principles of justice 
require; Rawls asserts that "one conception of justice is more stable than another 
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if the sense of justice it tends to generate is stronger and more likely to override 
disruptive inclinations and if the institutions it allows foster weaker impulses and 
temptations to act unjustly".23 The criterion of stability, which Rawls recognises is 
not decisive by itself, is related to the issues of human motivation and moral 
psychology, which are crucial to arguing for the sense of justice cultivated by a 
stable conception of justice in society. Although the issue of the development of 
moral consciousness is important to a theory of justice, we cannot give it due 
consideration here because it would divert attention from our search for, and 
assessment of, a procedure which will establish justice and the formation of 
society.24 
3. However, the procedure of the original position cannot be adequately 
grasped if we do not have some characterisation of the moral status of citizens in 
a well-ordered society, i.e. of the very citizens who deliberate within the original 
position. Rawls notes that the general facts of moral psychology crucially affect the 
choice of principles in the original position.25 Therefore, a third feature of the 
well-ordered society could be considered to be moral personality, or the model-
conception of the person. This conception is present in A Theory of Justice, but is 
more prominent in Rawls's later writings. According to Rawls, the citizens in a 
well-ordered society are, and recognise themselves as being, free and equal moral 
persons.26 They are distinguished by the possession of "two highest-order moral 
powers": 
a) The capacity to understand, to apply, to act from (and not merely in accord-
ance with) the principles of justice. 
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b) The capacity to form, revise and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
27 
good. 
The ascription of the first capacity assumes that citizens are capable of being 
effectively motivated by a stable conception of justice: their sense of justice means 
that they have a "normally effective desire to apply and act upon the principles of 
justice".28 This consideration is related to the equality of citizens, which is based 
on their common status as moral beings, and is more fundamental than the ideals 
of equality that are institutionalised in the basic structure of society (e.g., formal 
equality before the law, or equality of opportunity, etc.). Their capacity for moral 
personality is a "sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice"29 and to 
"equal respect and consideration in determining the principles by which the basic 
arrangements of their society are to be regulated".30 
The second capacity or moral power is related to the freedom of citizens, 
because it suggests that citizens are free to form, revise and pursue a conception 
of the good which will motivate them and give them a sense of worth and purpose 
in life. The freedom to revise their conception(s) of the good is an important 
feature of moral personality, because it means that they are not permanently 
attached to one conception but can change their ends and ideals during the course 
of their lives. Baynes notes that the framing of this capacity "reflects Rawls's 
commitment to a plurality of conceptions of the good and his belief that principles 
of justice should not rely on any particular conception of the good, but upon a 
conception of the person (as a free and equal moral being)".31 
4. The fourth feature of a well-ordered society is the constellation of condi-
tions which Rawls, following Hume, describes as the "circumstances of justice".32 
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The main implication here is that, although a society is a co-operative venture for 
mutual advantage, it is characterised by a conflict as well as an identity of interests. 
The role of justice is defined by the requirement and need to choose among the 
various social arrangements which determine the division of advantages; Rawls 
states that the background conditions that give rise to these necessities are the 
circumstances of justice.33 He describes the circumstances of justice as the moral 
conditions under which human co-operation is both possible and necessary. These 
circumstances are of two kinds - objective and subjective. The latter concern 
aspects of co-operation, i.e. of persons working together. Persons have their own 
plans of life and hence their own conceptions of the good, which lead them to have 
different ends and purposes, and to make conflicting claims.34 In brief, the circum-
stances of justice "obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward 
conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of modern 
scarcity".35 Here again Rawls's view emerges that in a well-ordered society there 
is a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good, all of which are permissible as 
long as they are pursued within the limits of justice. 
These features of the well-ordered society have been outlined in order to 
make clear their relation to the two principles which are chosen in the original 
position, which is the object of our investigation and to which we now turn. 
a/Lg'TSi© 'Original Position" and Jy§t?©e m fairness 
In presenting the main idea of his theory of justice (based on social contract 
theory), Rawls asks us not to think of the original contract as one to enter a 
particular society or to set up a particular form of government: 
Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic 
structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are 
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the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their 
own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining 
the fundamental terms of their association. These principles are to 
regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social cooper-
ation that can be entered into, and the forms of government that can be 
established. This way of regarding the principles of justice I shall call 
justice as fairness.35 
Rawls invites us to imagine that those who engage in social co-operation 
choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and 
duties and to determine the division of social benefits. The parties in the original 
situation or position must decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims 
against one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their society 3 7 As 
a group they must decide by rational reflection once and for all what is to count 
among them as just and unjust. Rawls argues that the choice which rational people 
would make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty determines the principles 
of justice.38 The idea of the original position is not intended to reflect any actual 
state of society, but is a Active heuristic device for excluding "the knowledge of 
those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their 
prejudices";39 it is an invitation to diverse people with different beliefs and values 
to accept its restrictions in order to get beyond the subjective circumstances of 
justice which prevent agreement on principles of justice and which prohibit agree-
ment on a full conception of the common good. 
Thus the idea of the "original position" is a hypothetical situation in which 
people come together to form a social contract;40 it is an initial situation of fairness 
where equal, rational, free and autonomous individuals must choose the principles 
which will regulate a just society. In Rawls's theory of justice as fairness the original 
position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of 
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social contract, he asserts that it is not an actual historical state of affairs or a 
primitive condition of culture, but "a purely hypothetical situation characterised so 
as to lead to a certain conception of justice",42 but not necessarily a full or complete 
conception off justice. 
To ensure that the circumstances of choice in the original position are fair, 
Rawls proposes that the representative persons in the original position must choose 
their principles of justice from behind a "veil of ignorance".43 This is an essential 
feature of the original position. The purpose of this device is to ensure that the 
parties do not know anything which would distinguish one from another. In a later 
chapter, on the veil of ignorance,44 Rawls elaborates the knowledge which the 
parties do not have: they do not know their place in society, their class position or 
social status, their fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their 
intelligence and strength, and the like (which presumably includes gender). They 
do not know their conception of the good, the particulars of their rational plan of 
life, or even the special features of their psychology (such as aversion to risk). They 
do not know the particular circumstances of their own society (i.e., its economic or 
political situation, or the achieved levels of civilisation and culture). They do not 
even have information as to which generation they belong; this is an important 
consideration because, as Rawls points out, "questions of social justice arise 
between generations as well as within them, for example, the question of the 
appropriate rate of capital saving and of the conservation of natural resources and 
the environment of nature".45 
Rawls believes that the veil of ignorance (the notion of which he thinks is 
implicit in Kant's ethics)46 
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ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of 
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of 
natural circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able 
to design principles to favour Ms particular condition, the principles of 
justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. For given the 
circumstances of the original position, the symmetry of everyone's 
relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between individuals 
as mora! persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends and 
capable, I shall assume, of a sense of justice. The original position is... 
the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements 
reached in it are fair. This explains the propriety of the name "justice as 
fairness": it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to 
in an initial situation that is fair. The name does not mean that the 
concepts of justice and fairness are the same, any more than the phrase 
"poetry as metaphor" means that the concepts of poetry and metaphor 
are the same.47 
The symmetry of the parties in the original position follows from their being 
conceived of as citizens who are equal moral beings in a well-ordered society: "We 
simply describe all the parties in the same way and situate them equally, that is, 
symmetrically with respect to one another. Everyone has the same rights and 
powers in the procedure for reaching agreement Now it is essential to justice as 
fairness that the original position be fair between equal moral persons so that this 
fairness can transfer to the principles adopted."48 
In some of his later writings49 Rawls shows his awareness of the diversity of 
people's religious and philosophical beliefs, and he explicitly recognises the role 
of those (possibly conflicting) beliefs in formulating and choosing principles of 
justice. This awareness is tied to his admission that there exists a plurality of rational 
moralities where people, on the basis of their religious or other beliefs, may have 
different conceptions of the good. Rawls states very specifically that in his theory 
of justice as fairness "the concept of right is prior to that of the good",50 and he says 
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that this priority of the right over the good, a central feature of Kant's ethics, turns 
out to be a central feature of his conception of justice.51 
Since diverse moralities might conflict when people come together to deter-
mine the principles of justice, Rawls deems it necessary to have a device by which 
people's conceptions of morality may be abstracted, i.e. they do not know their 
particular conceptions of the good. The reason for Rawls's construction of the 
original position (a fair initial contract situation) is to find general agreement about 
principles of justice, since rational and morally conscientious persons who insist 
that justice promote their own particular (complete) conceptions of the good 
cannot necessarily agree on moral principles. In view of people's opposing religious 
and philosophical beliefs, Rawls suggests that the only possibility for moral agree-
ment is for people to withdraw or abstract from their particular conceptions of the 
good and morality. 
The process of abstraction required by Rawls's device of the original position 
is an attempt not to ignore particular moral traditions but to discover general 
beliefs, ends and principles which people with different beliefs and values can 
embrace; the purpose of the original position is not to impose a conception of 
justice from above, but to invite people to withdraw from their particular beliefs 
and judgements in order to achieve agreement on a conception of justice with 
others who hold different beliefs and judgements. It is important to point out that 
Rawls's theory is not neutral with regard to the conception of the good; indeed, he 
admits that it is not neutral but fair between persons.52 This admission indicates a 
shift from his position inA Theory of Justice, where Rawls claimed the assumptions 
behind the original position were weak and neutral. However, the strength and 
John Rawls's Theory of Justice 135 
non-neutrality of Ms assumptions were soon recognised by critics.53 Further, Rawls 
himself admits that his theory "does presuppose a conception of the good, but 
within wide limits this does not prejudice the sort of persons that men want to be".54 
Later Rawls explains his "thin theory of the good": 
Since these assumptions must not jeopardise the prior place of the 
concept of right, the theory of the good in arguing for the principles of 
justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This account of the good I call 
the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary 
goods required to arrive at the principles of justice.55 
Rawls's partial conception of the good for a well-ordered society follows from 
his assumptions about the persons in the original position, and is a commitment of 
these free, rational and equal persons to the maximisation of primary goods on the 
basis of need. The conception of the good which ensues from his ideal of moral 
personality is bound to be biased, and may exclude certain other conceptions (as I 
shall argue later). A procedure to determine social justice should not impose prior 
constraints on the subject matter which the parties in the public discussion intro-
duce, nor should conceptions of the good be ruled out in advance. 
However, Rawls specifies that there have to be certain constraints on the 
parties as they choose the principles of justice in the original position. He recog-
nises that they are controversial, but argues that constraints are necessary in any 
social contract; he calls them "the constraints of the concept of right since they hold 
for the choice of all ethical principles and not only for those of justice".56 The formal 
constraints which Rawls believes it reasonable to impose on the parties' concep-
tions of justice are: 
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i) the principles must be general, Le. they should avoid references to the identity 
of individuals; 
ii) the principles are to be universal in application, i.e. they must hold for 
everyone in virtue of their being moral persons; 
iii) the principles must admit of 'publicity', Le. the principles and the grounds of 
their justification must be known to all; 
iv) the principles must impose an ordering on conflicting claims; 
v) the principles must be final, i.e they are to be the final court of appeal in 
57 
practical reasoning and disputes about justice. 
Rawls also assumes the mutually disinterested rationality of the parties.58 
The rationality which Rawls attributes to them is the notion of rational choice 
found in game or decision theory. Since they do not know the details of their 
individual rational plans of life, the question arises as to how they can decide which 
conceptions of justice are most to their advantage. To meet this difficulty, Rawls 
postulates that they accept an account of the good which leads them to assume that 
they would prefer more primary social goods than less. They try to advance their 
particular conception of the good by trying to secure for themselves the greatest 
amount of primary goods possible. 
Rawls builds into the original position the assumption that all the parties are 
motivated by the desire for certain primary goods; this desire is held to provide the 
motivation necessary to generate the problem of rational choice and to make 
possible a determinate choice for the principles of justice. The most reasonable 
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rule for the parties to employ in their choke of principles is Rawls's adaptation of 
the rational strategy of "maximum", a term which means the maximum minimorum. 
The "masimin rule" is an additional feature of (but distinct from) the Difference 
Principle - Rawls's second principle of justice. It stipulates that the parties in the 
original position would choose in such a way as to "maximise the minimum". The 
rule is to consider the worst that can happen under any proposed course of action, 
and to decide in the light of that. Rawls puts it as follows: 
The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible 
outcome: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which 
is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.59 
The strategy of maximin is intended to minimise risks in choosing under 
conditions of uncertainty. Parties in the original position operate under a veil of 
ignorance, and therefore cannot employ a rule based on probability outcomes or 
highest expected utility; they would, therefore, reasonably choose an action which 
promotes the highest minimum outcome. The maximin rule justifies a choice of 
principles which benefit the least advantaged in society, and thus protect against 
the risk of that stratum of society being deprived of primary social goods. 
Before the hypothetical contract and the choice of principles can proceed, 
Rawls requires one further assumption to guarantee strict compliance.60 The 
parties are presumed to be capable of a sense of justice and this fact is public 
knowledge among them. This condition is to ensure the integrity of the agreement 
made in the original position. It means that the parties can rely on each other to 
understand and to act in accordance with whatever principles are finally agreed to. 
The rationality of the parties consists in their capacity not to enter agreements 
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which they know they cannot keep, and in their strict compliance with the concep-
tion of justice which they finally adopt 
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There are two major considerations before Rawls as he contemplates the 
basic structure of society as the primary subject of justice. The first (distributive) 
problem is the assignment of fundamental rights and duties and the regulation of 
social and economic inequalities. The second is the basic structure of society as a 
public system of rules defining a scheme of activities that leads people to act 
together so as to produce a greater sum of benefits, and which assigns to each 
certain recognised claims to a share in the proceeds. Rawls states that these 
considerations "suggest the idea of treating the question of distributive shares as a 
matter of pure procedural justice".61 
The intuitive idea here, according to Rawls, is to design the social system so 
that the outcome is just whatever it happens to be:6 2 it means that whatever 
principles the parties select from among alternative principles are just. In pure 
procedural justice there is no standard for deciding what is just apart from the 
procedure itself. "Pure procedural justice obtains where there is no independent 
criterion for the right result."63 Rawls distinguishes "pure procedural justice" from 
""perfect" and "imperfect" procedural justice; he argues that in the latter cases there 
is an independent standard for assessing the justice of the outcome, the only 
question being whether a procedure exists to ensure a result that satisfies the 
standard. 
Since there is no such independent standard in pure procedural justice, 
whatever results from the procedure is "just" by definition. As far as Rawls is 
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concerned, there must be "a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is 
likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been 
properly followed".64 Therefore, whatever is chosen by the parties in the original 
position is just simply by virtue of being the outcome of the decision procedure. 
Lebacqz points out that if the parties do in fact choose Rawls's two principles, then 
these are the principles that provide justice.65 And indeed this is precisely what 
Rawls claims - that the parties will choose his two principles of justice. He states 
that 
the idea of the original position is to set up a procedure so that any 
principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure 
procedural justice as a basis of theory.66 
From this quote it appears Rawls regards social justice as "purely procedural" 
in character. Since there are no independent criteria for judging whether an 
allocation of any particular good is just or unjust, such an allocation is deemed just 
if it has arisen through an operation of fair or just procedures. Rawls states that the 
main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system, which needs 
to be designed "so that the resulting distribution is just however things turn out";67 
he designs68 a basically capitalistic institutional framework which will realise 
background justice, but he also allows for modifications for a socialist regime.69 In 
either case, Rawls claims that once the institutions are working there will be no 
need to examine the precise distribution of goods to persons which follows, because 
its fairness will be guaranteed by the procedures which have produced it. 
In a later essay, Rawls re-emphasises the point that whatever principles of 
justice the parties agree to will be just because the parties have no prior commit-
ment to principles by which to judge the outcome of the contract.70 The parties 
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"bracket" their commitnierits and agree to accept the final principles of justice when 
they agree to the restrictions of the veil of ignorance. 
In Rawls's view, the principles that will be chosen will be the result of a fair 
bargain, because the original position nullifies the accidents of natural endow-
ments and the contingencies of social circumstance which can b© exploited by 
others to their own advantage.71 Since all parties will be similarly situated, no 
individual will be able to design principles which favour Ms or her own particular 
situation. Further, since all persons will consent, the principles of justice will be 
sufficiently objective and universal to obligate all parties in the original position to 
the system of justice which the principles entail. However, as I hope to show, 
Rawls's theory is flawed because, despite his claims about neutrality and impar-
tiality, there is an independent standard in the original position. Further, a distinc-
tion becomes apparent between the original position as a principle or procedure 
of legitimation and substantive proposals for principles of social justice; as Baynes 
points out, "Rawls is unable to insist too strongly upon such a distinction since he 
designs the original position in such a way that only his two substantive principles 
of justice would be chosen in it".72 The problem with the original position is that if 
it is introduced to provide a neutral justification of substantive moral principles, it 
will not be able to yield the substantive principles which Rawls claims; on the other 
hand, if it does yield such principles, it must have stronger assumptions built into 
it. 7 3 
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It is Rawls's contention that under the conditions of the original position, the 
parties would choose the following two principles as a solution to the problem of 
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specifying what would count as a just basic structure: (I quote the final formulation 
from section 46, p. 302, since Rawls states them in a provisional form earlier in 
section 11, p. 60) 
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second Principle 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity. 
The first of these principles is sometimes called "the Principle of Greatest 
Equal Liberty". The second of Rawls's two principles really contains two principles 
in itself: (a) "The Difference Principle" = the core of Rawls's substantive theory of 
justice, which distributes the subset of primary goods of wealth, income, power and 
authority, and which permits some inequalities in distribution but states that those 
social and economic inequalities are to be so arranged that they are to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged; (b) The Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity. 
To some extent the Principle of Equal Basic Liberty and the Principle of Fair 
Equality of Opportunity act as constraints on the Difference Principle. 
Rawls further specifies that his two principles are to be arranged in a serial 
order with the first principle prior to the second, and he formulates rules of priority 
for this lexical ordering.74 
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Rawls adds that his two principles are a special case of a more general 
conception of justice which may be expressed as follows: 
General Conception (later formulation) 
All primary social goods »liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and 
the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least 
favoured.75 
With this general conception in mind, Rawls holds that injustice is simply 
inequalities that are not to the benefit of a l l 7 6 While Rawls maintains that the 
principle of liberty is to have priority over the second principle - the Difference 
Principle - it is the latter which is really the core of his theory, and which I consider 
to be most fruitful as an index to the function of justice in forming a society under 
modern conditions. Rawls claims that his two principles seem to be a fair agree-
ment on the basis of which those with greater natural endowment or a better social 
position, neither of which can be said to be deserved, could expect the willing 
co-operation of others when some workable scheme is a necessary condition for 
the welfare of all; and he contends that we are led to his two principles if, as I have 
already quoted, "we decide to look for a conception of justice that nullifies the 
accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstances as 
counters in quest for political and economic advantage ...m 7 7 
Rawls believes that his two principles express an egalitarian conception of 
justice.78 He holds that the Difference Principle in part addresses or contains the 
principle of redress; the latter principle holds that inequalities of birth and endow-
ment are undeserved and require compensation, or as Rawls puts it: 
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... in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of 
opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native 
assets and to those bom into less favourable social positions. The idea 
is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality.79 
It is for this reason that Rawls's position is regarded as egalitarian, and 
admitted as such by himself in the section "The Tendency to Equality";80 his theory 
requires society to reduce certain inequalities by pooling advantageous resources 
for everyone, especially the least advantaged. He points out, in a very important 
passage which needs to be quoted in full, that although the Difference Principle is 
not the principle of redress, it does achieve some of the intent of the latter principle: 
It transforms the aims of the basic structure so that the total scheme of 
institutions no longer emphasises social efficiency and technocratic 
values. We see then that the difference principle represents, in effect, 
ah agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common 
asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns 
out to be. Those who have been favoured by nature, whoever they are, 
may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the 
situation of those who have lost out The naturally advantaged are not 
to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs 
of training and for using their endowments in ways that help the less 
fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor 
merits a more favourable starting place in society. But it does not follow 
that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to 
deal with them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these 
contingencies work for the benefit of the least fortunate. Thus we are 
led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the social system so 
that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of 
natural assets or his initial position in society without giving or receiving 
compensating advantages in return.81 
Thus the Difference Principle is not a principle of pure redress nor a principle 
of equal outcome for all members of society. Rawls's intention is to establish 
processes for the distribution of society's resources so that the reasonable expec-
tations and condition of the least advantaged are improved. It is Rawls's concern 
for the least advantaged which constitutes what is most congruent with God's 
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justice, and intuitively has most appeal from a theological perspective, since it 
accords with three basic affirmations in Christian tradition: 
i) the inviolable dignity of the human person 
ii) the essentially social nature of human beings 
iii) the belief that the abundance of nature and of social living is given for all 
people82 
More specifically, concern for the least advantaged is consistent with a 
Christian understanding of God's justice, because throughout scripture and Chris-
tian tradition there is concern for the plight of the poor, and a concern to secure 
their well-being and rights. This concern, based on Christ's incarnation among the 
humblest and on his identification with the poor (e.g. Matt. 25:40), culminates in 
what has become known as "God's preference for the poor" or "the option for the 
poor",83 which is not purely a shibboleth of the left or of liberation theologians, but 
a fully substantiated argument from scripture, and particularly from an interpreta-
tion of justice as righteousness and right relationship in both Old and New 
Testaments. 
The issue of the convergence between the Christian understanding of justice 
and one of Rawls's substantive principles of justice, however intuitively appealing, 
is less at issue here than the method or procedure used to justify principles and 
norms which establish justice and form society. For this reason we need to assess 
the adequacy of Rawls's justificatory method in order to discover whether Chris-
tians can confirm his conception of justice and whether it mediates the justice of 
God. 
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This thesis is concerned to discover a means of justifying, and achieving 
agreement about, norms, values and interests which underlie the institutions we 
propose to form and regulate society. In order to determine whether Rawls 
provides a method which Christians can affirm, and which can be interpreted as 
mediating God's society-forming justice, we must examine his justification of that 
method, particularly the social contract device of the original position, and the 
problem of the conception of the good in the context of moral pluralism. 
As we have seen, Rawls offers two closely connected types of justification for 
his principles of justice - the idea of the original position and the concept of 
reflective equilibrium. Rawls believes that the original position provides an inde-
pendent justification for his two principles, because rational individuals, placed in 
a hypothetical situation in which they were ignorant of their personal attributes 
and qualities and place in society, would necessarily choose them. It is Rawls's view 
that "certain principles of justice are justified because they would be agreed to in 
an initial situation of equality",84 and that "the conditions embodied in the descrip-
tion of the original position are ones that we do in fact accept ..." or can be 
persuaded to accept... "by philosophical reflection".85 This justification rests on the 
view that if a principle would be chosen under conditions which, according to our 
considered moral judgements, are appropriate conditions for choosing principles 
of justice, then this is a good reason for accepting that principle. From this we can 
see that the real burden of justification rests with the notion of reflective equili-
brium. Rawls's entire project - the model conceptions of the person and the 
well-ordered society, their representation in the original position, and the formu-
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lation of the two principles chosen there, all depend on the process of reflective 
equilibrium, because the process reflects our considered moral judgements and 
establishes their coherence. 
Considered moral judgements are those intuitive moral judgements sub-
jected to reflection, Le. those moral judgements which we make reflectively, in 
circumstances conducive to impartiality and consistency, and under conditions 
favourable to the exercise of our sense of justice.86 According to Rawls, "justice as 
fairness is the hypothesis that the principles which could be chosen in the original 
position are identical with those that match our considered judgments and so these 
principles describe our sense of justice".87 The circularity in this statement is 
acknowledged by Rawls, who refers to it as "the notion of reflective equilibrium":88 
what Rawls is doing here is attempting to justify his general moral principles by 
showing that they conform with particular moral judgements that we actually do 
make and accept, and that the particular judgements themselves are in turn 
justified by being shown to be in accordance with the general principles of morality. 
Rawls claims that by this circularity the general principles and the particular 
judgements are allowed to be brought into agreement or reflective equilibrium 
with one another. This technique of reflective equilibrium brings into play our 
considered moral judgements, and facilitates the task of moral theorising by 
providing a structure of general principles (a theory) which supports those con-
sidered moral judgements. He suggests that when we are presented with an 
intuitively appealing account of our sense of justice, we may well revise our 
judgements to conform to its principles even though the theory does not fit our 
existing judgements exactly; in the two-way process of reflective equilibrium we 
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move back and forth between adjustments to our moral judgements and adjust-
ments to our general theoretical principles until we find a satisfactory fit between 
them. According to Rawls, from the stand-point of moral philosophy, "the best 
account of a person's sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior 
to his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his 
judgments in reflective equilibrium".85 
The matching of someone's moral judgements to his higher-order moral 
principles here described is an implicitly conservative method; critics like Brandt90 
and Daniels91 suggest that it simply reshuffles or coherently organises our 
prejudices. However, Rawls recognises that the process of justification is not 
complete with the achievement of a state of "narrow reflective equilibrium". In A 
Theory of Justice he recognises that the notion of reflective equilibrium varies 
depending on whether we are to be presented with only those descriptions which 
more or less match one's existing judgements except for minor discrepancies, or 
whether we are to be presented with all possible descriptions to which we might 
plausibly conform all our judgements together with all relevant philosophical 
arguments against them. He says that it is clearly the second kind with which we 
are concerned in moral philosophy, and that it is doubtful whether we can ever 
reach this state, because we cannot examine all possible descriptions and all their 
philosophically relevant arguments. The most we can do, adds Rawls, is to study 
the conceptions of justice known to us through the tradition of moral philosophy 
and any further ones that occur to us, and then to consider these.92 
However, in a later essay he outlines a further step called "wide reflective 
equilibrium",93 a condition in which someone's coherent set of considered moral 
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judgements and moral principles have been corrected and brought into harmony 
with a broader set of theories (moral psychology and philosophy, sociology, etc.) 
and various formal "conditions of rationality" (generality, publicity, universality, 
etc.).94 The "independence constraint" proposed by Daniels requires that if these 
theories and conditions are to provide credibility for the principles obtained 
through narrow reflective equilibrium, they must be independent of such moral 
principles. Since justification is a multi-faceted process in which beliefs are exposed 
to critical reflection from various perspectives, it requires an understanding of 
reflective equilibrium in which we submit our moral conceptions to the widest array 
of philosophical argumentation and theoretical scrutiny.95 
Rawls's constructivist approach96 to justification presented in his conception 
of reflective equilibrium is an attempt to avoid intuitionism, because his theory 
denies that there is a moral order prior to and independent of the public conception 
of ourselves as free and equal moral beings. In reply to those who charge him with 
a form of intuitionism (on the grounds that his considered judgements are none-
theless intuitions or "fixed" points of moral reference) Rawls suggests that none of 
his judgements is immune to revision. Unlike intuitionists who believe that moral 
intuitions are fixed and unchangeable, and that there is always a correct answer to 
a moral question, Rawls asserts that "there are no moral facts to which the 
principles [of justice] could approximate":97 "Apart from the procedure of con-
structing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts. Whether certain facts 
are to be recognised as reasons of right and justice, or how much they are to count, 
can be ascertained only from within the constructivist approach...1,98 
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However, the matter of justification is not so easily settled. There is a deeper 
circularity in Rawls's argument which he does not acknowledge, namely that the 
general moral principles to which he appeals rest on his particular judgements; the 
reason for claiming this is, as I shall argue more fully below, that Rawls does not 
have a genuine plurality of persons debating within the original position. The 
device of the thick veil of ignorance in the original position effectively removes 
differences to the point that the parties are conflated into one person, so that the 
original position becomes the monological thought-experiment of a single agent. 
Rawls cannot be allowed simply to take his considered judgements as given in his 
exercise of reflective equilibrium. 
This is an echo of the criticism by Wolff and others" of Rawls's method of 
pure procedural justice, namely that if Rawls truly used this method he could not 
claim to know in advance what principles of justice would be chosen in the original 
position. Rawls's method of pure procedural justice, in which the procedure 
determines the result, professedly does not admit an independent standard, but 
the result of the choice in the original position clearly points to the operation of 
such a standard - the standard of fairness, which Rawls builds into the original 
position. This undermines Rawls's claim to pure procedural justice, for if Rawls is 
permitted to import a standard into the original position, others might wish to do 
the same, thereby negating Rawls's express aim of creating a situation in which 
might be removed those particular beliefs which might bias choices. Christians may 
support Rawls's laudable aim of proposing a theory of justice which would deter-
mine the fair distribution of society's benefits and burdens, and which would 
establish a society in which social and economic inequalities should work to the 
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benefit of the least advantaged as well as of the fortunate; however, they may not 
find it straightforward (and some may find it impossible) to agree with his method 
of justifying universal obligation to such a theory. 
On the other hand, the answer to this objection (that the impartiality of 
Rawls's justification is undermined by the importation of an independent standard) 
may be found in the answer to another criticism, which relates to the status of 
Rawls's contractualism. The objection in this critique is that the contractarian 
element (i.e. a plurality of persons debating and voluntarily agreeing to be bound 
by the chosen outcome of their debate) is lost if the initial situation of choice relies 
too heavily on a prior set of moral constraints. If this reliance exists, the work of 
justifying principles of justice is performed by the moral constraints and not by the 
voluntary character of the agreement.100 However, as Baynes points out, since only 
agreements between free and equal moral persons are fair, "the description of the 
contract situation must in some way exhibit these features of the contracting 
parties",101 i.e. it is legitimate to build them into the description of the original 
position. 
It has to be conceded that certain assumptions are necessary to a theory of 
justice: the problem is gaining a sufficiently wide recognition and acceptance of 
them to offer the hope of a common ground for justice or, stated more strongly, 
for offering a basis for universal obligation to principles of justice. In proposing a 
theory one needs to be aware of the risk of building in one's assumptions into one's 
conclusions without the due process of rational justification.102 Rawls certainly 
uses strong (Kantian) assumptions in his process of rational justification, viz. that 
people are free, rational and equal. There are some who believe that these are 
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assumptions which are sufficiently widely shared today to offer the hope of a 
common grounding for justice.103 Rawls holds that the restrictioos of the original 
position mediate the moral beliefs that persons are free, rational and equal, and 
that persons with diverse particular beliefs can embrace those beliefs, implying that 
they express part of the common good which persons ought to affirm as a worthy 
end for their lives. 
Christians may well embrace Rawls's (Kantian) idea of free, equal and 
rational persons, because it is morally appealing; but Christians confront a dilem-
ma, according to Harlan Beckley,104 when they propose or support a system of 
justice which society may need to impose on all its citizens, and at the same time 
try to remain faithful to Christian beliefs and values without forcing others to accept 
the distinctive moral implications of beliefs which they do not and should not be 
required to share; he believes that the dilemma can be resolved for Christians if, 
on the basis of their beliefs and values, they can embrace general or shared beliefs 
(including Rawls's Kantian belief that people are free, rational and equal) without 
ignoring their distinctive beliefs and moralities, and which justify obligating all 
persons to a system of justice. 
Beckley claims that the dilemma which he discerns is potentially resolvable 
because, like Lebacqz, he thinks that there is sufficient continuity between Chris-
tian beliefs and the beliefs of others to justify shared principles of justice;105 in a 
later essay,106 Beckley argues that "Rawls's idea of justice as fairness and the 
original position which mediates it can provide the grounds for justifying a concep-
tion of justice that obligates all, including Christians, without compromising the 
distinctive features of Christian morality".107 It is Beckley's contention that the 
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ethical implications of the ideal of Christian love, i.e. uncompromised to accom-
modate agreement with others, require Christians to affirm something like the 
perspective of justice as fairness.108 
While I agree strongly with this latter sentiment, and that there is certainly 
much in Rawls's theory of justice which is consonant with a Christian understanding 
of justice, I am inclined to look beyond it for another theory because if its 
justificatory method is both flawed and disadvantages certain comprehensive 
conceptions of the good, including Christian ones, it does not have the moral 
authority to justify universal obligation to it. That flaw exists in the inconsistency 
of Rawls's position on the assumptions behind the original position. On the one 
hand his assumptions about moral personality in the original position are acknow-
ledged to be strong. On the other hand, he wishes to avoid strong assumptions in 
order to make possible the derivation of principles which do not presuppose any 
particular conception of the good. He is concerned that strong assumptions would 
threaten to impose a particular conception of the good, and so bias the choice of 
principles. I believe that the validity of his original position is diminished by the 
fact that his assumptions are not weak enough to avoid ruling out certain concep-
tions of the good in advance. 
Among the more serious flaws in Rawls's theory is its monological rather than 
dialogical nature. This conclusion is derived from two charges: firstly, that Rawls's 
attempt to reconstruct Kantian ethical procedure fails to take into account the fact 
that Kant's maxims are the idiosyncratic generation of an isolated subject. Accord-
ing to McFadyen, "for Kant it was only necessary to carry out tests of universal 
acceptability of a maxim in the mind of the isolated subject".109 Secondly, this 
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conclusion can be derived from the charge made by several critics who argue that 
the original position is not a genuine social-contractual (and therefore dialogical) 
situation, because the imposition of the veil of ignorance transforms it from a 
situation of agreement between separate individuals into a situation of rational 
choice by one subject.110 Having established an account of the moral subject as 
necessarily intersubjective, and a portrayal of the self as distinct with a specific 
identity, Rawls proceeds to create a situation - the original position - in which the 
plurality necessary for choice among different conceptions of the good and for 
agreement about principles of justice disappears. Behind the veil of ignorance 
(which is used to assure us that there are no differences in the characteristics and 
ends of the parties) the contract signified by the original position becomes a kind 
of individual rationality writ large. Rawls's removal from everyone in the original 
position of all characteristics which might distinguish one person from another not 
only renders distinct individuals invisible, but also leaves nothing that could 
possibly establish a plurality of persons. 
Thus Rawls convicts himself of the fault with which he charged utilitarianism, 
namely that it uses an "ideal observer" approach which derives social principles as 
though they were equivalent to the choices made by a single person. The collapse 
of Rawls's original position into the perspective of a single person is made clear by 
Rawls's actual statement that the final choice is that of one person: 
To begin with, it is clear that since the differences among the parties is 
unknown to them, and everyone is similarly situated, each is convinced 
by the same arguments. Therefore we can view the choice in the original 
position from the stand-point of one person selected at random. If 
anyone after due reflection prefers a conception of justice to another, 
then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached.111 
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From this passage in Rawls's section on the veil of ignorance, it is reasonable 
to argue that there is no plurality of persons discussing, deciding and choosing. The 
plurality which is essential to a proper discourse for detennining justice is replaced 
here by a monism in which all other interlocutors are identified with a single, 
undifferentiated subject. There is no genuine relation and dialogue, no real inter-
subjectivity; instead of relation and communication being based on the necessary 
prerequisite of difference, in the monological situation of Rawls's original position 
they are based on identity. As Phillips shows,112 if they all have the same pref-
erence, there is no need at all for any discussion, choice or agreement. Instead of 
there being a plurality of persons, there is only a single subject, and the subject is 
Rawls. Phillips rather cruelly puts it thus: 
Whatever his talk about discussions, bargaining, decisions, and choices 
in the original position, Rawls has developed an interesting and highly 
original way of showing which principles of justice ought to be 
preferred, i.e., those advance and defended by Rawls himself. But this 
is something else than specifying a procedure under which the parties 
in the initial situation will choose the principles applying to the basic 
structure of society.113 
In his later writings Rawls retreats from the stronger claims of his justificatory 
method, and begins to speak of justice (and justification) in practical political 
terms: 
The essential point is this: as a practical political matter no general 
moral conceptions [i.e. comprehensive moral theories or metaphysical 
philosophical conceptions] can provide a publicly recognised basis for 
a conception of justice in a modern democratic state...: such a concep-
tion must allow for a diversity of doctrines and the plurality of conflict-
ing, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the good affirmed by 
members of existing democratic societies ... [S]ince justice as fairness 
is intended as a political conception of justice for a democratic society, 
it tries to draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in 
the political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the 
public traditions of their interpretation.114 
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Among the basic intuitive ideas "implicit in the public culture of a democratic 
society" is Rawls's conception of the person having two moral powers, and there-
fore as free and equal.115 In his essay "Justice as Fairness", Rawls is arguing that 
the defences of particular political philosophies, e.g. liberalism, which rest on 
"metaphysical" or "comprehensive" moral views not easily accessible to or publicly 
acknowledged by all members of society, violate the principle of toleration that 
must be observed in an attempt to justify principles of justice in a democratic 
society. Such comprehensive moral views are inappropriate because they will 
inevitably be controversial and conflicting in a pluralistic society. This means that 
any comprehensive conception, including religious ones, will be disadvantaged in 
a Rawlsian society. This also constitutes a reason for doubting the adequacy of 
Rawls's justificatory method, and for not adopting the procedural device of the 
original position to legitimate norms and justify principles for the formation and 
regulation of society. 
3=3 Th<§ pirobtem ef @®mp@£Ing ©@ne@ptl@in!@ @fi tb@ g@@dl 
If Rawls's aim was to create a fair initial contract situation and a device (the 
original position) in order to locate common grounds and construct a common 
perspective for the public justification of the principles of justice, he would need 
to ensure impartiality and neutrality among competing conceptions of the good. A 
fundamental question in trying to propose and establish a theory of justice is 
whether it is possible to do so without presuming a single good or end for 
humankind; Lebacqz points out that "Rawls's method is to derive principles for 
justice without asserting any single good and without making justice dependent 
upon that goal".116 Rawls's vision of society includes the belief that individuals 
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should be allowed the freedom and resources to affirm and pursue a wide variety 
of conceptions of the good life. As we have seen, his theory of justice as fairness 
provides a basic framework for society, in which concrete decisions can be reached 
in a just and equitable manner. The device for reaching these decisions is the 
original position, which in turn employs the device of the veil of ignorance, which 
acts as a screen to exclude the undesirable beliefs and practices of actual persons 
which might set them at odds. 
What emerges from this device, however, is not a situation which is impartial 
to competing conceptions of the good, but a predetermined ideal of free, equal and 
rational moral persons, and a presupposed conception of the good (albeit partial) 
which follows from this ideal and is, as I have shown, a commitment of these free, 
rational and equal persons to the maximisation of primary goods on the basis of 
need. Sandal's critical analysis of Rawls's philosophical anthropology, and his 
charge of individualism regarding the person in the original position, are clear 
indicators of the disadvantaging of conceptions of the good other than Rawls's own. 
Sandel criticises Rawls's theory for depending on a notion of the self as constituted 
by an individual capacity for choosing diverse values rather than a constituent 
attachment to ends and communal values arrived at by knowledge of one's nature, 
which, Christians would hold, is intersubjective and social because it is made in 
God's image. 
For Rawls, "the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it";117 this 
deontological understanding of the self as a "subject of possession", as Sandel calls 
it, 1 1 8 i.e. where the self is distanced from its ends without being attached to them, 
can be located in Rawls's assumption of mutual disinterest. This assumption, that 
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parties take no interest in one another's claims, becomes an epistemological claim 
concerning the nature of the self, and for Rawls is "the main motivational condition 
of the original position"119 even though it "involves no particular theory of human 
motivation".120 Further, this assumption is concerned with the nature of subjects 
who possess motivations, how they are constituted, rather than the nature of the 
self s interests, desires and aims. Rawls states that a person's interests are "as they 
always must be, interests of a self',121 a self which is an antecedently individuated 
subject, whose bounds are fixed prior to experience and where identity is given 
independently of the self s interests, ends and relations with others. 
Sandel believes that it is in the assumption of mutual disinterest that "we find 
the key to Rawls's conception of the subject, the picture of the way we must be to 
be subjects for whom justice is primary".122 SandePs analysis of Rawls's theory of 
the person finds that Rawls understands the moral subject as "distanced" from the 
values and ends it holds. Rawls's understanding of the circumstances of justice and 
his assumption of mutual disinterest render his theory liable to the charge of 
containing an individualistic bias and of devaluing such motives as benevolence, 
altruism and communitarian sentiments.123 
There has been much debate about whether the hypothetical selves in the 
original position constitute the real essence of moral agents (i.e. whether the 
original position is a description of our real selves). Although Sandel himself has 
been criticised for taking the description of the original position too literally, and 
even for distorting Rawls's position in A Theory of Justice}2^ his critique does 
indicate that there is a serious problem with the idea of the self and the ends it can 
or cannot affirm in the original position. The very process of abstracting ourselves 
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from our ends and conception of the good, or agreeing to the partial or minimum 
conception of the good which operates in the original position, is the function not 
of actual selves, but of hypothetical selves who are distanced from their ends and 
will choose ends on the basis of Rawls's postulate of mutual disinterest This means 
that any "thick" conception of the good, which has a particular value such as 
community as constituent to the nature of the self, might be ruled out by Rawls's 
philosophical anthropology. 
It would be unfair to suggest that Rawls would be opposed to the value of 
community: he is simply concerned that the subjective circumstances of justice 
prohibit agreement on a full conception of the common good, and therefore that 
in the original position there should be no dominant or strong or "thick" conception 
of the good.125 Rawls is at pains to point out that while his theory has an individ-
ualist dimension, his assumption of mutual disinterest does not bias the choice of 
principles in favour of individualistic values at the expense of communitarian 
values. In^ 4 Theory of Justice Rawls argues that his theory of justice as fairness does 
not defend private society as an ideal,1 2 6 presuppose selfish or egotistic motiva-
tion,1 2 7 or oppose communitarian values.128 Nonetheless, Rawls's apparent affir-
mation of communitarian ends does not permit him to escape Sandel's criticism of 
individualism. Sandal's analysis of the Rawlsian self as an antecedently individ-
uated subject, standing always at a distance from the interests it has, leads to the 
conclusion that something as vital to true sociality as a sense of community becomes 
a possible aim of such a subject, and not constituent of her identity. Since com-
munity is thus one of a number of ends which an individual can choose within the 
framework defined by justice, it is not constitutive either of individual identities or 
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of society. Even if Christians were able to accept this unsatisfactory understanding 
of the self, we would have to ask whether a comprehensive good such as that of 
community would be permitted in the original position. 
We have already seem that Rawls's assumptions are not weak enough to avoid 
ruling out certain conceptions in advance, and that Rawls already has his own 
conception of the good in the original position which may exclude other concep-
tions. In his essay Fairness to Goodness, Rawls says that some conceptions of the 
good, which presumably might include religious, philosophical and moral convic-
tions, will be excluded if they conflict directly with the principles of justice; for 
example, conceptions of the good which "require the repression or degradation of 
certain groups on, say, racial or ethnic or perfectionist grounds" will be re-
pressed.129 Further, those conceptions of the good which require behaviour incon-
sistent with the social conditions of a well-ordered society, as may certain kinds of 
religion will eventually be excluded owing to a failure to gain adherents. Rawls 
argues that in neither case can we conclude that the original position is arbitrarily 
biased against those views: 
On any theory at all some conceptions are bound to be eliminated and 
others assume a minor role. In itself this is no objection. But further, it 
seems that a well-ordered society defines a fair background within 
which ways of life have a reasonable opportunity to establish them-
selves.130 
Given that restraint is necessary in a just society, Rawls is clear that not all 
conceptions of the good can be tolerated. Rawls's belief that "everyone is assured 
an equal liberty to pursue whatever plan of life he pleases as long as it does not 
violate what justice demands"131 may appear fair and even relatively neutral; but, 
as Richard Fern reminds us, we should also remember that "for Rawls the notions 
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of justice and rationality have a particular, highly developed content which may or 
may not be in accord with our intuitions about what is or is not just or unreasonable 
. J ' 1 3 2 This is especially true if the criticism of Rawls's defective contractualism is 
accurate: the notion of justice which emerges from the original position, even after 
the process of reflective equilibrium, is not neutral and is the preferred perspective 
of a single agent, namely Rawls. 
A result of Rawls's preferred perspective is that certain minimalist concep-
tions of the good are given special status and promoted by the very structure of 
society in a way that full conceptions of the good, like those found in religious faith, 
are not. Fern argues, rightly in my view, that some religious conceptions of the good 
are neither unjust or irrational, and would be placed at a serious disadvantage in a 
Rawlsian society: 
Not only does justice as fairness incorporate a favoured perspective on 
reality, it actively discriminates against other perspectives, some of 
which are arguably neither less just nor plausible than that adopted by 
Rawls. 1 3 3 
It is apparent, certainly in Rawls's earlier work, that some religious concep-
tions of the good are suspect from his perspective. An article entitled Outline of a 
Decision Procedure for Ethics*3* is an example of Rawls's suspicion of religious 
perspectives, and of his view that one cannot arrive at a justified belief in religious 
matters because there are no ascertainable facts about the existence of God; Rawls 
says that it is "generally recognised that the articles of religious faiths are not usually 
established by evidence acceptable to inductive criteria ...' , 1 3 5 The imputed irra-
tionality of norms and ethical insights derived from religious faith here must be 
challenged. Even if the status of Christian premises precludes the satisfaction of 
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certain philosophical criteria, e.g. that propositions must be accessible to reason 
and observation, Christians can still argue for the treatment of their premises as 
assumptions without initial justification, and which are not antithetical to others in 
a discourse. However, I am concerned here less with Rawls's attitude to the issue 
of faith and rationality than with his method or procedure for establishing justice. 
The fact that a secular theorist may be suspicious or antipathetic towards religious 
claims does not rule out the possibility that his theory may be a mediation of God's 
justice. But if the justificatory method of a theory of justice depends on the 
exclusion of certain ethical conceptions in advance, this would constitute a good 
reason for considering it flawed, inadequate and, ultimately, unacceptable. 
In his later work, Rawls retreats from a position which may be interpreted as 
ruling out comprehensive conceptions in advance. Yet even though he draws back 
from saying that certain conceptions will be ruled out in advance, it is evident that 
they will be discouraged if they are at odds with his assumptions. Richard Fern 
gives two examples of conceptions which may conflict with Rawls's justice as 
fairness.136 The first conception is based on a decision to follow the teaching of 
Jesus as found in St. Matthew 7:25-26, which may be interpreted as requiring a life 
of radical dependence on the will and love of God; such an attitude of absolute 
trust in and dependence on God may bring Christians to hold a conception of the 
good according to which personal fulfilment is inconsistent with the assertion of 
legal rights. 
The second conception may also be based on the teaching of Jesus as found 
in St. Luke 9:62, which may be interpreted as requiring absolute commitment. Such 
an attitude may follow from a belief that some good of great value can only be 
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realised by way of a loyalty beyond abandonment, and wffl lead many Christians to 
adopt a conception off the good which requires an absolute commitment for its 
realisation. 
Fern points out that since neither conception conflicts directly with Rawls's 
principles of justice, their pursuit will not be directly repressed in a well-ordered 
(Rawlsian) society, nor will individuals be forbidden to adopt either or both. But 
this does not mean that they will not be discouraged; in fact, since both conceptions 
are formulated so as to reject basic features of the original position, their adoption 
will be discouraged in a Rawlsian society. 
In some of bis later essays Rawls tries to counter what he considers to be 
narrow interpretations of his thesis of justice as fairness, and he introduces argu-
ments designed to demonstrate the diversity of views permitted in a Rawlsian 
society. Although he concedes that the justification of norms and principles for 
forming and regulating society is the result of using "free public reason",137 he 
maintains that in a pluralistic society we cannot hope to reach agreement if we 
appeal to general and comprehensive moral doctrines. We should instead draw 
only on "fundamental intuitive ideas regarded as latent in the public culture".138 
Rawls hopes that by using what he calls the "method of avoidance" existing 
differences between contending political views can be moderated (if not removed), 
"so that social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect can be maintained".139 
In his essay "Justice as Fairness" Rawls appeals not so much to the original 
position as to the idea of an "overlapping consensus"; he points out 1 4 0 that justice 
as fairness is not a comprehensive moral doctrine but a specific political concep-
tion, and that the members of the overlapping consensus each adopt justice as 
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fairness from their own point of view because they regard "its concepts, principles, 
and virtues as theorems..." at which their diverse comprehensive religious and 
moral doctrines coincide; however diverse these doctrines may be, all citizens will 
agree as a matter of conviction that for the purposes of political and social order 
they are all free and equal moral persons. According to his own constraints, 
although we cannot appeal to this comprehensive (Kantian) conception in order 
to justify the principles of justice, we are entitled to do so on the basis of its being 
a widely shared notion in our public culture. This strategy is successful only if Rawls 
can distinguish between comprehensive conceptions and the common-sense or 
fundamental intuitive ideas embedded in the public culture. In order to do this, he 
suggests that there is "lots of slippage" between the beliefs individuals hold and 
comprehensive doctrines, so that it becomes possible to appeal to the former 
without invoking the latter.141 
Rawls can argue along these lines only by constructing a moral epistemology 
in which he distinguishes between the public and non-public identity of citizens. 
The public identity is "a matter of basic law"142 and, because it is part of the moral 
conception of justice as fairness, it helps to regulate political and social life. 1 4 3 The 
non-public identity encompasses comprehensive moral doctrines as found in phil-
osophical and religious beliefs, which may be quite different from those associated 
with the basic structure of society. Rawls contends144 that while citizens may firmly 
hold certain religious, philosophical and moral convictions, they may not be 
committed to these ideals in their non-public lives if they regulate their social and 
political life in accord with the liberal ideals of justice as fairness. Rawls thus avoids 
questions about any disadvantaging of religious conceptions by appealing to the 
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bifurcation of identity; but this distinction, which involves a claim that the two 
identities may incorporate radically different values and beliefs, is both dubious 
and implausible. 
Apart from assuming that citizens are able and willing to set aside their 
comprehensive conceptions and personal points of view to justify principles of 
justice, the implication of members of the overlapping consensus adopting Rawls's 
idea of justice as fairness is that public identity will always appear as a sub-compo-
nent of the non-public identity. According to Fern, this means that no matter how 
divergent, the non-public identity of citizens will incorporate the ideal of free and 
equal persons engaged in social co-operation: 
Assuming, as we must, that the citizens of a well-ordered society are 
rational, it is difficult to see how... they could both affirm a Rawlsian 
public identity and, at the same time, adopt a comprehensive concep-
tion of the good which explicitly rejects or runs contrary to the Rawlsian 
ideal of moral personality.145 
Fern concludes that anyone who adopts a conception of the human good 
which conflicts with the common (Rawlsian) ideal of free and equal moral persons 
will encounter strong institutional pressure to the contrary; any commitment to a 
non-conforming (though arguably just and rational) conception "will be strongly 
discouraged by the very structures of society",146 because the society will not be 
stable unless citizens realise the underlying Rawlsian ideal of a moral personality 
in terms of pursuing a rational life plan in a context of legal entitlements. On the 
strength of this argument it is hard not to conclude that the pursuit of comprehens-
ive religious (moral) conceptions will be seriously disadvantaged in a Rawlsian 
society. 
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Having examined John Rawls's theory of justice to discover whether it 
provides a procedure for justifying the norms and principles of justice to form 
society and regulate its basic structure, I conclude that despite its great merits it is 
inadequate and deficient in terms of the provision we have sought Besides con-
taining a dubious epistemology, it is flawed by a circularity in its own internal logic, 
i.e. by a dialectic between the procedure and substantive norms and principles. The 
latter are assumed by the theory rather than justified by the procedure.147 
Rawls's claim to pure procedural justice is partially undermined by the 
importation of an independent standard into a situation which, by bis own defini-
tion, ought to have no independent standard operating within it (because it might 
bias the choice of principles). If we concede that this assumption or importation is 
permissible (since theories of justice require minimal but justifiable assump-
tions),148 we still find Rawls's theory wanting, because the further assumptions 
upon which bis independent standard of fairness depends, namely those relating 
to his model-conception of the person, are so strong as to disadvantage, if not 
exclude, certain conceptions of the good which are no less just or rational than his 
own partial theory of the good. Indeed, Rawls's self-interested, thin theory of the 
good contains assumptions which not all Christians would readily endorse, namely 
that all parties in the original position advance their conceptions of the good by 
trying to secure for themselves the greatest amount of primary goods possible. We 
have seen that not only the non-endorsement of Rawls's theory, but also the 
holding of comprehensive theories of the good would seriously disadvantage some 
people in a Rawlsian society. 
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Of all the many criticisms which have been levelled against Rawls's theory, 
the most telling against considering it an adequate mediation of God's justice are 
its individualism and its monological nature (i.e. the thought-experiment of a single 
agent detached from his or her ends). Rawls, as a Kantian philosopher who believes 
that the original position is a procedural interpretation of Kant's categorical 
imperative, seems not to have taken account of the charge that the categorical 
imperative is a subjective and monological principle, rather than an intersubjective 
and dialogical one. If we are to discover the justice of God in modern procedural 
understandings of justice, we must, without prejudging the outcome, be assured 
that the procedure is itself consonant with the intersubjective model of the Trinity 
and with the genuinely discursive model presented by Jesus' communicative action. 
Rawls's later work shows awareness that justification of norms and principles 
is tied to the idea of a public discourse among free and equal persons. If we seek 
to develop that awareness, we find ourselves pushed in the direction of a discourse 
ethics, in which the basic idea is that a norm is justified only if it could be agreed 
to by all concerned as participants in a practical discourse where no force but that 
of the better argument prevails.149 Such a universal or discourse ethics has been 
developed by Habermas who, with Karl-Otto Apel, has reformulated Kant's 
categorical imperative in terms of a discursive procedure for moral argumenta-
tion.1 5 0 This procedure does not impose prior constraints on the subject matter 
that can be introduced in practical discourse, but permits all participants freedom 
to introduce any argument or consideration they deem to be relevant Habermas's 
procedure, which we shall consider next, is constructed so as not to exclude in 
advance any conception of the good or interpretation of specific needs, but to ask 
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whether there are good reasons, i.e. reasons which could not reasonably be rejected 
by any of the participants, for excluding some conceptions from affecting the 
selection of principles of justice. 
The flaws which we have discovered in Rawls's theory of justice do not 
entirely vitiate it, in my view. If Christians are not able to affirm Rawls's theory 
because its proposed procedure is too restrictive and therefore deficient, they can 
still find much within it that is worthwhile, and even consonant with a biblical 
understanding of justice. At very least, Rawls's thesis is worthwhile because, in his 
own words, "it singles out with greater sharpness the graver wrongs a society should 
avoid".151 Even though Rawls's contractual procedure may be the idealised 
thought experiment of a single agent, it still yields "an interesting perspective on 
actual society"152 which may provide a critical standpoint on existing social arrange-
ments, and thereby the basis for acting to change them. Further, in his contractual 
procedure Rawls recognises a crucial aspect of justice, namely that the political 
principles which guide the choice of the optimal social policy must not discriminate 
arbitrarily between people in society. Rawls's egalitarian vision of society, despite 
its individualistic bias, may be sufficiently continuous with a Christian vision to 
permit continued dialogue between Christian and Rawlsian thinkers interested in 
the formation of a more just society, and even to permit the pragmatic adoption of 
much of Rawls's substantive practical advice about just institutional formation in 
order to establish background justice, and maintain a just basic structure. 
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In our search for a modem theory of justice which may be considered a mediation 
of God's society-forming justice, we have noted the inadequacy of Rawls's theory 
mainly on account of the monologkal procedure it advocates, and we concluded 
that the need for a more participatory and dialogica! model pushes us in the 
direction of a discourse ethics.1 The virtue of Habermas's discourse or communi-
cation ethics is that, unlike Rawls's theory of justice which is ambivalent towards 
the public sphere and democratic participation, it contains an implicit theory of 
justice which is developed in the form of a discursive legitimation procedure.2 
This procedure, which is a procedure for rationally evaluating the legitimacy3 
of a political order and for justifying proposed social norms of action, provides a 
method of moral argumentation among citizens in civil society.4 We have also 
noted that a society cannot be formed or maintained through force, but relies on 
a mutual recognition of, and agreement about, norms and values. Habermas asserts 
that such agreement is achieved only communicatively, through a special kind of 
linguistically mediated interaction which is both ideology-critical (unmasking the 
illegitimate and arbitrary use of power) and domination-free, in the sense that it 
prefers a system of justice in which happiness and harmony do not consist of the 
triumph of one over the repressed needs of others. 
Habennas understands society as designating "that symbolically prestruc-
tured segment of reality that the adult subject can understand in a nonconformative 
attitude, that is... as a participant in a system of communication".5 At the heart of 
his conception of civil society, in which citizens integrate or co-ordinate their 
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actions cornrminTicatively, i§ the notion of a pluralist public sphere in which people 
argue rationally about norms, policies and institutions that form society. A con-
stitutive rale of their argumentation is the principle of universalisability (U), which 
Habermas proposes as a reformulation of Kant's categorical imperative: 
Every valid norm has to fulfil the following condition: (U)AM affected 
can accept the consequences and the side-effects its general observance 
can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests 
(and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative 
possibilities for regulation).6 
Habermas's position is that this principle, and the norm of discursive will-
formation on generalisable interests, can be derived from the unavoidable and 
universal pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation and everyday communica-
tion. They are also derivable from the notion (implicit in communicative action) 
of what it means to justify a norm of action. The theory of communicative action 
and the theory of universal pragmatics form the basis of Habermas's justification 
of his discourse ethics, in which his theory of justice is to be discerned. 
Although Habermas's various theories are avowedly atheistic, and propose 
a rational procedure through which socially formative norms can be generated 
without what he calls regressing to mythological, religious and cosmological forms 
of thought,7 there is much in these theories which Christians can affirm: not least 
are Habermas's major aim of anticipating and justifying a better world society, 
which would afford greater opportunities for happiness, peace, justice and com-
munity, and his recognition that the value of justice (right, not might) is the basis 
of all political society. It is to be my contention in the next chapter that a theological 
assessment of the idea of communicative action will find that not only is it 
congruent with the justice of God understood in terms of right relationship and 
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true sodality, but that there is a theological dimension to it, in the sense that the 
reality underlying it is God (whose nature is justice). 
However, before we can proceed to justify this claim, we must examine the 
connection between Habermas's communicative understanding of justice and the 
formation of society, which is to be found in certain categories in his social theory. 
Thus I begin with a section (4.1) which explicates the connection between social 
rationalisation and the linguistic requirement of normative justification. In this 
section I refer to the fact that when people propose certain norms for social action 
they raise various validity claims. As competent subjects of communication they 
are aware of what it means to justify their beliefs and actions to another with 
reasons. This notion of communicative competence requires development, which 
Habermas carries out in his theory of universal pragmatics. The next section (4.2) 
is devoted to this theory, which argues that the validity claims raised by one' actions 
and utterances require "discursive redemption". The task of universal pragmatics 
is the achievement of communicative competence, i.e the theoretical reconstruc-
tion of the implicit knowledge of every speaker to justify actions and norms of 
action.8 
Justice resides in the quality of universality attaching to the norms which 
people propose in forming society through the co-ordination of their social actions. 
People's actions are bound together by reason expressed communicatively or 
dialogically (rather than monologically). Justice as normative legitimacy is depend-
ent upon rational consensus, which is the outcome of a particular kind of argumen-
tative discourse. Habermas's theory of justice can be constructed on the basis of 
the close parallels between justice and truth as these are established in distinct 
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types of discourse. Thus in the nest section (4.3) I consider Habermas's theory of 
truth, which is the model for his theory of justice. In his theory of truth, Habermas 
sets out the steps of argumentation and the conditions for achieving a rational 
consensus (i.e., "the ideal speech situation"). Having set out Habermas's theories 
of universal pragmatics and of truth as the foundation for his theory of justice, I 
proceed in the next section (4.4) to explicate his theory of justice. This section 
concentrates on the notions of universalisability and discursive will-formation, 
since these provide the link between justice and the formation of society. I conclude 
with an endorsement of Habermas's theory because, although it does not provide 
substantive principles of justice, it does provide a genuinely dialogical procedure 
for establishing true sociality in accordance with our social, relational and linguistic 
constitution by God. 
4 . 1 Tito® Mngulstll© ©@=©[rdltet8®[n) off ©©©Dull settlon? 
Habermas's reconstruction of Weber's thought in his Theory of Communica-
tive Action,9 and especially his social-theoretical analysis of social rationalisation 
from the dual perspective of a society as system and lifeworld, have generated two 
valuable insights into the way in which a society is formed through social actions 
which are linguistically mediated and co-ordinated:10 
i) social rationalisation means an increased differentiation between social sub-
systems and the expansion of instrumental reason;11 
ii) the possibility of new forms of communicative rationalisation within a life-
world freed from the functional imperatives of social subsystems. 
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Habermas's re-working of the Weberian connection between social action 
and rationality releases the emancipatory and transformative potential of ration-
alisation which is not tied purely to humankind's technical interests, and thus is not 
positivistically reduced to instrumental rationality and technological and economic 
processes. Habermas is critical of the tendency in Western societies to suppress 
the distinction between the practical (i.e. the normative) and the technical (i.e. 
those processes by which material means are fitted to material ends).12 In Haber-
mas's epistemology (contained in his theory of "knowledge-constitutive inter-
ests"13) every speaking and acting subject constitutes knowledge in the light of 
three universally given a priori "cognitive interests",14 which correspond to three 
different processes of inquiry. 1 5 
The first of these interests is a universal interest in the technical control of 
nature that "constitutes the meaning of possible statements" and "establishes rules 
both for the construction of theories and for their critical testing".16 In this view, 
the validity of scientific theories cannot be separated from the underlying technical 
interest of humankind in the domination of nature which allows the material 
production of species. Habermas's critique of "scientism" (positivistic science) 
reveals that an unreflective cognitive attitude in the theoretical sciences toward 
the domain of nature causes it to be fundamentally instrumental: the implicit 
objective of all scientific enquiry based on this technical cognitive interest is to 
control and dominate. 
The consequence of this cognitive attitude is that the tendency to control 
"objective" nature is transferred to the political sphere, with the result that political 
action is reduced to technical control and instrumental manipulation. It is in 
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response to humankind's technical interest in the domination of nature that science 
constitutes the world as one of potentially manipulable bodies. The expansion of 
technical control is accompanied by the technological manipulation of citizens, a 
manipulation which is normalised in order to maintain the system as it is. While 
technological development is important for the development of the human species 
and their society, it cannot proceed without due regard for progress in the fields of 
social institution and culture. Technical progress does not imply social and political 
progress, and cannot be identified with political emancipation and a more just 
social order. It does not follow that progress in the field of technical control implies 
improvement in the area of social interaction. 
To retain the cognitive attitude of technical interest alone is to walk into the 
dangerous trap of asking science (or, more accurately, scientific theory justifying 
instrumental action) to provide absolute and authoritative answers in the practical 
or communicative domain.17 Habermas, in his criticism of Stalinist praxis, suggests 
that scientism in theory is authoritarianism is practice.18 Dermot Lane notes that 
"the history of the world, especially in the twentieth century, is surely adequate 
warning against the devastating results that this expectation can bring".1 9 Lane 
points out the value of Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests is a 
valuable epistemological tool for understanding the cultural crisis of the west; in 
particular, Habermas's analysis of the supremacy of technical reason in modern 
society helps us to understand some of the grave injustices and "extraordinary 
anomalies"20 that beset the latter half of the twentieth century. Lane sums up 
Habermas's thought in noting the strange paradox which arises from the fact the 
advances of technology "have become in many instances more of a menace to 
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society than a source of genuine progress". 1 That menace consists in the identifi-
cation of instrumental reason with social reality and its divorce from practical and 
emancipatory interests. 
There is yet a more subtle and pernicious danger in technical rationality, 
because "it severs the criteria for justifying the organisation of social life from any 
normative regulation of interaction .. .m 2 2 Habermas adds that "technocratic con-
sciousness reflects not the sundering of an ethical situation but the repression of 
'ethics' as such as a category of life". 2 3 The consequence of reducing knowledge to 
technique is the debasement of the public sphere. Habermas's thought on this 
phenomenon points to the devastating effect it has on the contemporary political 
process where, instead of decisions being made through the forum of public debate, 
"the decision-making process of democracy is taken over by a new breed of 
technical 'experts' who decide priorities on the basis of instrumental reason, with 
little or no reference to the legitimate demands of practical reason".24 
Against the mistrust of reason and rationality in some theological quarters, 
Habermas's understanding of rationality is far removed from the unreflective 
technical and instrumental understanding with which rationality is often associ-
ated. It needs to be stated that Habermas's enlargement of the concept of reason 
was designed to bring about emancipation from oppression and the improvement 
of human society and social relationships; this aim is consonant with the Christian 
vision of justice. The thrust of Habermas's thought has been to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of an exclusively instrumental or strategic rationality. Habermas's 
predecessors in the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer and Adorao, were unsuccessful 
in their attempts through their critique of instrumental reason25 to bring about a 
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rational society in which reason, freedom and justice could be harmoniously linked 
for emancipation from a wide range of constraints, because they were not success-
ful in developing a coherent account of reason.26 Habermas wants to introduce and 
defend a wider, more comprehensive account of rationality (which he understands 
as "connected with ancient conceptions of logos''^). 
In developing bis account of communicative rationality, Habermas distin-
guishes between understanding-oriented action (communicative action) and suc-
cess-oriented action (purposive-rational or instrumental action).2 8 He makes a 
further distinction between strategic and instrumental action.29 Communicative 
action is an altogether different type of social action. Habermas points out that 
concepts of social action are distinguished according to how they specify the 
co-ordination among the goal-directed actions of different participants.30 Com-
municative action, for Habermas, designates a type of interaction that is co-ordi-
nated through language, specifically through speech acts.31 It refers to "the 
interpretation of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish 
interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra-verbal means). The actors 
seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action 
in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of 
interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation 
which admit of consensus"32 
Habermas's wider conception of rationality does not jettison technical ration-
ality. Habermas recognises that social systems expand their control over outer 
nature with the help of the forces of production: 
A society owes emancipation from the external forces of nature to 
labour processes, that is to the production of technically exploitable 
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knowledge (including "the transformation of the natural sciences into 
machinery"). Emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature 
succeeds to the degree that institutions based on force are replaced by 
an organisation of social relations that is bound only to communication 
free from domination.33 
In order to exercise technical control over outer nature social systems require 
technically utilisable knowledge incorporating empirical assumptions with a claim 
to truth. "Inner nature" is adapted to society with the help of normative structures 
in which needs are interpreted and actions are variously sanctioned; this transpires 
in the medium of norms that have need of justification. Habermas's distinction 
between instrumental action, or work according to technical rules, and communi-
cative action, or social interaction according to valid norms, is crucial to his 
understanding of a just social order, because only by it can we reconstruct the 
development of the human species as a historical process of technological and, 
interdependently, institutional and cultural development: 
The processes of natural history are mediated by the productive activity 
of individuals and the organisation of their interrelations. These rela-
tions are subject to norms that decide, with the force of institutions, how 
responsibilities and rewards, obligations and charges to the social bud-
get are distributed among members. It forms the linguistic communi-
cation structure on the basis of which subjects interpret both nature and 
themselves in their environment.34 
Habermas's analytic distinction between instrumental and communicative 
action at the level of social evolution, in which he distinguishes the growth in 
technical control from the extension of communication free from domination, 
provides the framework for his theory of legitimation crisis, which we considered 
earlier. 
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As we have seen, the burden of Habermas's bookLegitimation Crisis35 is that 
behavioural norms which govern social and political life derive their ultimate 
authority from their rational justifiability and their consequent capacity to com-
mand rational consensus. It is in the notion of rational consensus that we discern 
the contours of Habermas's theory of justice. Habermas does not have an explicit, 
fully developed theory of justice. However, justice (and truth) play an indispensable 
part in his thought on the political constitution of modern society and social 
evolution, in which he explores the origins, correlates and expressions of his 
standard of communicative rationality. This normative standard measures the 
course of development of the rationalisation process which Habermas reconstructs 
in his social theory. His thoughts on truth and justice can be gathered together to 
form a theory which is aimed at rationally grounding successful challenges to the 
stubbornly resistant "scientism" (false science) embedded in modern economics, 
philosophy, history, sociology, psychology, anthropology, politics and the hu-
manities. I believe that theology can incorporate this theory, and draw support from 
Habermas's rejection of positivism and his attempt to achieve a theoretical under-
standing, using the categories of communicative competence and communicative 
rationality, to transform society and establish justice. Habermas's theory suggests 
that our hopes for a free and just society are the expression of the rationality of 
communicative action. 
It is clear from Habermas's social theory, and from his communication theory, 
that society is formed as a consequence of the co-ordination of social action, which 
is a function of communicative action. Communicative action is action which is 
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oriented to reaching an understanding - the thesis he puts forward at the beginning 
of his important essay "What is Universal Pragmatics?".36 It is clear from this thesis 
that Habermas focuses on language as a medium for co-ordinating action, i.e., for 
producing situations and subsequent patterns of interaction that depend for their 
legitimacy or justness on the rationally binding force of norms justified consen-
sually37 in particular kinds of linguistic acts. Our everyday communication practices 
contain linguistic (illocutive) acts which have rationally binding force. This force 
is constitutive for communicative action, and is a condition for social action in 
general.38 It is the result of people acting communicatively, i.e. of trying to 
co-ordinate their social interaction linguistically. 
When people act communicatively, they draw on mutually shared interpre-
tations of their lifeworld. 3 9 In the utterance of their interpretations and their 
proposed social actions, they raise various related validity claims, and they mutually 
suppose that they each are ready to provide reasons if the validity of these claims 
should be contested. According to Habermas, competently speaking and acting 
subjects are aware, at least intuitively, of what it means to justify their beliefs and 
actions to another with reasons.40 The readiness to provide such a justification is 
counterfactual, but Habermas believes that any subject capable of speech and 
action has the intuitive knowledge and interpretive accomplishments to redeem 
normative validity claims discursively, i.e. to justify action linguistically. The lin-
guistic dimension is absolutely crucial to Habermas's thought on justice, and is 
carefully integrated with his systems-theoretical concept of legitimation crisis. 
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The problem of legitimacy has received very considerable attention in the 
fields of political and economic philosophy41 because it has always been central to 
social and political theory. A study of social justice which attempts to connect 
justice with the formation of society cannot avoid the central issue of legitimacy, 
and how that legitimacy is to be achieved. My study is less concerned with justice 
as an assessment of alternative forms of government, substantive political princi-
ples, ideals and patterns of organisation than with the method of assessment or 
justification. For this reason we turn to Habermas's theory of communicative 
action, which focuses on language as the medium for co-ordinating the actions and 
justifying the norms which form society. 
It is clear from Habermas's many works that communication and language, 
which are central to social theory, are essential vehicles for achieving a just society: 
Language behaviour is seen as the intervening variable between social 
institutions, the class system, and the state, on the one side, and, 
on the other, persons' capacity to interpret the social world rationally 
and to do something with others to change i t . 4 2 
Even before his "linguistic turn" in the 1970s,43 Habermas (as early as bis 
inaugural lecture at Frankfurt University in 1965) adverted to the central import-
ance of language: 
What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: 
language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited 
for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of 
universal and unconstrained consensus.44 
Justice is closely related to truth, and truth can be discerned and established 
only by a deep and proper understanding of language, i.e by those who are 
"communicatively competent". This necessarily involves paying close attention to 
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language, linguistics and communication theory, especially the rational reconstruc-
tion of the conditions of speech and action (which is the task of formal or universal 
pragmatics). These considerations are all part of Habermas's theory of communi-
cative competence, which deals with our ability to embed language in a network of 
relations to different orders of reality (see pp.194-195). It provides a unifying 
framework for his various disparate concerns and theoretical endeavours, from his 
theories of knowledge and action to his theories of socialisation and ideology. For 
Habermas, the theory of communication is the foundational study for the human 
sciences because speech is the distinctive and pervasive medium of life at the 
human level, disclosing the universal infrastructure of socio-cultural life. Haber-
mas sees language as a kind of transformer, which transforms inner experiences 
into intentional contents, thereby producing intersubjective structures which regu-
late the processes of adapting to society "that, by virtue of the competencies of 
socially related individuals, operate through the peculiar media of utterances that 
admit of truth and norms that require justification".45 Habermas's theory of 
communicative competence is not a theoretical luxury in the context of critical 
social theory but, as bis main translator sees it, part of the goal of his critical theory 
- a form of life free from unnecessary domination in all its forms - which is "inherent 
in the notion of truth; it is anticipated in every act of communication".46 
Habermas's shift of focus to language and action includes an explication of 
universal pragmatics, in which he develops his notions of communicative ration-
ality and communicative competence; it is from these conceptions that he derives 
his communicative ethics, because for him they constitute a universalistic perspec-
tive on normative legitimacy. In his theory of universal pragmatics Habermas 
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maintains that the fundamental norms of rational speech are implicit in ongoing 
linguistic interaction, a 'fact' which can be demonstrated by reconstructing what is 
intuitively known by every competent speaker. The theory of universal pragmatics 
is essential for a grasp of both his theory of truth and his theory of justice, because 
it provides the basis for his discourse ethics in which justice is determined, and thus 
warrants our investigation. 
4.2 Hafe@irm®g9i SEhi@©oy ©f ynSwsrs®! pragmatics 
The connection between universal pragmatics, justice and the formation of 
society consists in the quasi-transcendental or speech-immanent obligation to 
justify norms of social action. We have noted that social action is co-ordinated 
through linguistically mediated interaction, in which the utterances of citizens raise 
validity claims which require justification, and toward which a hearer can take a 
rationally motivated "yes/no" position. Such justification implies at least an intuitive 
grasp of what it means to justify one's actions by discursive redemption of the 
validity claims they raise. The task of universal or formal pragmatics47 is "to identify 
and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding",48 i.e., the theore-
tical reconstruction of what it is that competent speakers implicitly know when they 
understand the utterance of a sentence in their language.49 Universal pragmatics 
analyses the deep structure of the possibility of human communication, and 
establishes the conditions of linguistic interaction in a quasi-transcendental (i.e. 
unavoidable) sense. 
The theory of universal pragmatics, thus, is an extension of formal semantics. 
Formal semantics, in its pursuit of a theory of meaning, can be divided into two 
basic theories: truth-conditional theories and communication-intentional theories. 
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The former state that to understand the meaning of a sentence in a language is to 
know the conditions under which it would be true. 5 0 The latter, to which Habermas 
is much closer, assert that a complete theory of sentence-meaning must also include 
an account of what speakers characteristically do with sentences. According to P. 
F. Strawson, this can best be achieved with reference to the communicative or 
audience-directed intentions of speakers 5 1 Strawson contends that the meaning 
of a sentence is (in part) dependent on the conventional rules governing the use a 
speaker makes of a sentence of a particular type (e.g., stating or asserting). These 
rules are themselves determined by the pragmatic considerations a speaker stand-
ardly intends to do with such sentences. Thus the goal of a theory of meaning, 
according to communication-intention theorists, is the theoretical reconstruction 
of the practical ability possessed by competent speakers of a language.52 
Habermas is critical of those approaches originating with Carnap which 
restrict rational reconstruction53 to the syntactic and semantic features of language 
in abstraction from its pragmatic dimension. He is also critical of mainstream 
linguistics which relegates the pragmatic dimension to the domain of empirical 
investigations like psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics.54 Although he insists that 
it is legitimate to draw an abstractive distinction between language as structure and 
speaking as process (i.e an abstraction of language from the use of language in 
speech), he also believes that this methodological step does not warrant the view 
that the pragmatic dimension of language from which one abstracts is beyond 
formal analysis (i.e. inaccessible to a logical or linguistic analysis): 
The separation of the two analytical levels, language and speech, should 
not be made in such a way that the pragmatic dimension of language is 
left to exclusively empirical analysis... I would like to defend the thesis 
JQrgen Habermas's Theory of Justice 190 
that not only language bull speech too - that is, the employment of 
sentences in utterances - is accessible to formal analysis. 
In his essay "What is Universal Pragmatics?" Habermas reacts56 to Chomsky's 
distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic performance. Generative 
grammar is concerned with the former to the exclusion of the latter.5 7 Habermas 
believes that universal pragmatics permits the rational and universal reconstruc-
tion not only of linguistic competence (with its associated phonetic, syntactic and 
semantic features of sentences), but also of communicative competence (with its 
associated pragmatic features of utterances): 
[Universal pragmatics] thematises the elementary units of speech (ut-
terances) in an attitude similar to that in which linguistics does the units 
of language (sentences). The goal of reconstructive linguistic analysis 
is an explicit description of the rules that a competent speaker must 
master in order to form grammatical sentences and to utter them in an 
acceptable way. The theory of speech acts shares this task with linguis-
tics. Whereas the latter starts from the assumption that every adult 
speaker possesses an implicit, reconstructible knowledge, in which is 
expressed his linguistic rule competence (to produce sentences), 
speech act theory postulates a corresponding communicative rule com-
petence, namely the competence to employ sentences in speech acts. It 
is further assumed that communicative competence has just as universal 
a core as linguistic competence. A general theory of speech actions 
would thus describe exactly that fundamental system of rules that adult 
subjects master to the extent that they can fulfi l the conditions for a 
happy employment of sentences in utterances, no matter to which par-
ticular language the sentences belong and in which accidental contexts 
the utterances may be embedded.58 
This excerpt demonstrates Habermas's belief that the speech acts of com-
municatively competent actors conform to a set of rules, some of which establish 
the criteria of communicative rationality. Habermas's theory of communicative 
competence is an attempt to make good the claim that communication oriented to 
understanding has as its goal the attainment of agreement or consensus;59 he does 
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this by reconstructing the normative basis of speech as a system of universal and 
necessary validity claims (see p. 195 below). The rationale behind this approach is 
that language cannot be comprehended apart from the understanding that is 
achieved in it. For Habermas the rational reconstruction process in universal 
pragmatics is the task of rendering implicit know-how (universal or fundamental 
competence) into a set of explicit, "formal-pragmatic" rules. The pragmatic concept 
of performance is crucial to Habermas's proposal of investigating language in 
competence-theoretic terms, and of reconstructing speakers' intuitive linguistic 
knowledge in terms of a theory of communicative competence. 
In developing a theory of "communicative competence", and after conside-
ring numerous linguistic approaches from Wittgenstein onwards, Habermas 
adopts the theory of speech acts, based on the work of Austin and Searle,60 as the 
most promising approach for his own theory. The reason that Habermas is drawn 
to speech act theory is that "it clarifies the performative status of linguistic utter-
ances".61 J. L . Austin is credited with initiating this theory, which has been de-
veloped by Searle, Strawson and others (including Habermas and Apel). In this 
theory, the basic linguistic unit is not the sentence, but the speech act. According 
to Searle, speech acts are a species of constitutive (rather than regulative) rule, and 
to understand a speech act is to know the rules that are constitutive for the use of 
acts of that type.62 Searle claims that there are four main rules constitutive for the 
type of speech act performed: the prepositional content rule, the preparatory rule, 
the sincerity rule, and the essential rule (which is the most important, because it 
specifies an act's illocutionary point or aim).6 3 The thesis of Austin's famous work 
How To Do Things With Words is that speakers, in saying something, also do 
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something. He introduced a distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts:64 the former are acts of saying something, while the latter are acts one 
performs in saying something. Whereas locutionary acts refer to the sense and 
reference of the utterance, and bear truth and falsity, illocutionary acts indicate the 
force of the utterance and are determined not by conditions of truth or falsity, but 
of felicity or infelicity. 
Austin also distinguished between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.65 
The former are aimed at "securing uptake" or "bringing about an understanding of 
the meaning and of the force of the locution",66 while the latter aim at producing 
an effect in the audience.67 Searle clarified Austin's distinction by reformulating 
it not as a difference between two kinds of speech acts, but as a difference between 
the two basic components of any speech act.68 While the locutionary component, 
or propositional content, refers to the sense of the utterance, and can be true or 
false, the illocutionary component specifies the force with which the propositional 
content is uttered. For example, in the utterances "I assert thatp", "I promise that 
p", or "I command that p", the same propositional content p appears with varying 
illocutionary force. Each speech act consists, at the level of deep structure, of two 
sentences: a dominating or performative sentence, as in the examples above ("I 
assert, promise, command, that...); and a sentence of propositional content. The 
doing of something in saying something is Austin's "illocutionary force" of an 
utterance. 
The double structure, which is a feature of everyday communication, helps 
us to understand how a speaker and hearer can communicate simultaneously at 
two levels: 1) the level of intersubjectivity on which they are able to establish the 
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relations that permit them to come to an understanding with one another; and 2) 
the level of prepositional content which is communicated.69 Participants thus 
combine communication of a content with communication about the role in which 
the communicated content is used. The dominating sentence establishes the 
illocutionary force of the utterance, the mode of communication between speaker 
and hearer, and thus the pragmatic situation of the dependent sentence; the latter 
consists in general of an identifying or referring phrase and an indicative phrase, 
and establishes the connection of the communication with the world of objects. 
Habermas argues that the competence of the ideal speaker must be regarded 
as including not only the ability to produce and understand grammatical sentences 
but also the ability to establish and understand those modes of communication and 
connections with the external world through which speech in ordinary language 
becomes possible. External structures are not the only ones which are referred to 
or produced (performatively) in the double structure of speech; universal pragma-
tics undertakes the systematic reconstruction of general structures that appear in 
every possible speech situation. These structures serve to situate pragmatically the 
expressions generated by the linguistically competent speaker. 
Pragmatic rules for situating sentences in speech situations concern three 
basic relations to reality that accrue to a grammatically well-formed sentence in 
being uttered. According to Habermas, such a sentence is placed in relation to 
a) an external reality, or objective world of states of affairs; 
b) a normative reality of intersubjectively recognised legitimate interpersonal 
relationships, i.e. a social world of interpersonal norms and values, roles and 
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rules, that a speech act can fit or fail to fit. (These norms are either right -
legitimate, justifiable - or wrong.) 
c) an internal reality of intentionality and expressivity, i.e. a subjective world of 
70 
experience. 
Habermas also introduces these relations to reality as three possible world-
relations which social actors can adopt; as they seek to reach an understanding with 
one another about something in the world, they orient themselves to these worlds. 
Further, the utterances of speakers oriented toward understanding necessarily (but 
usually only implicitly) make validity claims of different types. According to 
Habermas, the claims are: 
*71 
i) that the utterance is comprehensible (grammatical in the linguistic sense); 
ii) that the utterance or statement is true (or, if no statement is made, that the 
existential presuppositions of his utterance's propositional content are ful-
filled); 
iii) that the speaker's manifest expression of intentions is truthful (or veracious:); 
iv) and that his utterance (his speech act) itself is right or appropriate in relation 
to a recognised normative context (or that the normative context it satisfies 
is itself legitimate). 
A speaker has to be able to convince her hearers that her validity claims are 
rational and thus worthy of recognition for there to be a rationally motivated 
argument or consensus on how to co-ordinate future actions.73 Habermas argues 
that from the perspective of communicative action, utterances can be assessed as 
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rational or irrational because they raise criticisable validity claims.7 Someone is 
considered rational not only by providing grounds for an assertion by pointing to 
appropriate evidence, but also if he is following an established norm and is able to 
justify his action by explicating the given situation in the light of legitimate 
expectations.75 Habermas holds that while genuine communicative utterances aim 
to bring about the understanding which has as its goal the attainment of consensus, 
some utterances are non-communicative, i.e. not every actual instance of speech 
is oriented to reaching understanding. Habermas regards these as "strategic" forms 
of communication (like lying, misleading, deceiving, manipulating, etc.), which are 
parasitic on speech oriented to genuine understanding, because they involve the 
suspension of certain validity claims, especially truthfulness.76 
From the point of view of a theory of justice, the centre of the theory of speech 
acts is an explanation of the illocutionary force proper to performative utterances, 
that is, of their power to generate the interpersonal relations intended by the 
speaker. Habermas limits his analysis of speech acts to those carried out under 
standard conditions77 (i.e. those which are meant sincerely and are not employed 
strategically). It is these speech acts which have a constitutive meaning for com-
municative action. As we have seen, communicative action is aimed at agreement 
that will provide the basis for a "consensual coordination"78 of social action, which 
is simultaneously the basis for the justice which forms society. The point of the 
concept of speech acts, for Habermas, lies in their "peculiarly generative power", 
which can cause a speech act to succeed or to fail. 7 9 A speech act succeeds if it 
establishes the intended relation by a speaker between him and his hearer, and if 
the hearer can understand and accept the content uttered by the speaker in the 
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sense indicated (e.g., a promise, assertion, suggestion, etc.): Thus the generative 
power consists in the fact that the speaker, in performing a speech act, can influence 
the hearer in such a way that the latter can take up an interpersonal relation with 
him."80 It is this performative aspect which receives most emphasis in Habermas's 
development of the necessary conditions for a successful speech act. 
Following Austin and Searle's analysis of illocutionary force, Habermas 
recognises that the success or failure of a speech act is not merely a question of 
comprehensibility but of "acceptability": "With an illocutionary act a speaker makes 
an offer that can be accepted or rejected."81 Habermas insists that a speech act 
counts as acceptable only if the speaker not merely feigns but sincerely makes a 
serious offer: "A serious offer demands a certain engagement on the part of the 
speaker."82 Although he follows Searle closely, Habermas believes previous ana-
lyses of speech acts to be unsatisfactory, "as they have not clarified the engagement 
of the speaker, on which the acceptability of his utterance depends".83 Thus, for 
Habermas, the essential presupposition for the success of an illocutionary act 
consists in the speaker's entering sincerely into a specific engagement, so that the 
hearer can rely on him: 
An utterance can count as a promise, assertion, request, question, or 
avowal, if and only if the speaker makes an offer that he is ready to make 
good insofar as it is accepted by the hearer. The speaker must engage 
himself, that is, indicate that in certain situations he will draw certain 
consequences for action. The content of the engagement is to be distin-
guished from the sincerity of the engagement... This condition, intro-
duced by Searle as the "sincerity rule", must always be fulfilled in the 
case of communicative action that is oriented to reaching under-
standing.84 
Habermas argues that the illocutionary force of an acceptable speech act 
consists in the fact that it can move a hearer to rely on the "speech-act-typical 
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commitments" (or speech-act-immanent obligations) of the speaker.85 The ques-
tion arises, if illocutionary force is to have more than suggestive influence, as to 
what could motivate the hearer to accept the speaker's sincerely intended engage-
ment. According to Habermas, in the case of "institutionally bound" speech acts 
(such as baptising and marrying), the illocutionary force can be traced back directly 
to the rationally binding force of established norms of action. In the case of 
institutionally unbound speech acts (which do not presuppose particular institu-
tional settings), the speaker can develop this force by inducing recognition of the 
universal validity claims raised by her speech act: 
With their illocutionary acts, speaker and hearer raise validity claims 
and demand they be recognised. But this recognition need not follow 
irrationally, since the validity claims have a cognitive character and can 
be checked. I would like, therefore, to defend the following thesis: in 
the final analysis, the speaker can illocutionarily influence the hearer and 
vice versa, because the speech-act-typical commitments are connected 
with cognitively testable validity claims - that is, because the reciprocal 
bonds have a rational basis. The engaged speaker normally connects 
the specific sense in which he would like to take up an interpersonal 
relation with a thematically stressed validity claim and thereby chooses 
a specific mode of communication.86 
Thus the engagement or performative attitude of the speaker is defined in 
terms of the validity claims which correspond to each type of illocutionary act, and 
which are built into the structure of acts of that type. Habermas argues that in 
different speech acts, in addition to the general conditions of intelligibility or 
comprehensibility, three universal validity claims are raised (truth, lightness, and 
truthfulness). The priority of the respective claim determines the basic type of 
speech act performed. In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas states 
that in analytic philosophy, there is an extended literature on each of the three pure 
cases of speech acts, which has developed instruments to explain the universal 
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validity claims to which speakers are oriented in their different types of speech act. 
The three types are: 
constative speech acts in which elementary prepositional (assertoric) 
sentences are used; 
regulative speech acts in which either elementary imperative sentences 
(as in commands) or elementary intentional sentences (as in promises) 
appear; 
expressive speech acts in which elementary experiential sentences (in 
the first person present) appear.87 
In constative or assertive illocutionary acts (such as asserting, reporting, 
narrating, predicting, denying, contesting), it is the claim to truth which is constitu-
tive and is thematically stressed. "In the cognitive use of language the speaker 
proffers a speech-act-immanent obligation to provide grounds. Constative speech 
acts contain the offer to recur if necessary to the experiential source from which the 
speaker draws the certainty that his statement is true. If this immediate grounding 
does not dispel an ad hoc doubt, the persisting problematic truth can become the 
subject of a theoretical discourse."88 
In regulative illocutionary acts (such as commands, requests, warnings, ex-
cuses, recommendations, advice, through which we mark the distinction between 
what is and what ought to be), the claim to tightness or appropriateness is themati-
cally stressed. "In the interactive use of language the speaker proffers a speech-act-
immanent obligation to provide justification. Of course, regulative speech acts 
contain only the offer to indicate, if necessary, the normative context which gives 
the speaker the conviction that his utterance is right. Again, if this immediate 
justification does not dispel an ad hoc doubt, we can pass over to the level of 
discourse, in this case a practical discourse. In such a discourse, however, the 
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subject of discursive examination is not the rightaess claim directly connected with 
the speech act, but the validity claim of the underlying norm."89 
In expressive or representative illocutionary acts (such as to admit, reveal, 
hope, fear, love, hate, want, desire, etc.), the claim to trathfulness is thematised. 
"In the expressive use of language the speaker also enters into a speech-act-imman-
ent obligation, namely the obligation to prove trustworthy, to show in the consequen-
ces of his action that he has expressed just that intention which actually guides his 
behaviour. In case the immediate assurance expressing what is evident to the 
speaker himself cannot dispel ad hoc doubts, the truthfulness of the utterance can 
only be checked against the consistency of his subsequent behaviour."90 
The point of Habermas's universal pragmatics for people living together who 
are trying to achieve justice (which is primarily relational or, in Habermas's 
language, "interactive"), and to form society, is that they must have mastered a 
whole set of distinctions between performatives, modes of language and validity 
claims if they are to able to use their utterances to generate the kind of under-
standing necessary for co-ordinating their social actions. His notion of universal 
pragmatics demarcates a certain sort of language use as "fundamental" or paradig-
matic for understanding.91 Only speech acts which clearly exhibit the mastery of 
the formal pragmatic rules fall into this category, for they alone have the full 
capacity to sustain understanding-oriented [communicative] action. 
In response to critics who allege that Habermas is privileging serious, 
straightforward unambiguous language usage,92 Habermas's defence93 of his 
classificatory scheme refers to its ultimate purpose. He privileges certain kinds of 
usage in order to clarify how it is possible for ordinary language to play its distinctive 
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co-ordinating role in human interaction: "We can explain the concept of reaching 
understanding only if we specify what it means to use sentences with a communi-
cative intent."94 
In Habennas's^l Reply to My Critics he argues that his "selectivity is harmless, 
since such expressions [e.g., verbal and non-verbal symbolic forms like fiction, 
poetry, dance, music, painting, etc.] do not as a rule take over functions of 
co-ordinating action".95 The reason that Habermas considers it so important to 
adhere to his classificatory scheme of speech is that the usage which he calls 
standard (i.e., normal) performs a direct co-ordinating role in a way which aesthetic 
expression does not. The basic question here for Habermas is what precisely the 
contribution of language is to the co-ordination of action necessary to the very 
possibility of social life; it is evident that justice is a crucial part of such action, since 
justice is primarily a relational and social virtue or quality making social life 
possible. 
Our study of universal pragmatics has been necessary, because it provides the 
linguistic basis of the principle of universalisability which is at the heart of Haber-
mas's theory of justice. As I have pointed out already, Habermas does not have an 
explicit theory of justice, but a discourse or communicative ethics which is part of 
his theory of communicative action, and is oriented toward social justice in terms 
of political legitimacy as the domain of morality (rather than the more limited area 
of personal choices and specific conceptions of the good life). According to Baynes, 
the central question in communicative ethics is "What norms should govern our 
common life?" rather than "What sort of person do I want to become?"96 The reason 
that discourse ethics is valuable for our exploration of justice and the formation of 
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society is that it is concerned with the specification of a procedure97 to determine 
the impartial and public regulation of conflicts of social action.98 
The universalism of Habermas's discourse ethics, I believe, makes it con-
gruent with the justice of God." The objection that Habermas's basically Kantian 
moral theory establishes its universality by deriving its principle of universalisa-
bility from the quasi-transcendental100 and unavoidable presuppositions of ar-
gumentation, and hence not from any other 'metaphysical' or transcendental 
source,101 can be countered by pointing to the universal presence of God in the 
very structures of language by which we are constituted as social beings (or 
individuals-in-society). Since society is formed by the co-ordination of social 
interaction,102 and since language is the primary medium through which such 
divinely willed co-ordination is achieved, God is present in the socially connecting 
structures of language to produce the right relationship or true sociality he intends 
in creation. 
Habermas's theory of universal pragmatics helps us to see that anyone who 
seriously enters discursive argumentation with another presupposes certain 
universal pragmatic rules from which the principle of universalisability can be 
inferred. Habermas's theory of communicative action asserts that humans repro-
duce their social and cultural life through the medium of speech in which validity 
claims are necessarily raised and in which subjects make the reciprocal supposition 
of accountability. Our study of universal pragmatics revealed that Habermas's 
concept of communicative action implies a structure of intersubjectivity from 
which we can derive a mutual "speech-act-immanent obligation to provide justifi-
cation"103 for the different sorts of claims which are continually raised in under-
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standing-oriented actions. Every subject recognises his or her obligation implicitly, 
simply by virtue of having engaged in communicative action. The rationality of 
anyone who refuses to acknowledge this normative obligation (including the 
supposition of accountability and the minimal demand for universalisation) is 
called into question.104 
As we have seen, the social systems of society are integrated "through the 
medium of norms that have need of justification",105 norms which imply a validity 
claim that can be redeemed discursively. To the truth claims raised in empirical 
statements there correspond claims of correctness or appropriateness advanced 
with norms of action.106 It is in the linguistic basis of bis theory of communicative 
action that we find the roots of his discourse ethics which, according to Seyla 
Benhabib, is "first and foremost a philosophical theory of moral justification";101 
the basic insight of this ethics is that the validity of norms and the integrity of moral 
values can be established only though a process of practical discourse or argumen-
tation. Three things distinguish Habermas's theory from other neo-Kantian the-
ories like Rawls's: 
1) It does not predefine the set of issues which can be legitimately raised in the 
conversation. The agenda of moral conversation or discourse is radically 
open, being defined by the agents themselves rather than by the theorist. 
2) The only constraint upon the moral discourse, apart from the procedural 
rules, is the constraint to seek intersubjective validation or justification from 
others. 
JUrgen Habermas's Theory of Justice 203 
3) In such a discourse, "individuals do not have to think of themselves as 
'unencumbered' selves. It is neither necessary for individuals to define them-
selves independently of the ends they cherish nor of the constitutive attach-
ments that make them what they are. In entering practical discourses, 
individuals are not entering an 'original position'; they are not being asked 
to think of themselves in ways which are radically counterfactual to their 
everyday identities".108 
When individuals in society propose norms of action which affect their 
individual and social welfare, they raise normative claims which stand in need of 
legitimation. The test of legitimation requires a suspension of normal constraints 
of action and the initiation of a mode of communication which Habermas, in an 
excursus on the theory of argumentation,109 refers to as discourse in either its 
theoretical and practical form. In a table outlining the types of argumentation he 
suggests that controversial validity claims tested in theoretical discourse have to 
do with the truth of propositions and the efficacy of ideological action, while 
practical discourse tests the lightness of norms of action.110 According to Haber-
mas discourse is 
a communicative practice which is oriented to achieving, sustaining, 
and renewing consensus - and indeed a consensus that rests on inter-
subjective recognition of criticisable validity claims. The rationality 
inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively 
achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons. And the 
rationality of those who participate in this communicative practice is 
determined by whether, if necessary, they could, under suitable circum-
stances, provide reasons for their expressions. Thus the rationality 
proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the 
practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to 
continue communicative action with other means when disagreements 
can no longer be repaired with everyday routines and yet are not settled 
by the direct or strategic use of force. For this reason I believe that the 
concept of communicative rationality, which refers to an unclarified 
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systematic interconnection! of universal validity claims, can be adequ-
ately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation,111 
Communicative rationality is Habermas's vision of how reason binds actions 
together; it carries with it "connotations based ultimately on the central experience 
of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, 
in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing 
to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the 
unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld".112 
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The contours of Habermas's theory of justice become evident from bis 
disparate remarks on discourse, argumentation, consensus, truth and justice. 
Habermas's theory of truth, articulated in his essay Wahrheitstheorien,113 is the 
model for his theory of justice. The notions of discourse and consensus are central 
components of both theories. Truth and justice both require consideration and 
testing in argumentative discourse. For truth, the forum for consideration is 
theoretical discourse, whereas for justice it is practical discourse. The nature of the 
discourse is determined by its subject. There are close parallels between the way 
in which propositions in his truth theory and norms in his justice theory obtain 
redemption in and through discourse. The parallel between justice and truth is in 
the validity claims raised in the speech acts of those debating justice in society, i.e. 
those disputing legitimacy norms. These validity claims are revealed by a universal 
pragmatic analysis of the conditions of consensual speech, and include claims to 
be intelligible, truthful, sincere, and correct or appropriate. 
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Habermas argues that any answer to the question "what does truth consist 
in?" must take truth to be something operational, something that can be decided 
among partners in discourse: "We call those statements true for which we are able 
to argue."114 Pettit points out that on the basis of this consideration, Habermas 
rejects the assimilation of truth either to subjective experience of certainty or to 
correspondence with objective fact11-5 He states that truth claims can ultimately 
be decided through critical discussion. Habermas's theory of truth is a revised 
version of C. S. Peirce's consensus theory: "The opinion which is fated to be agreed 
upon by all who investigate is what we mean by truth."116 Habermas's version is: 
I may ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if every other person 
who could enter into a dialogue with me would ascribe the same 
predicate to the same object. In order to distinguish true from false 
statements, I make reference to the judgment of others - in fact to the 
judgment of all others with whom I could ever hold a dialogue (among 
whom I counterfactually include all the dialogue partners I could find 
if my life history were co-extensive with the history of mankind). The 
condition of the truth of statements is the potential agreement of all 
others... Truth means the promise of attaining a rational consensus.117 
It is evident from this position that Habermas maintains the operational 
character of truth; as Pettit points out,1 1 8 Habermas chooses a sociological ap-
proach rather than a methodological approach to truth; the latter, like logical 
positivism, identifies the property of truth by reference to the procedure of 
verification, i.e., by identifying truth with that property which belongs to proposi-
tions and theories that satisfy certain confirmation tests; whereas the former ident-
ifies truth as that property which belongs to propositions and theories that are 
capable of commanding consensus. The ultimate criterion of truth for Habermas 
is rational consensus. The settlement of truth (and justice) claims depends on 
argumentative reasoning in a rational discourse. In a rational discourse, which 
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achieves a rationally motivated consensus, what is claimed is that the evidence and 
the arguments are such that any rational, competent judge would be persuaded 
solely by the cogency of the arguments employed and come to the same conclusion; 
that if anyone should disagree, we could - if only she would be guided by the force 
of the better argument = bring her to agree with us. The criterion of truth is "not 
the fact that some consensus has been reached, but rather that at all times and all 
places, if only we enter into a discourse, a consensus can be arrived at under 
conditions which show the consensus to be grounded".119 
In Habermas's understanding, truth is something which a speaker implicitly 
claims for any assertion that he makes. Habermas argues that whenever a speaker 
makes an assertion, that speaker must expect to be taken to believe, and thus 
implicitly claim, that his assertion is true. Further, it is a feature of communication 
that a speaker must be prepared to back up the claims which he implicitly makes 
if challenged; the attempt to redeem the truth claim of an assertion gives rise to 
what Habermas calls theoretical discourse, in which arguments are advanced for 
and against the truth of the assertion. For the achievement of a rational consensus 
in theoretical discourse, arguments have to be advanced for and against the truth 
claim in any assertion. The model on which Habermas bases120 his description of 
the structure of the argument is derived from Toulmin's The Uses of Argument;121 
this model provides a series of supporting steps for any proposition or assertion: 
i) Firstly, a contention will be traced to some evidence or data; 
ii) secondly, if the force of the evidence is questioned, a warrant will be provided 
for the connection; 
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iii) thirdly, under further pressure, a warrant wil be supplied with a backing. 
This kind of argumentation occurs in the raised level of discourse, which is 
necessary when the background or de facto consensus, represented by the four 
validity claims,122 breaks down. In his introduction to Theory and Practice*22, 
Habermas makes the distinction between communicative action (interaction) and 
discourse. In the normal context of communicative action, there exists a back-
ground or de facto consensus. The validity claims which are raised with every speech 
act are more or less naively accepted in ordinary interaction; in this kind of 
interaction speaker and hearer implicitly know that each raises validity claims, 
supposing that these are rightly made and can be redeemed. When the background 
or merely accepted consensus breaks down, the participants are faced with the 
alternatives of breaking off communication altogether, resorting to strategic forms 
of interaction such as competition, conflict and even physical force; or raising 
communication to the level of argumentative discourse in order to test the proble-
matic claims and come to a rational consensus.124 
In discourse claims to truth and, in the case of justice, norms and opinions 
which are taken for granted in communicative action become problematical, and 
their validity (now regarded as hypothetical) can be ascertained consensually only 
through the procedure of discourse; thus discourse represents a break with the 
normal context of interaction. Habermas holds that the presuppositions and pro-
cedures of discourse are the basis for establishing both the truth of assertions 
(statements, propositions) and the correctness of norms.125 There is in normal 
interaction a mutual supposition of responsibility, in the sense that each believes 
the other's intentions, and that the other can support his beliefs with reasons. 
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When fundamental differences in beliefs and values prevent communicative rela-
tions, the possibility of resolving them discursively becomes particularly significant, 
not only to people generally, but especially to those dedicated to bringing about 
understanding and reconciliation. For this reason Christians should give particular 
attention to this aspect of Habermas's work, which lies at the heart of his theory of 
justice. As McCarthy correctly observes, it "represents the possibility of instituting 
a consensual basis for interaction without resorting to force in any of its forms from 
open violence to latent manipulation; it represents the possibility of reaching 
agreement through the use of reason and thus by recourse to, rather than violation 
of, the humanity of those involved".126 
The way that Habermas understands discourse is as 
That form of communication that is removed from contexts of experi-
ence and action and whose structure assures us: that the bracketed 
validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or warnings are the 
exclusive object of discussion; that participants, themes, and contribu-
tions are not restricted except with reference to the goal of testing the 
validity claims in questions; that no force except that of the better 
argument is exercised; and that, as a result, all motives except that of 
the co-operative search for truth are excluded.127 
Thus Habermas requires an exclusion of all motives except that of a willing-
ness to come to a rationally grounded agreement, and a willingness to suspend 
judgement as to the existence of certain states of affairs (truth) or as to the rightness 
of certain norms (justice). For Habermas, discourse is that form of communication 
in which the participants subject themselves to the unforced force of the better 
argument, with the aim of coming to an agreement about the validity or invalidity 
of problematic claims. The aim of discourse is to achieve a rational consensus; the 
agreement which ensues represents a rational consensus, which is the result not of 
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the peculiarities of the participants or their situation but simply of their subjecting 
themselves to the weight of evidence and the force of argument. The agreement is 
regarded as valid not merely for the participants but as "objectively" valid - valid 
for all rational subjects as potential participants. 
Haberaias realises that this description of argumentative discourse is 
idealised, but as he argues in Theory <md Practice,^ it represents an ideal that has 
been operative in the course of social formation in the western tradition from early 
Athenian philosophy to modern (bourgeois) democracy. McCarthy notes that it is 
the institutionalisation of practico-political discourse, found in modern democracy, 
which is the guiding ideal of Habermas's critical social theory.129 
Habermas is aware that if the agreement achieved in critical discussion is to 
provide a warrant for truth claims, there must be some way of distinguishing 
between a rational consensus and a merely defacto consensus. When we participate 
in a discourse we suppose that genuine discourse is possible and that it can be 
distinguished from false consensus. Without this supposition, discourse would have 
little or no meaning. The attempt to come to a rational decision about truth claims 
entails the supposition that the outcome of our discussion will be, or at least can 
be, the result simply of the force of the better argument and not of accidental or 
systematic constraints on communication. Habermas realises that a rational con-
sensus-producing discourse, in which truth claims are disputed and need stronger 
justification than a matter-of-fact agreement, requires the normative sense of being 
well grounded, i.e. rationally motivated. Habermas's characterisation of a ration-
ally motivated consensus is an answer to another objection that is often raised 
against consensus theories of truth, viz. that "truth" is a normative concept and thus 
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cannot be tied to the de facto achievement of consensus: not just any agreement 
that comes to pass can serve as a warrant for truth. McCarthy says that this objection 
has to be taken especially seriously by Habermas in the light of his theory of 
systematically distorted communication: 
How can a discursively realised, "rational" agreement be distinguished 
from the mere appearance of rationality? Which are the criteria of a 
"true" as opposed to a "false" consensus? If there are no reliable criteria 
for deciding this question, then Habermas's discourse theory would 
simply have relocated the problem of truth without contributing sub-
stantially to its clarification. Furthermore if the criteria that serve to 
distinguish a "grounded" from an illusory consensus themselves require 
discursive justification, we are moving in a circle; if not, we have 
transcended the consensus framework in establishing it . 1 3 0 
Phillips raises a similar point when he says that if decisions about the 
rationality of consensus themselves rest on argument, the criteria of argumentation 
need to be given, and he puts the following questions: 
Since argumentation presupposes a consensus, how are we to distin-
guish between good and bad, sound and unsound arguments? Isn't there 
a danger here of an infinite regress?131 
The only way out of this dilemma, according to Habermas, is through a 
characterisation of a rationally motivated consensus, which is achieved solely 
through the force of better argumentation and is not due to contingent, extraneous 
factors (like external constraints on the discourse, or internal constraints built into 
the discourse). This also means that none of the constitutive elements of the 
argument can be systematically excepted from critical examination. As McCarthy 
points out, for a consensus ideally to be perfectly rational - and thus a sufficient 
warrant for truth - "it must be able to withstand meta-theoretical and epistemologi-
cal scrutiny. The supporting discourse must be structured in such a way as to allow 
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for freedom of movement to and from even the most reflective levels of argu-
ment".132 Thus the rationality of the parties is to be defined as their capacity and 
willingness to be bound by the conditions and rales for discourse. 
The conditions under which such a consensus can be achieved are to be found 
in the "ideal speech situation",133 which is implicitly presupposed in discourse, and 
which is an ideal underlying all subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The ideal speech 
situation will allow a rationally motivated agreement or consensus to be attained 
if certain conditions regarding the absence of constraints are met, and if the rules 
of discourse are observed. Habermas's rules for discourse and the ideal speech 
situation thus represent the formal pragmatic conditions necessary for reaching 
understanding, agreement and a rational consensus, and thus they express the 
normative core of the modern idea of argumentation. These rules, which describe 
what it means to be in a speech situation in which a conflict would be resolved by 
the "force of the better argument", and which aim at achieving a constraint-free, 
properly grounded, rational consensus, may be formulated as follows: 
1. Every speaker with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part 
in discourse. 
2. (a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
(b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the dis-
course. 
(c) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. 
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3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exer-
134 
casing his rights as laid down in 1 and 2. 
As we have seen, if the agreement reached in a rational discourse is to be the 
product of a rational will, then the only permissible force is the unforced force of 
the better argument, and the only permissible motive is the co-operative search for 
truth. Admittedly, Habermas's rules do not give guide-lines or criteria as to how 
we are to judge the force of the better argument; but bis theory assumes that those 
who participate in a practical discourse are communicatively competent, i.e. they 
know what it means to be involved in the rational justification a norm of action. 
This in turn assumes that they would be aware of what constitutes a rational 
argument, and that they would be able to assess the merits of the argument on the 
basis of the supporting evidence, warrant and backing. A more serious objection 
is the general one that Habermas's theory presupposes an immense capacity for 
rationality among people in society. It could be argued that Habermas's theory 
militates against the educationally and mentally disadvantaged in society, who may 
not have the degree of articulacy or education or natural ability necessary to engage 
in radical argumentation; for, as Phillips correctly indicates, "while participants in 
an ideal speech situation are bound only by the power of argument, the ability to 
argue is also a power: it is difficult to see how this power could ever be distributed 
equally".135 However, this objection does not invalidate Habermas' theory, be-
cause presumably those who lack communicative competence in Habermas's terms 
could be represented by someone who had their interests at heart. 
The third rule of the ideal speech situation structurally excludes all con-
straints on argumentative reasoning. This freedom from constraint, whether exter-
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nal (such as force or the threat offeree) or internal (such as neurotic or ideological 
distortions) can be given a universal-pragmatic characterisation, which can be 
summed up in the "general symmetry requirement", which ensures an effective 
equality of opportunities to assume dialogue roles. As McCarthy notes, in his 
explication of Habermas's Wahrhetistheotien, "the ideal speech situation must 
ensure not only unlimited discussion but discussion that is free from distorting 
influences, whether their source be open domination, conscious strategic beha-
viour, or the more subtle barriers to communication deriving from self-decep-
tion".136 To the objection that it is difficult to believe that the general symmetry 
requirement would guarantee interrogative space in a dialogue,137 the answer is 
that the participants themselves would recognise if they had not had equal time or 
opportunity to speak or argue, and could appeal to their initial willingness to be 
bound by the rules of discourse to rectify any imbalance. 
If the elements of the general symmetry requirement, contained in Haber-
mas's first two rules, are not met in the ideal speech situation, the resulting 
agreement is open to the charge of being less than rational, i.e of being the result 
of distorting influences rather than purely the force of the better argument. 
Further, truth will not be established where conditions of domination and other 
distorting influences are not structurally ruled out. For this reason, the idea of truth 
in Habermas's theory points to a form of interaction free from all distorting 
influences, and ultimately to an ideal form of life achieved through pure communi-
cative action. It is worth noting here that the speech acts of Jesus are an instance 
of pure communicative action, and as such are a manifestation of that ideal form 
of life which he called the Kingdom of God, characterised by the connected values 
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of truth, justice and freedom. McCarthy argues that the notion of truth cannot be 
conceived apart from the conditions of "pure" communicative action: "in this sense, 
the requirements of the ideal speech situation, in which discourse can lead to 
genuine consensus, include communication-theoretic conceptualisations of the 
traditional ideas of freedom and justice."138 The good and true life, which is 
anticipated in every speech act that contains the four dimensions of validity,139 is 
inherent in the notion of truth. For this reason Habermas contends, as he did at 
the end of Knowledge and Human Interests, that "the truth of statements is linked 
in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life".140 
Habermas is conscious that his idea of an ideal speech situation might appear 
wildly unrealistic, because actual situations of theoretical discourse rarely, if ever, 
even approximate to this purity: "The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical 
phenomenon nor a mere construct, but rather an unavoidable supposition recipro-
cally made in discourse."141 He recognises that this supposition is counterfactual, 
and that "no historical reality matches the form of life that we can in principle 
characterise by reference to the ideal speech situation".142 Even if it is made 
counterfactually, according to Habermas, "it is a fiction that is operatively effective 
in the process of communication. Therefore I prefer to speak of an anticipation of 
an ideal speech situation . . . 1 , 1 4 3 Habermas is aware that the many limitations of 
actual discourse seem to preclude a perfect realisation of the conditions of the ideal 
speech situation: 
The ideal speech situation would best be compared with a transcend-
ental illusion were it not for the fact that ... this illusion is also the 
constitutive condition of rational speech. The anticipation of the ideal 
speech situation has... the significance of a constitutive illusion which 
is at the same time the appearance of a form of life. Of course, we 
cannot know a priori whether that appearance is a mere delusion -
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however unavoidable the suppositions from which it springs - or 
whether the empirical conditions for the realisation (if only approxi-
mate) of the supposed life form can practically be brought about 1 4 4 
To the objection that the conditions of the ideal speech situation cannot be 
perfectly realised, McCarthy makes the correct reply that this does not render the 
ideal illegitimate, because it can serve as a guide for the institutionalisation of 
discourse and as a critical standard against which every actual achieved consensus 
can be measured: 
Our history is replete with ideals - religious, ethical, political, cognitive, 
artistic - that we know to be incapable of complete realisation but that 
are no less effective in shaping social life. 1 4 5 
As we have seen, both truth and justice require consideration in a discourse: 
for truth, the forum for consideration is theoretical discourse, whereas for justice 
it is practical discourse. The parallel between justice and truth is in the validity 
claims raised in the speech acts of those debating justice in society, i.e. those 
disputing legitimacy norms. The parallel is also to be seen in Habermas's communi-
cative or discourse ethics, which is an advanced formalistic ethics that "consistently 
works out... the independent logic ... of normative questions, i.e. that works out 
the idea of justice".146 Habermas makes strong claims for his communicative ethics 
in his work Legitimation Crisis, where he states (inter alia) that 
only communicative ethics guarantees the generality of admissible 
norms and the autonomy of acting subjects solely through the discursive 
redeemability of validity claims with which norms appear. That is, 
generality is guaranteed in that the only norms that may claim generality 
are those on which everyone affected agrees (or would agree) without 
constraint if they enter into (or were to enter into) a process of discur-
sive will-formation.147 
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The two major tenets of Habermas's communicative ethics are his assertions 
that a) normative validity claims have a cognitive meaning and can be treated like 
truth claims = to be redeemed discursively, and b) the justification of norms 
"requires that real discourse be carried out and thus cannot occur in a strictly 
monological form, i.e. in the form of a hypothetical process of argumentation 
occurring in the individual mind".148 Habermas speaks of the problem of what it 
means to redeem validity-claims discursively; he says that it calls for "an investiga-
tion of the communicative presuppositions of argumentative speech (discourse 
theory of truth) and an analysis of the general procedural rules of argumentation 
(logic of discourse). It is in the framework of a practical discourse - that is, of 
argumentation keyed to dealing with questions of practice (in contrast to questions 
of truth) - that we encounter basic questions of ethics, not only questions concern-
ing the meaning of normative statements but questions concerning the possibility 
of grounding them".149 Habermas refers to the works of Karl-Otto Apel, which are 
concerned above all with two problems: 
with the mode of grounding that relies on rational reconstruction of 
universal and unavoidable presuppositions of knowledge, action and 
understanding in language; and with the normative content of the 
formal structure of rational speech. His central thesis is that the fun-
damental principle of universalisation can be 'derived', in the sense of 
'transcendental-pragmatic' grounding, from general presuppositions of 
communication.150 
It is Habermas's position that practical questions, like those concerning 
justice and social policy, can be decided rationally in a practical discourse,151 i.e. 
that moral-political questions can be determined with reason, through the force of 
the better argument. In his work on the development of moral consciousness 
(particularly in relation to the thought of Lawrence Kohlberg), Habermas states 
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that "moral questions, which can in principle be decided rationally in terms of 
criteria of justice or the universalisability of interests are now distinguished from 
evaluative questions, which fall into the general category of the good life and are 
accessible only withm the horizon of a concrete historical form of life or an 
individual life style".152 
Thus Habermas retains a procedural distinction between questions of justice 
and questions of the good life; this distinction must be drawn within a discourse 
itself, and depends on whether or not a conflict involves a generalisable interest.153 
The function of actual practical discourses with reference to fundamental disputes 
in the public arena is to help differentiate between generalisable and non-genera-
lisable interests. At the same time, they will expose injustice in so far as they identify 
areas where real generalisable interests have been suppressed. As Baynes points 
out, "since it is likely (and desirable) that some reasonable disagreement even 
about generalisable interests or the common good will persist in a liberal demo-
cratic regime, the most useful task for the model of suppressed generalisable 
interests may be to emphasise the need for strengthening those institutions of the 
public sphere where debate and deliberation about the common good and collec-
tive need interpretation take place".154 
Habermas also believes that the outcome of a practical discourse can be 
rationally motivated - the expression of a rational will, a justified, warranted, or 
grounded consensus; and thus that practical questions can admit of "truth" in an 
expanded sense of that term.1 5 5 Those who participate in a discourse about justice 
(which has to do with normative legitimacy) are motivated to seek a rational 
consensus by virtue of the fact that they are communicatively competent; i.e, they 
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have an intuitive sense of the foundations of rational consensus, and this constitutes 
for Habermas the ultimate source from which any norm derives its legitimacy for 
a group or a society. For Habermas, the capacity of a norm to provide agreement 
and co-ordinated action must come from a conviction on the part of those subject 
to that norm that it is legitimate or valid. A just society is formed through the 
intersubjective recognition of the binding force or validity of norms. 
In the process of forming a society, people put forward different ideas about 
the ultimate sources of legitimacy for basic norms, especially norms relating to 
justice. Where Christians would disagree with Habermas is his view that such 
variation could be explained either as having an ideological basis or as indicating 
differences on the level of social evolution. White explains that "Habermas wants 
to interpret much of this variation as the result of different types of constraints on 
the capacity of given historical agents to put their intuitive knowledge to a thor-
ough-going use in assessing the legitimacy of norms to which they are subject".156 
Whether or not one accepts this interpretation, there is much to be gained for 
theology and ethics from Habermas's notion that the processes of modernity have 
expanded the degree to which individuals can test the norms to which they conform 
by the criteria learnt in becoming communicatively competent. Theological endor-
sement of this notion follows from a discernment and recognition of God's 
presence in the linguistic structures of human intersubjectivity,157 and particularly 
in the mutual speech-act-immanent obligation to provide justification for the 
different claims which are continually raised in understanding-oriented actions.158 
The effect of Habermas's claim that the lightness or legitimacy of norms (i.e., 
justice) is assessed in practical discourse is to supply a consensus theory of justice 
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parallel to his consensus theory of truth, for all the considerations which motivate 
the latter theory are taken by Habermas to apply in the case of justice. The 
consequence of this thesis is that justice is the property which belongs to norms 
that would rationally command anyone's assent. This criterion, like Habermas's 
sociological criterion of truth, is also to be understood non-analytically, i.e., the 
justice of the norms explains their ability to attract assent, rather than being defined 
by it: the norms are not just because they secure a rational consensus; rather, they 
secure a rational consensus because they are just. 
The link between Habermas's theory of justice and the formation of society 
consists in the notions of universalisability and democratic will-formation. Both 
these notions are grounded not in an appeal to the Kantian idea of the Fact of 
Reason but in an appeal to the universal and unavoidable ("transcendent") pre-
suppositions of argumentation. These presuppositions refer to the pragmatic 
conditions which speakers implicitly assume whenever they enter serious argumen-
tation, and which are necessary for successful or felicitous communication. As we 
have seen, their unavoidability consists in the sense that sceptical critics must 
presuppose them in the very attempt to deny their existence: anyone who denies 
them and yet wants to argue is guilty of a performative contradiction.159 
The formation of society depends, as I have argued above, on consensual 
validation of existing and proposed norms, i.e. on justice as right relationship 
achieved by free and equal persons who, in a spirit of genuine reciprocity, aim at 
agreement and consensus through argumentation in practical discourse open to 
al l . 1 6 0 In practical discourse, claims to the rightness or appropriateness of a norm 
are claims to justice, and require discursive redemption. Claims to rightness or 
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justice are redeemed when they can be backed up by a norm which itself proves to 
be justifiable on the basis of the generalisabiUty of She interests which underlie it. 
The formation of society also depends on how far this kind of democratic will-for-
mation can be made the organisational principle of society, and to what extent it 
can be institutionalised.161 We shall return to this point later, after we have 
examined Habermas's principle of universalisability. 
As we have seen, Habermas proposes certain rules of argumentation which 
represent the formal pragmatic conditions necessary for reaching understanding, 
agreement and consensus, and which thus represent the ideal speech situation; he 
argues that as a representation of the unavoidable presuppositions of argumenta-
tion, this ideal is actually assumed whenever anyone argues seriously.162 Basing 
political legitimacy on the achievement of consensus through a procedure approxi-
mating to the ideal of the ideal speech situation establishes the universality of 
justice as the principle of political legitimation. McFadyen, in comparing the ideal 
speech situation with the Kingdom of God, states that "it is not the actual achieve-
ment of consensus which establishes the generalisability of a political norm... and 
thereby legitimates it, but the extent to which such a consensus, and the [discourse] 
... used to reach it, anticipate the ideal communication situation. It therefore 
functions as a critical ideal against which present structures of communication may 
be judged and legitimated".163 
A theological critique of Habermas's optimistic view of the possibility of a 
rational consensus needs to point out that any actual consensus pertaining to justice 
will be partially distorted (because of our fallen nature), and will not be universally 
extensive (because communication does not include as subjects those who are 
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dead1 6 4). Habermas admits that nothing makes him more nervous than the impu-
tation of proposing an impossible ideal ("a rationalistic Utopian society").165 He is 
aware of the limitations of practical discourse,165 and he recognises that no single 
discourse can fulfil the conditions of the ideal speech situation. He also recognises 
the fallibility of our discursive practices, in that agreements reached today may be 
invalidated by new circumstances, perceptions, insights and information tomorrow. 
Habermas knows that a consensus which is reached in actual discourse will be false 
if it is based on error or deception (including self-deception), or on strategic 
motives by the participants: "The pseudo-consensus that depends on an inconspicu-
ous (for the participants) violation of necessary conditions for processes of consen-
sus formation is characteristic of systematically distorted communication."167 We 
need to be very wary about claiming a consensus to be rational and therefore 
normative for social action, because it could be based on significant distortions in 
communication. McFadyen rightly points out, however, that this does not mean 
that the norm for political interaction remains a lofty ideal; rather, it is a concrete 
norm," for it refers to the relatively undistorted consensus which would result in 
the here and now if significant distortions in and impediments to communication 
were removed".168 
A just society is formed when the norms proposed or defended by participants 
in argumentative, practical discourse are legitimated or shown to be fair, a quality 
which can be expressed by the principle of universalisation. Habermas argues that 
this principle can itself be rationally justified.169 
The first step of Habermas's derivation of the principle of universalisability 
is dependent, as we have seen, on the universal pragmatic presuppositions of 
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argumentation, although it cannot be derived solely from an analysis of these 
presuppositions. Habermas argues that the derivation of a distinctively moral 
principle of universalisability requires the combination of these presuppositions 
with the idea of what it means to justify a norm of action.170 Baynes, citing 
Wellmer's point that the rales of argumentation are not moral norms, suggests that 
such rules "possess a normative content, but... do not yet constitute a specifically 
moral principle, where this is understood as defining a category of moral oughtness 
or obligation".171 Among the reasons that Habermas offers for the requirement of 
a second step in justifying his principle of universalisability is his association of 
moral phenomena with forms of communicative action in general, rather than with 
its more demanding form as argumentation. Recognising that our moral intuitions 
centre around the ideas of individual well-being and compassion for others, 
Habermas seeks to clarify these ideas with reference to the suppositions of mutual 
reciprocity that is already contained or built into in our communicative interac-
tions, and that is so crucial for the formation of both individual and group ident-
ities.1 7 2 
The second step of Habermas's derivation of his principle of universalisa-
bility is dependent on two further claims: 
(i) that every speaker who believes she is engaging in argumentation must 
presuppose the conditions of discourse as adequately fulfilled;173 and 
(ii) that "every person who accepts the universal and necessary communicative 
presuppositions of argumentative speech and who knows what it means to 
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justify a norm of action implicitly presupposes as valid the principle of 
174 
universalisation". 
The universalisation of norms of justice takes place in practical discourse, 
which does not require the type of observational and experimental evidence used 
inductively to support hypothetical general laws. The relevant evidence is the 
expected effect of the application of a proposed norm with regard to the satisfaction 
or non-satisfaction of generally accepted needs. As intersubjectively binding reci-
procal expectations of behaviour, "norms regulate legitimate chances for the 
satisfaction of needs".175 Thus what has to be agreed upon in practical discourse is 
the social justice issue of the justifiability of a recommended regulation of such 
chances. 
The crucial difference between theoretical and practical discourse is that 
whereas in the former the bridge between evidence and hypothesis is usually 
inductive, the bridge in the latter is provided by the principle of universalisation. 
Induction serves as a bridge principle for justifying the logically discon-
tinuous passage from a finite number of singular statements (data) to a 
universal statement (hypothesis). Universalisation serves as a bridge 
for justifying the passage to a norm from descriptive comments (on the 
consequences and side-effects of the application of norms for the 
fulfilment of commonly accepted needs). 
Habermas understands universalisation as the universalisability or generali-
sability of interests which underlie norms. The principle of universalisability 
proposes that "only those norms are permitted which can find general recognition 
in their domain of application. The principle serves to exclude, as not admitting of 
consensus, all norms whose content and range of validity are particular".177 Thus 
a practical backing consists in an account of the interests served by the norm which 
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constitutes a practical warrant, and of how the interests support the norm in so far 
as they are impartially served by it, i.e. in so far as the norm would be chosen by 
someone who took those interests universally into account, and did not look only 
to his own welfare. 
Habermas considers various interpretations of universalisation, but finds 
them to be inadequate. In his reply to his critics he refers to the status that the 
principle of universalisation assumes in his discourse ethics, in that it signifies 
a procedure that is both open to hypothetical anticipation and suscep-
tible of being actually carried out, a procedure that is meant to secure 
the impartiality of moral judgement. The exchange of arguments -
unlimited in principle and unconstrained - among all those involved 
functions as a touchstone of whether a norm can be counted on to meet 
with grounded approval, that is, whether its claim to validity rightfully 
stands. A norm of action has validity only if all those possibly affected 
by it (and by the side-effects of its application) would, as participants in 
a practical discourse, arrive at a (rationally motivated) agreement that 
the norm should come into (or remain in) force, that is, that it should 
obtain (retain) social validity.178 
Thus, in the same way that truth is that which attracts rational assent, so justice 
is that which attracts the agreement and consensus of all who are potentially 
affected by a recommended norm.1 7 9 In this way Habermas establishes his prin-
ciple of universalisability: consensus achieved argumentatively in a practical dis-
course is a procedural realisation of universalisability. 
For Habermas, the point of discourse ethical universalisation consists rather 
in this, "that only through the communicative structure of a moral argumentation 
involving all those affected is the exchange of roles of each with every other forced 
upon us".180 It is important to establish the point that Habermas's universalisation 
principle is essentially dialogical, in contradistinction to Kant's monological ver-
sion. For Kant, the categorical imperative is a test which each individual can carry 
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out monologieally, i.e. by asking herself if she cam will a proposed norm to be a 
universal law. For Habermas the test is whether or not a proposed norm is 
acceptable in an actual argumentation to all who are potentially affected by that 
norm; acceptable here means that the norm satisfies the interests of each partici-
pant in the argument Justifiable norms are those which incorporate "generalisable 
interests".181 
At this point it is necessary to clarify Habermas's apparently confusing use of 
the terms needs and interests in relation to normative claims; sometimes Habermas 
defines normative claims as claims about the alternative orderings of the satisfac-
tion of the interests of everyone, and at other times he speaks of norms as regulating 
legitimate chances for the satisfaction of needs. This is not a distinction for, as White 
points out, "it seems fair to assume that Habermas would say that one has an interest 
in something if it satisfies one's needs".182 The relationship between the satisfac-
tion of needs and the legitimacy of norms does not imply that determinate princi-
ples of justice can be derived from a discovery of individuals' genuine needs in 
practical discourse. Habermas has no substantive conception of needs or principles 
of justice. For Habermas, the core values of a culture structure what constitutes a 
need; and generally he refers to "need interpretations",183 a locution which ex-
presses the cultural variability of needs. White interprets Habermas here to be 
implying that "what is taken to be a 'need' in a given society will be a function of 
what that culture defines as necessary to the flourishing of human life".184 
It may be objected that it is incorrect to call the relation between normative 
validity and consensus as the agreed satisfaction of needs "rational". Such an 
objection may be based on an argument which contends that if all needs and 
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interests are irremediably subjective, any agreement con^rning them could at best 
be a contingent compromise among competing, ultimately irreconcilable self-in-
terests. Pettit advances arguments against Habermas's claim that the justification 
of a norm can be pursued only by reference to interests that it fairly serves or needs 
that it impartially fulfils.185 However, Habermas can answer these arguments by 
contending that there are not only particular interests but common or "generalis-
able" interests; it is the function of practical discourse to test which interests are 
capable of being "communicatively shared" (i.e., those which admit of consensus), 
and which are not (i.e., those which admit at best of a negotiated compromise). 
McCarthy points out that in the case of generalisable interests, "the normative or 
evaluative judgements that give expression to 'reciprocally expected intentions' can 
claim a kind of objectivity; it is precisely this claim that is embedded in socially 
binding norms and standards".186 
Participants in a practical discourse can discover a generalisable interest on 
matters where they can envisage common need interpretations. Norms which 
incorporate such interests will be acceptable to all those involved in the discourse. 
The justification and demonstration of the generalisability of the interests under-
lying a proposed normative claim may be unproblematic; but this is not always the 
case. Need interpretations can no longer be assumed as given, but must be drawn 
into discursive will-formation.187 White understands Habermas here to mean that 
"the rules of discourse require that agents sincerely reflect upon the different need 
interpretations which underlie their respective but conflicting concepts of what 
interests are generalisable".188 This requires a continuing critical flexibility - a 
willingness to reconsider and modify their need interpretations when they appear 
Jurgen Habermas's Theosy of Justice 227 
to manifest weaker claims to universality than alternatives. The demand for 
flexibility does not guarantee that agents will produce generalisable interests. 
When interests continue to conflict, and agents fail to come to consensus on their 
interests, Habermas's communicative ethics requires compromise.189 
Habermas's thought on interests and need interpretation does not imply a 
claim about the needs and interests all would have in the good society, and which 
everyone could discover if she merely subjected herself to the rules of discourse. 
Such a universalistic claim about the shape of the good society is always unwar-
ranted, since it tries to settle once and for all what must be left open, if the 
requirement of reciprocity is to take into account voices which may not have been 
evident in any discourse. According to White, Habermas's notion that interests, 
and the needs on which they are based, ought to be taken into account in a 
formulation of universalisability runs contrary to Kant: 
Like Rawls, Habermas finds the Kantian formula (i.e the categorical 
imperative) unacceptable because it cannot account for why anyone 
would be motivated to follow just norms and partly because he wishes 
to argue that there are criteria in accordance with which some interests 
and needs can be rationalised in a non-strategic sense and others 
cannot. Habermas differs from Rawls on the questions of exactly how 
interests can be rationalised and how this rationalisation connects up 
with determinate principles of justice.190 
I argued in the previous chapter that Rawls's framework for structuring the 
choice of two principles of justice is partial in its incorporation of a theory of primary 
goods, and that it represents not a collective choice but a monological process - the 
thought experiment of a single agent. Habermas's opinion is that these problems 
will accompany any attempt to derive determinate, universal norms of justice. 
Rawls's theory represents the kind of problem Habermas finds inherent in any 
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attempt to explicate the idea of justice in terms which are both universalistic and 
substantively detenninate. In Rawls's theory, parties in the original position are 
assumed to value certain primary goods which will be beneficial after the veil of 
ignorance is lifted. In Habermas's terms, this account of primary goods is also 
implicitly an account of universalisable needs. 
We have seen that Rawls considers a determinate choice of principles 
emerging from the original position to be a major advance on the formalism of 
Kant while at the same time retaining a Kantian moral status.191 However, we have 
also seen that Rawls has accepted contextualist criticism that his list of primary 
goods is biased toward the kinds of needs fostered in specific types of society (i.e, 
modern democratic societies),192 and therefore that a substantive account of 
justice such as his cannot claim universality.193 
In the light of Habermas's theory, the incorporation of any substantive set of 
needs invariably violates the discursively interpreted requirement of reciprocity, 
in the sense that it declares once and for all that some potential voices, and the 
needs they express, will not be given an adequate hearing. Pettit most accurately 
sums up Habermas's theory of justice when he says it may supply a criterion of 
justice which tells us what justice is while leaving us in an agnostic position as to 
what justice demands.194 For Habermas, this is the most that can be expected from 
a philosophical ethics: it can elucidate what justice is, in the sense of universally 
valid procedural criteria appropriate to judging the justice of proposed norms, but 
it is unable to clarify what justice demands, in the sense of choosing determinate 
norms for judging action. For Habermas, the function of just norms is to provide 
some legitimate ordering of the satisfaction of interests. 
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Haberaias still thinks that a universalist account off justice or normative 
legitimacy is a possibility. But the universalism off a postconventionally interpreted 
principle off reciprocity can be saved only iff it is disconnected from the mono logical 
conceptualisation it has received in the formalist tradition from Kant to Rawls, with 
its attendant particularist problems. Rather, universalisation or the generalisability 
of norms has to be understood as dialogical or procedural: "the principle of 
justification of norms is no longer the monologically applicable principle of gener-
alisability but the communally followed procedure of redeeming normative validity 
claims discursively."195 The great advance which Habermas has made in the 
Kantian tradition is shifting the frame of reference from the solitary reflecting 
moral consciousness to the community of subjects in dialogue.196 Habermas 
understands bis discourse model to represent a procedural re-interpretation of 
Kant's categorical imperative: 
Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to 
be a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes 
of discursively testing its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from 
what each can will without contradiction to be ageneral law, to what all 
can will in agreement to be a universal norm 1 9' 
"What all can will" is not something that can be determined monologically, 
but has to be discovered and formed through communication processes. However, 
as we have seen above, if agents, through pressing their particular interests dialogi-
cally in a practical discourse, fail to reach a consensus, resort must be had to 
compromise. Although Habermas's view off compromise is considered suspect by 
some critics198 (because of Habermas's apparently contradictory claim in Legitim-
ation Crisis199 that it is possible to overcome the "impenetrable pluralism of ... 
ultimate value orientations" by his principle of universalisation), he has shown that 
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compromise has to be seen in the same light as discourse and its concomitant 
emphases on procedural equality, participation, non-deception and non-manipu-
lation; Le., the basic guide-lines for compromise construction must themselves be 
justified in discursive terms, for this alone can supply a standard for separating 
legitimate from illegitimate compromises.200 
Habermas states that the universality (or generality) of norms is guaranteed 
only through non-distorted, domination-free communication leading to agreement 
by all who are potentially affected by proposed norms. Universality is equally 
dependent upon the willingness of those affected to enter into a process of 
discursive or democratic will-formation. The concept of discursive will-formation 
provides what I consider to be the best principle for the formation of society, 
because the communicative ethics from which it stems alone seems to guarantee 
the universality of admissible norms through the discursive redeemability of the 
validity with which norms appear.201 
Habermas's formalistic discourse ethics does not specify particular norms of 
action but only a principle of the justification of principles. His theory of justice, 
with its totally open, dialogical procedure, seems to me to be the best available 
means of addressing the long-standing problem of the formation of a just society. 
His dialogical procedure, which is eminently consonant with the relational justice 
of God, appears to be a solution to the problem of arranging the powers of each 
selfish opposing inclination so that one moderates or destroys the ruinous effect 
of the other. Habermas's discourse model, which requires that valid social norms 
incorporate generalisable interests, also appears to narrow the gap between legality 
and morality.202 Instead of requiring obedience to social norms by law, it estab-
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lishes their binding character in terms of their capacity to be shared communica-
tively in rational dialogue. Norms thus established do not merely delimit com-
patible scopes of action in which individuals can pursue their selfish inclinations in 
such away that one moderates or destroys the ruinous effect of the other, but rather 
enjoin certain positive ends as being in the common interest. Habermas believes 
that in the discourse model for morality and politics "the opposition between 
morally and legally regulated areas is relativised, and the validity of all norms is 
tied to discursive will-formation".203 
Habermas recognises that in any political order not all interests (and the 
norms to which they give rise) are generalisable, and therefore that there will be 
need for compromise and for spheres of action in which individuals may pursue 
their particular interests freely: "the question of which sectors should, if necessary, 
be regulated through compromise or formal norms of action can also be made 
subject to discussion."204 The question of which interests are really particular and 
which are generalisable can be rationally decided only in a practical discourse: it 
is this procedure of discourse or democratic formation of the common will which 
should take precedence as the principle of the formation of society, i.e. as the 
organisational principle of political order. In his later essay "Legitimation Problems 
in the Modern State",205 Habermas recognises that democracy cannot mean an a 
priori preference for a specific type of organisation of society, nor can it exclude a 
priori any specific arrangement; rather, "it is a question of finding arrangements 
that can ground the presumption that the basic institutions of the society and the 
basic political decisions would meet with the unforced agreement of all those 
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involved, if they could participate, as free and equal, in discursive will-forma-
tion".206 
The path to establishing Habennas's theory of justice is immensely complex, 
and relies upon the validity of the structures on which he builds it, viz. his expanded 
and connected theories of communicative rationality and communicative com-
petence, universal pragmatics and truth. These notions admittedly contain con-
troversial claims. Although the many criticisms of his various theories are 
important and have a bearing on any ultimate judgement of Habennas's project, it 
is not feasible to marshal them here;2 0 7 rather, I intend to focus on a few important 
considerations which have significance for my contention that Habermas's theory 
can be regarded as a mediation of God's justice. 
We have seen that Habermas tries to provide a normative theory of justice 
without substantive principles of justice: it is a philosophical theory that rationally 
evaluates the quality of social and political life, and aims to achieve a society in 
which practical discourse, i.e., unlimited, domination-free and distortion-free 
communication, can be concretely realised. We have also noted that just as his 
theory of truth tells us what truth is but does not enable us unproblematically to 
distinguish true theories208 from false, so Habermas's theory of justice may supply 
a criterion of justice which tells us what justice is while leaving us in an agnostic 
position as to what justice demands. Habermas's project of a minimal discourse 
ethics restricts evaluative questions to questions of justice, and does not pretend 
to provide unambiguous, substantive norms of justice; however, his communicative 
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ethics directs us to a way of thinking about fair procedures for adjudicating between 
normative claims which I believe to be crucial for the formation of a just society. 
It seems to me that Habermas's communicative ethics, as a universal justice 
project, has not only plausibility but benefits for modern society and those contri-
buting to its formation (and re-formation). Its core ideas and concepts of intersub-
jective recognition, equal accountability, emphasis on real discourse, the 
connection of the criterion of generalisable interests to compromise, and the 
requirements of a mature, autonomous ego are all "other-regarding", and convey 
an attitude of openness to the "other". Habermas's insights into what communica-
tion really means and entails can be deepened by drawing upon resources which 
place less emphasis on the purely rational activity of contending normative validity 
claims, than on a more comprehensive approach to the relational!ty by which we 
are constituted. Among those resources is the ethics of care of feminist writers like 
Carol Gilligan, who values qualities like compassion, connectedness and interde-
pendence above the rational balancing of validity claims.209 Also among those 
resources are those forms of other-regarding behaviour reflected in the Judeo-
Christian prophetic tradition, especially the selfless love, compassion and caring 
revealed in the person and teaching of Christ. 
Some might consider it a serious weakness in Habermas's theory that it does 
not specify principles of justice which would characterize a just society, like Rawls's 
theory attempts to do. Habermas prefers an indeterminate or minimal ethics, 
hence he is critical of Rawls's position and of others who try to articulate a general 
yet substantive set of principles of justice. Habermas's consensus theory of justice 
provides a procedural criterion of justice, identifying the just social scheme as that 
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which would attract rational assent and produce a rational consensus. His minimal 
ethics proposes that practical questions, like the selection of principles of justice, 
can be decided through a consensus between all those concerned and all those 
potentially affected. To a critic like Phillips, this would severely restrict attempts 
by individuals to work out on their own the principles that would govern the just 
society.210 In Phillips's view, Habermas appears to require that, because "we cannot 
trust our own judgements about justice", we wait and see what happens under ideal 
conditions of communication, rather than formulate and define substantive prin-
ciples of justice in advance.211 
This understanding of Habermas might alarm some Christians, who might 
think that their concept of justice would be excluded ab initio in a Habermasian 
practical discourse; but this would be a mis-reading of Habermas's intention. The 
charge that Habermas's theory secures an agnostic result with regard to what justice 
demands does not provide a warrant for rejecting it, or seeing it as inimical to a 
Christian understanding of justice. It is true that Christians may be uncomfortable 
about Habermas's socio-theoretic claim that in modern societies, religions which 
previously had an identity-securing function have lost their claim to cognitive 
significance. They may also be discomforted by bis suggestion of discursive will-
formation through which norms and values that secure individual and collective 
identities can be generated without regressing to mythological, religious or cosmo-
logical forms of thought. The norm of discursive will-formation appears to exclude 
these alternatives, just as it aims at excluding other alternatives like apathetic 
socialisation patterns encouraged by a state in order to eliminate questioning the 
legitimacy of power. 
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However, this moras excludes the former only in so far as they attempt to 
dominate or establish themselves arbitrarily, without intersubjective testing and 
justification of their claims.212 Pettit points out that, unlike Habermas's theory of 
truth (which does not provide a standard of reference by which we judge theories 
true or false, because the condition of supplying all the relevant empirical data is 
unfulfillable), his theory of justice does not preclude people using or setting up a 
standard of reference by which to judge rival criteria of justice, "since the arguments 
by which we are moved to make our judgements, and by which we think anyone 
should be moved, are not vulnerable in the same way to the effect of novel empirical 
discovery".213 This consideration, while it has positive implications for a Christian 
contribution in any discourse, was brought to meet the Marxist requirement that a 
social theory should meet the constraint of securing an agnostic position on 
questions of justice. Habermas's theory "licences a variety of speculation which 
Marxists have traditionally dismissed as ideological",214 but which may favourably 
allow the consideration of a Christian understanding of justice in any discourse. 
Pettit's point is pertinent here: 
By parity of argument there is no reason why the consensus view of 
justice should inhibit anyone from speculating and arguing about ques-
tions of political right, laying down that this norm is compelling, the 
other objectionable, and so on. 2 1 5 
Habermas's recognition of Gilligan's work, and of that of many other critics, 
obliges him to listen to other voices in the conversation, and that any proposal of 
a norm needs to be examined not only from a strictly linguistically and logically 
analytical point of view, but with a preparedness to imagine and to discuss what the 
proposed norm would mean if it (or its underlying need interpretations) were to 
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be universalised. If this openness is entailed by Habennas's theory, a Christian 
understanding of justice ought not to be disadvantaged in a discourse in which a 
more just social order is being determined. 
There is nothing threatening to a Christian understanding of justice in 
Habermas's idea that we should submit our judgements about justice to intersub-
jective testing in ideal speech conditions, which we do know and under which our 
collective judgements (including those affecting all potential interlocutors) would 
be trustworthy. On the contrary, our social, relational and linguistic constitution by 
God requires that we establish justice as right relationship or true sociality collec-
tively and analogically: Habermas offers us a theory of justice containing a proce-
dure which, although ideal, provides a means of legitimating social norms in order 
to form a just society. However, before we can claim that his theory of justice may 
be regarded as a mediation of God's society-forming justice, we need to consider 
a major aporia in Habermas's theory of communicative action and discourse ethics, 
viz. the limitation of solidarity entailed by Habermas's universalism or "transcend-
ence from within". Habermas does not recognise that the problems of transcendent 
universal solidarity, and of the unlimited communication community implied in all 
communicative action, can be answered only by theology. In the next chapter I shall 
argue that not only can Habermas's theory of justice as communicative action be 
appropriated and transformed from a theological perspective, but that it has a 
theological dimension in that the reality at the heart of his theory is the just and 
saving reality of God. 
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1 Habermas states that Ms principle of universalisability (U) "precludes a monological 
application of the principle", aad he contrasts it explicitly with Rawls's position. 
^Discourse Ethics" (hereafter BE), in Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action (hereafter .MCCA), Cambridge: MIT/Polity Press, 1930, p. 66.] Haberaaas 
acknowledges that his theory bears similarities to that of Rawls: both are concerned 
with an ideal situation and ideal conditions under which agreements take place about 
the principles of justice that form society. Since they believe that there is no 
independent criterion of justice, they both use the notion of pure procedural justice: 
what is just is defined by the outcome of a consensus under certain specified condi-
tions. In the case of Habermas, he focuses on the formal conditions that would have 
to be realized in order for any set of moral principles to be justifiable: "Only the rules 
and communicative presuppositions that make it possible to distinguish an accord or 
agreement among free and equals from a contingent or forced consensus have 
legitimating force today". ["Legitimation Problems in the Modern State", in Com-
munication and the Evolution of Society (hereafter CES), Heinemann, 1979, p. 188.] 
2 Benhabib applies her criticism of the circularity of methodological proceduralism to 
Habermas just as much as she does to Rawls, insisting that his "initial counterfactual 
abstraction" (i.e. his ideal speech situation, as the counterpart to Rawls's Original 
Position) does not serve as a justification but as an illustration of the normative 
principles presupposed by the theory. [The Methodological Illusions of Modern 
Political Theory: The Case of Rawls and Habermas", Neue Hefte fur Philosophic 21 
(1982), pp. 49,57,58.] The problem with Benhabib's critique is that it presupposes 
absolute value-neutrality for any justification process, something which is virtually 
impossible to achieve. The advantage of Habermas's theory is that the ideal speech 
situation which he advocates as the condition for argumentation functions as a 
regulative idea that can be used to criticise the normative assumptions operating in 
actual discourses. 
3 By legitimacy Habermas means "the worthiness of a political order to be recognised". 
["Legitimation Problems in the Modern State", CES, p. 182.] 
4 Some critics have expressed doubt about the moral status of Habermas's discourse 
ethics (e.g. D. Phillips: Toward a Just Social Order, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1986. p. 83; and A. Wellmer: Ethik und Dialog: Elemente des 
moralischen Urteil bei Kant und in der Diskursethik, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986, pp. 
102-113, 144-145), but this is largely the result of confusing Habermas's rules of 
argumentation with specific moral principles, and of making a distinction between 
rationality and moral rationality in Habermas's thought - a distinction which Haber-
mas himself does not make. However, Phillips recognises that Habermas, like Rawls, 
holds that "a moral principle is valid only to the extent that it would be mutually 
acknowledged under certain ideal conditions - freedom, rationality, equality, knowl-
edge - by all agents to whom it applies. Those moral principles about which there is 
publicly acknowledged consensus under the specified conditions are valid moral 
principles". [Phillips, op. cit, p. 83.] 
5 Habermas: "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in CES, pp. 1-68. Hereafter UP/CES. 
6 Habermas: BE, p. 65. 
7 Habermas: The Theory of Communicative Action, volume 2, Chapter 3 - The 
Rational Structure of the Linguistification of the Sacred"; Boston: Beacon Press, 
1987. 
8 The concept of communicative competence serves as the basis of Habermas's 
conception of moral autonomy. 
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9 Habermas: The Theory of Commmicative Action, w two volumes: Volume 1: Reason 
and the Rationalisation of Society, Bostons: Beacons Press, 1984 (hereafter TCA/1); 
Volume 2: LifeworM and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1987 (hereafter TCA/2). Habermas's references to and reliance upon Weber 
occur frequently throughout both volumes, but are concentrated in Volume 1, 
Chapter 2 - "Mm Weber's Theory of Rationalisation"; see also Chapter 4, part 1. 
10 R Tugendhat charges Habsrmas with a questionable conception of what the con-
tribution of the philosophy of language to social theory should be, because Habermas 
does not adequately analyse the function of language for social action ["Habennas 
on Communicative Action", in Seebass, G., and Tuomela, R., Eds.: Social Action, 
Dordrecht/Boston/I^ ncasten Reidel, 1985, p. 182]. Although there may be some 
substance in this charge, I think that the insight produced by Habermas's foray into 
linguistic philosophy, namely that the defining property of communicative actions is 
that they contain criticisable normative validity claims, far outweighs the alleged 
ambiguity in his work between a structural analysis of language and the interest in a 
specific social attitude (i.e., the achievement of understanding). 
11 This insight is also generated by Habermas's reconstruction of Marx's distinction 
between the material base and the ideological superstructure of society. 
12 In view of the rise of technocratic consciousness, with its disintegrative effect on the 
public sphere, Habermas is critical of the tendency to define practical problems as 
technical issues. 
13 The theory of "knowledge-constitutive interests" appeared in Habermas's first major 
work Knowledge and Human Interests, Heinemann, 1972 (hereafter referred to as 
EOff). This work, in which he attempted the task of enlarging the concept of reason, 
is a comprehensive study of epistemology, conceived as a systematic history of 
ideas with a practical intention - na historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the 
prehistory of modern positivism with the systematic intention of analysing the con-
nections between knowledge and human interests", [ibid., Preface, p. vii.] Habermas 
goes beyond a mere analysis, and attempts to establish new epistemological ground-
ings in the service of truth, justice and freedom; he deems these new groundings 
necessary because ideology - i.e. all ideas that hide or legitimate arbitrary power -
reaches back into the very constitution of knowledge in society. In Knowledge 
and Human Interests, Habermas criticises modern (positivistic) epistemology which 
has ruled over every branch of learning from natural sciences to the humanities; 
although it is a specific critique of scientism - modern positivism's tendency to 
mutilate human reason and force upon us a limited but dominant empirical theory 
and practice of science, its task is to justify a more comprehensive and more rigorous 
epistemology which can rehabilitate the claims of reason in human affairs. 
14 i.e., "knowledge-constitutive interests". 
15 KHI, p. 308: The first or technical cognitive interest is incorporated by the empiri-
cal-analytical sciences. The second interest is contrasted with the technical, and is 
a practical cognitive interest, i.e. a universal interest in mutual understanding in the 
everyday conduct of life, which is incorporated by the historical-hermeneutical 
sciences (i.e., those which gain knowledge in the sphere of human intersubjectivity). 
This is the interest held by the human species to maintain that level of intersubjec-
tivity which is achieved in ordinary language communication and is necessary for the 
reproduction of human beings as social-cultural beings. Human beings share a 
universal interest in the mutual self-understanding which underpins all social action. 
According to Habermas, "hermeneutic inquiry discloses reality subject to a constitu-
tive interest in the preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible 
action-orienting mutual understanding. The understanding of meaning is directed in 
its very structure toward the attainment of possible consensus among actors in the 
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framework of a self-understanding derived from tradition". [KM, p. 310] The third 
interest, incorporated by the critically oriented sciences, is the emancipatory cogni-
tive interest, which gives rise to the critique of ideology, 
16 ibid. 
17 Habermas: Theory and Practice, Heinemann, 1974, pp. 33ff.: Habermas here argues 
that theory (understood in scientistic terms) cannot play the role of legitimising and 
justifying what should be done politically: "Decisions for the political straggle cannot 
at the outset be justified theoretically and then be carried out organisationally. The 
sole possible justification at this level is consensus aimed at in practical discourse, 
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Habeimas's theory of justice, situated within his larger theory off communicative 
action, is theologically significant for my thesis, which proposes that it is specifically 
divine justice that forms society and provides the impulse continually to transform 
society. Habennas's theory of justice is crucial for illuminating the kind of eman-
cipatory communicative action in which the mutual recognition of the other's 
unconditional equality occurs, in which the other is defended against humiliation 
and destruction, and in which the good and the freedom of the other is sought and 
promoted. This kind of other-regarding action, or justice, is necessary for the 
formation of a society which is not to be characterised by the degeneracy of strategic 
action in one's own interest as a result of surrendering the principle of solidarity, 
and by the nightmare of persons who conceive of themselves as limited natural 
beings in a gruesome struggle for mutual destruction. 
It is impossible to maintain the dimensions of that action - equality, recipro-
city and solidarity - without referring to their ultimate theological context. It is the 
task of theology, especially a radical political theology, to uphold the moral 
principle of unconditional, mutual recognition and respect among human beings 
as free subjects, and to develop this principle further towards a theory of action 
which can gain universal validity. Rudolf Siebert, a political theologian steeped in 
the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, states that such a moral principle is 
impossible without theology.1 It is the theological context of "other-regard-
ing" action which supplies the explicitly theological categories of crucifixion 
The Divine Reality Underlying Justice 
as Communicative Action 252 
and resurrection, understood in Christian theology to comprise the historically 
significant saving event, which empower human action to work toward the forma-
tion of a just society; it is only when communicative action, and the theory of justice 
contained in it, are seen in a theological contest, specifically in terms of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, that it is possible to discern the saving, just reality that 
is presupposed and experienced in communicative action, namely God whose 
nature is justice. 
Since Habermas's theory of justice is inseparable from his theory of com-
municative action, I shall at different points refer to the former in terms of the 
latter, on the understanding that when I refer to the theory of communicative action 
I am assuming the interdependence of the two theories. A theological analysis of 
communicative action may reveal that it is necessary to speak of justice as com-
municative action. I intend to argue that this theory can not only be appropriated 
(critically) and transformed from a theological perspective, but that it has a 
theological dimension. I do this in the light of the work of two major theologians 
who have developed Habermas's thought, especially his theory of communicative 
action, namely Helmut Peukert2 and Rudolf Siebert. Although Habermas's various 
writings tend to disavow theology, the contradictions and central aporia which his 
theory of communicative action in universal solidarity produces can only be 
answered by reference to theology. The theory of communicative action, when 
confronted with the biblical tradition, needs to render an account of the saving 
reality, asserted for all others, implicit in the very structure of communicative 
action. 
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We have seen that justice is the primary subject of society, and that the 
formation of a just society depends partially upon an analysis of social interaction 
and its normative foundations, and partially on the establishment of a common 
normative foundation; the theological path to this foundation is to be found in the 
theory of communicative action, because the reality at the heart of this theory is 
the just and saving reality of God. The theory of communicative action, with its 
normative core and its fundamental demand for universal solidarity, is, in the view 
of Peukert, the best candidate in modern times for the transformation of theology: 
"The central realm of a fundamental theology consists of a mode of interaction in 
which the partners mutually recognise each other as unconditioned and in which 
they do so in temporal interaction, approaching death."3 Peukert's reconstruction4 
of a foundational theology from the theory of communicative action, while it is not 
the subject of this investigation, contains some crucial insights which assist my task 
of examining the role of justice in the formation of society. My contention is that 
this justice is none other than the justice of God in its practical expression to achieve 
God's purposes of his people living selflessly, for each other, in order to form a 
society beneficial to all. The action denoted in living selflessly is not only selfless, 
solidaristic and affirming of the other, but also reconciling. The theological ca-
tegory of reconciliation through the Cross can be determined as a vital dimension 
of action issuing from the ideal speech situation. 
A theological analysis of Habermas's theory of justice involves an examin-
ation of the limit situation and the contradictions that arise if the universalism 
which is central to communicative ethics is extended to the dimensions of historical 
and social action. This analysis leads to the necessary assertion of a reality which 
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is implicit in enduring communicative action, We have seen that Habermas em-
ploys a quasi-transcendental approach to his theory of communicative action, an 
approach which partially draws on Karl-Otto Apel's transcendental-pragmatic 
transformation of philosophy.5 Apel proposes the Peircean concept of the un-
limited communication community which he believes to be implicit in all communi-
cative understanding, and to be an existential commitment forced on every speaker 
who engages in genuine communication. The concept of the unlimited communi-
cation community is fundamental to rational identity, because the identity of the 
subject, the constitution of the self, the possibility of the partner in interaction 
finding bis or her identity, depends on the reciprocal solidarity which is a normative 
dimension of communicative action; this solidarity includes all dimensions of 
existence in intersubjectivity and, in principle, all possible subjects of communica-
tive action. Thus the identity of the subject is established through interaction of a 
specific kind - true intersubjectivity or communicative action. This kind of interac-
tion is the basis for asserting that the reality at the heart of communicative action 
is theological. Whereas Apel proposes the unlimited communication community, 
Habermas puts forward the concept of the ideal speech situation, which supposes 
the implicit suspension of force and equality of chances in every act of communi-
cation aimed at mutual understanding, i.e. communicative action. Also implied in 
the very structure of communicative action are three normative claims: equality, 
reciprocity, and universal solidarity (which Peukert claims to be "the utmost ideal 
achievable in modern times"6). 
The transcendental conceptions of a rational, unlimited communication 
community and the normative dimensions of communicative action require trans-
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lation into practice. The problem is that when they are given a historical dimension, 
the relation to the past, with all its set-backs, catastrophes and injustice, becomes 
fundamentally problematical for an otherwise thoroughgoing universalism. This 
aporetical aspect of Haberaaas's theory of communicative action consists mainly 
in his neglecting the diachronical character of the historical struggle of people 
against injustice in society. Siebert contrasts Hegel's awareness of "the massive 
destruction of individuals and whole nations and civilisations" with Habermas's 
apparent ignoring of the "gigantic annihilation of action systems and of the people 
interacting in them";7 and he contends that political theology is able to resolve the 
aporia in the theory of communicative action by not being merely another form of 
that theory, but "by referring to essential truths in the Judeo-Christian and other 
religious world-views ..."8 
What Peukert has done is to uncover the necessary and implicit reference to 
a theological dimension in the aporia of Habermas's secular universalism. Peu-
kert's pushing of Habermas's universalism one step further into the dimension of 
history and concrete social praxis is the step that entails the admission of theologi-
cal concepts, and the question about the conditions of possibility of existence in 
solidarity with others in the situation of historical and social injustice. 
The step that admits theology in the development of the theory of communi-
cative action is the uncovering of the main problem of its normative basis, namely 
its fundamental demand for universal solidarity (in genuine inter subjective com-
munication) toward freedom and justice. It is in response to this problem that 
theology claims its modern sphere of validity, because the theory of communicative 
action, as I intend to argue, falls into aporia when the concept of a unified humanity 
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is penetrated. Theology alone can supply a full conception of communicative 
action in universal solidarity because at its heart resides a reality and a power which 
enable this action; on the other hand, a theology of justice as communicative action 
is possible only insofar as this praxis follows from an integration of the biblical 
concept of justice with the theory of communicative action. The theoretical con-
tradictions of the theory of communicative action occur in the utmost possibility 
of a life lived in accord with the normative demand for universal solidarity, namely 
the death of the innocent who has struggled for justice and freedom for others. 
The parados emerges when the ideal of universal solidarity is incorporated 
in the emancipatory philosophy of history that is central to a theory of society and 
its formation. When this ideal is historicised in the context of the struggle for justice 
and freedom, the community to which this solidarity extends must include past 
generations, to whom we owe the creation of the possibilities to live ever more 
humanely injustice, harmony and peace. This sort of solidarity is unthinkable in 
modernity, because modern secular thinkers like Horkheimer and Adorno hold 
that solidarity cannot be extended to a past which is closed, in which the dead are 
irrevocably dead, and for whom there can be no justice. Those who presently, and 
those who in the future will, enjoy the fruits of the emancipatory struggle for 
liberation and justice, are faced with the "paradox of anamnestic solidarity", a 
phrase which Peukert borrows from Christian Lenhardt's generational typology of 
relations to the past in the struggle for emancipation10: they can be happy only at 
the cost of the wholesale erasure of memory and denial of the past. If they recall 
the terrible sufferings of those who were and are annihilated in trying to bring 
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justice and liberation, they cannot but live in "the most extreme despair and 
inconsolable grief'.11 
This parados can be resolved by a Christian response grounded primarily in 
a theology of the resurrection, but also in a theology of the Cross. I hope to argue 
that the explicitly theological and Christian categories of the Cross and the Resur-
rection not only resolve12 a theoretical paradox, but more importantly are an 
expression or demonstration of God's justice, which also empower human action 
to achieve reconciliation and universal solidarity in history, and thereby to establish 
justice in the social dimension. This argument now requires development, in three 
successive stages: 
1. A theological analysis of communicative action (section 5.1); 
2. the paradox of anamnestic solidarity (section 5.2); 
3. the empowering capacity of the Resurrection, and the adoption of a radical 
political theology and its praxis (section 5.3). 
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A theological analysis of communicative action which attempts to establish 
its significance for justice in the social dimension must begin by identifying the 
theological theme of communicative action, namely intersubjectivity, for com-
municative action is concerned with the constitution of subjects and of society in 
interaction. The identity of subjects is established through intersubjectivity, which, 
by definition, takes place in the realm of society: it depends on the basic structure 
of socially constitutive interaction. The mode of interaction which occurs between 
subjects is regulated by a number of factors, including the organisation of produc-
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tion, distribution and consumption, and the accepted rules and norms of a society, 
thereby deciding the very possibility of achieving identity for the subjects who take 
part in and constitute social relations. If these relations are distorted, subjects in 
such a society may suffer domination; such deformed relations require transfor-
mation through justice as communicative action. 
The question of identity, and particularly of the modern identity crisis, cannot 
be ignored by political theology. The concept of an identity crisis signifies the 
modern experience of not being able to understand oneself or being able to make 
oneself understood to others. According to Siebert,13 this breakdown of the ability 
to engage in intersubjectively reflected self-understanding is like a modern Babel 
with its confusion of languages, and can happen to individuals, groups, whole 
societies and action systems (i.e., ideologically-driven forms of government). An 
analysis of the modern identity crisis leads one to conclude that it has its roots in 
an uncritical conformity to power; Siebert claims that "our action is determined by 
systemically petrified mechanisms of accumulation of power", whether economic 
or administrative, which colonise all aspects of our life-world by "money power or 
bureaucratic power".14 
It is the function of a theologically-based understanding of justice as com-
municative action to consider the overcoming of the identity crisis, which threatens 
our existence, by breaking through the systemically ossified mechanisms of power-
accumulation by which the social world is formed and steered, and also by breaking 
through the mechanisms of material reproduction and money-accumulation which 
generate situations of inequity and injustice. Siebert claims, correctly in my view, 
that this can be achieved only when action or praxis "orients itself according to the 
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principles of practical, commimicative rationality and intersubjectivity", such 
principles, namely the right to life, equality, freedom, and their unconditional 
mutual recognition are consonant with Judeo-Christian tenets and precepts, and 
should guide all action. Such action is necessarily communicative action; its nor-
mative principle consists not only in the intersubjective recognition of the other, 
but much more in the will to secure and broaden the life possibility of the other. 
Theologically, this action, this intersubjective creativity, is empowered by the Holy 
Spirit to become a life-form which forms the kind of society willed and demanded 
by God. In this sense, a political theological understanding of justice radicalises the 
theory of communicative action, and shows how it is much more than a mere theory 
of communicative action. 
The need for genuine intersubjective communication in establishing consen-
sus and finding a new level of orientation of action, and thus normative legitimacy 
in society, can be seen as an interpretation of the demand arising from a biblical 
concept of justice, and is a problem largely unresolved by modern theology. Against 
a history in which ethical norms have been subordinated to socially-politically 
mediated religious claims for the upholding of the status quo, theology needs to 
recognise the protest of a radicalised consciousness of freedom which has come 
from the social sciences, especially critical theory. As Siebert points out, "for this 
mode of consciousness of freedom only the consensus of free subjects, equipped 
with inalienable human rights, can provide the basis for the binding power of rules 
and action".16 The Judeo-Christian tradition's understanding of justice as right 
relationship or true sociality is of constitutive meaning for the subject. Intersubjec-
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tivity, in the communicative terms set out above, is an understanding of right 
relationship. 
Owing to the extraordinarily creative way in which Habermas integrates the 
results of research in many diverse disciplines, his theory of communicative action 
reveals an important aspect of intersubjectivity, namely the ability of the subject to 
acquire and preserve identity in interaction determined by social and historical 
norms. This insight is derived from his work on the development of moral con-
sciousness, in which he found that the ability to make judgments in situations of 
ethical conflict refers to insight into principles that make possible the preservation 
and achievement of identity for a subject through the recognition and maintenance 
of the identity of the interaction partner.17 
A theological analysis of this aspect of Habermas's thought must at the same 
time pay attention to the systematic deformations of identity, and ask for a praxis 
which can overcome these deformations. The nature of this praxis will become 
clearer as our analysis proceeds, but it is sufficient to say here that in the light of 
Peukert's theological development of Habermas's theory of communicative action, 
it is a new notion of praxis: it means to act in a transforming way, directed toward 
a non-alienated form of life, while in the midst of an alienating world with all its 
systemic contradictions and identity-deforming capacity. This non-alienated form 
of life assists subjects to find their identities together, and thus to change them-
selves and unjust conditions through justice as communicative action. This kind of 
communicative action (which is in itself a learning process), seeks and asserts an 
unconditional, eternal God at its heart, and helps people to free their perception 
of God from the economic and political increase of power which threatens their 
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existence. Lawrence Koblberg's work on the development of moral conscious-
ness18 shows that interactive behaviour is oriented, through an ordered, successive 
series of stages, toward increasingly higher forms of reciprocity. Peukert notes, with 
regard to Kohlberg's work, that "the only binding mode of discovering norms is that 
in which all interaction partners are recognised as having equal rights and stand-
ing".19 He also notes that the development of reciprocity demands (since it is always 
socially mediated) an environment where full reciprocity, and thus the autonomy 
of the subject, is permitted and practised. 
Full reciprocity is a sacrificial and a deeply Christian virtue, and is a de-
veloped understanding of the Christian teaching of "love thy neighbour". Genuine 
reciprocity has nothing to do with the bourgeois relation of exchange in late 
capitalistic societies. What characterises these exchange relations in most civil 
societies, from Roman times to the present, is the bourgeois principle do ut des (I 
give to you that you may give to me). Some thinkers are tied to this principle as an 
understanding of reciprocity,20 but I do not find this in Habermas's thought. 
Indeed, in a recent essay Habermas displays a full understanding of reciprocity as 
"a relationship in which a subject is associated to another without being submitted 
to the degrading violence of exchange - a derisive violence that allows for the 
happiness and power of the one only at the price of the unhappiness and power-
lessness of the other".21 
Reciprocity means the recognition of the other for his or her own sake, and 
for my sake. It means recognition of the other as equal and equally needy, who 
depends on love and understanding as I do. Genuine reciprocity springs from 
intrinsic common knowledge that we are unconditionally dependent on each 
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other.22 For this reason, we must come to a consensus with each other about what 
we do, what we want, what we should do, and what w© should want to do in the 
interests of our common humanity and before God.23 As a consequence of this 
recognition, love of the neighbour as reciprocal solidarity seeks discourse; it moves 
from recognition to language; it struggles for understanding and mutual recogni-
tion. It does this not only for the neighbour as friend, but also the neighbour as 
enemy. Siebert notes that reciprocity in this sense is not merely a Christian virtue: 
"it is rather a deeply humane form of communicative action",24 in that it desires the 
transformation of the enemy. The importance of reciprocity as one of the core 
values of communicative action points to a fundamental principle in Hegelian 
thought, namely the mutual constitution of subjects in interaction. This suggests 
that the mutual recognition and affirmation of the other as unconditionally equal 
is the condition of self-existence.25 
The structure of communicative action can be characterised by the reciprocal 
mutual recognition of the communication partners in the binding equality of their 
rights through all the dimensions of communication. G. H. Mead's thought is 
important for establishing the concept of the conversation or community which, in 
principle, incorporates all possible subjects of communicative action. The notion 
of a universal communication community is derived from the thought of C. S. 
Pierce and K. Apel, as well as from Mead's idea that the universal conversation or 
discourse is the formal ideal of communication,26 and receives further attention 
below. 
The importance of intersubjectivity and the authentic constitution of individ-
uals through their existence for others is established in Karl Rahner's theology.27 
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Maimer's assertion that the experience of the realty of God (with his attributes of 
love and justice) is mediated through others is an important corroboration of the 
assertion that the theological theme of communicative action is intersubjectivity 
(which is also a theme of justice). This intersubjectivity is of a peculiar and specific 
kind, involving the affirmation of the other, the turning toward the other, which is 
summed up in the Christian category of love of the neighbour. (In this sense it 
differs from the kind of intersubjectivity implied by Rawls's theory of justice, which 
seeks co-operation for mutual advantage, but essentially from the motive of 
self-interest). 
InRahner's theology of the unity of the love of God and the love of neighbour, 
the experience of God is present only in the communication with a human 
"Thou":28 "The act of love of neighbour is, therefore, the single categorial and 
primordial act in which man attains the whole of reality given to us in categories, 
with regard to which he properly fulfils himself perfectly and in which he always 
already has transcendental and direct experience of God by grace."29 The affirma-
tion of the other in interaction is achieved through the experience of the nearness 
of the absolute mystery, toward which human existence transcends in turning 
concretely to the other: 
The categorially explicit love of neighbour is the primary act of the love 
of God, which in the love of neighbour as such really and always intends 
God in supernatural transcendentality in an unthematic way, and even 
the explicit love of God is still borne by that opening in trusting love to 
the whole of reality which takes place in the love of neighbour.30 
The affirmation of the other, the turning toward the other, is vital to an 
understanding of justice which involves action on behalf of the other, even at the 
cost of death. This kind of action looks to a future brought about by individuals 
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who, in accordance with the ethic of a Christology which asserts the possibility of 
the unconditional affirmative self "manifestation of God in one man for others, 
mediate God's justice in their action to form a just society, free from dornination 
and oppression and characterised by freedom. This mode of interaction, to the limit 
of one's own death, asserts the absolute affirmation of the other, for his or her 
freedom, through the reality inhering in communicative action. This interaction, 
in which the unconditional recognition of the other takes place, is made possible 
by the experience of the unconditional affirmation by God; Christian faith in this 
is the ground for the possibility and obligation for individuals in interaction to 
affirm the other unconditionally. 
This interaction is also made possible by the experience of being summoned 
by absolute freedom and absolute justice, categories attributable only to God; 
therefore only God, out of pure, free self-communication and as a gift of grace, can 
enable free self-communication among humans in communicative action. Accord-
ing to Siebert, a theologian like Feukert (who speaks of God, as Hegel before, as 
absolute love and freedom) "can speak of God as liberating freedom only insofar 
as he can speak of man's freedom, as it is liberated by God's freedom".31 Human 
praxis, true communicative action, is the movement towards God as absolute 
freedom, who initiates and makes possible human existence in the first place. One 
of the problems with Habermas's understanding of human freedom is that he is 
unable to thematise, let alone answer, the question of absolute freedom as the 
presupposition of finite historical freedom. It is God alone who can be and is 
experienced as the one who makes possible and fulfils absolute freedom, and 
therefore absolute meaning, mediated through relative, finite, temporal freedom. 
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For Peukert "this freedom of man liberated by God as absolute freedom has, as 
praxis of love, anon-limitable horizon of universal solidarity".32 Thus, while human 
autonomous freedom and human identity are constituted intersubjectively, these 
depend for their completion on orientation toward universal communication and 
solidarity. At the centre of such orientation is communicative action, in which God 
is mediated through intersubjectivity, directed toward universal solidarity. 
A theological analysis of communicative action also needs to examine Haber-
mas's basic thesis that language is the medium of social formation and transforma-
tion in communicative practice. Because language is rooted in the communicative 
and reflexive practice of individuals in creative interaction, it can mediate between 
objectivating (reifying) constructions and self-reflection in order to unlock reified, 
rigid structures. Our analysis needs to ask whether, by incorporating the vital 
linguistic aspects of the theory of communicative action (the unlimited communi-
cation community, the ideal speech situation and the notion of undistorted com-
munication intended to bring about a society free from domination and 
oppression), a Christian understanding of justice and its theological statements 
have the innovative and critical power to uncover and break through the injustice 
in society, i.e. the context of interaction. A Christian understanding of justice which 
apprehends and emphasises the importance of language in the formation of society 
can show how the linguistic aspects of the theory of communicative action could 
become, in a theological context, a theory of socially rectifying speech. 
We have seen, in our examination of Habermas's universal pragmatics, that 
speech act theory and the theory of performative speech point to the constitutive 
significance of the partners for each other and for the referential structure of their 
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communication, insofar as their speech represents effective action on each other. 
In communication, because finite freedom can be expressed and experienced, 
partners can provoke each other to ever greater reciprocally granted and received 
freedom. A theological appropriation of the speech-act theory in Habermas's 
theory of communicative action could point to the benefit to be gained from 
understanding the capacity of language (speech) to open up the communication 
situation to new dimensions, experiences and possibilities, namely the revelation 
of access to the categories of the reality disclosing itself for subjects who enter into 
commitments in linguistic action. If Peukert is right in believing that the reality that 
discloses itself in communicative action is God, then the theory of communicative 
action is of immense significance for a Christian understanding of justice, because 
it is precisely this reality which provides, through language (i.e. performative 
speech or correctly mediated, creative linguistic action in a process of reciprocal 
reflectivity), the new possibilities for overcoming injustice. 
In our earlier discussion of the ideal speech situation, which is the normative 
core of theoretical and practical discourse, we saw that in the course of communi-
cative action mutual, normative suppositions are proffered and accepted as binding 
the communication partners from the moment they enter communication. We saw 
that the structure of communicative action consists of the communication partners 
mutually accepting each other as having equal standing and rights in all the 
dimensions of communicative action and recognising the obligation to justify their 
mutual claims. However, the necessary transcendental presupposition33 of the 
ideal speech situation in the practice of communication implies an unlimited 
communication community, because the conversation in which validity claims are 
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tested argumentatively cannot in principle be limited; anyone who in any way 
enters discourse with the intention of argumentatively contesting validity claims 
must be accepted as a partner:3^ "Hence, in principle, in any communicative act 
the entire human species is implied as the final horizon of the communication 
community. Communicative action is this bound to normative, ideal criteria. In it 
we receive insight into what should be."35 
The norm in discourse that makes possible the reciprocal recognition of 
communication partners, and indeed makes possible the justification of all other 
norms, is the norm of transsubjectivity. It leads to the view that the communication 
partners within the framework of an unlimited communication community must 
"always already" be recognised as having equal standing if communication is to 
succeed at all in all its dimensions, and if argumentation is to be possible.36 The 
idea of an ideal communication community provides a useful analytical tool for the 
judgement of the state of communication in society. Apel's notion of the dialectic 
between the real and the ideal communication community has helped to make it 
possible to view the evolution of society, and to transform society: 
Communicative action is always played out in a concrete society, with 
all its contradictions and reifying mechanisms. In its factual implica-
tions, concrete communicative action already points to the ideal com-
munication community, if such action is not to become 
self-contradictory. The ideal implications of any socially constitutive 
action are the concrete impulses to change existing situations and to 
transform society as a whole.37 
From a theological perspective, in the context of justice, communicative 
action is constituted by a specific form of action, namely language-mediated 
struggle for unconditional mutual recognition at every level of human activity. A 
theology of communicative action thematises this specific form of action, which 
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makes possible personal and social identity under modern conditions and con-
tributes toward the formation of a just society. According to Siebert, "this identity 
owes itself to God's unconditionally turning toward the partners in communicative 
praxis and mutual recognition. This turning of God toward the interacting partners 
must always be presupposed and practically realised in action for the other".38 
Siebert argues that it is God who makes it possible for the interacting partners to 
overcome dominance in all its forms and to move toward unconditional mutual 
recognition of each other as free subjects.39 Further, such communicative praxis 
between partners aims in its societal dimension at the formation of a common 
social world and of institutions, in which the overcoming of dominance and the 
consequent unconditional mutual recognition among people are the condition of 
the self s identity, and the location for the experience of that absolute liberating 
freedom, which in the Christian tradition is called God - absolute truth, justice, 
love.40 
From the foregoing discussion it is possible to distinguish the elementary 
determinations of communicative action exercised in the dimensions of history and 
society: equality, reciprocity and solidarity.41 These determinations are at the same 
time the determinations of justice, as liberating action characterised by them for 
others. According to Peukert, who contends that the thesis of the egalitarian and 
solidaristic basic structure of communicative action is at the same time the cultural 
thesis of the whole of theology,42 the opening up of immediate interaction to an 
unlimited community is built into the structure of communicative action, which is 
posited and accepted as normative for one's own action: "This also gives us 
exigencies and criteria for the overcoming of untruth, injustice, deception, and 
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self-deception. 3 The innovative actions of subjects in communicative action are 
mutually constitutive performances, disclosing new possibilities for others and for 
themselves. Such actions not only represent a reciprocal constitution of meaning 
but also are a "disclosive provocation"44 for others, making possible and realising 
their freedom. In the course of communicative action these actions, accomplished 
in the horizon of an unlimited communication community, change an existing 
(unjust) situation by calling into question existing (disputed) norms and disclosing 
new dimensions of action about which agreement can be reached. This kind of 
action, in freedom, is demanded of, and is binding on, everyone. According to 
Peukert, "the community disclosed in this universal solidarity that elaborates its 
possible self-understanding throughout history is the utmost horizon of action and 
the condition of possibility that action can contain in this horizon a moment of the 
unconditioned".45 This structure of communicative action formulates the utmost 
limit of what is conceivable - the limit idea implied in communicative action itself: 
the unlimited, universal communication community, the realisation of freedom in 
solidarity through historical action.46 
A serious challenge to this conclusion is brought by Simpson, who argues that 
Peukert's failure to engage in a theological analysis of the ideal speech situation 
and its resulting empirical limit situation, leads him to jettison the transcendental 
criterion of the ideal speech situation and "to change the venue to another tran-
scendental presupposition for communicative action",47 namely Apel's more 
strongly transcendental concept of the unlimited communication community, 
which he goes on to privilege throughout his thesis. We need to consider the 
empirical conundrum which results from a privileged focus on the unlimited 
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communication community, namely how those in the past are to be included as 
partners in communication within the unlimited communication community. 
If the normative core of the theory of communicative action is equality, 
reflective reciprocity, and universal solidarity, it needs to be established whether 
these determinations can be achieved in the historical dimension of society. The 
evolution of society, seen from a theory of history reconstructed in terms of 
communicative action, can be viewed as the factual development of the human 
species from material need and social injustice toward a condition of uncoerced, 
communicative agreement of subjects to overcome injustice through common 
practice. Such a theory of history conceives of the historical process as a history of 
emancipation, i.e. as the ever-increasing realisation of human freedom: 
The past that is supposed to be reconstructed in a theory of history is 
certainly primarily the historical, communicative practice of subjects 
who in concretely coming to terms with nature and with the contradic-
tions of their own society have also disclosed new orientations for then-
own action and for their progeny. This achievement of new orientations 
does not simply have the character of a theoretical debate; rather, it 
consists in the effective action of concrete subjects on themselves and 
others; that is, they may freely settle in mutual dependence what they 
want to be and finally what they can be. In this concrete action they 
disclose their possibilities for action and for existence.48 
The problem for such a view is how universal solidarity and the unlimited 
communication community, which are among the constitutive conditions for being 
human, can be extended to those in the past, if the past is past and closed. 
This problem was given prominence in a debate between two members of 
the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer, which Peukert 
considers to be "one of the most theologically significant controversies of our 
century".49 In this debate Benjamin, who was concerned to develop a way of 
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treating history that did not renounce solidarity with the generations of the down-
trodden and oppressed, claimed that the past is not closed. Horkheimer's response 
was that in the past injustice had occurred, people who had been slain were "truly 
slain", and that nothing could be don© to correct past injustice: 
What happened to those human beings who have perished does not 
have any part in the future. They will never be called forth to be blessed 
in eternity. Nature and society have done their work on them, and the 
idea of the Last Judgement in which the infinite yearning of the op-
pressed and the dead is taken up once again is only a remnant of the 
primitive thought which denied the negligible role of the human species 
in natural history and humanised the universe.... All these desires for 
eternity and above all for the entry of universal justice and goodness 
are what is common between the materialist thinker and the religious 
point of view, as opposed to the indifference of the positivist view. 
However, while the religious thinker is comforted by the thought that 
this desire is fulfilled all the same, the materialist is permeated with the 
feeling of the limitless abandonment of humanity, the single true 
answer to the hope for the impossible.50 
In tracing the influence of Hegel's thought on the Frankfurt School (and also 
on Habermas and Peukert), Siebert points to Hegel's adherence to the a priori 
principle that God's providence governs history, and that all that happens in history 
is ultimately sublated into God's absolute spirit, love and freedom. This is Hegel's 
solution to the theodicy problem: "he transforms the negative into a positive 
completeness of history. The historical process is open in principle. Hegel's phil-
osophy of history is indeed a theology."51 God's providence is powerful enough to 
assert itself against the negativity not only of nature, but of society and history as 
wel l 5 2 According to Siebert, "Hegel's political theology contains the promise that 
the moments of God's providence, plan and purpose - human freedom, agents of 
change, social system, course of action - will contain the essential determinations 
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for the answer to the question which arises from the dark picture of history: the 
theodicy problem".53 
At one point in their correspondence, Horkheimer wrote to Benjamin sug-
gesting that Benjamin's statements ultimately were theological. Benjamin com-
mented: 'The corrective for this sort of thinking lies in the reflection that history 
is not simply a science but a form of empathetic memory. What science has 'settled', 
empathetic memory can modify. It cam transform the unclosed (happiness) into 
something closed and the closed (suffering) into something unclosed. That is 
theology, certainly, but in empathetic memory we have an experience that prohibits 
us from conceiving history completely non-theologically, as little as we may want 
to try to write about history in immediate theological concepts."54 The depth 
structure which Peukert perceives in Benjamin's thought and in his debate with 
Horkheimer he designates as "anamnestic solidarity" - a phrase which he borrows 
from Christian Lenhardt to mean "solidarity confirmed in an empathetic memory, 
in the recollection of the dead and downtrodden".55 Using Lenhardt's concept, 
Peukert proposes that the dead ° especially the oppressed and "innocently annihi-
lated" - have been denied partnership and subjectivity and must therefore, as a 
constitutive group of the unlimited communication community, be rescued in a 
preferential way so that they can be subjects in community rather than refuse in 
history.56 
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Thus there is a paradox at the heart of this form of solidarity-motivated 
communicative action, and it is brought to light by the generational typology of 
Christian Lenhardt,57 which fits any emancipatory theory of history and even any 
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conception that the labour of historical action is for the greater happiness of others. 
Lenhardt distinguishes three generations in history: a pre-world, a co-world, and 
a post-world. The first is a past generation of oppressed, enslaved, unhappy 
ancestors, the second is a present generation of living, oppressed subjects which 
struggles for liberation, and the third is a future generation that achieves this 
liberation and enjoys the fruits of the efforts of others to establish justice. 
Difficulties and even contradictions arise when the concepts of universal 
solidarity and the unlimited communication community are tested in respect of 
Lenhardt's typology. The place of the oppressed ancestors (the pre-world) is 
apparently least problematic because they do not owe anything to the next gener-
ation (the co-world) for whose liberation they have struggled. The co-world, 
conscious of the historical dimension of its task, struggles for its own liberation and 
that of its children, and in so doing satisfies its debt to the pre-world by working 
for the happiness of the post-world. The problem becomes acute when the position 
of the post-world and its relation to previous generations is considered: according 
to the logic of Lenhardt's (simplistic) typology, the post-world is by definition 
liberated, its members living in perfect solidarity and having achieved the end state 
of happiness. 
However, a paradox begins to emerge when their relation to previous gener-
ations is considered, in so far as they must live with the consciousness that they owe 
everything to the oppressed, downtrodden, the victims of exploitation and a range 
of injustices58 during the prior process of liberation. The questions which arise 
from this terrible consciousness that the happiness of the living exists in the 
expropriation of the dead are trenchantly framed by Peukert: 
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Is happiness at all conceivable under these presuppositions? Is it not 
the presupposition of happiness that the unhappiness of those who went 
before is simply forgotten? Is amnesia, the utter loss of historical 
memory, the presupposition of happy consciousness? If the uncon-
sciousness of world history is the presupposition of living happily, then 
is not the life of these human beings in this future inhuman?... How can 
one retain the memory of the conclusive, irretrievable loss of the victims 
of the historical process, to whom one owes one's entire happiness, and 
still be happy, still find one's identity? If for the sake of one's own 
happiness and one's own identity this memory is banished from con-
sciousness, is this not tantamount to the betrayal of the very solidarity 
by which alone one is able to discover oneself?59 
Thus the extreme counter-experience which radically calls into question the 
normative structure of communicative action is the experience that those who have 
sought to act out of justice, in solidarity, to achieve the freedom of others have been 
destroyed. We become aware that such action contains the experience of indeb-
tedness, insofar as one person can give to or take away from another the possi-
bilities of life; if such a person is irrevocably taken from us, so that there is no 
possibility of making good his or her presence, the possibility of reciprocal 
presence is destroyed. 
Thus the basic normative structure of communicative action is destroyed as 
a possibility of action; and since this structure assures the possibility of the identity 
of others, its destruction threatens the destruction of every subject at the core of 
his or her being. The survivor is threatened with inner destruction by the death of 
the other in his or her own inner centre of self. This follows from the core concept 
of communicative action, namely universal solidarity, which is the condition for 
individual identity. The possibilities available after this counter-experience (of the 
destruction of the other) are grim: the attempt to exclude the memory of the 
(innocent) other would be identical to the attempt to deny reality. Siebert has 
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pointed to the possibility that the price for the ego's being able to remain itself may 
be the repression of a catastrophic experience, in which case the ego would be 
imposing on itself an amnesia "of world historical proportion".60 Such amnesia 
would cripple the consciousness of the individual and would end an attempt to 
regain its identity. The ego which represses any catastrophic experience through 
amnesia betrays the solidarity which is the condition for ego-identity and ultimately 
for the individual's freedom; in which case human existence becomes a self-con-
tradiction. 
Another possibility is cynically to conclude from the experience of the 
sacrifice of others who have attempted to act in solidarity that one "should simply 
use all possibilities of action optimally for oneself alone; solidarity too would then 
be surrendered as the basic principle of the achievement of one's own identity; 
communicative action would then degenerate into purely strategic action in one's 
own interest".61 
Lenhardt's concept of anamnestic solidarity, when used in an analysis of the 
theory of communicative action, marks the paradox of a historically and communi-
catively acting entity: "one's own existence becomes a self-contradiction by means 
of the solidarity to which it is indebted. The condition of its very possibility becomes 
its destruction. The idea of 'perfect justice' can only then become a nightmare."62 
Faced with such a paradox, it is not difficult to sympathise with Horkheimer's 
suspicion that this nightmare might shed light on the real situation: 
The thought is monstrous that the prayers of the persecuted in then-
hour of greatest need, that the innocent who must die without explana-
tion of their situation, that the last hopes of a supernatural court of 
appeals, fall on deaf ears and that the night uniUuminated by any human 
light is also not penetrated by any divine one. The eternal truth without 
God has as little ground-and footing as infinite love; indeed, it becomes 
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an mthinkabl© concept But is the nnonsteousness of any idea any more 
a cogent argument against the assertion or denial of a state of affairs 
than does logic contain a law which says that a judgement is simply false 
that has despair as its consequence?*" 
Peukert notes that "here the most extreme point of despair is reached, and, 
if despair does not kill, the point of inconsolable grief.6 4 (This is, of course, a 
re-statement of the problem of theodicy - the justification of the all-loving, all-
powerful, all-merciful, totally just God in the face of the horrors and barbarous 
injustices in history and society. In the view of Siebeit, Peukert's theology of 
communicative action provides a plausible and theoretical answer to the problem 
of theodicy.65) In response to Horkheirner's remark concerning Benjamin's refusal 
to declare the past to be finally closed - "Your statements are ultimately theologi-
cal" - Peukert is right to ask: "What sort of theology is this?"66 
The paradox of anamnestic solidarity and the aporia it uncovers in the theory 
of communicative action indicate the theory's necessary theological dimension, 
and the theological reality it reveals. Through the paradox of anamnestic solidarity 
we approach the limits of the theory of communicative action, and also of Haber-
mas's theory of justice. It seems necessary to postulate absolute freedom and 
absolute justice as the reality at the root of communicative action, because they are 
the ground for free subjects working acts of justice in solidarity for others; at least 
the paradox raises the question about the relation between the normative structure 
of intersubjective, reciprocally oriented communicative action in unconditional 
solidarity and absolute freedom. 
Other limit questions are uncovered by the paradox: what sort of conception 
of communicative action can still be held good after undergoing the crisis of the 
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destruction of the innocent who attempt, in the historical dimension, to act in 
accordance with the basic normative structure of communicative action? Does not 
their experience contradict the core structure of egalitarian and solidaristic action, 
thereby making the theory of communicative action self-contradictory? It is hard 
to avoid the conclusion that the normative implications of a theory of communica-
tive action end in aporia "at the point where the attempt is made to conceive of the 
historical constitution of humanity united in solidarity".67 However, we have seen 
that this very aporia which poses the question of the reality that is the subject matter 
of theology, also poses the question of a reality witnessed for the other in the face 
of his death by acting in solidarity with him.6 8 It is my contention that such action 
in solidarity is the work of justice, and further that it is enabled and empowered by 
the nature of the reality nameable in the aporia of the theory of communicative 
action - God, whose nature is justice, and who by the ultimate act of justice saves 
and resurrects the innocent who have struggled for justice. 
Our investigation of biblical justice as true intersubjective action, i.e. com-
municative action, supports Peukert's assertion that the "the Judeo-Christian 
tradition is concerned with the reality experienced in the foundational and limit 
experiences of communicative action and with the modes of communicative action 
still possible in response to these experiences".69 In the biblical tradition, the basic 
experience of God's liberation, with its normative demand for justice and its 
normative claim of the recognition of the unconditional equality of the other being 
the condition of access to and acceptance of God, is called into question at the 
point where someone is destroyed precisely because he allows this claim to enter 
into his actions. 
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The experience of the prophets to that of Jesus and Ms disciples is the 
experience of the failure of the just, who is pursued and destroyed on account of 
his solidarity with others - primarily the poor, the oppressed and victims of social 
injustice. Support for this is found, e.g., in Pss. 22; 25:2,3; 31:1; 41:1; 55:16,17,22; 
72:12; 91:14; 106:44; Lk. 18:7, where God is affirmed for the one praying as the 
reality who saves those who are threatened with death because of their attempts 
to live a just life; and in the Suffering Servant passages in Isaiah, where one who 
lives in unconditional solidarity to the point of annihilation is simply and finally 
annihilated. Feukert, in his exegesis of Isa. 52:13-53:12, notes that the assertion 
that God will save and lift up the suffering servant in his downfall is put in the mouth 
of God himself: "By letting God himself speak in this way, the text affirms God as 
the reality for the other, for one who suffers in solidarity; the reality of God proves 
itself as a reality, inasmuch as God saves those who live in solidarity unto death in 
death."70 
This salvation by God is an instance of his unconditional will to justice, and 
is also the underlying motive of the apocalyptic tradition, which, in the face of 
terrible persecution, posed the question whether justice would ever be done to 
those murdered despite their innocence. Peukert observes that 
at first, this was restricted to the particularistic hope that the innocent 
dead of Israel would be resurrected to participate in the future salvation 
at the end time. (See Dan. 12:2, Isa. 25:8; 26:19; cf. 2 Mac. 7:9ff.) Later 
this idea was extended universally to the expectation of the resurrection 
to Judgment and to the addressing of the balance of justice for all.... In 
the explosive development of the apocalyptic tradition, hope is placed 
in a God who will make the dead alive again, who will transform the 
entire existing order of the world in a cataclysm and thereby inaugurate 
a kingdom of justice.71 
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The thesis that God's justice saves those who live (and die) in accordance 
with that justice is embodied in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus.72 Siebert 
claims that Jesus's discourse and communicative action are obviously concerned 
with making the beginning of God's dominion experienced for people as the event 
which liberates them into freedom, and which creates for them the possibility of 
recognising and accepting each other, since everyone "is already recognised and 
accepted by the redeeming Reality called God1 1.7 3 In his yearning for the fulfilment 
of the Kingdom of God, Jesus asserts the reality of God and his salvation for others. 
Jesus makes this assertion not merely in theory but in his preaching and acting; in 
the performance of his factual existence as communicative practice he asserts that 
God is the saving reality - primarily for the poor and all who are disadvantaged in 
society. For Peukert, Jesus is this assertion for others: 
In this way Jesus exists radically for God, by asserting this God for others 
practically and by making this God experienceable in his action as a 
healing, forgiving, saving reality. By acting in solidarity for others, he 
asserts God as the saving reality distinct from himself. It must be 
assumed that Jesus understands himself precisely in terms of this 
reality, which he asserts and makes present for others in his actions -
that is, he understands himself in terms of others.74 
The problem raised by the execution and death of Jesus is an even more acute 
instance of the contradiction found in communicative action, and brings about a 
change of perspective which radicalises the question of the reality of God: Jesus 
asserted the reality of God for others: does not this assertion hold for Jesus himself 
in his own death? Peukert believes that this is an elementary question which must 
have faced the followers of Jesus:75 it is also a question which concerns every 
human being confronted with death as a consequence of just action on behalf of 
another. It must have seemed that Jesus's assertion was not valid for himself, and 
The Divine Reality Underlying Justice 
as Communicative Action 280 
that his execution was a factual refutation of God as the saving Reality.76 With the 
death of Jesus any attempt toward a good life, which asserts in the existence for 
others an Unconditional, is led towards absurdity. In St Mark's representation of 
Jesus as the just man dying with the cry of why God has forsaken him the question 
of the reality of God is posed. Other equally sharp questions follow: 
If the one who in his existence asserts God for others is himself 
annihilated, is this assertion then not refuted? How can we still talk 
about God at all? Does not the attempt at an existence that asserts an 
unconditional reality for others lead to absurdity? If one does not simply 
extinguish this fate from consciousness, how can one still exist without 
despair?77 
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There is an answer to the questions posed above. It is provided by the Gospels 
and the entire Christian proclamation which profess unequivocally that God 
resurrected Jesus from the dead and showed him to be saved, living, and not 
annihilated. God rescued Jesus from destruction through the resurrection, thereby 
affirming and justifying him "before the establishment that murdered him in the 
framework of power comformity and, thus, of systematically distorted communi-
cation".78 
The Resurrection reveals God as the divine power who saved Jesus - the one 
who existed for others and actualised the saving reality of God for them. Faith arises 
from the experience of Jesus' resurrection, and makes possible an existence which 
asserts God as the saving reality and which anticipates the completion of salvation 
for all. Faith is a remembering assertion of the saving reality for Jesus, who existed 
for others; therefore faith is a remembering assertion of God as the saving reality 
for all others. Peukert argues that faith is a practice in practical, anamnestic 
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solidarity with all others which "asserts God for others in communicative action 
and attempts to confirm this assertion in action".79 The Resurrection empowers 
one to witness to this faith, which is the anamnesis of Jesus's death and his being 
saved in death; it also empowers one to live a Christ-like existence for others, i.e., 
to "manifest the possibility off such an existence through the manner of one's own 
existence, through one's own communicative action".80 
In the face of great injustice, before the victim who has suffered injustice or 
before the survivor of one who has been killed unjustly, all language and theory 
fails. Solidarity in intersubjectivity, i.e. love, may be the most humane and Christian 
praxis. In view of the serious injustices which confront most of humankind (as they 
are reported daily in the media), a theology of justice must consider the kind of 
praxis through which people may try to secure a humane survival out of crises and 
other oppressive exigencies, and to determine the meaning of their existence. 
Siebert points out that global economic and political crises are also crises of 
consciousness and culture: they demand "elementary transformations of subjective 
interpretation of reality and orientation, i.e. anthropological revolutions, as well 
as qualitative changes of the social and cultural structures in modern action 
systems".81 
The Church has a necessary role to play in such transformations and changes. 
It should encourage both those within and those outside it to adopt new paradigms 
of action, and should educate in such away that partners in action are seen as equal, 
autonomous, free yet inter-connected. The underlying principle in this paradigm 
of action, which is also one of the essential norms of communicative action, is 
unconditional mutual recognition of partners as ends in themselves. The "other", 
The Divine Reality Undertying Justice 
as Communicative Action 282 
however weak or disadvantaged, is regarded as one who can enter the ideal speech 
situation, as one who can contradict the other with good reasons, who can dispute 
norms and require their justification; thus parties can find, through interaction and 
practical discourse, a common orientation of praxis, thereby gaining their personal 
identity and forming the kind of society they desire. The Church will assist others 
to exist in right relationships, i.e. to do justice, when it eschews instrumental 
rationality, subtle manipulation, domination and other distorted forms of com-
munication and interaction.82 
However, if the Church subscribes to paradigms of action in which instrumen-
tal rationality is upheld (as, for example by the New Right and libertarian types of 
government); if the Church's own form of organisation contradicts the very cause 
to which it is called to witness, namely the Kingdom of God - in which there is no 
domination of one by another, because among the norms which operate there is 
the one which states that the greatest shall be least, will be humble, will be the 
servant of others (Mt 18:4; 23:11-12; Lk.. 9:48; 22:26); if fundamental civic and 
ecclesiastical structures are not oriented toward unconditional mutual recognition 
of the other, then genuine social and personal formation is endangered and even 
destroyed. 
Siebert's trenchant remarks about first-world Christianity are apposite here: 
following Metz he says that Christians of the first world, especially those supporting 
right-wing regimes and ideologies, cannot receive the messianic and socialistic 
impulses sent by the poor churches of the third world because they are subordi-
nated to obsolete patterns of theological images and thoughts.83 They are unable 
to accept the new unity of experiences of redemption and liberation; or to appre-
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head a church community which "enfolds in itself a new relationship of religion and 
politics and which understands its fundamental Christian experience of grace as 
political mystique of resistance against the idolatry of am unjust world, which holds 
its people in utter contempt".84 It is in the Basic Christian Communities which 
began in Latin America in the 70s that political theology sees the kerygma of 
liberation intervene positively in the situation of continuing oppression. Siebert 
contends that Christians in these real Christian communities 
look for the historical Jesus as the Messiah and for his cross in and 
through the Evangelium rather than for the dogmatic Jesus of the 
churches. They are engaged in a meta-dogmatic interpretation of what 
is essentially Christian. In the midst of the present world crisis, these 
Christians are committed to a communicative, universal ethics of 
brotherhood and sisterhood, very much like the one envisioned by 
Habermas. But they are at the same time conscious of its roots in the 
New Testament. They are living out of this messianic ethics.85 
The political hermeneutics of their situation, which points to the longing for 
justice, throws Christianity back to its essence, to what is specifically Christian. The 
Basic Christian Communities to which Siebert refers originate from the experience 
of the bourgeois Church's deficiencies, like its lack of eucharistic community, lack 
of liberating praxis, and lack of solidarity with the oppressed and disadvantaged. It 
is in these alternative forms of community that solidarity can be practised. Siebert 
suggests that the Basic Christian Community movement is part of the praxis 
theology intends as theology of communicative action;86 that it is a provocation to 
a hierarchical Church too well adjusted to the bourgeois action system of which it 
is part; and that it warns and acts in the name of the biblical prophets against the 
Church's "overadaptation to capitalistic society".87 
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There is no doubt that such radical alternative Christian communities reclaim 
the prophetic power of the biblical message, and that they are a critical force in 
powerful, bureaucratic ecclesiastical institutions. In many ways they provide an 
example of the kind of praxis which the biblical tradition and Habermas's theory 
envisage. For them, faith is an inspiration and a source off energy for political 
engagement on the side of the oppressed. In a sense, they exist wherever Christians 
are committed to justice, and wherever Christians associate themselves freely with 
believers and non-believers in the attempt to form a more just society. 
The Church must go further, as political theology does, and radicalise the 
fundamental ethical norm of recognising the freedom of the other. This is so, as 
Siebert points out, "since political theology has to be the witness to and must 
preserve the liberating and life-giving power of God for the other in the structure 
of its action".88 The telos of such action or praxis is communication without 
domination, universal dignity and freedom in universal solidarity. Siebert states 
that it is most important that the determination of Christian and ecclesiastical 
action through political theology corresponds to the demands found in [Haber-
mas's notion of] communicative action, in which the central concern is "communi-
cative, liberating, innovative action, which enables people to accomplish common 
self-knowledge and self-determination and thus to overcome systemic resistances 
and contradictions"89 Such a political theology, following Metz, Peukert, Arens, 
Siebert, Moltmann, etc., requires an interdisciplinary approach, which correlates 
historical, systematic and practical problem positions. This is so, since such a 
theology of praxis must work out its fundamental concern of a practical and political 
hermeneutic of Christianity, and which must pursue its task in continuous interdis-
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ciplinary discourse with those disciplines in the human sciences and philosophy 
which deal with action-theoretical problems.50 
The essential intent of a critical political theology is to achieve a new 
conjugation of faith and reason, of grace and freedom; Hegel's reconciliation of 
faith and reason is the basis from which secular theorists like Habermas and 
political theologians search for solutions to the conditions of utter misery in late 
capitalistic and socialistic action systems. According to Siebert, "the theology of 
praxis will start from the foundation of the practical, political hermeneutic of 
Christianity, which is to be derived historically-exegetically. This foundation is 
rooted in Jesus's language-mediated communicative action. The development of 
the theology of praxis will start in the face of the systematic-theological questions 
concerning the Christological, ecclesiological and ethical consequences of Jesus's 
communicative-practical explications of the reality of God and the self-explication 
of this reality in Jesus's life, suffering, death and resurrection".91 
Siebert, following Peukert, notes that political theology must be ready and 
willing to participate in this horizon in interdisciplinary discourse and co-oper-
ation, not only with the social, but also with the natural sciences, which should 
also be bound to a humane concept of action.92 Such interdisciplinary discourse 
and co-operation produces and develops the categories and principles for a critical 
political theology which can have foundational-theoretical significance for the 
whole of human praxis directed toward justice and the formation of abetter society. 
Metz, Peukert, Arens and Siebert are examples of theologians who have attempted 
to develop such a theology from critical theory, and who agree with the fundamen-
tal thesis of critical theory, "that the mechanism of modern action systems which 
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aim at an accumulation of money and administrative power and are ultimately 
destructive, increasingly endanger the construction of a communicative life-world, 
in which human consciousness, spirit, can awaken and find itself, be at home with 
itself, and be free in solidarity with others".93 Such a theology must seek that kind 
of innovative praxis which breaks open and can transform the systematically 
distorted and petrified psychic and social mechanisms of modern action systems, 
and can open up a life-world "for intersubjectively reflected self-knowledge and 
self-determination"94 
Whereas members of the Frankfurt School attributed this kind of innovative 
liberating praxis to art or the metaphorical language movement, political theologi-
ans, following Habermas, need to demonstrate that this praxis is a fundamental 
characteristic of human, intersubjectively-oriented action in all action systems 
throughout history. Siebert notes95 that political theologians like Metz, Peukert, 
Arens, etc., are helping many Christians to face the dilemma of injustice, by 
communicating a new solution to the theodicy problem. As theologians of com-
municative action, following the example of Jesus, they take the case of the 
innocent victims of history very seriously because they think from the perspective 
of these victims. From this perspective they develop, with the help of the theory of 
communicative action, a salvation-historical perspective of the world. They go 
further, not only appropriating Habermas's theory, but like Arens (as we have seen) 
they apply this theory to the historical Jesus and his parables and discourses. 
We have seen that Arens's application of the theory of communicative action, 
especially the dialectic of language and recognition, to the historical Jesus, to 
his parables and stories about the Kingdom of God, and to his discourses with 
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his Mends and opponents, produces a notion of praxis which demonstrates how 
God's justice forms society: namely through the language-mediated struggle to 
achieve domination-free communication, agreement, consensus and freedom. The 
insights of Habermas's universal pragmatics into the double structure of everyday 
communication help us to see that the performative components are vital in Jesus' 
parabolic speech acts and his other forms of communicative action, which are 
oriented toward mutual understanding. Jesus' interactive behaviour is the real 
framework of his ketygma. The performative effect of the speech act, in the case 
of the parables, does not lie wholly in the power of the speaker: just as, in the 
parable of the sower and the seed (Mark 4:1-20), the seed is partly in the power 
of the soil, so the Gospel or Kerygma is partly in the power of the hearer, the 
communicative partner. Jesus is responsible for the propositional content of the 
parables, but only partly responsible for the success of its relational aspect. Where-
as a speech act's illocutionary force has the power to generate an interpersonal 
relationship, this is not coercive or even guaranteed, and takes the form of an 
invitation, an offer. Jesus offers his opponents his interpretation of reality, and 
invites them to enter a new form of action. The effect of the offer is envisaged 
proleptically through the parable, as convincing or converting. 
The fruit for this understanding of justice (and a Christian praxis to achieve 
justice) is the insight that there must be, in our speech and our action for justice, 
in mimesis of Jesus' parabolic speech acts and interactive behaviour, a correlation 
between the truth of our verbal expressions and the rightfulness of the norms 
underlying our praxis. Just as in the case of Jesus' communicative action, so what 
is at stake for his followers is a self-obligating assertion of truth and rightfulness. 
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Of course, the grounding of truth and rightfulness claims continuously need to take 
place through discourse, demonstrated in Jesus' own life. We have seen (p. 109) 
that Jesus' parables could be understood as narrative argumentation, i.e. discursive 
arguments in the framework of his practical discourse with friends and opponents, 
intended to bring about unconditional recognition of the Kingdom of God and the 
emancipation of the people. It is this 'quasi-discursive' character of Jesus' parabolic 
action which leads Siebert to contend that the parables constitute political theology 
foundationally.96 Jesus grounds the truth claims raised in his speech acts about God 
and bis rule by demonstrating these claims, as the foundation of his action, in his 
interactive behaviour toward the disadvantaged of every kind in society. 
By referring to the redemptive Reality in communicative action, Jesus is 
pointing to the justice of God as it is mediated through the linguistic interaction of 
subjects. What characterises Jesus' communicative action is his disclosure, for his 
friends and his opponents, of God as Abba - providential, loving and liberating. 
Jesus makes these actions or qualities of God a matter of immediate experience 
through his own discourse and intersubjective action; he explicates this God in the 
interconnectedness of language and struggle for mutual, unconditional recogni-
tion. As Siebert boldly puts it, Jesus "linguifies" God in his interaction-embedded 
discourse;97 Jesus' speech and interaction interpret each other mutually and 
mediate the reality of God, so that He is experienced in language and in the struggle 
for recognition through communicative action. 
A theology of justice as communicative action makes it possible to enfold the 
political implications of speaking about Jesus's intersubjective action and, after his 
The Divine Reality Underlying Justice 
as Communicative Action 289 
death and resurrection, of praxis in imitation of him which is central to Christianity. 
Christians concerned about justice and who work to mediate God's justice through 
their own communicative action, must advert constantly to the ideological-critical 
and understanding-enabling function of Jesus' parables, in order to pursue the 
innovative intent of changing oppressive situations as well as the participants and 
the various power-relations in those situations, Le. to move them to a new inter-
pretation of self and reality, and thus to a new orientation of action. This involves 
adopting a political hermeneutics which understands the aim of Jesus' parables to 
expose the repressiveness of his opponents' world-view, by presenting a view of the 
"true" life, and to achieve consensus between himself and his opponents in order 
to invite them into the Kingdom of God. Siebert, following Arens, advocates the 
replacement of the old images and metaphors used by Jesus with new ones owing 
to the changes in historical situations: 
The old illustrations and stories must rather be re-interpreted through 
new ones, which today can take over their former critical function. The 
theologian of communicative praxis intends to realise the communica-
tive, i.e. ideology-critical, argumentative and analogical potential of 
Jesus' parables in a new, personal, economic, social, political, historical 
and cultural situation with new opponents, e.g., in the present world-
wide class struggle between the multinational corporations and the 
fascist military or civilian dictators who protect their interests and the 
neo-conservative religious ideologists who try to legitimate both, on 
one hand, and the exploited masses and the exploited masses, who 
produce their surplus labour and value and accomplish the maximis-
ation of their profit on the other.98 
Thus Christians must seek new interpretations, and must actualise in speech 
acts the structure of communicative action through the localisation of communi-
cative models in present, concrete situations. The tendency of Arens's thought on 
the parables of Jesus is that they are relevant only to the extent to which equivalents 
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can be found or invented in contemporary historical situations into which the 
Kingdom of God has broken." These present-day equivalents of Jesus' communi-
cative action, which show the actuality of biblical tests in the present economic, 
political and social situation, are also oriented, through the inter-connection of 
ideology-critique, discursive argumentation, and analogy, toward understanding 
and consensus. 
This new political theology nevertheless rests entirely on faith - the type of 
Kiekegaardian leap of faith in the Resurrection which answers the apparent 
absurdity of the triumph of murder and all kinds of injustice. Jesus, out of his 
resurrection, became a living parable of the providential, eschatological action of 
God: the one who had communicated the providential God in story and action had 
himself turned into a story of the providential God. 1 0 0 Hegel's insights101 into the 
death and resurrection of Jesus represent the theological significance of these 
events. For Hegel, the death of Jesus is the centre around which Christianity turns: 
with it begins the transformation of consciousness. The death of Jesus is the highest 
proof of humanity, since it is the fate which all humans must suffer. But for Hegel 
the death of Jesus has a further meaning, for in it God has died; this could point to 
nihilism but it does not, because God maintains his identity in the non-identity of 
Christ's (and His own) death - a process which is the death of death, the negation 
of negation. In Hegel's thought, things turn into their opposite: non-being into 
being. Jiirgen Moltmann is the theologian who most closely follows this under-
standing of politically liberating Christology,102 in which human nature receives, 
through resurrection as the death of death, elevation to and identity with Divine 
nature. 
The Divine Reality Underlying Justice 
as Communicative Action 291 
Whoever recognises this is challenged to act in imitation of Christ. Siebert 
maintains that "the following of Christ means the attempt to take over the structure 
of his communicative action out of the experience of the reality of God". 1 0 3 This 
tendential following of the pattern of Christ's life is part of a political theology 
which concentrates on the fundamental questions concerning Christian speech 
about God in relation to what happens in, with and through Jesus. 
One of the other essential norms of communicative action is solidarity. As 
anamnestic solidarity with Jesus, made possible through his life and the action of 
God in saving him, faith in the Resurrection is also universal solidarity, which 
asserts God as the saving reality who unconditionally affirms the other and stands 
on his side. This solidarity anticipates the completion of salvation for everyone. 
Peukert is right to stress that this universal solidarity must be realised in concrete 
actions of individuals in relation to each other.104 It means never forgetting those 
innocent victims who died after lives of great difficulty in working for justice; for 
what society has done to these people, after unimaginable cruelty, can never be 
cancelled out. This is true not only for victims of the past, but for those in the 
present and in the future. If the dead, the unjustly destroyed, are forgotten, it is a 
very easy step toward forgetting those who presently are hungry, oppressed, 
alienated, tortured and killed (or who will be in the future). 
A theology of resurrection concerned with anamnestic and proleptic soli-
darity can approach the solution of the theodicy problem with greater hope of 
success, because it is rooted in the hope and faith that ultimately justice will be 
done. From this it can be seen that how important solidarity, both anamnestic and 
proleptic, is for a political theology of communicative action. Just as critical theory 
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before it, critical political theology intends to be nothing else than the mouthpiece 
for the innocent victims of history who can no longer speak for themselves, or 
indeed for the weak, the poor, the oppressed, the marginalised today whose voices 
are not heard, either by the civil establishment, or by bourgeois Christendom robed 
in privilege in contradistinction to the robing in humility by God in the Incarnation. 
Siebert, following Kierkegaard, makes the powerful point that "God's reality, love, 
providence and the consequent rescue of the innocent victim in death is com-
prehended by the survivor only if such comprehension proves itself in the uncon-
ditional recognition of the suffering other here and now ".105 
The assertion of God as the reality that unconditionally stands on the side of 
the other, which follows from interacting in terms of the experience of possible 
solidarity with the crucified Jesus, while entirely a matter of faith, remains con-
nected with communicative reason. As a matter of faith in the resurrection, such 
faith is in itself a praxis, i.e. communicative action, which asserts the prophetic and 
messianic God for others and "which tries to express Him in intersubjectivity and 
interaction and in granting unconditional recognition",106 particularly to the weak, 
the poor, the oppressed, the exploited, the marginalised, the betrayed, the tortured 
and the murdered. 
The understanding of justice which emerges in our investigation emphasises, 
inter alia, the importance of affirming the other. The measure of the state of justice 
in any society is the radicality with which the other is affirmed, particularly the 
disadvantaged other. According to Peukert 
the affirming of the other in the manner of asserting God as absolute 
reality for the other in death excludes oppression. Jesus' assertion that 
God is there for the other as unconditional goodness and love is 
confirmed conclusively in his resurrection. It becomes the normative 
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core of communicative action in the dimensions of society and thus 
implies the demand of social freedom and solidarity. This solidarity 
proves to be the condition of one's own identity: one can break with this 
solidarity of all finite beings only at the price off the loss of one's own 
identity.107 
The normative dimensions of communicative action, namely equality and 
unconditional mutual recognition, reciprocity and solidarity, may also be seen as 
the demands of a radical revolutionary Christian praxis which stems from a radical 
political theology developed in intersubjective dialogue between the biblical tradi-
tion and modern theories of justice and society, particularly the critical theory of 
Habermas. It is my contention that this praxis or communicative action is justice, 
and is aimed at forming a just society. The normative dimensions mentioned above 
are evident in the praxis of those who continually call and work for unconditional 
mutual recognition; who help people living under various kinds of modern ideo-
logical action systems to attack the global problems of war, hunger, political 
oppression, ecological destruction and alienation; and who refuse to compromise 
with the unconsciousness with which bourgeois society allows thinking to be reified 
and to become ossified. 
True revolutionary praxis depends on a theory which does not close itself to 
the knowledge of the Absolute, i.e. to theology.108 At the heart of such a theory is 
the theological reality - the resurrecting God who saves the poor, the unjustly 
treated, the innocent victims, who is able to inspire anamnestic and proleptic 
solidarity, and thus the action which brings about justice in society. A political 
theology, which springs from the theory of communicative action and is centred in 
the Absolute, can help people who live in advanced capitalist systems to mitigate 
what Siebert, following Hegel, calls "Future I" - the totally monetarised and 
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bureaucratised society; to resist "Future H" - wars; and to promote passionately 
"Future HF - the reconciled society, the realm of freedom, the domination-free 
communication, the victimless society, the society characterised by unconditional 
mutual recognition.1*® 
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What emerges from a theory of justice as communicative action in the light 
of a theological analysis is the thesis, inconceivable without the biblical tradition 
of the destruction of the communicatively active innocent, that temporal communi-
cative action in solidarity unto death anticipates a reality which, by one's own 
practical performance, reaches beyond itself and can and does actually save others: 
"The performance of one's own existence in communicative action is then factually 
the assertion, in this action itself, of a reality that does not simply allow others to 
become an already superceded fact of the past."110 The assertion of the resurrec-
tion of Jesus is real as practical anamnestic solidarity with all innocent victims of 
history, and as faith in God who himself died on the Cross, thereby making possible, 
through the negation of negation, the death of death, the Resurrection and the 
Ascension. Unlike the false assertion of existentialist philosophy found in the 
analysis of death from Kierkegaard to Heidegger, namely that the experience of 
the death of the other is secondary to the existential accomplishment of the 
anticipation of one's own death, communicative action asserts a reality that does 
not allow the other simply to be annihilated. What is aimed at in the anticipation 
of one's own death "discloses itself as a reality in the experience of solidarity in the 
death of the other".111 Peukert states that 
communicative action in remembering solidarity with the innocent 
victim seems then to be the assertion of a reality which saves the other 
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who acts in history from annihilation, Only in this sort of interaction 
and in terms of the reality disclosed in it do I obtain the possibility of 
my own identity in an existence approaching unto death.... This reality 
disclosed in communicative action, asserted as the saving reality for 
others and at the same time as the reality that through this salvation 
makes possible one's own temporal existence unto death, must be 
called "God'. Within a situation of communicative action, which is 
ultimately inevitable, the reality of God becomes identifiable and na-
meable through the communicative action itself.112 
Siebert comments113 that the political theologian can and must introduce the 
word "God" - God as absolute love, providence, freedom, justice, truth - when 
referring to the saving reality which underlies true communicative action; and 
further, that God, as the saving Reality, can only be called by his name out of 
communicative action, i.e. the intersubjective mode of existence in which one lives 
a life for others, thereby asserting God as the saving Reality: "Thereby, all talking 
of theology is bound back to a certain communicative praxis. That excludes a 
reifying understanding of the reality of God, since God is experienced as a lib-
erating Reality, who as absolute liberating freedom puts into motion transforma-
tions in the one and the other."114 
The resurrection thus provides the theological category by which communi-
cative action is rescued from self-contradiction. Since Jesus, in his own communi-
cative action, demonstrated the saving reality of one acting, up to and through his 
own death, to save others as the basic and universal structure of communicative 
action, the assertion of the presence of God as the saving reality for others can no 
longer be limited. Peukert shows that the reality within communicative action is 
universal: 
The experience of the Kingdom of God, the reality of God for all, can 
no longer be historically separated in its universality from this specific 
person. Only as practised solidarity with all others is the assertion of the 
resurrection real. J. B. Metz set forth this inseparable connection 
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between the hope in the resisnrection and universal solidarity, which is 
to say the eschatological dimension of solidarity. The word of the 
resurrection of the dead "is aword of justice, a word of resistance against 
any attempt simply to truncate the ever-renewed desire and search for 
the meaning of human life and to reserve this meaning for those who 
are ever to come, who have already somehow managed through it all, 
to a certain extent for those lucky ones who are the final winners and 
who enjoy the benefits of our history".115 
Peukert has shown how theology can assimilate modern theories of action, 
particularly Habermas's theory of communicative action with its theory of justice 
arising from universal pragmatics; theology needs to do this in order to explicate 
what it means to exist as a Christian in the face of the demand for justice, and how 
that existence is enabled from the eschatological perspective of the Resurrection. 
The Resurrection of Jesus makes possible a kind of existence which, through 
communicative action and a life lived in universal solidarity, asserts God as the 
redeeming Reality for Jesus and, in anticipation of the eschatological completion, 
for all innocent victims of the past, present and future. Faith in the Resurrection 
is practical solidarity - genuine universal solidarity = with all those who have been, 
are, or will be victims of injustice; it is therefore an act of justice. Such faithful 
communicative action helps those who survive to find a new identity, which 
develops out of the experience of liberation into an unlimited, universal solidarity. 
Siebert asserts that this identity does prove itself practically in modern, highly 
differentiated action systems: 
In this case, religion is not obsolete! While such faith-directed com-
municative action disproves Habennas's thesis of the obsolescence of 
religion, it at the same time strengthens his theory of communicative 
praxis by breaking through its aporetical aspect1 1 6 
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Peukert's theological radicalisation of Habermas's theory of communicative 
action provides the basis for a political theology which takes its inspiration and its 
enabling power from the Resurrection. We have seen that this radicalisation 
defines, not naively, the Judeo-Christian tradition of faith as hope for justice, 
thereby permitting a new interpretation of this tradition in the contemporary phase 
of the world historical struggle for recognition on the level of subject, society and 
history. This hope for justice is not confined exclusively to those who innocents who 
have been killed unjustly, but to all who have suffered or who presently suffer 
injustice in the apocalyptic conflict between north and south, between rich and 
poor, luxury and misery, abundance and scarcity, owners and workers, producers 
and consumers. 
This hope, based on the Resurrection, means the reversal of the triumph not 
only of the murderers but of all who oppress or are engaged in acts of injustice.117 
Simpson's corrective emphasis on the Cross is important for understanding how it 
is possible to overcome present injustice through radical critique and communica-
tive action in the form of argumentation in practical discourse, i.e. by the inclusion 
of all in the disputing of norms and the continuing effort to achieve consensus and 
normative legitimacy. But the Resurrection stands as the ultimate sign that injus-
tice, especially in its extreme forms of the annihilation of the innocent, will not 
triumph.118 
Siebert, while admiring Peukert's achievement, states that a future political 
theology can and must overcome the deficiency of Peukert's fundamental theology; 
he believes this deficiency to consist in the merely "assertive" character of Peukert's 
own aporia solution - "the Kierkegaardian leap of a faith to which dialectical reason 
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is not reconciled". i y What Siebert believes is necessary is the kind of reconciliation 
which Hegel achieved between faith and dialectical reason. I concur with Siebert's 
view that political theology "must develop a post-Hegelian conjugation of faith and 
dialectical reason and thus build a bridge to non-ideological enlightenment";120 
and further that, if like Hegel, we try to reconcile reason with religion, then it is 
communicative reason we want to reconcile with Christianity, especially faith in 
the resurrection. 
However, I cannot see the deficiency in Peukert's leap of faith or in his 
assertion of faith in the Resurrection;121 for it is precisely this assertion which 
answers the aporia in Habermas's theory, and which reconciles communicative 
reason with the central truth of Christianity. We have seen that the necessary 
theological reality at the core of communicative action is what rescues Habermas's 
theory of justice and communicative action; Siebert himself rather confusingly 
admits that Peukert has discovered this, thereby nullifying his criticism of alleged 
deficiency: 
If the political theologians [Peukert and Arens] intend, like Hegel, to 
know religion in its manifold formations as internally necessary, then 
they mean the necessity of that Reality in Judaism and Christianity and 
other world religions, which rescues men in their annihilation and thus 
makes possible communicative praxis and mutual unconditional recog-
nition and reciprocity among the one and the other. When the political 
theologians intend to rediscover, like Hegel, in Christianity, the truth 
and the idea, then it is once more the truth that God did not let his just 
one rot in the grave; death of death; negation of negation; and that such 
resurrection is promised to all innocent victims destroyed in history.122 
Siebert, like Peukert, rightly claims that in the Resurrection the innocent 
victim receives the highest recognition: the murderers do not triumph over their 
innocent victims ultimately.123 God rescues the innocent victims, justifying them 
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before their murderers, thereby justifymg Himself. According to Siebert, this is the 
Christian theodicy: God's justice consists in the ultimate triumph of the victim over 
the murderer.124 Siebert has argued passionately that the Resurrection gives hope 
to us who are living now that we can successfully resist and conquer the murderers 
(at least ultimately), and that we can act justly in the face of massive injustice.125 
The basis for this action is a synthesis of the Biblical understanding of justice 
as right relationship and Habermas's theory of justice as part of his theory of 
communicative action, which provides a paradigm for understanding anew the 
Biblical texts about justice and intersubjectivity as forms of communicative action 
in terms of the dialectic of language and interaction. The reason that such a 
synthesis is possible is that Habermas's theory of communicative action (even 
though he may be unaware of it) has a specifically Christian core: its dimensions 
are congruent with those of Christian action, and may be regarded as an incarna-
tional medium for the expression of those dimensions in modern times for modern 
conditions. 
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The aim of this thesis has been to investigate whether modem theories of justice 
might be understood as mediations of the justice of God to form the kind of 
harmonious society which not only God wills but humans desire.1 Both Rawls's and 
Habeimas's theories are in the tradition of the Enlightenment attempt to deter-
mine the kind of rationality that would make a universal discourse possible, in 
which a consensus of all as the basis for transformative action to form a just society 
could be achieved.2 One of the problems raised by contextualist rationality is its 
apparent preclusion of a universalist moral perspective, particularly one which 
links reason with justice. Modern thinkers like Maclntyre3 and Walzer4 are point-
ing to the increasingly serious difficulty which lies before anyone trying to defend 
universalism in moral and political philosophy. However, justice, because of its 
connection with the universal human capacity for reason, transcends any particular 
cultural conception of it, in so far as it is the outcome of a consensus about norms 
of action to which all who are potentially affected could rationally agree in the 
universal communication community. In this sense it may be included in the 
category of transcendental universals ("necessary notes of being", like unity, truth, 
goodness and beauty), which may be conceived of as "forms through which being 
displays itself'.5 Gaims of justice, according to Stuart Hampshire, "have always been 
the preferred examples of moral claims that are to be recognised by reason J',6 and 
which are not contingent upon any particular social order or ideology. 
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An understanding of the justice of God as right relationship, a concept which 
is not tied to any particular sodo-cultural matrix, reveals that there is in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition a thrust toward a universal rationality and ethic but which 
is not systematically articulated in scripture. It is my contention that this rationality 
and ethic find their articulation, not without remainder, in the theories which we 
have considered. 
In this final chapter I want to pursue the claim that the justice of God is 
operative incarnationally in secular theories which aim at the formation of a more 
just and humane society. This is followed by a section in which I offer reasons for 
considering Habermas's theory of justice to be a mediation of God's justice, owing 
to its truly social rather than monistic character, and because to a greater degree 
than Rawls's theory it meets the criterion of congruence or consonance with a 
theological understanding developed from the biblical notion of justice. I realise 
that this may appear to be privileging a theological concept as an unassailable 
criterion for assessing other concepts and theories. This is not the case, however; 
the interdisciplinary method I am using advocates a mutually correlated critique, 
in which the various interacting traditions are self-critical and mutually critical. 
Among the useful insights gained from Habermas's critical theory and his 
foray into linguistic philosophy is the way in which the conditions of validity 
specified by a normative theory must be raised to a higher level of abstraction, 
where validity claims and their supporting arguments can be thematised, justified, 
and agreed. The theological establishment of consonance or congruence is not an 
end in itself: it serves only to assert that a secular theory and its method or 
procedure may be a good (if not the best possible) way to establish the social justice 
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of God and to form the inclusive, participatory society God intends. Formation of 
the kind of domination-free society intended by God depends on participation and 
dialogue: therefore a theory which emphasises these, and provides a procedure 
within a framework of an ethics which is consonant with the social and dialogical 
nature of God's creative Word, i.e. a communicative ethics, is more likely to be 
considered a mediation of God's justice (because of its congruence with the 
primary (i.e. biblical) source of our understanding of God's justice). 
Finally, I assert that the dialogical insights which such a theory generates 
about the public nature of justice impel us toward a twofold task: 1) to develop a 
theory of justice in closer connection with a model of properly deliberative democ-
racy (toward which Habermas's theory tends);7 2) to commit the Church to a 
spirited defence of the public sphere, in which all participants, whatever their 
differences, can meet and discuss any claim that is rationally redeemable. 
6.1 Th® Inc&GrnatBonaD pr@@@in!e@ ®f 0@d In sseylar th@@irl@s ©f 
What emerges from a study of the biblical exposition of God's justice is that 
we are required to reflect his righteousness: what God requires is grounded in what 
God is. What are the implications of the biblical divine imperative to do justice? 
Does it imply that we are to proclaim a unique (orthodox) understanding of justice 
and use that alone to work toward the formation or transformation of society? Or 
does it obligate Christians to discern the justice of God in those systems and 
theories which aim to bring about what is effectively congruent with the justice of 
God, and thus to affirm such theories? The tendency in "orthodoxy" to absolutise 
and make exclusive its point of reference in dogmatic assertions is responsible, 
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according to McCann and Strain, for its decline and increasing unpopularity in 
modern theology.® An unrefiective assertion of an unreconstructed biblical justice 
(i.e one which fails to correlate its understanding critically with the use of reason 
and with other interpretations and theories) as the only understanding of justice 
falls foul of McCann and Strain's critique of both "orthodoxy" and "orthopraxis". 
The strictures in this critique are based on the analysis in Charles Davis's 
important study of the theory-praxis dialectic in Theology and Political Society,9 
which suggests that "a religious community's attempt to immunise its traditional 
form of life against historical change is practically vicious and theoretically absurd. 
The artificial exclusion of theory from the flux of experience betrays the deformed 
modernity of orthodoxy and illuminates alienation from anything authentically 
traditional".10 In a modern pluralistic society any ideology or praxis, secular or 
religious, which absolutises its normative claims without dialectical reflection11 
and without submitting them to public discourse and justification is rightly liable 
to the charge of domination, which, as we have noted, is a major source of injustice. 
A narrow biblical view is insufficient to provide the answer to what justice 
demands under modern conditions. It may be that God's justice finds expression 
in systems or theories of justice other than those which claim dogmatically to 
encapsulate it. To suggest this is not to confer a quasi-religious status on secular 
theories; nor is it be unaware of the possible charge of the reductionist exercise of 
dissolving God into a dimension of human existence, or what Pannenberg calls 
"assimilation to the secularism" of the modern world.121 do not believe that this is 
a danger in my thesis because I am aware that we cannot contain God in any of our 
categories and theories,13 and because I have advocated a mutually critical corre-
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lation of theology with secular thought Pannenberg's caveat is aimed at "uncritical" 
assimilation to secularism, and at those who would give up the central elements of 
God's transcendence of the world.1^ 
My point has not been to replace the biblical view, but to suggest that modern 
secular theories might articulate systematically, thus mediating and developing, 
what already exists in inchoate form in the biblical text. God is the divine reality 
underlying the human desire for justice and harmonious society, just as God is that 
reality impelling humans to devise means to achieve them. The task for theology 
is to discern the divine reality in advanced and systematic modern theories which 
coincide with God's will. Pannenberg, who acknowledges that it was Karl Rahner 
in this century who perceived this task "with great mastery", believes that "the 
opportunity for Christian faith and its theology is to integrate the reduced under-
standing of reality on the part of secular culture and its picture of human nature 
into a greater whole, to offer the reduced rationality of secular culture a greater 
breadth of reason, which would also include the horizon of the bond between 
humankind and God".15 Pannenberg's use of the word "reduced" here is unfortu-
nate, because the concept of rationality which we have seen developed in the course 
of this investigation is tantamount to the communicative rationality which Jesus 
himself employed. 
Nonetheless, we can affirm Pannenberg's remark if we modify it to include 
the rider that the "greater breadth of reason" depends on an openness, humility and 
preparedness on the part of theology and secular thought to correlate their insights 
and understandings. Habennas, while still rejecting the ontological-metaphysical 
basis of religion, has admitted that he too readily classified world religions as 
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fimctioning to legitimate governmental authority.16 He acknowledges the example 
of theologians like Gollwitzer and Irwand in Germany while he was a student, who 
attempted to free the church from its comfortable alliance with the power of the 
State and the existing social conditions: 
They sought renewal instead of restoration and to establish universal 
standards of judgment in the public political realm. With this exemplary 
witness and widely effective change of mentality there arose the model 
of a religious engagement which broke away from the conventionality 
and interiority of a merely private confession. With an undogmatic 
understanding of transcendence and faith, this engagement took seri-
ously this-worldly goals of human dignity and social emancipation. It 
joined in a multivoiced arena with other forces pressing for radical 
democr atisation.17 
It has been my contention that the locus of justice rests in God himself, 
specifically in the righteousness or justice which is the essence of his nature. In 
adopting an incamational approach to justice, I offer the view that the final 
revelation of justice is to be found in the person of Jesus Christ. Since, in Christian 
tradition, Jesus is seen as the mediation of God himself, and since God's nature is 
justice, in the human person of Jesus justice has become incarnate. In the incarna-
tion, the divine presence is completely manifested in human form; this is the ground 
for affirming that God's justice (righteousness) is known in his action through 
human forms. This intrincisist or incarnational theology asserts that God is in the 
world and the world is in God, without reducing God to the world or the world to 
God. This perspective helps us to perceive God as that gracious reality which is 
continuously co-present to humans in everything they do, including politics and 
action for justice. The Incarnation means that "there is no area in life that the 
Christian can a priori decide falls outside the gracious action of God".18 
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Justice is mediated not only in the single human person of Jesus, but poten-
tially in all humanity whose condition God assumed in Christ and for whom Jesus 
is the pattern. I am conscious that there is a danger in making this assertion, which 
may appear to assert that all human systems of justice are mediations of God's 
justice. For this reason I emphasise that justice is God's righteousness mediated 
through human agency and activity in society, including some secular social the-
ories, in so far as they can be recognised to be consonant with the ethic of God's 
justice in scripture and tradition interpreted through a socio-political hermeneutic, 
and in so far as they can be affirmed by the public use of human reason. 
The traditional suspicion of human reason, allied with a virulent anti-ration-
alism, in many tracts of Christian history is as responsible for some of the injustices 
and horrors of human history as the abuse of reason has been in secular thought in 
modernity.19 The subjection of social norms of action to some form of communi-
cative praxis in which reason is employed dialogically in a public forum is much to 
be preferred to a dogmatic adherence to, and assertion of, codes and rules whose 
underlying norms have not been determined by consensus, but by a form of 
arbitrary decisionism. Anti-rationalism in Christianity is an aberration. Flight into 
irrationality on account of suspicion of secular culture is an abrogation of the 
Christian duty to witness to the central truth of the Incarnation (and indeed to God 
as the Creator and Reconciler of this world). Lamb, commenting on Lonergan's 
articulation of the questioning dynamism of human intelligence, refers to Augus-
tine and Aquinas's understanding of their faith in Jesus Christ as the incarnate Son 
of God "as a healing intensification of their intelligence and reason".20 Together 
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with love, this positive reason, employed communicatively, could overcome the 
hatred, domination and barbarity caused by the abuse of reason. 
Theology and secular thought together are indebted to Habermas's demon-
stration of the possibility of reclairnimg the positive aspect of the Enlightenment 
cornmitment to the role of reason, particularly in the exercise of human rationality 
(in and through the communication community) to resist the negative intrusion by 
the system into the lifeworld.21 This resistance against the use of instrumental 
reason is a vital task for theology and the Church, and is part of the work of justice, 
understood in terms of normative legitimacy achieved through public discourse 
and communicative action. One of Habermas's great contributions to modern 
thought, particularly in his work The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,22, is to 
advocate the abandonment of subject-centred reason in favour of a radically 
intersubjective, communicative reason. In this paradigm, reason is tied to the 
linguisticality of the intersubjective process rather than to the power of the subject 
over what there is to be known,23 i.e. the paradigm of communicative action and 
rationality, with its emphasis on consensus, replaces the paradigm of consciousness, 
with its use of instrumental reason and tendency toward domination. 
This optimistic affirmation of human reason and Habermas's theory of justice 
should not blind us to the possible blighting effects of individual and social sin on 
human reason and action. On the other hand, propensity to personal sin should not 
deter us from struggling to overcome the social, political and economic consequen-
ces of this sinfulness, nor from seeking to form a better society through justice. 
Rather, the promise that sin is overcome through the abundant forgiveness, grace 
and love of God through Christ, should encourage and strengthen us in the struggle 
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for justice. Excessive concentration on human sinfulness, quite often related to the 
use of eschatology as a category for interpreting political struggle, has produced 
cynicism, despair and resignation, thus thwarting sustained participation in the 
work of justice.24 Sharon Welch states the problem thus: "While a denial of the 
fragility of our political struggles and structures is undoubtedly dangerous, the 
evasion of the resiliency of our work for justice is equally devastating".25 Welch 
notes that liberal and conservative theologians alike have criticised liberation 
theologians for not abiding by the "eschatological reservation", which is a theologi-
cal concept or principle reminding us that all our good works are partial, and that 
they cannot be directly identified as the work of God, nor identified as the Kingdom 
of God, even though they may be inspired and guided by God. 2 6 
Theologians like J. B. Metz and A. McFadyen believe that the dialectical 
nature of theological commitment - transcendent and "determinate" (i.e. particu-
lar, concrete) - places an eschatological reserve against the distortions of the 
present, as well as against its own commitment. Both believe that the Kingdom of 
God and its universals of freedom, justice, peace, truth, etc., cannot be identified 
with any political situation,27 and both argue that the eschatological proviso 
prevents the Church's political commitment from slipping into idolatrous forms. 
Welch cites J. L. Segundo, who criticises Metz's position as reactionary28 because 
it is too concerned with absolute purity of intent, actualisation and consequences, 
causing political theologians to avoid activism. Their example in turn 'legitimates 
that avoidance in others".29 Segundo's criticism of this turning away from real-life 
history is even more biting: 
Hope is paradoxically translated into a radically pessimistic view of the 
whole process of change, even when the latter is not violent, precisely 
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because any and every change prompted by man cannot but help lose 
out to world-dominating sin. The Kingdom of God can only be fashioned 
by someone who is free from sin, and that comes down to God alone.30 
This debate raises an issue which is central to my assertion that the justice of 
God operates incarnationally secular theories, namely the presence of the univer-
sal in the particular. Although I acknowledge that a human political commitment, 
whether following the biblical divine imperative or a secular theory exhorting social 
justice, is pemMmate and fallible, I am concerned that a fully incarnational 
theology should uphold the principle that the ultimate operates in and through the 
penultimate. The will for political commitment and action is undermined, if not 
destroyed, by a view which fails to apprehend that God is graciously active through 
human agency in his creation. The problem here is the criterion for recognition of 
the presence or activity of the transcendent in the particular. If distorted determi-
nate circumstances (including the social form) inform our consciousness, what 
status is to be attributed to a critical process in which the understanding of a 
transcendent point, from which present social norms of interaction may be judged, 
has itself determinate social form? 
McFadyen discusses this problem in his attempt to preserve the transcend-
ence of theology and faith over their present positive socio-political commitment31 
He is aware that a positive political commitment to a greater justice in the present, 
rather than the full justice of the eschatological Kingdom of God, implies that "the 
mind of faith has a direct intuition of the kingdom alongside a complete under-
standing of the determination and distortion of the present".32 What this means is 
that "a new norm has been apprehended as ana priori by members of a determinate 
situation and is then, in the determinate dialogical moment, referred for confirma-
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tion to those who might have no access to its cognitive base".33 McFadyen claims 
that the problem of legitimating a socially critical socio-political commitment with 
socially transcendent criteria can be satisfactorily resolved only if it is recognised 
as a religious question, because "religion is the only sphere within which a critique 
of the present... is possible".34 
This claim needs to be challenged, because it undercuts the incamational 
principle. The answer is not to be sought by an esclusivist referral to the Church,35 
as McFadyen does, but in an affirmation of critical human reason, and in a spirit 
of repentance and humility to remain constantly self-critical36 and socially critical 
about social norms and the traditions from which they originate. By "socially 
critical" I mean engaging in criticism dialogically with others in order to submit 
ethico-political questions, programmes and actions to a mutually correlated 
critique, i.e. to a broad reflective equilibrium between the normative traditions of 
the Christian faith and the insights and interpretations of secular thought. F. S. 
Fiorenza believes it is the role of the churches as "communities of interpretation" 
to function within the dialectic between (secular) attempts (like Habermas's 
discourse ethics) to achieve a discursive consensus with regard to the principles of 
justice, and the reconstruction of the normative potential of the Christian ethical 
tradition.37 It is Fiorenza's proposal that political theology use a "broad reflective 
equilibrium" between what is normative in a (religious) tradition and with what is 
publicly normative through principles of justice, where mutual and reciprocal 
criticism takes place.38 
An awareness of the distorted and fallible circumstances which affect human 
consciousness, and an awareness of the need for social criticism, should prevent us 
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from the disastrous consequences of identifying any secular theory or political 
programme with God's justice and God's will. However, even with a penitent 
recognition of the provisional and penultimate nature of all human endeavour, it 
remains possible for Christians to affirm the presence of God in forms which do 
not have scriptural or ecclesiastical provenance. 
The emphasis on the communicative nature of reason and rationality in 
Habermas's theory of justice compels us to conclude that his, rather than Rawls's 
theory of justice, is more worthy of consideration as a mediation of God's justice. 
As we have seen, Rawls's theory attempts to provide a procedure for justifying the 
norms and principles which might form a just society and regulate its basic struc-
ture; it is to Rawls's credit that bis theory distinctively regards the basic structure 
of society as the primary subject of justice. However, if his concept of society is tied 
to the monological nature of the procedure by which Rawls proposes to form his 
society, true sociality cannot be considered to be the outcome of the procedure by 
which he attempts to determine the principles of justice. As we have noted, the 
most telling criticism against his theory being considered a mediation of God's 
justice is its virtual monism, in the sense that there is at the centre of his device of 
the original position a single agent, rather than a genuine plurality of agents 
determining the principles of justice and norms of action which will form and steer 
society. The monism in Rawls's theory is also a consequence of his atomistic 
conception of the person, in contrast to Habermas's socially interactive conception 
of the person. In this sense, Habermas's communicative theory is consonant with 
the social and relational conception of the person in the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
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with the dimensions of God's other-regarding action in Christ, and with the 
Christian teaching of the love of the neighbour. 
The individualism in Rawls's theory is incompatible with a Christian under-
standing of sociality derived from the mtersubjectiv© model of the Trinity, and its 
processes of argumentative or communicative mutuality. Although Rawls avers 
that there is a plurality in the original position, it is an individualistic pluralism in 
which individuals are bearers of a universal substance which is identical in each 
person. It is possible to elucidate the monological nature of Rawls's original 
position by reference to McFadyen's explanation of individualist epistemology and 
anthropology: 
Knowledge of another is then tantamount to knowing oneself, and what 
may be known of one another is only that which confirms the knower's 
individual perspective. Individualist epistemology and anthropology 
may only know others as bearers of an abstract identity. What is truly 
other, different and individual can be neither informative for others nor 
a matter of public knowledge, interest or communication.39 
The biblical idea of justice as right relationship implies understanding 
(achieved through argumentation in practical discourse), mutuality and recipro-
city. These qualities are operative only if there is genuine intersubjectivity, genuine 
relation, and genuine dialogue. These are crucial qualities in Habermas's theory 
of communicative rationality and communicative action. 
Habermas's analysis of the way in which rationality can be employed strategi-
cally, rather than communicatively, reveals that monological communication is 
oriented toward success rather than understanding, and is an attempt to manipulate 
or exploit (i.e. control) the other. If communication is entered with the intention 
of regarding one's interlocutor as an object, it degenerates into strategic communi-
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cation, creating a spurious relation in which the other (as object) is intended as 
having no independent meaning, and perceived as not being ethically transcendent. 
Because the other is related to as an object rather than as another subject of 
communication, he or she is intended and experienced as a reflection of the 
'communicating' subject, who seeks from the other "only that which is a confirma-
tory repetition of itself'. 4 0 Monological subjects cannot recognise communication 
oriented toward a genuine mutuality of understanding because they do not recog-
nise others as subjects, and because their intention of others as objects effectively 
silences their otherness. They cease to be subjects of interpersonal interaction and, 
as McFadyen points out, exist 
not so much in a social (i.e. moral) 'world', as in a causal world. That is 
to say, as a monological subject of communication, [such a person] 
becomes an object causally interacting with others in order to bring 
them under control.... In monological communication a person is in 
relation only in and for her or himself. The other is intended as an object 
whose existence in the relation coincides with one's own purposes, 
desires, needs and intentions which have been self-constituted and 
validated.41 
The profoundly individualistic nature of Rawls's original position as a device 
to establish social justice, despite his avowedly social intentions, is incompatible 
with the Christian vision of society as based on right relationship, determined by 
genuine intersubjective communication, and characterised by community, not 
self-interest and individualism Such a society, intended by God in creation (and 
not confined to the Christian doctrine of the Kingdom of God), is a society of 
universal justice, truth and freedom in which relations are intended and structured 
dialogically by God. The Christian vision of true sociality is captured in a social and 
political theology which stresses the inter-relatedness and organic unity of creation 
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and, by its social analysis, attempts to address the injustices and evils facing 
humankind today (which are as much structural as individual). Such a theology will 
discern and use a 'mediative' theory like Hatoermas's theory of justice as it tries to 
develop a co-operative, dialogical social praxis for social justice. It will also avoid 
theories and other theologies which intentionally or not purvey the pernicious 
individualism which vitiates rather than forms society, and is therefore antithetical 
to God's society-forming justice. 
A deficient understanding of the Trinity, e.g. a "hard monotheism" in which 
God is perceived to be the sole, undifferentiated subject,42 produces a pathological 
individualism which is responsible for domination because the form of its com-
munication is monological. This kind of individualism is not only the consequence 
of defective Trinitarian theology: it also flows from the tenacious and prevalent 
view in the Church that Christian faith is concerned with the relationship of the 
individual soul to God, and with personal faith in Christ as "my personal Saviour". 
Against this view it needs to be asserted vigorously that the Christian faith is directly 
concerned with social and political matters, and should issue in conduct oriented 
toward achieving a just society which conforms to the kind of society which God 
desires and designs by his justice. It is an irreducible tenet of Christian faith in the 
Incarnation that the gift of salvation is available only in and through the human 
realities of society, history, people and politics.43 Lane rightly points out that "we 
cannot by-pass these mediating factors and move into some realm of the purely 
sacred".44 Church teaching which shuns the social implications of the Judeo-Chris-
tian faith insulates faith from the contingencies of daily life, and undermines the 
sense of human responsibility for society and for the future of the world. The belief 
Consonance with the Justice of God 
and Deliberative Democracy 321 
which such teaching engenders does not foster intense human concern for justice 
or a responsible commitment to the building of the Kingdom of God. Lane notes 
that humankind is called "in Christ" to partner the history of liberating salvation, 
to be the co-operators with God in effecting the New Creation: "For the Christian, 
to exist is to co-exist with Christ in the task of working for the Kingdom of God".4 5 
Other influences in Christian tradition are equally responsible for the emer-
gence of individualism, especially the dualistic nature of Augustine's two-city 
theology and Luther's two-Kingdom theology which is inadequate, unsatisfactory 
and even immoral. 4 6 The early Lutheran understanding of the evangelical precept 
of love not being applicable to political society produces a kind of individualism 
and a purely personal spirituality which ignores the structural conditions which 
cause misery to one's neighbours. Troeltsch explains the consequences of such a 
spirituality: 
... as soon as the Christian believer turns from this spirituality to take 
his part in real life, he can only express his inner liberty through 
submission to the existing order, as a method of manifesting Christian 
love to the brethren, and to Society as a whole, or as something evil to 
be passively endured and accepted .. . 4 7 
Niebuhr pronounced an even harsher judgement on the social teaching of 
Luther when he showed the disastrous consequences which Luther's Two-King-
dom theology and his insistence on passive righteousness had in the history of 
German civilisation.48 According to J. L. Segundo, the Lutheran separation of faith 
from good works spawned an immoral neutralism with regard to political systems.49 
Segundo argues that Christian theology and accurate biblical exegesis must be 
based much more on a sensitive appreciation of what liberates humankind, and on 
the communal demands of building the Kingdom, here and now. 5 0 
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The tendency to separate faith and politics, religion and society, continues in 
our own time and is responsible for the current cult of individualism with its 
idolatrous pursuit of self-interest.51 This individualism has produced not only a 
ruthless competitiveness but a shameless lack of concern for social justice and for 
the formation of a just society. According to Metz, it is "bourgeois religion" which 
embraces the liberal, individualistic separation of religion and politics, and which 
favours a highly privatised religion. 5 2 The individualism associated with such a 
church is antithetical to real community, because it accepts the unbiblical view that 
society is merely the coming together of independent people seeking their own 
independent interests; it leads to what Solle calls "necrophiliac religion" = the love 
of, attachment to, and support for an institutionalised, dehumanised, and emotion-
ally deprived society.53 The excellent social teaching of the Roman Catholic 
Church, based soundly on Scripture, has unfortunately made little impact on other 
churches, and many parts of its own tradition. The social nature of human beings 
made in God's Trinitarian image, the message of human interdependence, of 
human beings not as isolated individuals but as individuals-in-community,54 must 
be pressed home with greater diligence by the Church. Dermot Lane, explicating 
the organic thought of A. N. Whitehead's process philosophy, says that once the 
fundamental relationship between the individual and society is severed, "the 
individual begins to take on an aggressive, exploitive [sic], competitive role towards 
the larger organic whole of reality" 5 5 
Theology and the Church must emphasise the essential interdependence of 
individuals and their need of society, as well as the social nature of the action 
appropriate to God's people who are his co-workers or agents in the holy task of 
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establishing justice in the world. If justice is right relationship, taking the form of 
communicative action, and is intended by God to form a network of healing and 
life-giving connections (i.e. a just society), the capacity in humans to seek and 
establish the right relations which God intends is divine. Al l who desire and 
struggle for justice participate in divinity.5 6 Carter Heyward argues that the capac-
ity for right relations is the gift of God, and that God is nothing other than "the 
eternally creative source of our relational power";57 Welch goes further, and claims 
that "the divine is that relational power".58 The perception by feminist ethical 
theorists of the divine reality underlying relationality provides support for my 
contention that Habermas's theory mediates God's justice because of its other-re-
garding and relational ethos. 
The critique brought against Kantian moral theory by writers like Carol 
Gilligan can be levelled against Rawls's theory of justice, which posits an autono-
mous moral agent who discovers and applies a set of fundamental rules through 
the use of universal and abstract reason. The self in Habermas's communicative 
ethics differs from Rawls's Kantian self: the latter operates in the service of a 
formal, universalis tic ethics of duty, mastering each new situation by submitting it 
monologically to the test of the categorical imperative, but does not examine 
prevailing cultural values and the need interpretations to which they give rise. 
Rawls's Kantian universalism seems to support a notion of autonomy defined in 
terms of the rigid independence of the ego from the situations which confront it -
and thus some sort of isolation from the claims of the other, particularly when they 
have a radically different character. 
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Habermas contends that this moral rigorism is to be contrasted with the 
image of autonomy which can be derived from the notions of ego identity and the 
communicative interpretation of reciprocity. The critical reflectiveness and flexi-
bility in relation to need interpretations required by these notions cannot be 
realised through a monological, situation-independent style of cognition and 
judgement. Rather, it can come into its own only in dialogue. At the core of 
communicative ethics is the image of an open conversation, that is, a conversation 
in which one is obliged to listen to other voices. Such conversation is ultimately to 
be seen as a continual learning process in which different experiences are shared 
in the processes of recognising more clearly who we are and what we want to 
become.59 
The orientation of his communicative ethics has led Habermas to enter the 
open conversation he advocates, and to listen to (and accept) other voices, espe-
cially the challenge that has come from the work of Gilligan. 6 0 She contrasts the 
focus of thinkers like Kohlberg on the Kantian "ethic of justice" which emphasises 
rights, fairness, balancing claims, with her own focuses on compassion, avoidance 
of harm, context-sensitivity, connectedness and interdependence. According to 
White, "much of the thrust of Gilligan's critique runs parallel to the insights of 
communicative ethics",61 particularly Gilligan's view of a mature conception of 
morality in which "dialogue replaces logical deduction as the mode of moral 
discovery".62 
The other-regarding and dialogical nature of Habermas's theory of justice 
can be considered a manifestation of the divine, and the presence of grace. Grace, 
in this sense, is an intensity of relationship which is effected through the power of 
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the Holy Spirit present in communicatiom oriented toward mutual recognition, 
understanding and reciprocity. Habennas's emphasis on orientation toward the 
other, and on the role which language plays in forming society through communi-
cative action, reflects the justice of God as right relationship, communicatively 
established. Habennas's elevation to primacy of the social role of language con-
tains the recognition that language is the starting point for the history of the species. 
Since language is the instrument of our formation, and universally constitutes 
intersubjectivity which leads to the true sociality God intends in creating us as social 
creatures for society, God is present in the very structures of language. A theologi-
cal interpretation of Habermas's remark that "the Logos of language founds the 
intersubjectivity of the lifeworld, in which we find ourselves already preunder-
stood"63 relates it to the presence of Christ, God's Logos or Word to humankind, 
in communication which establishes right relationship necessary for the formation 
of society. Relationship is conformed to Christ when those who are party to it 
recognise the radical mutuality of our being, and accept each other as genuine 
subjects (not objects) of communication;64 when they expose themselves to each 
other's criticisms and respond in an attempt to reach rational agreement with them 
about the truth of statements, the correctness of norms, and the generalisability of 
particular interests, needs and intentions. Rational understanding and agreement 
here depend on the cogency of reasons given for the pursuit of interests. 
We have seen that the communication which establishes right relationship 
entails legitimation of the norms involved in the co-ordination of social action; 
legitimation here means the rational justification or discursive redemption of the 
universal validity claims underlying these norms in practical discourse, under 
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conditions approximating to the ideal speech situation. The "organisational en-
ergy"65 behind co-ordination of social action, and present in communication which 
is for others, is the Holy Spirit The Holy Spirit, through co-inherence with Christ 
as the Word of God, is active in the attempts of those who try to form a society 
through domination-free, consensus-seeking discourse. McFadyen maintains that 
"in social terms, the power of the Spirit is operative in breaking open hard 
structures of distorted communication in order to establish dialogue and com-
munity ... The activity of the Spirit in the social world is therefore primarily an 
orientation on others and only secondarily... on oneself1.66 
The particular discourse advocated in Habermas's theory of justice and 
communicative ethics is dependent upon a particular mode of human action, 
namely communicative action. The communicative justice of God (by which I mean 
right relationship established through undistorted argumentation in the Trinity) is 
socially refracted or mediated in communicative action which is oriented to mutual 
understanding, and in practical discourse which seeks consensus about the norms 
steering social policy and guiding social action. Habermas's theory of justice 
proposes the ideal speech situation, with its unlimited, domination-free discourse, 
as the procedural device by which justice is to be established in society. This model 
of communication is an ideal to which all communication tends because language, 
which is at the root of communication, has an inherently emancipatory drive toward 
truth and justice, understood as uncoerced consensus arrived at through a conver-
sation to which all have equal access. 
The discursive procedure in Habermas's universal discourse ethics, as we 
have seen, does not (like Rawls's theory of justice) impose prior constraints on the 
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subject matter that cam be introduced in practical discourse. Habermas's theory of 
justice permits parties to the discourse to introduce specific needs and interests, 
provided that these are submitted to collective scrutiny in a concrete, public forum 
in order to be tested for generalisability. The formation of society by the open 
discussion of generalisable needs and interests, and by the coEective shaping of 
norms and values in free communication (rather than the struggle for distributive 
power) implies democratic political activity in the public sphere. I f justice is 
understood in terms of legitimation or justification of generalisable interests67 with 
the aim of forming a just society, then the defence of the public sphere and 
democratic institutions becomes a crucial activity for the Church in its quest for 
social justice and its effort to follow the divine imperative, because what is gener-
alisable can only be determined by dialogue and debate in the public sphere. 
Another reason for the attractiveness of Habermas's thought to theology 
(rather than that of Rawls who tends to neglect the public sphere within civil 
society) is his emphasis on democratic participation in a public sphere in which 
citizens define the terms and conditions of their public life, and engage in dialogue 
and argumentation about the norms and social policies which form their society 
without repression.68 A serious objection has been raised by Seyla Benhabib to 
Habermas's argument that his theory of practical discourse, and specifically the 
counterfactual procedure of discursive will formation on generalisable interests, 
can form a just society. Benhabib makes two criticisms: 1) that the gulf between 
ideal and actual discourse is so great as to be unbridgeable - i.e., the notion of 
consensus is so exacting that there is no reason to assume that any actual norm 
would satisfy it; 2) and that Habermas's discourse model cannot serve as a criterion 
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of democratic legitimacy," for it presupposes the possibility of a self-transparent 
and self-identical coUectwity"P Bemhabib considers the counterfactual idea of 
discursive argumentation to be paradoxical, because the step of "abstraction" that 
leads social and political agents to engage in practical discourse when conflicts and 
crises cause a background consensus to collapse "can only take place when such 
agents are willing to suspend the motivating force and content of these real conflict 
situations. ... [T]he very project of discursive argumentation presupposes the 
ongoing validity of a reconciled intersubjectivity".70 Habermas's ideal community 
of reconciled intersubjectivity thus eliminates conflict and diversity of interests by 
allowing only universalisable need interpretations. According to Benhabib, 
This is a transcendental illusion, for, although the very project of an 
emancipated society means eliminating certain structural sources of 
interest conflict in present societies, a human society freed from all 
sources of conflict and diversity of interests cannot be conceived of 
without eliminating the radical plurality of ways of life, of cultural 
traditions and individual biographies which differentiate humans from 
one another. Such a society of reconciled intersubjectivity would be a 
self-identical collectivity, but not a human community.... Not only is the 
project of such a self-transparent and self-identical collectivity im-
possible, it is not even desirable.71 
The error in this argument is its misconstrual of the way in which Haberma-
sian consensus functions. Habermas's notion of a rational consensus does not 
require that everyone shares the same ideals, or that they all subscribe to one 
particular concept of the common good; rather, it points to a form of life in which 
the ideal of diversity and plurality is publicly affirmed and maintained on the basis 
of citizens' sharing a democratic conception of themselves as free and equal 
persons. 
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Baynes has argued against criticisms similar to those of Benhabib: he 
maintains that the ideals of a rational consensus and the ideal speech situation do 
not require that every social norm or public policy receive the unanimous agree-
ment of all who might be affected by it: "What is required... is that the processes 
of public decision making and compromise formation be considered fair in the 
sense that the rules governing those processes also be open to debate and in 
principle capable of general agreement at a deeper level of justification. The 
picture of a legitimate order in Habermas's notion of a rational consensus is not 
that of a society that requires unanimity on every debated issue, but of a society 
that at a variety of levels and in different forms has institutionalised a network of 
overlapping and intersecting civic, political, and legal forums in which citizens 
collectively deliberate about and determine the basic terms of their collective life 
[i.e., a public sphere]".73 There is little evidence in this picture of a self-identical 
collectivity, nor of a prior or continuing reconciled intersubjectivity. The aim of 
practical discourse is to achieve the formation of a just society by dialogical, 
non-coercive communication that establishes which particular and diverse inter-
ests can find acceptance among all participants in the discourse. The aim is to 
achieve consensus, not to require an initial state of undisturbed agreement and 
harmony. 
I believe that the dialogical, non-coercive and democratic form of communi-
cation advocated in Habermas's theories represents a mediation of the communi-
cation within the Trinity, and impels Christians to seek a properly deliberative 
model of democracy. It also impels us to work for a healthy and re-politicised public 
sphere by establishing or strengthening informal political institutions in which 
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dialogue and debate about social norms of action take place in a fair setting. This 
is the subject of the final section. 
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The connection between the justice of God, the formation of society, and 
democracy is discourse, with its essential requisites of genuine dialogue and 
participation, which are norms for both divine and human communication. Of all 
political theories of government, democracy is best suited to the aim of forming a 
just society, because it entails the recognition of the real needs and interests of 
others as claims on the community at large. Democracy will lead to a just society 
only if it incorporates a genuinely communicative and deliberative principle of 
generalisability (like Habermas's), and if it embodies the norm of dialogue, thus 
generating justice as normative legitimacy. 
The controlling conception of justice which I have used through this thesis is 
right relationship, which I have supplemented with the related notions of com-
municative action and normative legitimacy. Justice, in this sense, is concerned 
with the discursive legitimation of the norms, based on particular needs and 
interests, which affect the direction of social policy and the co-ordination of social 
action. What is required for such legitimation is the extension of free and equal 
participation in dialogue and in a political structure in which people are recognised 
as autonomous subjects of political communication. McFadyen, in making the 
point that the exercise of socio-political power must conform to the norm for 
participation in dialogue (namely, freedom as autonomy in communication), notes 
that "freedom is itself to conform in its exercise to the norm for commitment to 
others, which is also set in dialogue".74 
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Democratic participation receives different emphasis in the theories of 
Rawls and Habermas. In the following exploration of this difference I rely strongly 
on Baynes's analysis of the role of the public sphere in the thought of Rawls and 
Habermas. I use this analysis to show that the genuinely participative and deliber-
ative democracy toward which Habenmas's theory of justice tends has greater 
affinity with the communicative nature of God's justice, and provides a model 
which theology can appropriate in its attempt to implement the divine imperative 
to do justice, thereby forming the kind of society which God intends. 
Baynes argues that "no topic in A Theory of Justice is more ambiguous or 
conflict-ridden than the role of democratic participation (both political and non-
political) in Rawls's vision of a just society".75 The difficulty is that, while Rawls 
regards the basic social structure as the primary subject of justice, he divides the 
basic social structure into a public and a private sphere. The retention of this 
traditional liberal distinction has undesirable consequences for his theory of social 
justice, including his ambivalence about the importance of democratic participa-
tion, 7 6 and his assumption that social justice could be realised through the active 
intervention of the welfare state into the private sphere.77 More seriously, accord-
ing to Baynes, Rawls "fails to thematise the public sphere within civil society"78 
Rawls, in his definition of the basic structure,79 acknowledges the importance of 
the publicity requirement, i.e. that the terms of social co-operation are publicly 
known, and that the background social institutions of society are fair. However, 
Baynes contends that "despite the importance of the publicity requirement, Rawls 
nowhere explicitly discusses the need for, and importance of, institutions of the 
public sphere within the basic structure".80 Even though I consider this charge to 
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be unfair (because Rawls does include a number of important institutions in the 
basic structure),811 agree with Baynes that Rawls does not discuss how these or 
other institutions (like autonomous, self-organised associations within civil so-
ciety) might curb the regulatory power of the state. 
The fact that Rawls does not include the public sphere as a specific institution 
(or set of institutions) within the basic structure is evidence that he does not make 
democratic participation central to his notion of social justice. The result, according 
to Baynes, is that "Rawls's discussion of democratic participation is vague and 
fragmented".82 By contrast, because Habermas makes the concept of the public 
sphere an explicit theme in his writings,83 he gives greater weight than Rawls to 
democratic participation. It is my contention that the post-traditional public sphere 
which emerges from Habermas's study84 of the (largely Kantian) idea of the 
bourgeois public sphere represents the kind of overarching institution which the 
Church should promote and defend, because it would contribute to the creation of 
a deliberative democracy in which justice, as normative legitimacy, would produce 
true sociality, thus forming a society in accordance with God's will and desire, and 
conforming to his social Trinitarian nature. 
The bourgeois public sphere, which is the basis of Habermas's concept,85 was 
a set of socio-cultural institutions that arose in the conditions of liberal capitalism 
in the 18th century, in opposition to the absolutist powers of the state. These were 
autonomous voluntary associations like private clubs, coffee-houses, learned so-
cieties, literary associations, publishing houses, journals and newspapers. These 
institutions of the public sphere were based on the principle of reasoned communi-
cation among private citizens as free and equal persons, and whose purpose was to 
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restrain and legitimate the political power of the administrative state. They also 
provided a forum for the public debate, deliberation and discursive transformation 
of "private interests" in civil society.86 Habermas's thesis in his early work on the 
public sphere was that this concept had a very limited life-span, ideologically as 
well as historically. It did not provide the basis for the expansion of political and 
civil liberties to include all members of the demos; nor did it eliminate those social 
inequalities which restricted the scope of the public sphere, because of the com-
mercialisation and bureaucratization of civil society during the 19th century. What 
emerged, instead of a public sphere formed by an enlightened citizenry, was a 
society manipulated by propagandistic mass media, oriented to consumption and 
a politics based on the competition and bargaining between interest groups. The 
conclusion of his early work was extremely cautious about the possibility for a 
renewed public sphere under the radically altered conditions of late capitalist 
society 8 7 
However, in his later work Legitimation Crisis88 Habermas introduced socio-
theoretical categories which enabled him to analyse both institutions and potential 
legitimation crises in modern capitalist societies; but he was not yet able to show 
how institutions that would contribute to form a deliberative democracy might 
arise from the sort of crisis tendencies he analysed.89 According to Baynes, Haber-
mas achieves a reconstructed, post-traditional public sphere in The Theory of 
Communicative Action, "primarily through the introduction of ... an analysis of 
social rationalisation from the dual perspective of society as system and life-
world". 9 0 In Habermas's notion of a pluralist and deliberative society citizens 
define the terms and conditions of their common life, and engage in discursive 
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argument about collective norms, social policies and political decisions. Baynes 
points out that what is unique about this understanding of the public sphere is the 
view that the formation of public opinion should take place within informal 
institutions or "secondary associations" that are sufficiently shielded from the 
colonising effects of the capitalist economy and administrative state (e.g., adver-
tising and party political propaganda).92 These informal or secondary associations 
provide public forums for discussion and debate, and for the formation and 
transformation of the preferences and interests of the members of a society.93 
The challenge which this model presents for a more radical democratic 
practice is to find ways in which the growth of "solidarity" or resource of public 
opinion can be encouraged, and then employed to curb or control the resources of 
money and power that are the primary media of the market and administrative 
state. Baynes raises two difficult questions in connection with Habermas's under-
standing of the public sphere and democratic practice: 
1. What measures can or should be taken to insure that such self-organised and 
autonomous associations are themselves democratically organised or at least 
congruent with other democratic values? 
2. How can these associations within civil society exercise any control over the 
formal institutions of the market and administrative state without either 
being absorbed by them or producing the "mischiefs of faction" ... within 
them?9 4 
Answers to these questions are discernible in recent essays by Habermas, 
where he has spoken of the need for social movements and autonomous associ-
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ations within civil society, along with more formal institutions like the judiciary, to 
exercise a delicate combination of power and intelligent self-restraint with respect 
both to the state and to the market9 3 In contrast to other models of democracy, 
the idea in the model of deliberative democracy is "not so much to accord certain 
key functional groups (e.g. labour and business) privileged access to the decision-
making processes of government, but to find ways to encourage the growth of a 
wide range of civil and political forums, provide them with access to relevant forms 
and sources of information, and develop mechanisms such that the deliberative 
conclusions reached in them have an effect in setting the agenda and in shaping 
the policies and proposals considered within the more traditional forms of par-
liamentary representation".96 Habermas does not want the formal political system 
and its mass political parties simply to be replaced by a more highly decentralised 
form of democratic rule based solely on such secondary institutions. What he insists 
on is that the former relinquish one of their functions - the generation of mass 
loyalty.97 Habermas, instead of calling for the dismantling of the formal political 
system, suggests that secondary associations of the public sphere should surround 
and "besiege" it, without conquering it. 9 8 
Baynes notes that although this metaphor does not help much to identify the 
specific modes of exchange that should exist between institutions of the public 
sphere and the state, the basic intuition is clear: 
the informal associations within civil society responsible for the pro-
duction of solidarity should exercise an indirect influence upon the 
formal political system through the production of loyalties and legitim-
ations.99 
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The importance of these informal associations and institutions in the public 
sphere cannot be over-emphasised.100 The deliberative democracy which they 
engender is vital to the formation of a just society, for without it the destructive 
logic of the subsystems of money and power would threaten to subsume all 
institutional life. Cohen and Arato argue that "this is why even small and finite steps 
in political and economic democratisation=pale in comparison to the unattainable 
ideals of the classical theory of democracy - can have dramatic implications in all 
modern societies. The gains to be had are not in a revived agora, but in a multiplicity 
of more autonomous roles, solidary and egalitarian relations and forms of partici-
pation in all dimensions of modern culture".101 
Baynes suggests that Habermas's model of the public sphere is not limited to 
proposals for reforming the traditional institutions of parliamentary debate, but 
must be broadly conceived as a vast array of institutions in which a wide variety of 
practical discourses overlap. It ranges from the informal movements and associ-
ations in civil society where solidarities are formed, through the institutions of the 
mass media, to the more formal institutions of parliamentary debate and legal 
argumentation. Although the idea of a practical discourse in which all citizens 
participate as free and equal persons is not directly realised in any one of these 
forums, this idea should be evident in the design and arrangement of the whole 
network of institutions. In the deliberative model, the "moment" of deliberation 
does not reside primarily with the judiciary nor with the body of elected repre-
sentatives, but is dispersed throughout a vast communicative network.102 
The robust model of the public sphere which Habermas proposes contains 
indications for a genuinely deliberative democracy, and (like communitarianism) 
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bases its vision of justice on a vibrant view of political community. By his emphasis 
on political participation and the widest-reaching democratization of decision-
making processes in social life, Habermas has enriched our understanding of the 
social and cultural possibilities of modernity, particularly the re-politicisation of 
the public sphere.103 Consequently, Habermas's theory puts greater emphasis than 
Rawls's theory of justice on democratic participation by citizens in the institutions 
which attempt to secure normative legitimacy, the steering of public structures, and 
thereby the formation of a just society. Such a society cannot be formed unless the 
process in which norms, interests and needs are to deliberated and tested for 
generalisability is genuinely participative and dialogical. Justice is established 
through the procedure proposed in Habermas's discourse ethics, because the 
genuine explication of needs and interests which occurs in it ensures the incorpor-
ation of the particular, yet generalisable, interests of particular groups into the 
democratic structures of public communication. The needs and interests here 
referred to are "life-interests", a term which McFadyen uses to denote those 
interests and needs which no one can or should do without.104 Since these needs 
and interests, especially of the poor and disadvantaged, are satisfied largely in a 
society which is formed by communicative justice, i.e. the justice of God, there is 
an intrinsic connection between this justice and genuinely deliberative, democratic 
institutions: 
life-interests which really are essential and generalisable ... may only 
be formulated through a dialogue in which interests are legitimated and 
priorities for need satisfaction agreed. The real and abiding universal 
life-interest is primarily ... in the institutionalisation of dialogue in 
concrete socio-political situations, without which those interests in a 
situation which are generalisable could be neither thematised nor 
democratically formed. There is consequently a universal interest in 
democratic forms of socio-political structure... The universality of this 
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democratic interest corresponds to the universality of human creation 
in God's image, to God's intention of all people as autonomous subjects 
of communication, as under God's rule and as sharing in the democratic 
dominion over the earth. ^ 
Recognition of the correspondence between the deliberative democratic 
model and the universal, beneficial purpose of God's justice for the formation of 
society should impel the Church to a vigorous promotion and defence of the public 
sphere, because it is in this sphere that such a model of democracy could thrive. 
Consensus in public affairs is derivable ultimately from unconstrained debate and 
agreement in the public sphere, under conditions approximating to Habermas's 
ideal speech situation. Since these conditions are a codification of the ideal form 
of life in God's Trinitarian image, the Church should endorse and implement the 
theory in which they appear.106 
0©oi©ly@5®in) 
In this chapter I have argued that the justice of God is present in secular 
theories which aim at the formation of a just and better society. Although Rawls's 
theory of justice is motivated by a desire to achieve justice in society, and to ensure 
a just basic structure (i.e to form a more just society), his procedural method of the 
original position was found to be inadequate on account of its tendency toward 
monism, and owing to Rawls's ambivalence about real democratic participation in 
determining norms and principles for steering society. In his view of ethical 
discourse as a type of practical reasoning that seeks to adjudicate between conflict-
ing moral points of view about how we ought to live, Habermas holds that moral 
reasoning does not adjudicate between different points of view behind a veil of 
ignorance, but rather in actual discourse with others. 
Consonance with the Justice of God 
and Deliberative Democracy 339 
I have argued that Habermas's theory of justice, set within his theory of 
communicative action and his discourse ethics, is more worthy to be considered a 
mediation of God's justice, because it is more consonant with the communicative 
and non-coercive or domination-free nature of God's justice. I have also argued 
that since there is an intrinsic connection between God's communicative justice 
and a model of deliberative democracy, the Church should ensure that that model 
is operative in its own structures; and it should strive to strengthen all those 
informal institutions, of which it is a special kind, so that the solidarity they produce 
can resist the forces of monetarisation and bureaucratisation which threaten the 
public sphere in the lifeworld, and can have a transformative effect on the formal 
political system in order to form a just society. 
The Church is a special kind of institution in the public sphere because it is 
more widely, and in some cases more intimately, connected with the array of 
institutions in society. It can rely, to a considerable extent, on the good will of many 
of these institutions and on their recognition of its supportive and enabling role. 
Where this good will and recognition do not exist, the Church must demonstrate 
that the practical or political theology which motivates it to be involved in the 
common quest for a better society does not rest on the acceptance of its beliefs or 
on imperialistic forms of communication.107 Rather, the Church must demonstrate 
a preparedness to correlate its social critique mutually with those of other disci-
plines, with a recognition that in some modern theories what is true, right, good 
and just cannot be known in advance,108 but can only be established through an 
extended dialogue in which all those who are potentially affected can argue and 
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agree about the norms which will regulate their interaction and satisfy their 
particular but generalisable needs and interests. 
This preparedness and recognition constitute a de facto acceptance of the 
communicative ethics which is at the heart of Habermas's theory of justice = an 
ethics which corresponds to the communicative justice of God in its intention to 
form society. The recognition of this correspondence, which I have argued is the 
result of the incarnational presence of God in all sincere efforts to establish justice 
with the intent of forming a just society, should impel the Church to promote 
communicative ethics at every level of social interaction, from personal to inter-
national relations, from local to national and international government, as well as 
in ecclesiastical structures. 
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oured" [ibid., p. 35]. The implications of this for justice as right relationship, depend-
ent on mutual understanding and agreement, is that partners in communication 
cannot achieve a real mutuality of understanding or be properly oriented on one 
another if one is always subject and the other always object McFadyen makes the 
point that "conformity to Christ m dialogue indicates a process of mutual, open 
discovery through radical respect, not the imposition of one's life, desires, needs and 
understanding on others", [ibid., p. 166.] The other must be recognised and respected 
as a distinct yet related subject capable of independent response, and with whom one 
can seek an unforced understanding in an undistorted, constraint-free discourse. 
65 This is a phrase which McFadyen uses to conceptualise the Holy Spirit: ibid., p. 63. 
66 ibid., p. 65. 
67 The corollary of this understanding is that injustice would be constituted by the 
suppression of generalisable interests, which is a function of domination. 
68 There are strong similarities between Habermas's thought and the radically anti-dog-
matic thought of Hannah Arendt, whose vision of participatory politics in The 
Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958) and her other works 
emphasises the importance of communication, and points to the real possibility 
individuals coming together to act collectively in forming society through public 
debate. As for Habermas, so for Arendt, there is no authority for judging the 
adequacy of opinion [and norms] other than through the force of the better argument 
in genuine, public discourse. [Between Past and Future, Faber and Faber, 1961, pp. 
222-223.] 
69 S. Benhabib: The Methodological Illusions of Modern Political Theory: The Case 
of Rawls and Habermas", Neue Hefte fur Philosophic 21,1982, p. 71. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid., p. 72. 
72 S. Lukes: "Of Gods and Demons: Habermas and Practical Reason", in Habermas: 
Critical Debates, op. est, pp. 139-141; M. Walzer: Interpretation and Social Criticism, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 11 n. 9; I . Young: "Impartiality and 
the Civic Public", in Feminism as Critique, Eds. S. Benhabib and D. Cornell, Minnea-
polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, pp. 70-72; J.-F. Lyotard: The Post-Modem 
Condition, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 
73 K. Baynes: The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism, Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1992, p. 121. 
74 McFadyen, op. cit, p. 207. 
75 Baynes, op. cit., p. 167; there is no agreement even among Rawls's most able critics, 
among whom Baynes cites the following: H. L. A Hart: "Rawls on Liberty and Its 
Priority" in Reading Rawls, Ed. N. Daniels, Oxford: Blackwell 1975, p. 252; A. 
Gutmann: Liberal Equality, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 
175-176; C. Pateman: The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of 
Liberal Theory, New York: Wiley, 1979, p. 133. 
76 Baynes says that there are a number of considerations that might be responsible for 
the (explicitly) diminished role of political participation in Rawls's theory of justice. 
These are fairly complex and lengthy, and would divert us unduly at this stage; see 
Baynes, ibid., pp. 168469. 
77 Our discussion of Habermas's thesis of legitimation crisis in chapter one revealed 
how such intervention by the welfare state, in order to achieve greater social justice, 
often results in the fragmentation, bureaucratisation, monetarisation and juridiflca-
Consonance with the Justice of God 
and Deliberative Democracy 346 
tion of civil society (Le., the colonisatioia o£ the lifeworid). The deficiency of Rawls's 
analysis in regard to the pathologies caused by welfare-state intervention is the result 
of his failure to engage in the kind of social analysis found in Habermas's theory of 
communicative action. 
78 Baynes, op. cit, p. 162. 
79 J. Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject", in Values and Morals, edited by A. 
Goldman and J. Kim, Boston: Reidel, 1978, p. 47. 
80 Baynes, op. cit, p. 162. 
81 Rawls mentions the following institutions in A Theory of Justice: the political con-
stitution (TJ, pp. 7,304-309), the nuclear family (TJ, pp. 7,300,511), the competitive 
market (TJ, p. 7, 304-309), an autonomous legal system (TJ, p. 235), and an 
interventionist welfare state (TJ, p. 275). 
82 Baynes, op. cit, p. 167. 
83 See R. C. Holub's study of Habermas's concept of the public sphere: Jiirgen Haber-
mas: Critic in the Public Sphere, Routledge, 1991. 
84 Habermas: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: MTT Press, 1989. 
85 cf. H. Arendt's picture of the public sphere (derived from her understanding of the 
classical Greek age) as a tangible, communal realm in which people face one another 
as free and equal, and participate in the formation of opinion, and thus in determining 
society-forming norms of action, through public discourse, through persuasion rather 
than force: The Human Condition, op. cit, pp. 26,30-31. 
86 Habermas: The Structural Transformationop. cit, pp. 27-28. 
87 ibid., pp. 234-235; according to Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Habermas never-
theless insisted that "the now Utopian idea of a critical public could not be entirely 
abandoned by liberal democracies, and therefore the institutional reconstruction of 
genuine public life remained possible and desirable". See Cohen and Arato's essay 
"Politics and the Reconstruction of the Concept of Civil Society" in Zwischenbetrach-
tungen im Prozess der Aufkldrung: Jurgen Habermas zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by 
Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe and Albrecht Wellmer, Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989, p. 492. 
88 Habermas: Legitimation Crisis, Heinemann, 1976. 
89 Baynes, op. cit, p. 174. 
90 ibid. 
91 A similar argument is presented by J. Cohen: "Why More Political Theory?" Telos 
40, Summer 1979, pp. 70-94; and by J. Cohen and A Arato in Civil Society and Social 
Theory, Cambridge: MTT Press, 1991. 
92 Baynes, op. cit, p. 178. 
93 The democratisation of society, as a vital dimension of the formation of society, is a 
more complicated enterprise than the promotion of active and participative second-
ary associations. Along with ensuring a constitution with judicial independence (a 
sine qua non of a democracy), efforts must also be aimed at institutionalising 
structures which will ensure certain complexes of fundamental rights (e.g. those 
concerning cultural reproduction, like freedom of thought, press, speech and com-
munication; those insuring social integration, like freedom of association and assem-
bly; and those securing socialisation, like protection of privacy, intimacy, and 
inviolability of the person). According to Cohen and Arato, "these complexes are 
Consonance with the Justice of God 
and Deliberative Democracy 347 
related to two other sets of rights that mediate between civil society and either the 
capitalist economy (rights of property, contract, labour) or the modem bureaucratic 
state (electoral rights of citizens, welfare rights of clients).... Accordingly, the project 
of establishing or transforming fundamental rights is one of the most important tasks 
for collective actors involved in the politics of society". [Cohen and Arato: "Politics 
and the Reconstruction of the Concept of Civil Society", op. cit., p. 502.] However, 
even the revival of the idea of a public sphere, and the efforts to re-politicise society, 
could dramatically improve the situation for many in modern societies if illegitimate 
power were restrained and generalisable interests were not suppressed. 
94 Baynes, op. cit, p. 178. 
95 Habermas: The New Obscurity. The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion 
of Utopian Energies", in The New Conservatism, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989, pp. 
64fF; "Ist der Herzschlag der Revolution zum Stillstand gekommen? Volkssouver-
anitat a Is Verfahren", in Die Idem von 1789, edited by Forum Fur Philosophic Bad 
Hamburg, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989, pp. 28ff.. 
96 Baynes, op. cit, p. 179. 
97 Habermas: The New Obscurity", op. cit, p. 67. 
98 Habermas: "Volkssouveranitat...", op. cit, p. 31. 
99 Baynes, op. cit, p. 179. 
100 cf. H. Arendt's idea of the spontaneous formation of citizens' councils, which come 
about because of the deep desire of people to participate, to debate, to have their 
voices heard in public, and to have a possibility to determine the political course of 
their country; Crises of the Republic, New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1969, p. 
232. 
101 Cohen and Arato: "Politics and the Reconstruction of the Concept of Civil Society", 
op. cit, p. 503. 
102 Baynes, op. cit, p. 180. 
103 S. Benhabib contends that after Max Weber, "Jiirgen Habermas has given us the 
most differentiated and subtle account of the developed possibilities of modern 
societies, while challenging our imagination to envisage anew the task of participa-
tory politics in complex, democratic societies". ["Autonomy, Modernity, and Com-
munity. Communitarianism and Critical Social Theory in Dialogue", in 
Zwischenbetrachtungen, op. cit, p. 391.] 
104 McFadyen, op. cit, p. 214. 
105 ibid. 
106 Implementation involves detailed attention to working out and establishing struc-
tures of participation. Preston, among others, has pointed out that participation 
raises its own crop of questions, and opens up a very large number of problems which 
will test political, economic, social and industrial policy to the full: see his essay 
"Capitalism, Democracy and Christianity" in M. Taylor, Ed.: Christians and the Future 
of Social Democracy, op. cit, pp. 26- 27; see also David Held, Models of Democracy, 
Oxford: Polity Press/ BlackweU, 1987. 
107 cf. F. S. Fiorenza's remarks about the need for discourse between theology and other 
disciplines: "Habermas's discourse ethics provides a model for understanding the role 
of the tradition of moral discourse and the public task of political theology. A 
communicative conception of rationality impels a political theology to base its 
political and moral appeals not simply upon the authority of a religious tradition, but 
rather upon open discourse within the community and in relation to the discourses 
Consonance with the Justice of God 
and Deliberative Democracy 348 
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My concern in this thesis has been to investigate whether leading secular theories 
of justice mediate the justice of God so as to form a just society, i.e. a society 
characterised essentially by right relationship. The reason for my turning to the 
theories of Rawls and Haberaaas is that the biblical material on justice is not 
capable of direct application to modern conditions, because the Bible's social 
precepts were formulated for entirely different conditions. Nor has the theological 
material on justice been systematically formulated in a theory which attempts, in 
an interdisciplinary way, to relate the biblical understanding to contemporary 
political, sociological and philosophical theories which are designed to form a just 
society under modern conditions. The theories of Rawls and Habermas both 
attempt to supply a procedure aimed at establishing justice as normative legitimacy 
(and, from a theological point of view, right relationship) at a societal level. My 
investigation reveals the greater adequacy of Habermas's theory because it is more 
consonant with the social and dialogical nature of God's justice, and because that 
justice is the divine reality underlying communicative action, with its dimensions 
of unconditional mutual recognition, equality, reciprocity and solidarity. 
The understanding of justice which emerges from my correlational and 
critical theological engagement with two modern socio-political theories of justice 
is right relationship, established in modern times by a publicly discursive procedure 
which secures a domination-free agreement and rational consensus about univer-
salisable norms, whose tightness and validity have been justified through practical 
discourse. To the charge that such a definition of social justice, which appears to 
rest on the notion of pure procedural justice, has no distinctive theological content, 
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I reply that my 'ineamational' approach discerns the presence of God in the very 
structures of the procedures which attempt to secure, non-coercively, the right 
relationship that God intends as part of the creative process of forming society. 
The contribution which theology makes to an integrated approach in the 
public arena to the formation of a just society is both the Gospel proclamation of 
the special justice of God, with its bias to the disadvantaged; and the affirmation 
of a communicative understanding of justice. This takes account of the needs and 
interests of all potential participants in public discourse, thereby working to 
prevent domination, whilst giving opportunity to the disadvantaged both to be 
heard and to participate deliberatively in the formation of society.1 With the aid 
of analytical categories drawn from Habermasian communication theory, it is 
possible to see that Jesus' communicative action exemplifies the non-coercive 
operation of God's justice, in so far as it proceeds in a genuinely dialogical way to 
establish right relationship. 
Since it is possible to discern the major direction of God's justice in the Bible 
and to understand its nature, it is also possible to affirm theories and action which 
are consistent with God's justice, and to consider them as at least partial mediations 
of God's justice. Further, since we know that the Judeo-Christian tradition contains 
an imperative to "seek first the Kingdom of God and his justice" (Matt. 6:33), the 
Church should act to establish this justice in the realm of human interaction, i.e. 
the political realm, and should look for signs of God's justice wherever they may 
be found, especially extra ecclesiam. After due critical assessment and correlation, 
the Church should affirm and support theories which are aimed at the formation 
of a just society. 
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The Church, acting in this role, can be an important agent in the formation 
of society. I suggested earlier (p. 341) that the Church should promote the notion 
of a universal ethics, and should commend a procedure which tries to secure 
normative legitimacy through domination=free, fully intersubjective and inclusive 
communication, based on shared understanding, agreement, co-operation and 
consensus. The Church, cognisant of and sensitive to the pluralistic nature and 
conditions of the modern state, should go further and join those who are trying to 
establish a common normative foundation. 
Since it is the case that God wills just society, it is incumbent on the Church 
and theologians to produce a political theology which employs a communicative 
and relational understanding of justice in the task of ensuring that the state returns 
to a basis of normative legitimacy, and of sustaining the consensual basis of society 
at a national and international level. The Church, if it is true to its normative 
tradition, is in a position to do this because it can provide an institutional and 
cultural locus for the consideration of practical moral issues, especially justice, and 
thus provide an institutional base in modern society for a universal discourse 
ethics.2 
I have no illusions about the formidable difficulties facing anyone who 
proposes such a radical shift in the Church's role, and indeed in its mission. The 
first hurdle to overcome is the internal ecclesiastical resistance to, and frequent 
dismissal of, political involvement. We are faced here with a massive educational 
task. Educational policy and training in the Church need radical re-vision, so that 
the nature of God (justice) and the social teaching of Jesus may be re-presented, 
stripped of erroneous 'personalist' and exclusively 'other-worldly' theology which 
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separates the secular and spiritual realms. Such theology leads either to an under-
standing of religion and faith as interior and personal piety, with a concomitant 
withdrawal from the public sphere, or to the maintenance of an uncritical attitude 
to the powers that be, often arising from an interest in conserving the status quo 
and thus legitimating the existing order. In order to be true to what God requires 
(Mcah 6:8), the Church must re-orient itself at every level,3 especially in its 
educational policy, to the priority of justice, which is at the centre of the Judeo-
Christian tradition. Those in the Church who oppose political involvement need 
to be shown that the search and struggle for justice are profoundly spiritual, 
because these are an integral part of seeking (and actively working for) God's 
Kingdom and his justice. 
The second obstacle to overcome is the essentially disrespectful attitude of 
those who wish to relegate religion to the private sphere, owing to its alleged 
inability to contribute anything meaningful to the public sphere if that contribution 
emanates from irrelevant, outdated (and therefore untrue) cosmological world-
views (e.g. Habermas) and irrational, incredible metaphysics (e.g. Rawls). The 
advantage of Habermas's discourse ethics is that it is guided by the moral principle 
of unconditional mutual recognition and respect among humans as free and equal 
subjects. It also admits to the discursive process all points of view, with the proviso 
that their adherents are able to justify the claims underlying the norms which they 
propose to form society, and that they are willing to submit to no force other than 
the force of the better argument. 
According to his own theory, Habermas should not (like Rawls) be 
prejudiced against any conception of the good or point of view, whether or not he 
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is able to accept its provenance, for normative legitimacy is determined purely 
through discursive will-formation, i.e. through what is universalisable by the agree-
ment of all who are potentially affected. Although he departs from his own 
principles when he regrettably disparages the views of those arguing from religious 
grounds, his theory advocates unconditional respect for all points of view, and 
accepts the fact of their contribution in the public arena where justice is determined 
discursively. Habermas, and others, need to be held to this fundamental principle 
of human interaction, so that the voices of all may be heard, and not relegated to 
a private sphere in which there is little or no possibility of participating in the 
formation of society. 
A third hurdle to be overcome arises from the requirement of a crucial 
attitude if Habermas's model of communicative action is to succeed, namely the 
willingness or preparedness to accept the outcome of a practical discourse in which 
the force of the better argument alone prevails. If justice and the formation of 
society are the outcome of an ideal legitimating procedure (such as that devised by 
Habermas), and if Christians believe that humans' social, relational and linguistic 
constitution by God requires that we establish justice as right relationship or true 
sociality dialogically, then we should have the humility to recognise that God's will 
may be expressed in such an outcome, and to accept it. 4 
However, this means that when Christians enter the public arena they must 
be well-prepared5 and confident that, on the basis of their substantive normative 
tradition and a competent grasp of the issues and related disciplines, they will be 
able to put forward the best argument. This, in turn, means that they will recognise 
the complexity of the issues surrounding justice and the formation of society; that 
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they will have engaged seriously in social analysis and thought carefully through 
the arguments and implications of secular theories; and that they will have done as 
much substantial and rigorous empirical and normative work on the issues as their 
counterparts in other disciplines, especially the social sciences. Forrester remarks 
that the Church must become more intellectually serious about its involvement 
with politics and about entering and sustaining a dialogue between theology and 
social theory. He notes that "there seems to be a profound reluctance to take any 
form of social theory seriously, and a naive assumption that a political theology is 
possible which is innocent of ideology and serious social analysis alike".6 
Thus, not only is humility required by the Church, which has for most of its 
history been accustomed to operating 'magisterially' and imperiaiistically by re-
course to unassailable sovereign claims; what is also required is intellectual rigour 
as the Church engages in social analysis. It is not, nor will be, enough to make 
simplistic forays into other disciplines. I recognise that this is a danger facing any 
interdisciplinary approach. Demosthenes Savramis, a Christian lecturer in the 
sociology of religion, warned the World Council of Churches in the late 1960s to 
avoid dilettante engagement in social problems: "the tasks that could once be 
accomplished in this field are now too complex, and sociological knowledge is too 
advanced, for such dilettantism to be indulged in any longer".7 However, as long 
as the Church and its theologians are aware of the complexity of social issues, and 
remain alert to the need for carefully thought-out and convincingly integrated 
contributions to the public arena, there is no reason for them not to be in the public 
sphere and to engage with political theories, structures, policies, ideologies and 
practices. If we were to wait until we had achieved expertise or mastery in every 
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related discipline before we engaged with others to address the urgent issues of 
justice and society, we should probably never affect or change anything. 
Thus to search for signs of God's grace in the work of modem justice theorists, 
extra eccksiam, is a contribution to the educative task of demonstrating the 
incarnations! presence of God throughout his creation, the irruption of God's rule 
in history through the person of Jesus Christ, and the sustaining power in the 
present of the Holy Spirit, all of which manifest themselves in the struggle for 
justice and the formation of the kind of society which God wills. It is my contention 
that God is present a fortiori in those areas where people seek the formation of a 
just society which accords with his justice and loving will. My mutually critical 
engagement with the theories of Rawls and Habermas has led me to conclude that 
the formation of society is dependent upon justice understood as normative 
legitimacy, achieved through communicative action and a universal discourse 
ethics, underlying which, as I showed in chapter 5, is the divine reality of God's 
justice. 
The interdisciplinary engagement which has helped to produce this under-
standing of justice and the formation of society, although theoretical, serves to 
ground what is ultimately the aim of all such theory - human action. Action for 
Christians who are concerned with justice and the formation of society involves: 
1. Active, critical, political engagement by Christians, especially with those who 
shape policy at different levels in society. 
2. Commendation of theories which may be considered to mediate God's 
justice, especially those which contain concrete proposals and procedures for 
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determining dialogicaliy a just social charter and, more specifically, just social 
norms and policies. 
3. Promotion of and support for social movements or informal political associ-
ations which engage in practical discourse about social norms of action, and 
which exercise a noticeable influence on the formal political system, in order 
to develop a properly deliberative democracy. 
4. Continual, even persistent, exhortation to involvement by the Church in the 
political process, in order to arrest the debasement of the public sphere, to 
improve the quality of political life and debate, to counter cynicism and 
disillusionment with the political process, and create a vibrant political and 
social community. Such exhortation is aimed at the re-politicisation of so-
ciety, so that its formation is determined by communicative justice, i.e. 
through linguistically mediated interaction (communicative action) to 
achieve domination-free agreement and consensus about policies and deci-
sions which affect all. This exhortation is a crucial implementation of God's 
special justice for the disadvantaged, because it seeks to draw the powerless, 
the marginalised and the voiceless into the political process where their needs 
and interests may be presented or represented in real practical discourse. 
The political implications of Christian action outlined above derive from an 
understanding of communicative action, which is the fruit of this interdisciplinary 
approach. The normative principle in both Habermas's conception of communi-
cative action and in Christian action is love - interpreted in this context as inter-
subjective recognition of others and, more importantly, the will to secure and 
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broaden the life possibilities of others by securing social justice and a just basic 
structure discursively. 
The kind of other-regarding and other-affirming intersubjectivity contained 
in communicative action has been described in chapter 5 as love of the neighbour, 
empowered through the Holy Spirit by faith in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ 
Since the Resurrection is the ultimate demonstration of God's justice, faith in the 
Resurrection, which is an assertion of God as the saving reality for aU others, is 
itself just action, expressing God in loving solidarity and interaction which grants 
unconditional recognition and inclusion to all who are disadvantaged and victims 
of injustice. It remains for Christians and the Church, in response to the divine 
imperative to do God's justice, and empowered by Resurrection-faith that ulti-
mately justice will be done, to give themselves to the formation of a society 
characterised by right relationship, achieved through action whose goal is domina-
tion-free communication, universal dignity and freedom in universal solidarity. 
1 See chapter 6, pp. 338-339. 
2 cf. the WCC's Evanston report, which described the Christian community as the 
'visible centre of the social community' and thus the foundation of social responsi-
bility in the local sphere. [The Evanston Report, edited by W. Visser't Hooft, SCM, 
1955, p. 114.] 
3 cf . the emphasis of the Roman Catholic encyclical Justice in the World, which was the 
outcome of the deliberations of 1971 International Synod of Bishops; this document 
is, according to J. C. Haughey, S J . , "the most forthright statement to date [i.e. 1977] 
from an official collegial body in the Church on the proper response of the Church 
and its members to the use and abuse of political and social power". [The Faith That 
Does Justice, New York: Paulist Press, 1977, p. 3.] Haughey also points to the 
admirable determination of the Jesuit Order, after its General Congregation in 1975, 
that "the promotion of justice in the world was to become a major focus of its work 
in the future and a primary way of expressing the faith commitment of its member-
ship", [ibid., my emphasis.] 
4 This humility is not the same as the timidity in the face of secular theories and 
disciplines, nor as conformity to the "spirit of the age", for which some modern 
theologians have been criticised. It is the humility of Christ who, in his communicative 
action, was faithful to, but non-dominating about, the substantive normative position 
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from which he was offering his peispective. Such humility in modem practical 
discourse is of the kind which is prepared to submit to the 'force' of the better 
argument under conditions approximating to the ideal speech situation. 
5 The criticism that some Church contributions to social theory and problems have 
been ill-thought out was one of the few valid points made in the otherwise shameful 
publication of a number of essays in 1984, entitled The Kindness That Kills: The 
Churches' Simplistic Response to Complex Social Issues, edited by D. Anderson, 
SPQC cf. the essays in Strain, C , Ed.: Prophetic Visions and Economic Realities, 
Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1988. 
6 D. B. Forrester: Theology and Politics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, p. 157. There is not, 
however, only the problem of a reluctance to take social theory seriously; there is 
also the problem of those in the Church who take it seriously, but dismiss it: see, for 
example, J. Milbank's "sceptical demolition of modern, secular social theory" from a 
Christian perspective - Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990. cf. A Linzey's scathing review of Milbank's work in an article 
entitled "An End to Turbulent Priests and Faddish Theologians?", in The Times 
Higher Education Supplement, 15-11-1991, p. 20. 
7 D. Savramis: Theology and Society: Ten Hypotheses", in R. H. Preston, Ed.: 
Technology and Social Justice, SCM, 1971, p. 400. 
Conclusion 359 
Note: unless otherwise indicated, place of publication is London. 
Ackerman, B.: Social Justice m the Liberal State, New Haven: Yale, 1980. 
Ackerman, B.: "What is Neutral about Neutrality?" in Ethics 93/2 (1983), 372-390. 
Acton, H.: The Morals of Markets: An Ethical Exploration, Longman, 1971. 
Apel, Karl-Otto: Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, translated by G. Adey and D. 
Frisby from the German (1972,1973), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. 
Aquinas, T.: Summa Theologwe 2a-2e, 57-62, (vol. 37 - JUSTICE), translated and 
edited by T. Gilby, Blackfiriars, 1975. 
Arendt, H.: Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought, Faber and 
Faber, 1961. 
Arendt, H.: Crises of the Republic, New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1969. 
Arendt, H.: The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958. 
Arens, E. : Towards a Theological Theory of Communicative Action", in Media 
Development 28/4 (1981), 12-16. 
Areas, E. : "Gleichnisse als kommunikative Handlungen Jesu: Uberlegungen zu einer 
pragmatischen Gleichnistheorie", ThPh 56 (1981), 47-69. 
Arens, R: Habermas und die Theologie, Dusseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1989. 
Arens, E. : Kommunikative Handlungen: Dieparadigmatische Bedeutung der Gleichnisse 
Jesu fur erne Handlungstheorie, Dusseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1982. 
Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics, translated by D. Ross, Oxford University Press, 1954. 
Arrow, K : "Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice": The Journal 
of Philosophy, 70/9 (1973), 245-263. 
Ashcroft, J., Bockmuehl, M., and Townsend, C : "A Christian Vision of Justice", 
Appendix I to Relational Justice: an Interim Report, Cambridge: Jubilee Group, 
1992. 
Austin, J.: How to do Things with Words, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Clarendon, 1975. 
Austin, J.: "Performative-Constative", in C. E . Caton, Ed., Philosophy and Ordinary 
Language, Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1963, pp. 22-54. 
Austin, J.: "Performative Utterances", in Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1961, pp. 220-239. 
Baird, J.: The Justice of God in the Teaching of Jesus, SCM, 1963. 
Barry, B.: Democracy, Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon, 
1989. 
Barry, B.: The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines 
in 'A Theory of Justice'by John Rawls, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973. 
Bibliography 360 
Barry, B.: Theories of Justice: A Treatise on Social Justice, Volume I, 
Harvester- Wheatsheaf, 1989. 
Barth, M.: "Jews and Gentiles: The Social Character of Justification in Paul", Journal of 
Ecumenical Studies 5 (1968), 241-267. 
Baum, G.: The Social Imperative, New York: Paulist Press, 1979. 
Baurmann, M.: "Understanding as am Aim and Aims of Understanding", in Seebass, G., 
and Tuomela, R., Eds.: Social Action, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Reidel, 1985, 
pp. 187-1%. 
Baynes, K.: The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1992. 
Baxter, EL: "System and Lifeworld in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action", 
Theory and Society 16/1 (1987), 39-86. 
Beckley, EL: "A Christian Affirmation of Rawls's Idea of Justice as Fairness - Part 1", 
Journal of Religious Ethics 13/2 (1985), 210-242. 
Beckley, EL: "A Christian Affirmation of Rawls's Idea of Justice as Fairness: Part II", 
The Journal of Religious Ethics 14/2 (1986), 229-246. 
Bedau, EL, Ed.: Justice and Equality, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 
Bedau, EL: "Social Justice and Social Institutions", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 
(1978), 159-175. 
Bell, D: The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Heinemann, 1976. 
Benhabib, S.: "Autonomy, Modernity and Community. Communitarianism and Critical 
Social Theory in Dialogue", in Zwischenbetrachtungen im Prozess derAufkldrung: 
Jurgen Habermas zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, 
Claus Offe and Albrecht Wellmer, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989. 
Benhabib, S.: "Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical 
Philosophy" in Benhabib, S. and Dallmayr, F., Eds.: The Communicative Ethics 
Controversy, Cambridge: MIT, 1990. 
Benhabib, S.: Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
Benhabib, S., and Cornell, D., Eds.: Feminism as Critique, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987. 
Benhabib, S.: "The Methodological Illusions of Modern Political Theory: The Case of 
Rawls and Habermas", Neue Hefte fur Philosophie 21 (1982), 47-74. 
Benn, S. and Mortimer, G., Eds.: Rationality and the Social Sciences, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1976. 
Benne, R.: The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism -A Moral Reassessment, Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1981. 
Bergant, D.: What Are They Saying About Wisdom Literature! New York: Paulist Press, 
1984. 
Bernstein, R.: Philosophical Profiles: Essays in a Pragmatic Mode, Cambridge: Polity, 
1986. 
Bibliography 361 
Bernstein, R.: The Restructuring ofSocial and Political Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 1976. 
Berrigan, D.: Uncommon Prayer, New York: Seabury, 1978. 
Birch, B.: Let Justice Roll Down, Loiusville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox, 1991. 
Birch, B., and Rasmussea, L,: The Predicament of the Prosperous, Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1978. 
Blackburn, S.: Spreading die Word, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. 
Blocker, H. and Smith, K , Eds.: John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice, Athens, Ohio: 
Ohio University Press, 1980. 
Bobbio, N.: The Future of Democracy: a Defence of the Rules of the Game, translated by 
R. Griffin and edited by R. Bellamy, Cambridge: Polity, 1987. 
Bonhoeffer, D.: Ethics, translated by N. Horton Smith from the German (1949), SCM, 
1965. 
Bonino, J.: Toward a Christian Political Ethics, SCM, 1983. 
Brand, A : The Force of Reason: An Introduction to Habermas' Theory of 
Communicative Action, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990. 
Brandt, R., Ed.: Social Justice, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. 
Brandt, R.:A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Clarendon, 1979. 
Braybrooke, D.: "Utilitarianism with a Difference: Rawls's Position in Ethics", Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, 3/2 (1973), 303-331. 
Browning, D. and Fiorenza, F. S., Eds.: Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology, New 
York: Crossroad, 1992. 
Brueggemann, W.: Genesis, Atlanta: John Knox, 1982. 
Brueggemann, W.: Hope Within History, Atlanta: John Knox, 1987. 
Brueggemann, W.: In Man We Trust: The Neglected Side of Biblical Faith, Richmond: 
John Knox, 1972. 
Brueggemann, W.: Old Testament Theology, edited by P. Miller, Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1992. 
Brunner, R: Justice and The Social Order, translated by M. Hottinger, Lutterworth, 
1945. 
Cardenal, R: Psalms, translated from the Spanish (1969) by T. Blackburn, et al., New 
York: Crossroad, 1981. 
Carey, G. and Schall, J.: Essays on Christianity and Political Philosophy, Lanham, 
Maryland: University Press of America, 1984. 
Chomsky, N.: Aspects ofthe Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MTT, 1965. 
Clark, H.: "Justice as Fairness and Christian Ethics", Soundings 56/3 (1973), 359-369. 
Cohen, J.: "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy", in Hamlin, A , and Pettit, P., Eds.: 
The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, pp. 
17-34. 
Bibliography 362 
Cohen, J.: "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social 
Movements": Social Reseat 52/4 (1985), 663-716. 
Cohen, J.: "Why More Political Theory?" Telos 40 (Summer 1979), 70-94. 
Cohen, J . and Arato A.: "Politics and the Reconstruction of the Concept of Civil 
Society" in Zwischenbetmchtungen im Pwzess derAufklarung: Jurgen Habermas 
zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe and 
Albrecht Wellmer, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989 
Coote, R.:Amos among the Prophets, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981. 
Crenshaw, J.: Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction, SCM, 1982. 
Crossan, D.: "Justice of God", New Catholic Encyclopaedia, Washington B.C.: 
McGraw-Hill, 1967, pp. 73-74. 
Curran, C : American Catholic Social Ethics: Twentieth Century Approaches, Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. 
Dallmayr, F.: "Critical Theory and Reconciliation", in Browning, D. and Fiorenza, F. S., 
Eds.: Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology, New York: Crossroad, 1992, pp. 
119-151. 
Daniels, N., Ed.: Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' Theory of Justice, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1975. 
Daniels, N: "Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points", Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 10/1 (1980), 83-103. 
Daniels, N.: "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics", Journal of 
Philosophy 76/5 (1979), 256-282. 
Davidson, A.: The Theology of The Old Testament, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1904. 
Davis, C : Theology and Political Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
Dorr, D.: Spirituality and Justice, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984. 
Dow, G.: The Basis for a Doctrine of Justice in the Christian Doctrines of Man and God, 
M. Phil. Thesis: Nottingham University, 1982. 
Duff, E. : The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches, Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1956. 
Dummett, M.: "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in Guttenplan, S., Ed.: Mind and 
Language", Oxford: Clarendon, 1975, pp. 97-138. 
Dummett, M.: "What Does the Appeal to Use Do for a Theory of Meaning?" in 
Margalit, A., Ed.: Meaning and Use, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Reidel, 1979, pp. 
123-135. 
Dunn, J.: "The Justice of God - a Renewed Perspective on Justification by Faith", The 
Journal of Theological Studies 43/1 (1992), 1-22. 
Dunn, J. and Suggate, A.: The Justice of God: A Fresh Look at the Old Doctrine of 
Justification by Faith, Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1993. 
Durkheim, R : Essays on Morals and Education: edited with an introduction by W. 
Pickering, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 
Bibliography 363 
Eichrodt, W.: Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. L translated by J. A Baker, SCM, 
1961. 
Elliot, M.: Freedom, Justice and Christian Counter-Culture, SCM, 1990. 
Elster, J.: "Sour Grapes - Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants", in Amartya Sen and 
Bernard Williams, Eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, pp. 219-238. 
Epsztein, L.: Social Justice in the Ancient Near East and the People of the Bible, 
translated from the French by J. Bowden, SCM, 1986. 
Fern, R.: "Religious Belief in a Rawlsian Society", The Journal of Religious Ethics 15/1 
(1987), 33-58. 
Fiorenza, F. S.: The Church as a Community of Interpretation: Political Theology 
between Discourse Ethics and Hermeneutical Reconstruction", in Browning, D. 
and Fiorenza, F. S., Eds.: Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology, New York: 
Crossroad, 1992, pp. 66-91. 
Fletcher, J.: Moral Responsibility - Situation Ethics at Work, SCM, 1967. 
Fletcher, J.: Situation Ethics: the New Morality, SCM, 1966. 
Folk, J.: Doing Theology, Doing Justice, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991. 
Forrester, D.: Beliefs, Values and Policies: Conviction Politics in a Secular Age, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1989. 
Forrester, D.: Theology and Politics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988. 
Friedrich, C. and Chapman, J., Eds.: JUSTICE (Nomos VI: Yearbook of the American 
Society for Political and Legal Philosophy), New York: Atherton, 1963. 
Galston, W.: Justice and the Human Good, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980. 
Gauthier, D.: The Social Contract as Ideology", Philosophy and Public Affairs 6/2 
(1977), 130-164. 
Geuss, R.: The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
Gibson, M.: "Rationality", Philosophy and Public Affairs 6/3 (1977), 193-225. 
Gierke, O.: The Development of Political Theory, Allen and Unwin, 1939. 
Gierke, O.: Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500-1800, translated by E . Baker, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950. 
Gilby, T : Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State, 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1953. 
Gilligan, C : "Do the Social Sciences Have an Adequate Theory of Moral 
Development?" in Norma Haan, et al., Eds., Social Science as Moral Enquiry, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 33-51. 
Gilligan, C : In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
Godsey, J.: The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, SCM, 1960. 
Bibliography 364 
Goldberg, J.: Interpretation and Justice: an Essay on Moral Epistemology and Political 
Theory, M. Phil. Thesis: Oxford University, 1985. 
Gordon, A.: "Righteousness (in the Old Testament)", in the Encyclopaedia of Religion 
and Ethics, vol. X, Ed. J. Hastings, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1918, pp. 780-784. 
Gottwald, N.: The Tribes ofYahweh, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1979. 
Gough, J.: The Social Contract, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957. 
Gouldner, A : The Dialectics of Ideology and Technology, Macmillan, 1976. 
Gouldner, A : The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class, Macmillan, 1979. 
Gouldner, A : The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Heinemann, 1971. 
Griffiths, B.: Monetarism and Morality: A Reply to the Bishops, Centre for Policy Studies, 
1985. 
Gunton, C. and Hardy, D.: On Being the Church: Essays on the Christian Community, 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989. 
Gutierrez, G.: "Liberation Praxis and Christian Faith" in R. Gibellini: Frontiers of 
Theology in Latin America, translated by J. Drury, New York: Orbis, 1979. 
Gutierrez, G.: The Power of the Poor in History, translated from the Spanish (1979) by 
R. Barr, SCM, 1983. 
Habermas, J.: Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by T. McCarthy 
from the German (1976), Heinemann, 1979; referred to as CES. 
Habermas, J.: "Ist der Herzschlag der Revolution zum Stillstand gekommen? 
Volkssouveranitat als Verfahren", in Die Ideen von 1789, edited by Forum Fur 
Philosophie Bad Hamburg, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989, pp. 7-36. 
Habermas, J.: "Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning 'Stage 6'", in The 
Philosophical Forum 21/1-2 (1989-90), 32-52. 
Habermas, J.: Knowledge and Human Interests, translated by J. Shapiro from the 
German (1968); Heinemann, 1972; referred to as K M . 
Habermas, J.: Legitimation Crisis, translated by T. McCarthy from the German (1973); 
Heinemann, 1976; referred to as LC. 
Habermas, J.: On the Logic of the Social Sciences, translated by S. Nicholsen and J. Stark 
from the German (1968), Cambridge: Polity, 1988. 
Habermas, J.: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, translated by C. 
Lenhardt and S. Nicholsen from the German (1983), Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT/Polity, 1990; referred to as MCCA. 
Habermas, J.: The New Conservatism, translated by S. Nicholsen, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989. 
Habermas, J.: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, translated by 
F. Lawrence from the German (1985); Cambridge, Massachusetts: MTT, 1987. 
Habermas, J.: "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests", in Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 3 (1973), 157-189. 
Habermas, J.: The Public Sphere", New German Critique 3 (1974), 49-55. 
Bibliography 365 
Habermas, J.: "Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action", in Seebass, G., and 
Tuomela, R. Eds.: Social Action, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Reidel, 1985, pp. 
151-178. 
Habermas, J.: "A Reply to My Critics", in Thompsoo, J., and Held, D., Eds.: Habermas: 
Critical Debates, Macmillan, 1982; referred to as IMPLY. 
Habermas, J.: "On Social Identity", Telos 19 (Spring 1974), 91-103. 
Habermas, J.: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Enquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by T. Burger from the German (1962); 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1989. 
Habermas, J.: The Theory of Communicative Action, in two Volumes: Volume 1, Reason 
and the Rationalization of Society, translated by T. McCarthy from the German 
(1981) Boston: Beacon, 1984; referred to as TCA/1; Volume 2: Lifeworld and 
System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, translated by T. McCarthy from the 
German (1981) Boston: Beacon, 1987; referred to as TCA/2. 
Habermas, J.: Theory and Practice, translated by J. Viertel from the German (1971), 
Heinemann, 1974. 
Habermas, J.: Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics, translated 
by J. Shapiro from the German (1968,1969); Heinemann, 1971. 
Habermas, J.: "Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in This World", in 
Browning, D. and Fiorenza, F. S., Eds.: Habermas, Modernity, and Public 
Theology, Crossroad, New York, 1992. pp. 226-250. 
Habermas, J.: "Wahrheitstheorien", in Helmut Fahrenbach: Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: 
zum sechzigsten Geburtstagjur Walter Schulz, Pfullingen: Neske, 1973; referred to 
asWAHK. 
Habermas, J.: "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in Communication and the Evolution of 
Society, Heinemann, 1979, pp. 1-68; referred to as UP/CES. 
Haferkamp, H.: "Critique of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action", in Seebass, 
G., and Tuomela, R. Eds.: Social Action, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Reidel, 
1985, pp. 197-205. 
Hampshire, S.: "Morality and Convention", in A. Sen and B. Williams, Eds., 
Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Hanson, P.: The People Called- The Growth of Community in the Bible, San Francisco: 
Harper and Row, 1987. 
Haring, B.: The Law of Christ, vol. I, translated by E . G. Kaiser from the German 
(1959), Cork: Mercier, 1963. 
Hauerwas, S.: After Christendom? - How the Church Is to Behave If Freedom, Justice, 
and a Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas, Nashville: Abingdon, 1991. 
Haughey, J., Ed.: The Faith that Does Justice, New York: Paulist Press, 1977. 
Hayek, F.: The Mirage of Social Justice: Volume II otLaw, Legislation and Liberty, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976. 
Hegel, G.: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, translated by H. Nisbet, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
Bibliography 366 
Held, D.: Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas, Hutchinson, 1980. 
Held, D.: Models of Democracy, Oxford: Polity/Blackwell, 1987. 
Heller, A.: Beyond Justice Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. 
Heschel, A : The Prophets, New York: Harper and Row, 1962. 
Himes, M. J., and Himes, K. R.: The Myth of Self-interest", Commonweal 125 
(23-9-1988), 493-498. 
Hobbes, T.: Leviathan, Everyman edition, 1914. 
Hobhouse, L.: The Elements of Social Justice, Allen and Unwin, 1922. 
Holland, J. and Henriot, P.: Social Analysis: Linking Faith with Justice, Maryknoll, New 
York: Orbis, Revised Edition, 1983. 
Hollenbach, P.: "Social Aspects of John the Baptizer's Preaching Mission in the Context 
of Palestinian Judaism", mAufstiegundNedergangderRomischen Weltgeschichte 
und Kultur Roms in Spiegel der Neueren Forschung II: Herausgegeben von 
Hildegard Temporini und Wolfgang Haase; Principat, Band 19.1, Berlin and New 
York, 1979, pp. 850-875. 
Mollis, M. and Lukes, S., Eds.: Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982. 
Holub, R.: Jurgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere, Routledge, 1991. 
Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, M.: Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by J. Curry 
from the German (1944), New York: Herder and Herder, 1972. 
Horkheimer, M.: Critique of Instrumental Reason, translated by M. O'Connell from the 
German (1967), New York: Seabury, 1974. 
Horkheimer, M.: Critical Theory: Selected Essays, translated by M. O'Connell from the 
German (1968); New York: Herder and Herder, 1972. 
Horkheimer, M.: Eclipse of Reason, New York: Seabury, 1974. [1st Edition, 1947.] 
Huffmon, R, A, Spina and A. Green, Eds.: The Quest for the Kingdom of God: Studies in 
Honor of George E. Mendenhall, Winona Lake, Indiana: Eisenbrauns, 1983. 
Jacob, R : Theology of the Old Testament, translated from the French by A. Heathcote 
and P. Allcock, Hodder and Stoughton, 1958. 
Ignatieff, M.: The Needs of Strangers, Chatto & Windus, The Hogarth Press, 1984.. 
Jay, M.: The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute 
of Social Research, 1923-1950, Heinemann: 1972. 
Jones, L . G.: "Should Christians Affirm Rawls' Justice as Fairness? A Response to 
Professor Beckley", The Journal of Religious Ethics 16/2 (1988), 251-271. 
Joseph, K. and Sumption, J.: Equality, John Murray, 1979. 
Joy, D., Ed.: Moral Development Foundations: Judeo-Christian Alternatives to 
PiagetlKohlberg, Nashville: Abingdon, 1983. 
Jiingel, R : Christ, Justice and Peace, translated by D. Hamill and A. Torrance, 
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985. 
Kairos Document, British Council of Churches, 1986. 
Bibliography 367 
Karamer, C : Ethics and Liberation: an Introduction, SCM, 1988. 
Kamenka, E . and Tay, A.: Justice, Edward Arnold, 1979. 
Kant, I.: The Political Writings of Kant, Ed. H. Reiss, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971. 
Kant, L: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, in The Moral Law, translated and 
analysed by HL Paton, HuteMnson University Library, 1966. 
Keat, R.: The Politics of Social Theory: Habermas, Freud and the Critique of Positivism, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
Kelbley, C : The Value of Justice, New York: Fordham University Press, 1979. 
Kittel, G., Ed.: Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Volume 2, translated by G. 
Bromiley, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1964. 
Kohlberg, L.: "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away 
With It in the Study of Moral Development", in Cognitive Development and 
Epistemology, edited by T. Mischel, New York: Academic, 1971, pp. 151-236. 
Kohlberg, L : Essays in Moral Development, vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral 
Development, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981. 
Kohlberg, L.: "Stages of Mora! Development as a Basis for Moral Education", in C. 
Beck, B. Crittenden, and E . Sullivan, Eds.: Moral Education: Interdisciplinary 
Approaches, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971, pp. 23-92. 
Kohlberg, L. , Levine, C , and Hewer, A.: Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and 
Response to Critics, Basel/London: Karger, 1983. 
Kortian, G.: Metacritique - The Philosophical Argument ofJUrgen Habermas, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
Kuhn, T.: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962. 
Lakeland, P.: Theology and Critical Theory, Nashville: Abingdon, 1990. 
Lamb, M.: "Communicative Praxis and Theology: Beyond Modern Nihilism and 
Dogmatism", in Browning, D. and Fiorenza, F. S., Eds.: Habermas, Modernity and 
Public Theology, Crossroad, New York, 1992, pp. 92-118. 
Lamb, M.: Solidarity With Victims, New York: Crossroad, 1982. 
Lane, D. A.: Foundations for a Social Theology: Praxis, Process and Salvation, New 
York/Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1984. 
Larmore, C : Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987. 
Lash, N.: Theology on the Way to Emmaus, SCM, 1986. 
Lebacqz, K.: Justice in an Unjust World, Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1987. 
Lebacqz, K.: Six Theories of Justice, Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986. 
Leech, K,: The Social God, Sheldon, 1981. 
Leech, K.: True God, SPCK, 1985. 
Lehmann, P.: The Transfiguration of Politics, SCM, 1974. 
Bibliography 368 
Lenlhardt, C : "Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes", Telos 25 (Fall 
1975), 133454. 
Lessnoff, M.: Social Contract, Macmillan, 1986. 
Lillie, W.: Studies in New Testament Ethks, Oliver and Boyd, 1981. 
Linzey, A : "An End to Turbulent Priests and Faddish Theologians?", in The Times 
Higher Education Supplement, 15414991, p. 20. 
Locke, J.: Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, Ed. J. 
Gouigh, Oxford: Blackwell, 1946. 
Longenecker, R.: New Testament Social Ethics for Today, Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1984. 
Lukacs, G.: History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, translated by 
R. Livingstone, Merlin, 1971. 
Lukes, S.: "Of Gods and Demons: Habennas and Practical Discourse", in Thompson, J., 
and Held, D., Eds.: Habermas: Critical Debates, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 134-148. 
Lyon, D.: The Steeple's Shadow: on the Myths and Realities of Secularisation, SPCK, 
1985. 
Lyons, D.: Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. 
Lyotard, J.-F.: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated from the 
French (1979) by G. Bennington and B. Massumi; Theory and History of 
Literature, vol. 10, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. 
McCann, D. and Strain, C : Polity and Praxis, Minneapolis: Winston, 1985. 
McCarthy, T: The Critical Theory ofJurgen Habermas, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 
1978. 
McLeod, A.: "Distributive Justice, Contract and Equality", Journal of Philosophy 81/11 
(1984), 709-718. 
McFadyen, A : The Call to PersonhoocLA Christian Theory of the Individual in Social 
Relationships, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Maclntyre, A.: After Virtue, 2nd Edition, Duckworth, 1985. 
Maclntyre, A.: Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Duckworth, 1988. 
Macpherson, C : The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1962. 
Macquarrie, J.: "God and Secularity", Volume III of New Directions in Theology Today, 
Lutterworth, 1968. 
Mahan, B. and Richesin, L. , Eds.: The Challenge of Liberation Theology: A First World 
Response, Mary knoll, New York: Orbis, 1981. 
Manin, B.: "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation", Political Theory 15/ 3 (1987), 
338-368. 
Mann, M.: "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy'', American Sociological Review 
35/3 (1970), 423-439. 
Bibliography 369 
Mead, G. EL: Mind, Self, and Society From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. 
Mendenfaall, G.: "Ancient Oriental and Bibiicai Law", Biblical Archaeologist 17/2 (1954), 
26-46. 
Mendenhall, G.: Law and Covenant m Israel and the Ancient Near East, Pittsburgh: 
Biblical Colloquium, 1955. 
Mendenhall, G.: The Tenth Generation, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973. 
Mete, J. B.: The Emergent Church: The Future of Christianity in a Post-Bourgeois World, 
translated by P. Mann, SCM, 1981. 
Mete, J. B.: Faith w History and Society, translated by D. Smith, Bums and Oates, 1980. 
Mete, J. B.: Theology of the World, translated by W. Glen-Doepel, Burns and 
Oates/Herder and Herder, 1969. 
Milbank, J.: Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990. 
Miller, D.: Social Justice, Oxford: Clarendon, 1976. 
Miranda, J.: Marx and the Bible: a Critique of the Philosophy of Oppression, translated by 
J. Eagleson from the Spanish (1971), SCM, 1977. 
Moltmann, J.: The Crucified God, translated by R. A. Wilson and J. Bowden, SCM, 1974. 
Moltmann, J.: Theology of Hope, translated by J. W. Lei ten from the German (1965), 
SCM, 1967. 
Moltmann, J.: The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, translated by M. Kohl from the 
German (1980), SCM, 1981. 
Moltmann-Wendel, R , and Moltmann, J.: Humanity in God, SCM, 1983. 
Monsma, S.: Pursuing Justice in a Sinful World, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1984. 
Mott, S.: Biblical Ethics and Social Change, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982. 
Moyser, G., Ed.: Church and Politics Today, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985. 
Muilenberg, J.: "The 'Office' of the Prophet in Ancient Israel", in J. Hyatt, Ed.: The 
Bible in Modem Scholarship, Nashville: Abingdon, 1965, pp. 74-97. 
Muilenberg, J.: The Way of Israel' Biblical Faith and Ethics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1962. 
Murphy, R.: "Wisdom and Creation", JBL104/1 (1985), 3-11. 
Nagel, T.: "Rawls on Justice", pp. 1-16 in N. Daniels, Ed., Reading Rawls, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1975. 
Nathan, N.: The Concept of Justice, Macmillan, 1971. 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops: Economic Justice For All - Pastoral Letter on 
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy: Third Draft, 1986; published by 
the United States Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C. 
Bibliography 370 
Neuhaus, R.: The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1984. 
Newbigin, L.: The Other Side of1984, British Council of Churches, 1983. 
Niebuhr, R.: Love and Justice: Selections From the Shorter Writings ofReinhold 
Niehbuhr, edited by D. Robertson, Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1976. 
Niebuhr, R.: The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2 - Human Destiny, Nisbet and Co., 
1943. 
Nozick, R.: Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. 
Ogletree, T.: The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. 
Outka, G.: Agape: An Ethical Analysis, New Haven: Yale, 1972. 
Pannenburg, W.: Christianity in a Secularised World, SCM, 1988. 
Parsons, T.: Essays in Sociological Theory, New York: Free Press, 1949. 
Parsons, T.: The Structure of Social Action, 2nd Edition, New York: Free Press, 1949. 
Peacocke, C : Truth Definitions and Actual Languages", in G. Evans and J. McDowell, 
Eds.: Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, Oxford: Clarendon, 1976, pp. 
162-188. 
Pedersen, J.: Israel MI, Copenhagen: S. L . M0Uer, 1926. 
Peirce, C. S.: How to Make Our Ideas Clear", in Wiener, P., Ed.: Values in a Universe of 
Chance: Selected Writings of Charles S. Peirce: Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1958. 
Perelman, Ch.: The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argumentation, translated by J. 
Petrie from the French, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. 
Pettit, P.: "Habermas on Truth and Justice" in "Marx and Marxisms", Ed. G. Parkinson: 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series: 14, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982, pp. 207-228. 
Pettit, P.: The Importance of Reading Rawls", in Cambridge Review 96/2225 
(28-2-1975), 100-103. 
Pettit, P.: Judging Justice: An Introduction to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. 
Peukert, H.: "Praxis universaler Solidaritat Grenzprobleme im Verhaltnis von 
Erziehungswissenschaft und Theologie", in E . Schillebeeckx, Ed., Mystik and 
Politik. Theologie in Ringen um Geschichten und GeseUschaft, Mainz: 
Matthias-Griinewald Verlag, 1968, pp. 172-185. 
Peukert, H.: Science, Action and Fundamental Theology: Toward a Theology of 
Communicative Action, translated by J. Bohman from the German (1976), 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MTT, 1984. 
Peukert, H.: Theology and the Enlightenment as Unfinished Projects", in Browning, D. 
and Fiorenza, F., Eds.: Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology, Crossroad, New 
York, 1992, pp. 
Phillips, D.: Equality, Justice and Rectification, Academic Press, 1979. 
Bibliography 371 
Phillips, D.: Toward a Just Social Order, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton, 1986. 
Phillips, D.: Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge, MacmiMan, 1977. 
Pieper, J.: The Four Cardinal Virtues, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1966. 
Pitkin, H: "Obligation and Consent" in Peter Laslett, W. Runciman, and Q. Skinner, 
Eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, Fourth Series, Oxford: Blackwell, 1972, pp. 
45-85. 
Pixley, J. and Boff, C: The Bible, the Church and the Poor, Bums and Oates, 1989. 
Plato: The Republic, in The Dialogues of Plato, Volume U, translated by B. Jowett, 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1953. 
Pompa, 3L: Human Nature and Historical Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. 
Preston, R.: Church and Society in the Late Twentieth Century: The Economic and 
Political Task, SCM, 1983. 
Preston, R.: The Future of Christian Ethics, SCM, 1987. 
Preston, R., Ed.: Technology and Social Justice, SCM, 1971. 
Pusey, M.:Jiirgen Habermas, Ellis Horwood, 1987. 
Quick, O.: Christianity and Justice, Sheldon, 1940. 
Quine, W.: From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1953. 
Quinn, P.: Divine Commands and Moral Requirements, Oxford: Clarendon, 1978. 
Quinney, R.: Social Existence: Metaphysics, Marxism and the Social Sciences, vol. 141 of 
the Sage Library of Social Research, Sage Publications, 1982. 
Rahner, K.: The Church's Commission to Bring Salvation and the Humanisation of the 
World", Theological Investigations Volume 14, Barton, Longman and Todd, 1976, 
pp. 295-313. 
Rahner, K.: "The 'Commandment' of Love in Relation to the Other Commandments", 
Theological Investigations Volume 5, Barton, Longman and Todd, 1966, pp. 
439-459. 
Rahner, K.: "One Mediator and Many Mediations", Theological Investigations, Volume 
9, Barton, Longman and Todd, 1972, pp. 169-184. 
Rahner, K,: "Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of God", 
Theological Investigations Volume 6, Barton, Longman and Todd, 1969, pp. 
231-249. 
Raiser, K.: "Reflections about Social Justice within the Ecumenical Movement", in 
Justice and Righteousness (Biblical Themes and their Influence), Ed. H. Reventlow 
and Y. Hoffman, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplement Series 
137, Sheffield Academic Press, 1992, pp. 154-162. 
Rauschenbusch, W.: Christianity and the Social Crisis, Louisville, Kentucky: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991. 
Bibliography 372 
Rawls, J.: The Basic Structure as Subject", in Goldman, A., and Kim, J.: Values and 
Morals, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Reidel, 1978, pp. 47-71. 
Rawls, J.: "Fairness to Goodness", The Philosophical Review 84/4 (1975), 536-554. 
Rawls, J.: The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7/1 
(1987), 1-25. 
Rawls, J.: The Independence of Moral Theory", Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 48 (1975), 5-22. 
Rawls, J.: "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", in Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 14/3 (1985), 223-251. 
Rawls, J.: "A Kantian Conception of Equality", Cambridge Review 96/2225 (28-2-1975), 
94-99. 
Rawls, J.: "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", The Journal of Philosophy 77/9 
(1980), 515-572; referred to as K G 
Rawls, J.: "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics", The Philosophical Review 60/2 
(1951), 177-197. 
Rawls, J.: Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
Rawls, 3.: A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972; referred to as TJ. 
Reventlow, H. and Hoffman, Y., Eds.: Justice and Righteousness (Biblical Themes and 
their Influence), Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplement Series 
137, Sheffield Academic Press, 1992, pp. 154-162. 
Ricoeur, P.: The Conflict of Interpretations, Evanston: Northwestern University, 1974. 
Riley, P.: Kant's Political Philosophy, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1983. 
Roderick, R.: Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1986. 
Rogers, A.: The Theory of Ethics, New York: Macmillan, 1922. 
Rorty, R.: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. 
Rousseau, J-J.: The Social Contract and Discourses, translated by G. Cole, Dent, 1963. 
Runciman, W.: Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. 
Sandel, M.: Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982. 
Sanders, J.: Ethics in the New Testament, SCM, 1975. 
Savramis, D.: Theology and Society: Ten Hypotheses", in Preston, R., Ed.: Technology 
and Social Justice, SCM, 1971, pp. 398-421. 
Schaar, J: "Legitimacy in the Modern State", in Green, P. and Levinson, S., Eds.: Power 
and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science, New York: Random 
House (Vintage Books), 1970, pp. 276-327. 
Schnackenburg, R.: The Moral Teaching of the New Testament, translated from the 
German (1962) by J. Holland Smith and W. O'Hara, Burns and Oates, 1965. 
Schofield, J. N.: Introducing Old Testament Theology, SCM, 1964. 
Bibliography 373 
Schotfroff, W. and Stegemann, W., Eds.: God of the Lowly: Socio-historical 
Interpretations of the Bible, toransllated by M. O' Connell, MaryknoIJ, New York: 
Qrbis, 1984. 
Schrey, H.-H., Walz, EL, Whitehouae, W.: The Biblical Doctrine of Law and Justice, 
published for the Division of Studies, World Council of Churches, by SCM, 1955. 
Schussler-Fiorenza, E. : Toward a Feminist Biblical Hermeneutics: Biblical 
Interpretation and Liberation Theology" in The Challenge of Liberation Theology: 
A First World Response, edited by B. Mahan and L. Dale Richesin, Maryknoll, 
New York: Orbis, 1981, pp. 91-112. 
Schwartz, A.: "Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods", Ethics 83/4 (1973), 294-307. 
Searle, J.: "Austin on Locutionary and Elocutionary Acts", Philosophical Review 11 
(October 1968), 405-424. 
Searle, J.: Speech Acts: an Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969. 
Segundo, J. L.: "Capitalism - Socialism: A Theological Crux", Concilium 6/10 (1974), 
105-123. 
Segundo, J. L.: Faith and Ideologies (Volume 1 of Jesus of Nazareth Yesterday and 
Today), translated from the Spanish (1982) by J. Drury, Maryknoll, New York: 
1984. 
Segundo, J. L.: The Liberation of Theology, translated by J. Drury, Maryknoll, New 
York: Orbis, 1976. 
Sellars, W.: Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. 
Sen, A., and Williams, B., Eds.: Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
Siebert, R.: The Critical Theory of Religion: The Frankfurt School From Universal 
Pragmatic to Political Theology, Berlin: Mouton, 1985. 
Simmons, A.: Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton, 1979. 
Simpson, G.: "Theologia Crucis and the Forensically Fraught World - Engaging Helmut 
Peukert and Jurgen Habermas", Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 
LVII/3 (1989), 509-541. 
Skinner, J.: "Righteousness in OV, Dictionary of the Bible, edited by J. Hastings, volume 
IV, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902, pp. 272-281. 
Snaith, N.: The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament', Epworth, 1944. 
Solle, D.: Death by Bread Alone, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978. 
Stanley, M.: The Technological Conscience, New York: Free Press, 1978. 
Stark, W.: Social Theory and Christian Thought, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958. 
Stone, J.: Human Law and Human Justice, Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1968. 
Strain, C , Ed.: Prophetic Visions and Economic Realities, Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1988. 
Bibliography 374 
StrawsoB, P.: Logko-Linguistk Papers, Methuen, 1971. 
Tanner, &.: The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice, Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1992. 
Taylor, M., Ed.: Christians and the Future of Social Democracy, Gnnskirk and 
Northridge: G. W. and A Hesketh, 1982. 
Thiselton, A : New Mortons m Hermeneutics, HarperCollins, 1992. 
Thompson, J., and Held, D., Eds.: Habermas: Critical Debates, Macmillan, 1982. 
Tillich, P.: Love, Power and Justice, Oxford University Press, 1954. 
Toulmin, S.: Human Understanding, vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon, 1972. 
Toulmin, S.: The Uses of Argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. 
Troeltsch, R : The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, vol. 2, translated by O. 
Wyon, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931. 
Tugendhat, E . : "Habermas on Communicative Action", in Seebass, G., and Tuomela, R., 
Eds.: Social Action, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancasten Reidel, 1985, pp. 179-186. 
Visser't Hooft, W., Ed.: The Evanston Report, SCM, 1955. 
von Rad, G.: Old Testament Theology, Volume I, translated by D. Stalker from the 
German (1957), Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1962. 
von Rad, G.: Wisdom in Israel, translated by J. D. Martin from the German (1970), 
SCM, 1972. 
Vriezen, Th. C.:An Outline of Old Testament Theology, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1970. 
Walsh, M. and Davies, B., Eds.: Proclaiming Justice and Peace - One Hundred Years of 
Catholic Social Teaching, Flame/CAFOD/Collins, 1991. 
Walker, M.: The Atonement and Justice", in Theology 91/741 (1988), 180-186. 
Walzer, M.: Interpretation and Social Criticism, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1987. 
Walzer, M.: Spheres of Justice, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. 
Weber, M.: The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated by E . A Shils and H. A 
Fisher: New York: Free Press, 1949. 
Welch, S.:A Feminist Ethic of Risk, Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990. 
Wellmer, A : Ethik und Dialog: Elemente des moratischen Urteil bei Kant und in der 
Diskursethik, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986. 
Westermann, C : Blessing in the Bible and the Life of the Church, translated by K. Crim 
from the German (1968), Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978. 
Westermann: Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, translated by J. Scullion from the German 
(1974), SPCK, 1984. 
White, S.: The Recent Work ofJurgen Habermas: Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988. 
Bibliography 375 
Williams, B.: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1985. 
Wilson, B., Ed.: Rationality, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979. 
Wilson, R.: Prophecy and Society in Ancient Israel, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980. 
Winter, C : The Breaking Process, SCM, 1981. 
Wolf, H.-H.: Towards an Ecumenical Consensus", in Preston, R. H., Ed.: Technology 
and Social Justice, SCM, 1971, pp. 425-445. 
Wolfe, A,: The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary 
Capitalism, New York: Free Press, 1977. 
Wolff, R.: Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of a Theory of Justice, 
Princeton: Princeton, 1977. 
Wolterstorff, N.: Until Justice and Peace Embrace, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1983. 
Wolterstorff, N.: "Justice as a Condition of Authentic Liturgy", Theology Today 48 
(1991), 6-21. 
Wright, C : Living as the People of God, Leicester: Intervarsity Press, 1983. 
Wuthnow, R.: "Rationality and the Limits of Rational Theory: A Sociological Critique", 
in Browning, D. and Fiorenza, F. S., Eds.: Habermas, Modernity and Public 
Theology, Crossroad, New York, 1992, pp. 206-225. 
Yoder, J.: The Politics of Jesus, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1972. 
Yoder, J.: The Priestly Kingdom - Social Ethics as Gospel: Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. 
Zimmerli, W.: The Place and Limit of the Wisdom in the Framework of Old Testament 
Theology", SJT17/2 (1964), 146-158. 
Zimmerli, W.: Old Testament Theology in Outline, translated by D. Green, Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1978. 
Bibliography 376 
